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Kyle: (​00:02 ​) 
Okay, great. So, um, my name is Kyle Taylor. I'm the director of fair vote. Um, we're also the 
secretariat for the APPG. Um, and so I just wanted to very briefly outline how we've gotten to 
this point in about a minute and then talk through some of our initial proposals. So fair vote 
came about following the allegations of law breaking vote leave and then the date of a scandal 
around Cambridge Analytica. And so we were first pursuing that, uh, which of course the 
electoral commission found them responsible last summer. Um, but we viewed that as an 
indicator that it was - more needed to be done. And so we expanded our remit to be focused on 
reform and, uh, not just the referendum, but lessons learned from 2015, 2017 and now 2019. 
Um, with, uh, the funding issues that arose in the EU elections. Uh, and last summer we worked 
to, uh, sort of develop what we believe were the first things we could do quickly to enact 
change. 
 
Kyle: (​01:05 ​) 
And a year later we're in that same place where these initial things haven't come about. And 
we've spent, I've spent time at different conferences in different contexts and it feels like 
awareness that something needs to be done is very high, but nobody really knows where to 
start. And so the goal for us is that this can be a starting place. Um, we wrote to the speaker 
who advised that he didn't feel that he could advise on where these issues would sit, which is 
why we want to put together, um, the green paper to be able to actually pursue change in three 
main areas. Transparency, deterrence and monitoring. So from our perspective, um, these, the 
top proposals we believe that will help and be able to, um, create change quickly, um, are 
around the electoral commission itself and its ability to, uh, investigate and prosecute those who 
break electoral law. 
 
Kyle: (​02:03 ​) 
Um, we believe, you know, there could be something like a specialized electoral offense officers 
who are very well versed in the law and able to pursue these similar to the way we've seen the 
ICO, really use their remit to pursue, uh, people who are, uh, have committed data offenses. Uh, 
and, and along with that, we believe that the fine level should be unlimited. Um, the cap of 
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20,000 pounds means that it, you know, the, the, the fines themselves have been described as 
a cost of doing business. Um, the second is reporting campaign spending online. So right now, 
National Party expenses are available online, but individual candidate expenses, for example, in 
a general election are not, they're held by local returning officers. These are meant to be 
publicly available documents, but we've seen time and again that even that awareness isn't 
there and it's led people to have to submit freedom of information requests to see candidate 
returns. 
 
Kyle: (​02:59 ​) 
Uh, the reason this is particularly complicated is because oftentimes, uh, an item like a leaflet or 
an ad will have a split expenditure between the candidate and the National Party. Well, if you 
can only verify the national party side of it online, you're unable to actually be sure that that item 
has been adequately and accurately reported in both places. Uh, along with that, we think there 
should be repositories for both leaflets and digital ads so that people can see every 
advertisement that was sent out in an election. Uh, and just one further detail of that, we think 
that, you know, something that could be considered as separating online spending from offline 
spending in actual campaign spending expenditure law so that there are specific limits for 
specific mediums. Uh, and we have further ideas that I can talk about in greater detail. And I can 
also submit this in written form to the APPG, uh, which is specifically around digital, um, 
democracy. 
 
Kyle: (​03:57 ​) 
Just two more quick ones. Um, before I finish. Uh, the next one is ending financial transfers in a 
referendum scenario between the designated campaign and other groups. So that was the core 
of what happens between, with vote leave and believe is that the spending, there was a rule 
that, uh, the designated campaign could give up to 700,000 pounds to other campaigning 
groups as long as they didn't coordinate campaigning. From our perspective, a gift of 700,000 
pounds does not come with no strings. And I think it's pretty reasonable to assume that. And so 
that that was used as a funneling mechanism to coordinate and spend more than the limit, uh, 
which just is not a level playing field and it's not. So the spirit of the law, uh, is, is of course 
different than the reality of the law itself. Uh, and then lastly, uh, it's just about, um, the parody 
between offline and digital advertising. 
 
Kyle: (​04:54 ​) 
So, you know, really ensuring that the first thing we can do is apply all leaflet rules like imprints 
and targeting information directly to digital ads. That's very, very easy, obvious one. Um, but 
then as I said, there's a lot more we can do, um, when we, when we think about what to do 
online, um, with the frame really for us that digital and online is always viewed through the lens 
of people as consumers, not people as citizens. And so I think in terms of, you know, when 
we're looking at, um, digital and elections, we have to view people as citizens and not 
consumers. Uh, these aren't advertisements to sell soap. These are advertisements to 
determine the future of a nation. Um, so let's give it the credence that deserves. Thank you. Oh, 
thank you for inviting me. I went back through all these excellent query. 
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Jessica Garland: (​05:58 ​) 
Sorry. Of course. Yeah. Assume you all know me the benefit of the tape. I'm Jessica Garland 
and I'm director of policy and research at the electoral reform society. So just a few introductory 
comments. I think, um, firstly let's say that I think it's worth bearing in mind that not all, and we 
are are looking a little bit about digital campaigning as well as campaigning more generally. Not 
everything that happens online is a bad thing. There's a lot of good democratic good from, from 
online campaigning. And I think the challenge of this green paper is to deal with the stuff that 
clearly is wrong without crushing all the stuff that's good. Um, because of course we don't want 
to, you know, shut down democratic debate and finding where to draw that line has being a 
traditional challenge of electoral regulation. But I think particularly in this era, it's about finding 
where that line is. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​06:49 ​) 
But I think it is very possible to do because of course we're in a situation where it's not that 
we've had really robust regulations that have failed. We have out of date regulations. I think 
bringing them up into, you know, up to speed is, is, is a perfectly possible thing to do. And of 
course just one other things I say is that a lot of the issues that we're dealing with aren't new 
issues. They're not issues that just came about cause we had a referendum then or issues that 
just come about because people are campaigning online more than they used do. Some of 
these issues like the role of money and politics are very old issues. And so again, I think that 
gives an interesting perspective on it. And I'm glad that we're the APPG on electoral 
campaigning, transparency, not just digital campaigning transparency because a lot of these 
issues such as issue between national and local spend kind of crossover both, both worlds. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​07:39 ​) 
Um, so just in terms of policy proposals, um, we agree with, with all of these proposals that are, 
um, that Carla's outlined, I would just, um, I'll just say very briefly a few things about each of 
them. Um, in terms of the electoral commissions power, obviously deterrence is really important 
cause we don't want to be in a situation where the, the result of a contest is brought into 
question. I think that's really important from the voter perspective because when we're thinking 
that some of the negative influence in our democracy might be from organizations or even 
states that are trying to disrupt our democracy, what we don't want to do is then kind of shut it 
down ourselves or undermine democracy by saying that the result isn't the right result because, 
you know, there hasn't been the right monitoring and deterrence in, in the first place. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​08:25 ​) 
So that's, that's hugely important I think from the [inaudible] perspective. Um, completely agree 
in terms of, um, live reporting and, and being, and more transparency around spending and 
invoices and receipts and all the rest of it. I think one thing to consider is where that, where the 
line is. That line I mentioned about, you know, what's proportional because you know, for local 
electoral agents, you know, in the heat of a campaign with lots of very small receipts, um, you 
know, that there are challenges there and I think that's um, it's important we do it. I'm think it's 
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important that we think how this might play out both at the constituency level and at the national 
level as well. Um, and I think that that focus on the national level is really important as donation 
spending. Cause of course that's not being looked at at the moment in the current inquiry on 
updating electoral law, uh, which Pakrac are doing. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​09:15 ​) 
Um, on the third point about finances, I think just absolutely right about coordinating work. If 
you're serious about people being separate entities then it makes no sense to be transferring 
money or that into that. There are issues about our law where there's issues around the local 
and the national spend. There's issues about where money comes from. Electoral Commission 
have been saying for a long time that, you know, there's UK foreign companies can funnel 
money into our political system through UK subsidiaries, even if that UK subsidiary is not doing 
enough business in this country to make that money that's been transferred. And we saw 
recently of course there's the issue of money under 500 pounds. We saw with the story about 
Brexit party and donations under 500 pounds from, from overseas. Now that's not against the 
law, but I think there's a situation where what we might imagine our laws to do, they're not 
necessarily doing that. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​10:12 ​) 
And so I think we should be thinking about that as well. Um, and then there is of course the role 
of third party campaigners. When our regulations were drawn up, it was about regulating money 
into political parties. Now campaigns can be influenced by people without actually channeling 
any money through a political party, databases can be bought, data can be bought. Um, all of 
this can happen without actually touching the regulations. So I think that's something also to 
consider. And um, yeah, people are citizens, not consumers. Absolutely. I think we need to think 
really what is the role of our government and our regulators in our democracy and ensuring that 
we have a vibrant democracy. We shouldn't be necessarily following where the social media 
companies are going. We should decide ourselves what's right for our democracy. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​11:00 ​) 
Thank you, thanks very much, Ken did you want to... 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​11:02 ​) 
Well, where do you want to start? I mean I think the electoral commission for some years has 
been a fairly ineffective body and it has been set up and I think problems with electioneering are 
getting worse and worse, the national boundaries button launch goal, any individual knows, they 
just almost receive moving Facebook by election, um, and sometimes get quite careless about 
where they earn their money from his work. Was he spending [inaudible] uh, [inaudible] pause 
reinforcement, um, and the eddy arise too late anyway. Uh, and uh, it's getting more and more 
distractions of that. Kevin, he's changing this all date. [inaudible] versus each reading. 
[inaudible] straight with that. and all that sort of thing. I do think we should have some equivalent 
of imprint rules as campaigning material that's fairly clear. Um, and then how it's actually 
enforced because the moment you can do what you like during the campaigns and then you'll 
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have roused the electoral commission some months afterwards, which most people won't take 
offense or notice of. And it's changing rapidly that there's more and more the ability to use 
technology to attribute opinions to your opponents, which - do we attribute to false information, 
which the person doing is unknown and not accountable. It's a huge use subject instead of 
station. I'm not even Denny then, which minister is theoretically in charge this. And so, 
 
Kyle: (​13:11 ​) 
so, um, what the letter we received back from the speakers committee, because we believed 
we, we ultimately were told when we sent the letter that the speakers committee was ultimately 
responsible for the electoral commission because it's actually, um, responsible to parliament, 
not to government. Um, but they outlined, um, the Home Office, the Cabinet Office, the, um, uh, 
the Home Office, the Cabinet Office as the two main points of contact. But we're also unable to 
offer clarity as to who would hold the, the legislation or the empower. The power behind 
[inaudible] 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​13:54 ​) 
I did as I knew well are quite comprehensive, but this notion and really only needs to go do that 
and to manage it, it's going to be huge resistance to them. Sled so much bested interest 
resisting it and you've lobbying to stop protecting it. There's at least the speakers committee 
ever likely to breach legislation? 
 
Kyle: (​14:21 ​) 
No, I don't know. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​14:22 ​) 
I think you'd want to speak to committee. They came back and confirmed for us they had a 
responsibility for the finances of the actual commission. So I think that the speakers committee 
approves the budget for the electoral commission, which seems very odd to me. Is you thought 
that would be a government department? 
 
Kyle: (​14:40 ​) 
Well, there's right, it can 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​14:42 ​) 
be really awkward, but I don't have any responsibility for what connects for commissioner 
[inaudible] sentence towards the Cabinet Office. All right. My [inaudible] subject cause the 
cabinet office attorney currently preparing some policy proposals, almost all of them. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​15:00 ​) 
Some can't do it. I'm sure. Look, yeah. [inaudible] situation downing street in practice where 
there's uh, uh, attorney holding prime minister minister, which is going to get you nowhere for a 
very long time. 
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Kyle: (​15:13 ​) 
Yeah. And, and he did he, he did say the electoral commission itself is accountable to 
parliament and members can table parliamentary questions both oral and written to press for 
action or change. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​15:24 ​) 
Actually, there is a section of the question time is when somebody answers, we've got to do, 
 
Speaker 4: (​15:28 ​) 
I think it's the cabinet office that answers questions on the electoral commission. 
 
Kyle: (​15:33 ​) 
So that's a point to clarify definitely. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​15:35 ​) 
There is a sort of consolidation of electoral law happening at the moment. Following on from 
the, the law commission's review, if you remember that back in 2014 and that is solely 
concerned with sort of tolerating the 30 pieces of electoral law that deal with at the local level. 
But I did, yeah. I did wonder whether there's a route which might expound that 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​15:57 ​) 
new business to transact for several months now except within erupts on Brexit and he'd spend 
most days and speak of it was at the town and very healthy with urgent questions. There are 
other ways his mother wouldn't apple pie or what am I with this policy? And there are heaps of 
law commission recommendation, some which are very bad at any moment [inaudible] none of 
which showed the slightest interest in incrementing the law abuse. Very valuable. Once in a 
blue moon you get any law commission recommendation, any for reasons I don't understand, 
but there we are. So that's - onestarting point is who we are trying to prompt to take action 
because eventually we should confront somebody and try to get to the meetings and the 
[inaudible] rounding around responsibility and how are we going to change anything. Then we 
have to produce practical concrete proposal for making the law that we once had a whole 
inquiry into the electoral permission conducted by an official [inaudible]. Well, his name escapes 
me. Um, and he got [inaudible] give evidence like [inaudible] we should get Polish. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​17:29 ​) 
What happens is the men, as they were inquiring into the future of the electoral commission, uh, 
that encourages you to pile on the recommendations, but anyway, they otherwise cause 
enforcement a stronger electoral with more possible penalties, penalties as demonstrated quite 
meeting. Um, and more ability intervene and monitor, and intervene when something's going on 
rather than this coming back two weeks, six months later I'd have thought because once 
whatever organizations used to be fighting the election, frankly they're always bound to take the 
view of teachers are so slight penalties, but we'll cross that bridge when we reach you. Um, and 
then, uh, is transparency, the whole thing is transparency, but then accountability to stop 
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benches to require those sites taken down because either foreign government or somebody 
else or one of them campaigns or parties deliberately breaking rules is putting out other stuff 
and it's very tricky censorship and [inaudible] to be in. But how's to stop the promulgation of 
quite malicious information, which is clearly defamatory at needs of the candidate or the 
organization senior lead. When can the lead [inaudible] stepping in and requiring the platform to 
take this stuff down? I was really yesterday when I was traveling, but in America, I think 
someone's basis system where you can now produce photographic abuse and image of 
somebody saying something that she isn't actually saying and that is beginning to be you. 
 
Kyle: (​19:29 ​) 
Yeah, they're called deep fakes. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​19:32 ​) 
Okay, well we need somebody really bad, dangerous giving as he sort of passed because the 
data wouldn't be misused to stop. [inaudible] saying true things led me to August MDT junction 
to stop this, to require the candidate who will say these no idea where it's coming from, uh, to, 
to, to find out where it's coming from and I'm stopping at their captions. So, 
 
Kyle: (​20:01 ​) 
and that for us as well, just some points that I've picked up from what Gil said that we're linking 
to that again is the heat. It's a hugely around deterrence. And I think something that's now being 
abused in the electoral system is, uh, the, the, the role of the agent as responsible. So what 
we've seen is a proliferation of people appointing very young agents who don't have the agency 
to actually say no to very powerful people within their party. Uh, and so, you know, if we look at 
it - yes for let's say for a general election candidate, um, and, but if instead, you know, we're 
looking at in terms of deterrence, the more of the idea of the person with significant control 
within a campaign, you know, rather than it being an arbitrary sort, you're the agent and 
therefore, you know, we know there are people with significant control within the campaign who 
are not the agent. And so to be able to hold them responsible as well for rule breaking will be 
much greater deterrence. Um, and then just an anecdote about as you were talking about the 
inability to actually pursue in real time. So I was an agent in 2017, um, and uh, are there were 
fly, there was fly posting going up in buildings, calling my candidate an expletive word next to 
their candidate, you know, hero of the world. Um, I immediately got in touch with the, uh, agent 
of the other campaign who was, yes, this is bad. Let's take it down. I'll find out who did it. They 
provided me with the names and contact details of the people responsible. I gave all of that to 
electoral commission and the police, I mean, so we had agreement between the campaign that 
was the offending campaign and we were interviewed all the rest of it, you know, four months 
later get a letter: "Well we just couldn't confirm the case and therefore we've dropped it." I mean 
we have photos and names and agreement from the party responsible that it was done and an 
apology and yet it still leads to nothing, no action. And so what happens then, what happens 
within the culture of campaigns is you use it as it's used as a tactic to waste the time of the other 
campaign because if you commit an offense, you know there is no real deterrence. But instead 
you get the other candidate or campaign stuck on filing, talking to police, trying to get it down, 
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which can derail several days. And in a short campaign, that's a lot of time. So you end up just 
sort of going, oh well. This is exactly, and it's really damaging because yeah, then you're not 
really opposed to the rules and you feel an incentive to break them. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​22:47 ​) 
Adrian, Gino Control, uh, so able, the ability to save involved with the campaign should stop 
doing is do what you shouldn't do and always and always that would prevent good. The danger 
of that is for local organizations and smaller organizations as lose judgment ones. You could be 
imposing expense difficult at all times. I don't know what the practice in the Labor Party, I mean 
perhaps on the ground in the surfing party, usually the agent now is somebody who's 
volunteered to do the paperwork afterwards is a bit of a nightmare. Okay. It's quite complicated 
putting in the financial return. This isn't honest, 
 
Kyle: (​23:25 ​) 
it's all done on paper. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​23:27 ​) 
divisions today and most agents we'd ever been by buddy. You used to have professional 
agents in every significant constituency and there was a professional body of their [inaudible] 
and [inaudible]. They're all trained with genuine expertise. You can't and I use an old retired 
one, uh, to, to, to, to do mine cause the dollar my volunteers would have a clue how to do the 
spending. Uh, amazing. The difficulty is if you start laying down strict criteria, the loader that 
liberal politics, they, well they didn't have matching membership and big money anymore often 
will just be blown out of the ground. The satisfying that, who do they find and the person they 
saves the ancient quite often. So the slightest controlling of the candidate, the party officers or 
anybody else that just, they just take off. 
 
Kyle: (​24:23 ​) 
And that's the, that's the issue I think. And with the professionalization of campaigns, most 
campaigns have a campaign manager who is not the agent and they do that intentionally so that 
the campaign manager can stretch far beyond the rules with a very weak agent who just says, 
well you're the campaign manager. And yet that agent, the one held responsible and the 
campaign manager, literally no responsibility. And that's why this sort of Pacific who, who has 
significant control so 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​24:51 ​) 
well if you have any control over it. But I mean I have complained to the guys, but my body, 
anybody who's taken part in any bike campaigns, having some sometime like won't take the 
violation in mind judging quite active pictures. Maybe my head until it got to the right really. But 
it's quite obvious that neither the big parties was taken thing to two stages of the spending limits, 
uh, if as interpreted the Broccoli, but it's all being run by paying officials and the Central Party 
who descended on the constituency. We're living there in hotels and so on. Uh, when engaging 
new Spanish, you know, all [inaudible] national body activity but even bothering to tell the 
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candidate level in local people what they were doing. Uh, we shows the inadequacy of the low 
ball and the inadequacy of the rules about disclosure that got one of my present colleagues 
prosecuted recently. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​25:47 ​) 
Just kind of threw it. Craig McKinley who I don't know who's responsible for bringing the 
prosecution. . 
 
Jessica Garland: (​25:55 ​) 
It's the police when it's at the candidate level. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​25:57 ​) 
So its the police locally - in that case because most police forces wouldn't bother cause they 
have to satisfy that it's in the public interest. And I think [inaudible] is too complicated for them. 
We don't understand it. The less one of them be their volume, then they will police this morass. 
Um, so in that case, obviously it must have been so good. Tourists, they came, police did, they 
[inaudible] were all in conservative headquarters because was knew we've never troubled by 
this inquiry. 
 
Kyle: (​26:30 ​) 
Exactly. And that's the, that's the issue, right? When a responsibility, when one person is held 
responsible, but other people are making all the decisions, they have no um, recourse for their 
wrong. And so they have incentive to not break the rules and break the law. I mean, I think, um, 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​26:48 ​) 
central Buffy, I didn't have them spread about it. Great. Can you talk, but I know they both tell 
Craig No. 
 
Kyle: (​26:55 ​) 
And that's very common in the booking hotels that even the candidate doesn't fully, 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​27:02 ​) 
yeah. I mean my understanding of violations is the spending rules are different. It's a higher, 
much higher level because [inaudible] and they were huge to somebody else 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​27:15 ​) 
if all, presumably it keeps the deliveries afterwards. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​27:18 ​) 
Yes. I think it's 85 actions going to the big part of the national kind. Even a local campaign 
spending of it. It's all part of the National News. 
 
Kyle: (​27:28 ​) 
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Yeah. For a bi-election 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​27:31 ​) 
I've never seen anybody take the slightest notice. 
 
Kyle: (​27:33 ​) 
No. One of our other ideas around this as well as for the idea of donations in kind, right, which is 
a common thing, which is the campaign hasn't paid for it. It's been, so the best example is office 
space, right? There's no guidance provided for what an office space should be billed at for 
donation in kind. So you'll see people, oh, we used an office for six weeks, it was a hundred 
pounds and they'll have a notional invoice for a hundred pounds, 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​28:01 ​) 
which is to claiming expenses. I don't know what they all do now. My, my own expense. But if 
you wish to claim reimbursement for the higher office [inaudible] um, you've got pretty ips 
evaluation. 
 
Kyle: (​28:15 ​) 
Exactly. And we want the same guidance to be provided for in, for, for donation in kind 
expenditure. There should be a bands, you know, and a London band, a a city's band, a rural 
band for what you have to bill and in condemnation as for office space for, um, use of a printer, 
you know? Yeah, yes. You'll build a paper, office equipment, all of this. And he goes in as a 
notional expensive, you know, oh, use of the printer for six weeks, 50 pounds. What, you know, 
obviously renting that printing for six weeks doesn't cost 50 pounds. Um, and the other huge 
one is stamps, you know, so 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​28:54 ​) 
We've only touched on it so far, constructing a proper democratic framework doesn't inhibit what 
you do, the true mentally practical and workable to tackle this. The difference in housing 
goldens and what goes on here. [inaudible] particularly, but you have determines, but it's, it's 
pretty useless because it has become one of these organizations which is obsessed with the 
process. Uh, those organizations are, I wanted to be called aim, so I will give them an 
[inaudible] relations with them and think they demand and claim as much as most people. And 
they do it multiple but [inaudible] because some of the colors you can send to prison removes a 
genuine scandal. Baptize. Then we meet in two days and if you make the physical part is all the 
breaks and the party all [inaudible] very powerful interest mounting. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​30:04 ​) 
We keep coming back to this theme of determine [inaudible] institutional capability. Could you 
say a bit more about your thoughts on, on what kind of institutional capacity building is required 
so that we have a watchdog hold on, enforcing some of these new rules that we want to put in 
place. I think you've given a clear kind of list of the sorts of change that we'd like to see 
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[inaudible] scale. I think how you would create an institution, a being focused on parents to 
make time 
 
Jessica Garland: (​30:41 ​) 
[inaudible]. Do you mean sort of the, the culture of the institution as well as the, the tools that 
has cause like yeah 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​30:46 ​) 
we'll, we'll move in full suit in the rules in the sensible way and we should do crossed financial 
regulators and John, when we've made repeated attempts chosen the financial conduct 
authority has its Cruces but its downside better than the useless regulations from having for 
2000 blades and the issues regulated. Um, I think you need something that powerful. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​31:09 ​) 
Well I think you're only as good as your, the tools you've got though. And, and if, and, and you 
can certainly see the culture of how the, the electoral commission goes about things. It's based 
on the fact that they, they only have the powers to do things after the fact. So if you only have 
the panels to do stuff on further down the line when the contest is over, then that's the sort of, 
that's the sweeping up approach that you've got to take. So I do think bringing in the line with 
the episodes is done with, um, with the information commissioner is important cause you have 
to have the tools first. But I do appreciate it. There's probably gonna need to be a bit of a culture 
shift. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​31:40 ​) 
Well no as well do they have thousands. Someone just refuses to cooperate to subject about 
buddy and they say, I'm tired, I'm too busy, get lost. A lot of delayed commission. 
 
Kyle: (​31:52 ​) 
Well, so at present most of it is through first to the police and then it's referred to the Crown 
Prosecution Service. So the electoral commission has a very, very limited, if any role in the 
actual deterrence process. So that, that, so for us it's like the practical is what does the 
organization look like? Well, it's way better funded obviously. It uses the ICO model of um, uh, 
evidence, uh, investigation and prosecution where they actually investigate and they actually 
prosecute. So, um, we, we, we thought regional electoral offense officers, especially during the 
short Campbell fence officers that would do random spot checking of campaign headquarters 
just turn up no announcement. Right now. They usually, you know, with the Brexit party, they 
said, oh, next Tuesday we're going to come by and see what you're up to. You know, whereas 
the ICO just rated Cambridge analytic has offices, you know, so you can see the difference of a 
that were going, it was in the news. 
 
Kyle: (​32:53 ​) 
Yeah, exactly. Everybody. Exactly. Yeah. And, and also same day, injunctive power. So the 
electoral commission, if they had the ability to same day and jumped, it can initially be a limited 
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timeframe injunction. It can be a 24 hour injunction on whatever the possible offenses while they 
invest, while they do a rapid investigation. But what happens now is every investigation is three 
to six months. Parliament's already started. If the, if the, if the victory was wide enough, the 
margin was wide enough, it's sort of like, oh well they would have won anyway. You know? And 
that culture just leaves, leaves people thinking, well what's the, what's the issue? And, and the 
key I think is that even if you win there, you should still be able to be held to account if you're the 
person of significant control. If you broke an electoral law. 
 
Kyle: (​33:44 ​) 
So a petition or a violation. Yes. Or, and also criminal and civil. So criminal penalties and yes. 
Yeah. But if, if, if your offense was, you know, if your fine was 10 times, you know, if you look at 
the GDPR, you know, 20,000 pounds per offense or 20,000 years per offense, um, with the 
recent Facebook allegations, the maximum of find, the ICO give is 500,000 pounds because it 
was before the GDPR. But Elizabeth Denham had noted that had it occurred after the GDPR, 
the fine would have been 500 million pounds, 500 million pounds for the exact same offense. 
 
Kyle: (​34:32 ​) 
Even Facebook would have felt that. So if you look at electoral offense in the same way in terms 
of deterrence, um, I think that's key. And you know, the reason that I think transparency to turns 
and monitoring have emerged as the three themes is because they're the areas that cause, um, 
the, the most immediate return on investment, right? So deterrence is driven by fear, fear of 
being arrested, fear of being fined, transparency leads to a culture shift in people paying more 
attention. So I always say that, you know, you'll end up with, if you have every candidate return 
online and national party expenditure of return online, you'll end up with a subculture of sleuths 
who go through every single return and make sure every pound matches. And when they find 
that it doesn't, they will report it. The electoral commission, it's, that's free, effectively free 
support. 
 
Kyle: (​35:27 ​) 
Uh, and that's, as you said, good versus bad online. That's a good aspect of, of that. And then 
monitoring monitoring is about making sure people don't feel like reality. You know, the 
reputation of the t representation of the People Act was read people's act was 2000 election and 
referendums act a representative. He was like 1983 and the political parties, elections and 
referendums act of 2000 was the really the last significant election written, uh, regulation, um, 
reform legislation. So that monitoring so that people are aware of, you know, whether it's five, 
five years or 10 years, review of electoral law as part of the regulator's role to say, this is what's 
now outdated. This is what's, um, emerging and being more on top of it. Um, would be helpful. I 
have one other thing to say about transparency of donors, but I can hold it until, if you want to 
talk more about this first. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​36:25 ​) 
Well I think it's what stretch for them in the details but to make it all [inaudible] they don't crash 
due to all the stuff about what structure would be good. You're going to change the culture then 
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lots of what we want is a powerful regulator who will actually change what people do because 
they fear the consequences of not and who is personally, not all these agents you, they 
shouldn't be personally level, but that really concentrates by and if individuals face penalties and 
then penalties as Trapiche in trade talent versus it used to go against the agent and the 
candidate. I think the agent was convicted because she obviously had some idea of what was 
going on. I think Craig was like [inaudible] which is totally typical of bad actions to give on them. 
So much attention on was they're absolutely desperate for RJ out. Uh, it, Craig it off an opinion 
on his campaign. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​37:27 ​) 
He might have been given someone who will be found. If you liked hearing, I don't think you 
would have that. We have so many so called experts running national campaigns now. I don't 
think anyone who protected the slash named are and a young ambitious politician in any party, 
you know, does not start challenging his leader, the Party organization and the people 
appointed by the leader to make Joel, he or she wins. And how you actually, you know, firstly in 
jumped from doing something so you can have an effect on the campaign, stop them and then 
penalize the responsible individual [inaudible] every other area. I mean you're looking at me 
[inaudible] 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​38:13 ​) 
um, things like same day in geography powers, criminal appellate penalties, establishing 
regional lead to, or offense officers with a forensic capability. All of that deal. Do we think that 
would require primary legislation? You couldn't do that just by Sii amending the p the 2000 
[inaudible] major piece of industries. [inaudible] homes. [inaudible] organizations would use 
interest in s yes. Some consultant, your headquarters. Uh, they, they would not want, 
 
Kyle: (​38:58 ​) 
sorry. I think, I think what, what the electoral commission is also seeing, realizing from watching 
the ICO is that the ICO has just taken their remit and they're waiting until someone says, no, you 
can't do that. They're just doing more and more and more and more. And no one's really said, 
no, you can't do that. So there could be some element of the electoral commission [inaudible] 
their own re-interpreting their remit and saying, actually no doing this falls under this, doing this 
falls under this. Um, 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​39:28 ​) 
so they could just do this stuff, but they can't give themselves the ability to undertake criminal 
prosecutions. Um, can do that kind of [inaudible] actually prosecute. 
 
Kyle: (​39:41 ​) 
They can be the, um, I was plaintiff, no defendant, no, no. That's the same thing. They give me 
the prosecutor. Yes. They, yeah, they can provide the prosecution. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​39:54 ​) 
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These are of things require an expert prosecutor. Yes. That's why they have been living in two 
local county police forces. Ken Talks, he got the bean and the bit between the teeth, but foster 
jobs you've led the therapists or just don't make up on anything else off the local politicians 
would be one of them. But it all starts with the VP first at all. 
 
Kyle: (​40:15 ​) 
And the person who came to the person who came to interview me was from the homicide 
division of the city of London police. I assure you she had better things to do than talk to me 
about fly fly posting in the elephant. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​40:28 ​) 
Yeah. And, and, and that's why this national local division is, is quite unhelpful because we've 
got this one piece of legislation prepared of it's dealing with the national staff. And then we've 
got essentially just the 1983 RPA act, which is governing everything at the local level. We've got 
police looking at the local stuff, we've got electoral commission looking at the national stuff. And 
I think that the divide is really unhelpful when it comes to spending for all those reasons. When it 
comes to responsibility, if you really ramp up all the monitoring and prosecution, all that at the 
local level and leave the national stuff on top. So I think that's very dangerous because of 
course the buck can be so easily passed as, as you've rightly pointed out, even with that 
candidate not having any say over that. So I think looking at these two things together and 
thinking, well, is it right that the electoral commission don't touch anything at the local level? I 
don't think that is right. I think those two things need to be brought together. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​41:20 ​) 
Yup. So that's a clear thing. Recommendation around greeting the [inaudible] national together, 
how many ones on the low costs [inaudible] commission has to be beefed up, uh, to be able to 
manage that information when they older then having almost satellites electoral commission at 
the regional level, at least during election time. Yeah. [inaudible] 
 
Kyle: (​41:46 ​) 
um, and just as a quick example of good intention with unintentional consequences was the, 
um, the change with the short campaign and long campaign with fixed rate, with the fixed term 
parliaments act, the idea that, you know, there's a budget for the short campaign and there's a 
different budget for the long campaign, but the long campaigns starts two years before an 
election. But we don't know two years before that there's going to necessarily be an election. So 
actually what ended up happening with 2017 is parties were scurrying to try and figure out, well 
that leaflet we did eight months ago is that part of our long campaign spend because you know, 
we're supposed to go back two years, you know, had very unintentional consequences and 
doesn't fit in a parliamentary democracy where you can have an election at any time. And then 
old national campaigns 
 
Speaker 4: (​42:39 ​) 
the previous two years [inaudible] be relevant because the next new build foundation [inaudible] 
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Kyle: (​42:46 ​) 
yeah, just, it's not sensible. So 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​42:48 ​) 
the, it seems like the intention with the fixed tone poem attack was we would move away from 
snap collections to a fixed point in time every five years and that is clearly not going to happen. 
Highly unlikely that the next general election will be in 2022 so that, that, as you rightly say, that 
has a knock on effect on campaign spending. What, what would be the proposal to fix it? Cause 
if you, you've set a long campaign period based on the fact that we would never be stumped 
election [inaudible] snap elections. What do we do about that? No, unfortunately it's a rip a 
sorry. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​43:24 ​) 
Yeah, no, no I was going to say this, this phase to me another issue which is actually what to do 
with the electoral commission, which is the guidance that's available. You know, cause if you're 
going to have more robust rules then you have to be really clear with your guidance to parties 
and campaigners and what they're going to be charged on and what they're not. And I think 
actually having clearer and more robust legislation will help with that because often, as it was 
with the third party campaigners legislation, it's quite difficult to navigate your way around and 
know what is allowed and what isn't allowed and then the electoral commission say, well just do 
your thing and you know, probably be fine. So, so the, so that has to change as well. Really 
clear guidance for people on what, what's permitted and what's not. I think in terms of the 
regulated periods, um, what can you do if there's gonna be snap elections? Um, like I said, 
there has to regulate from the moment that it starts, but it does allow for a lot of money to be 
spent as we've seen, um, you know, recently with, you know, referendum and what have you. 
That, that you can be in campaign mode putting money in. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​44:29 ​) 
I mean again, you could argue about whether to take, take the second book thing violations 
here, take the death of a member. I mean, you could say from the days of death, cause 
everybody knows it's gonna be a bad action. It's the vacancy, rather than let everybody pour 
resources in like mad for about a couple of months and they call them election. Um, but I mean 
these are all details, but then to do need to be addressed because otherwise you lay down 
desirable guidance and others, I think just relying on Durham Patency, which is the traditional 
way of doing it is a big waste of time. The number of members of the public and interest. If six 
months later somebody report somewhere exactly that they were misled. 
 
Kyle: (​45:18 ​) 
And there's the short answer is the fixed term parliaments act should be repealed because you 




Speaker 5: (​45:37 ​) 
um, [inaudible] everything's relative. 
 
Kyle: (​45:51 ​) 
Um, but you know, having, growing up and having worked several elections including the 2016 
presidential cycle in the u s what you see is, because everyone knows there's an election in four 
years, it is a permanent machine and it becomes an industry and the more exposure to it, the 
more likely it is that the public will become apathetic to it. And so re-instituting that uncertainty 
around election time means that no one has a sort of a headstart, right? So if you decide, oh 
actually we're going to call an early election, we're not going to tell anybody you have six 
months to not spend or overspend knowing what you're about to do that nobody else knows 
you're about to do. Um, I mean, just as an example, the Hillary campaign spent near $2 billion in 
the end. And you know, the Iowa caucus is always the first primary in the United States in the 
month before that, political parties become the largest employer in Iowa because of the scale of 
influx of professional staff. 
 
Kyle: (​46:51 ​) 
Right? It isn't a joke that every Iowan has met a presidential candidate. You'd because of the 
scale of the industry and we have to ask ourselves, and I wrote a piece about this in, um, lecture 
reform societies, um, wild west is, you know, that is where we are headed if we don't sort of stop 
now, um, especially with, with dark money. Um, which again, I can come back to in terms of 
transparency of donors. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​47:17 ​) 
But do you think about recommendations or recommendations. TPA should be this great. I think 
what it would be an interesting thing to ask other people you have to go 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​47:30 ​) 
to have some health was spinosa good identity boss because, but the coalition and the 
conservatives, so will the other mind double cross and suddenly bring the government down the 
time they're choosing, taking their partners by surprise but have no other purpose and it isn't 
working. Producing fixture on phones. It does make it possible. Bring down a gun and replace 
all the people who got with them. Theresa [inaudible] and the walls did [inaudible] you couldn't 
lose the general election challenge to the property. It was just one of them we'll be able to take 
over. That's where they were often. And a theory, this house [inaudible] where you could, you 
could bring the rest of the government down if you didn't, don't meet rob when his leadership 
relational suddenly. Um, and then you would have the opportunity of all the government 
[inaudible] I mean it made a lot of countries commenting. We had to, we'd have a government of 
national unity by now, British should not up to that, but the other one is there to be time to under 
the fixed term parliament, uh, there will be time to do that. [inaudible] his own to do that. Um, 
[inaudible] repeated and you get back to the prime minister of the day having taken the 
discretion, because back then everybody was going to like, uh, let people go off into 
parliamentary majority just having to sit and wait to see what happens. 
17 
 
Speaker 4: (​49:07 ​) 
Perhaps [inaudible] refined it perhaps where the asking people in future sessions as well about, 
about the fixture parliament action if they believe it plays any role in. Yeah. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​49:18 ​) 
We obviously have to keep the skirt. Absolutely. Yes. [inaudible] mission creep and we'll end up 
getting into multiples. But I think that's very, it's an interesting angle to take on it. Um, one of the 
other issue, you mentioned that this thing about donations under fire. Can you say a bit more 
about what, how do you think that should be better regulated? 
 
Jessica Garland: (​49:46 ​) 
Yeah, and I think it's, I've got, I don't have the gold solution here. I'm rather raising a, a problem 
that I'm still working through myself, but we know obviously that the under 500 pounds is, is, um, 
doesn't fall rather in permissibility criteria. So none of the usual requirements of, of donations 
affected. Um, so, and I suspect when that was decided upon, um, it was thought that there 
wouldn't be large numbers of under 500 pound donations. Obviously we're all moving towards 
an era where lots of smaller donations all becoming, um, more the way of fundraising rather 
than the, you know, single person, huge donation, which was previously more an issue. Um, 
and there's nothing so, so I wouldn't say that that, that sort of crowd funding model is wrong. 
You know, it's lots of things, individuals giving money to party that. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​50:37 ​) 
they just use several straight shot donations of 499 pounds. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​50:43 ​) 
from wherever and, and so, so what's the answer to this either. So if it's coming into a party, 
then the, the, it makes sense that that party is then held accountable. So then they, the onus is 
on them to make sure whichever method they're using for knowing where their donations are 
coming from the composite. So cutting off the, the, the paypal issue as it were an day that it's 
not the use of paper, let's the fact that it's the amount of data that you're collecting from it so that 
the amount that you're requiring people to provide when, when you receive it. So this might be 
an area where we just need clearer, clearer statement of what, what is permissible and what 
isn't and do we need to maybe that that probably doesn't need primary legislation actually. Um, 
but I think it's, it's a new area where I think what's assumed to be the case is clearly not the 
case anymore. So it's just assumed that they were, you wouldn't be using this channel for 
foreign donations. And I think it's quite clear that that is now wide open. So, um, so maybe it's a 
on parties just to, to be responsible for whether donations are coming from across the board. 
Again, I don't want to be too draconian about these things. You don't want to shut down people 
donating, but I think it's reasonable for a postage of responsibility program. 
 
Kyle: (​51:57 ​) 
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Well, I mean, and that's, that's what likely could have occurred with the Brexit party is, you 
know, the, the same credit card could be used and people could be putting in a different name 
every time. 49094994994 99 you know, the, the, the threshold at 500 is that you have to confirm 
they're on the electoral roll, actual register. Every party has transparency. We should because 
you mean it's when you get to 1,250 then yeah, it's the full transparency and, but you know, 
there's no reason why and every party has access the electoral role. There's no reason why 
every donation regardless of amount has to be verified in terms of a person being on the 
electoral roll. That would be your proposal. So just drop it into one pence. Yeah. What, anything 
over one,. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​52:39 ​) 
it's a way of automating that so it's not, ot to suddenly be a cost to the parties. Me. Sure. This 
should be a way of just 
 
Kyle: (​52:45 ​) 
so just as a speak to me, Chicago with within, you know, within the party that I worked, it was 
very easy. Like I could have an entire list as a spreadsheet that I imported into B sis, our 
system, and it told me which ones weren't on the electoral roll. So it's not a difficult process. I 
mean it's a, it's a very easy process to confirm if someone is on the electoral role and so then 
just refund the money if it's not. There's one other problem in this area, which you know is I think 
within our remit would, especially around utterance, which is that what campaigns will do in the 
short campaign is they'll have donors give to the local, not to the campaign because the 
threshold for the campaign in a short campaign, I think it's 20 pounds or 30 pounds, but the 
threshold for the party is 500 so they'll have people give to the local party than the local party. 
We'll give a donation to the campaign to cover the costs of the election. [inaudible] 
 
Kyle: (​53:45 ​) 
so the actual donors are not being verified by the campaign. So let's say, you know, it's the local 
Labor Party of Birmington on southern versus Neil Coyle's campaign for the seat give money. 
I'm not saying he's done this, I'm just, that's where I live. It's where I live. So that's the first name 
of my head. Um, but you'd have people give to the local Labor Party where the threshold is 
much higher and then they local Labor Party would write a 10,000 pound check to the candidate 
and that would be the only donor on their candidate declaration form. 
 
Speaker 4: (​54:19 ​) 
Yes. And you've got no real sense of where that turned out. I was coming from originally. So 
what would you do? Sip just in essence one set of rules. One pence, one kind of trust the board 
[inaudible] 
 
Kyle: (​54:32 ​) 
and if that means making the electoral register more easily available to campaigns, small 
campaigns that can't afford it, that's a much easier task than trying to figure out a less 
complicated way or picking a threshold that is in the end, completely arbitrary. And they're 
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dealing with the same thing in the u s I think the threshold is $200 in the u s or two 50 before 
you have to check the person as a citizen. The Trump campaign received twice as many small 
gifts. 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​55:00 ​) 
There's also publicize the name of the donor. The has, his name is available publicly. 
 
Kyle: (​55:06 ​) 
Mm, yes. And Yeah, the Trump campaign received 62% of their donations under the threshold, 
a large number and something like 30% came in on the same day. Come on [inaudible] 
 
Speaker 4: (​55:25 ​) 
as Obama C, you know, the Obama was kind of paving was hailed as the campaign of the small 
donors and Trump see twice as many and when you look at profile with the support, you can 
see where Obama's would have come from all those young people in the students making some 
more motivation. I don't see the Trump support base being the same. 
 
Kyle: (​55:46 ​) 
No. And it's effectively money laundering, right? If you're just funneling tons of cash in small 
amounts through the same vehicle for a purpose. It's money laundering. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​55:57 ​) 
Yeah. Yeah. Through one credit card. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​55:59 ​) 
So do you need to spot check that the names were the right names? I'm just thinking you could, 
you could get the list and send money in in someone else's name 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​56:11 ​) 
if the opponent had real suspicion. I did. Normally I'd be doing all this stuff. That information is 
out there, but I looked up the name of the donors to buy little payments or else it's just been, 
they occasionally, every now and again some election will occur where this is really funny. 
[inaudible] how on earth did this lots of before this fantastic, uh, around like my Dickies, perfectly 
obvious, any volume of our brain that spending limits were not being adhere to in this particular 
ah, all abuse they were. Um, and then then some investigative journalist or somebody who does 
get around those by stop trying to find that, uh, actually paying for all this. And was there any 
limit being encouraged by anybody? Only in lounge rooms, all costing. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​57:06 ​) 
So I wonder about the live reporting of those donations. Not In detail, but that's to a level of 
transparency. So an investigative journalists or opposing candidate that can then go and 
investigate whilst the contest is on rather than kind of after the crash. 
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Speaker 3: (​57:22 ​) 
This is here. 
 
Kyle: (​57:23 ​) 
Yeah. And, and the way it's confirmed is with, um, the person's address on their name. So you 
would need a lot of, I mean to, to do this on mass. Yeah. You'd need a lot of information to like 
sort of, um, impersonate, you know, x doesn't x a hundred people, but then again, you move 
straight to existing criminal legislation around identity theft. Right? Yeah. But so at least we 
know with that deterrent that there is an very easy, easy, but, um, without, um, transparency. 
There's a very, there's an existing strong deterrent, right. Identity theft is a massive crime. Yeah. 
Okay. Let's use that then imply apply. Yeah. That would then immediately apply and yeah, if 
you'd tried to impersonate 50 people to give 499 pounds each to a campaign, that would be 50, 
um, crimes of identity theft. And all you need is one of those that you see, that the transparency 
of the names. I'll give you just one of those people to go, I didn't do that. 
 
Speaker 4: (​58:23 ​) 
But what is the source is a foreign government. 
 
Kyle: (​58:29 ​) 
Yeah. I mean, and you can, you can you prosecute 
 
Speaker 4: (​58:31 ​) 
foreign government and frightened seaside. 
 
Kyle: (​58:36 ​) 
Uh, and I mean if it's straight out of the coffers of a foreign country, yes ma'am. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​58:42 ​) 
Be the party. That's the ultimate [inaudible]. But actually the revealing to the foreign government 
 
Speaker 3: (​58:48 ​) 
paid a lot of, part of the campaign would be Susan degenerate to the candidate, but he and 
everybody else inside. Well, it's very nice of the government, the better rules to offers all his 
money. But, uh, we really calmed, uh, um, the, the, the, the uh, 
 
Kyle: (​59:04 ​) 
well, cause if you to submit, you do right 
 
Speaker 3: (​59:06 ​) 
live, we'll be back on the campaign or change a little money 
 




Speaker 4: (​59:15 ​) 
we'll call John Jane blogs, et Cetera. And then you create false accounts and you donate to 
become an a in sort of the Brexit party or to travel or whatever. You've, you caught someone, 
you have to discover the source of that. Who is doing that. I can see that too is great. And those 
folks on the [inaudible] activity. 
 
Kyle: (​59:41 ​) 
And I think then that that extends, you'd hope that there would be consensus around that 
extending beyond partisan politics or a single election and be viewed as an issue of national 
security. Really. Um, that would be the hope. Right. And I think I agree that that would be at end 
the PR nightmare of, you know, as you say, Oh thank you Belarus for funding, whatever. But 
um, 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:00:06 ​) 
and how so how, what to get the forensic capability of doing is, is that something that like, first of 
all, you need the legislation to say everything over a pound has to be fully, you have to be able 
to see who's given that money and to check that they're all, 
 
Kyle: (​01:00:23 ​) 
and that exists already, um, for over 500 pounds. Yes. So we'd just be lowering the limit if that's 
not a new yeah, it's just changing the limit of what you have to do it. 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:00:34 ​) 
Right. So that's the only legal, the law change that needs to take place. And then you need an 
enforcement capability because it, you, would you do that? Would you propose that it's done by 
the electoral commission? Perhaps if we can set up these red enforced regional actuals officers 
and at that part of their job would be to do spot checks on campaign donations, party donations. 
 
Kyle: (​01:00:58 ​) 
Yeah. [inaudible] has to be unannounced. You know, it really needs to be, and the system, the 
electoral commission should be able to view from the other end, whatever system is used. 
Right. So as opposed to now where you, I mean, you actually as an agent, you, you print out 
spreadsheets and fill them in, then you print out invoices and you hand write on the invoice and 
then you staple. I mean it's, it's insane. Um, so simply putting that online with the electoral 
commission can spot check what you're reporting at what rate they have, the electoral register, 
the electoral commission and that. And then the last piece of that, you know, we talk about the 
minimum. Okay. From one p the last piece of this is considering whether there should be a 
maximum gift allowed. You know, so that which is in the u s they have a maximum gift. The 
most you can give to any candidate is $2,850 I believe. And which is why the culture in America 
is not, of course corporations can give unlimited amounts of money, but people are limited to a 
ceiling, which is why the main goal in American politics is to get what our people call bundlers. 
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So when Bundler says, I'll raise $1 million for you, and they go out and find x number of people 
to Max one in the primary, you have the same amount in the primary as you do in the general. 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:02:20 ​) 
Well, you'd have individual donors who give less bold than that. 
 
Kyle: (​01:02:23 ​) 
Right. And, and so that, that's a, that's a question, you know, should there be a maximum 
individual or corporate gift, it greatly reduces influence in politics, which is it, this is why in 
America people have no influence, but companies have huge influence. I think. Um, that's, that's 
a racist as some tactical question for us, Kevin. Right. You're [inaudible] a lot of the poses are 
going to meet strong resistance from the policy machinery, but that one that you just mentioned 
with meet the most resistance more and it's very interesting to see if you said that's how they do 
it in the United States. Oh, you have a bigger problem in the United States I think here as well. 
Corporations are into politics. Well and at the very least what we can, we can address, we can 
say this was something that was brought up. We, we decided ultimately, you know, it's out of 
remit for our immediate objectives but you know, it's areas for further consideration type thing. 
Yeah, 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:03:27 ​) 
no I'm not dismissing, I'm just [inaudible] we all know that some [inaudible]. Yeah, absolutely. 
[inaudible] 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:03:37 ​) 
and he had actually looking into the day to day list article. She restricts me. They publish 
accounts and so on, but they didn't see as a vast amount of public information about they do 
have data, which is why people best staunching about surprises in portions, dinners and things. 
Because I do think they get recorded. Uh, and uh, so when the price is, is, uh, two weeks to 
result in Barbados, hundreds of thousands, um, so hey, by some Russian lady and then 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:04:13 ​) 
that's it. Game of tennis [inaudible] thousand credits. Yeah. 
 
Jessica Garland: (​01:04:19 ​) 
And if I could just add to that that that good, although we'll see there has been a history of 
individuals paying lots of money that the, there is a certain level of transparency about us as a 
sad person who has looked at the actual commission's website and database of donations. So it 
sits over a certain amount of money and its name and you can also see where someone's 
donated as an individual and also through that business. Um, you know, it doesn't take a genius 
to work that way. [inaudible] yes. So it's uh, yeah, it's, it's, and you can, you can, you know, the 
database, you can sift by policy, you can sift by, um, the contest. You know, the other thing, I 
think there is a certain level of, I think the electoral commission has done a, you know, a decent 
network and getting some transparency around. And I know comparatively in terms of other 
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democracies, um, it stands up pretty well in terms of what, what other countries have done in, in 
terms of those transparency on the larger donations. Um, it's just whether people are finding 
new ways of getting around and whether that that focus on large donations to parties is really 
still the game in town. I guess 
 
Kenneth Clark: (​01:05:24 ​) 
they use tricky position you say and stops individuals. It doesn't stop with the stock go regiments 
I suppose in this thing of lots of shoots injury coming 
 
Kyle: (​01:05:33 ​) 
when it could be a maximum corporate gift as opposed to maximum individual gifts. But it could 
just be something we know as you know, something that came up that we thought of sort of light 
bulb topic. But um, the other way that they funnel it is through individual members because then 
at the only place it goes on the red is on the register of members interests, which who reads 
those? It'll be keeping PDFs. You know, 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:05:58 ​) 
Laura as the Lord, we love him. He's so easy to avoid. Again. [inaudible] 
 
Jessica Garland: (​01:06:02 ​) 
I was just is, so having, having experienced the, the database of, of of donations about the, the, 
the invoices have been just going back to the earlier point about online spend on invoice from 
uh, sorry, a receipt from Facebook island which covers a ball sum of money and, and just for 
advertisement but no detail on the content of the ad, which constituency it was aimed at. Which 
group of people it was aimed, uh, I mean compared to the other rep compared to where I've got 
to with transparency of individual donations leaving some balls and parties side, which is still an 
issue, but the, the, there is nothing, there is nothing firm to go on for, for online spend. So, so 
that is a really issue. 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:06:42 ​) 
Hmm. Well what we do, our theme is this issue group to work out practical way. Okay. Law 
Change change in the culture of politicians of 12. We get to the bed, contemplate any idea, 
commit this whole body group on a scale cause otherwise we've put the total [inaudible] with 
why reforms get better posing. Which what you, we touched on [inaudible] I'm sued fund sign up 
for that [inaudible] to be at will this main to visit difference? Oh Sir, no, no, the size of [inaudible] 
but I first went to American election back in the 1960s from Vegas. America is great and the 
best of America with Mama's the worst Americans have to be dreadful. 
 
Kyle: (​01:07:38 ​) 
[inaudible] his 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:07:39 ​) 
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relationship intervals from but, but the, the, the um, one thing that struck me even then as a little 
aspiring of young aspiring English Paul, that was the sums of Monday, well, vast dentist couldn't 
understand the other people fighting primaries for Senate motivation. We're spending couple of 
million dollars in it. Well, a generation later you wouldn't even get to the starting in this true 
[inaudible] yeah, the suitable times was the 1960s here with increasing speed, the gang into the, 
you know, whole new ways of campaigning, huge levels of expense, all kinds of organizations 
coming in, uh, methods of campaigning, which are totally unscrupulous. And Ah, firstly, how do 
you get effective law organizations to stop? How do you actually created a cloud here where 
people that interest parties better face up to doing it? 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:08:53 ​) 
[inaudible] I think Kevin does it is very difficult to, because there's so much inertia in the system 
and so many vested interests feels to me a little bit blind. Things have shifted because of the 
referendum, both in terms of what happened with phone leave and to believe, uh, the fact that 
[inaudible] balance is being investigated now by the National Crime Agency. You still don't know 
what the source of that 8 million pounds he gave the largest donation and this [inaudible] 
investigation is only because of some of the love account account. Dominic's. It definitely feels 
like it's much further up than the foreign government intervention. [inaudible] 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:09:39 ​) 
well, I've always very, we get the directions and probably quite a lot of other governors are doing 
this and test it there. There is kind of a thing, it's quite taking on the scale once you go out of the 
pockets and the establishment will be deeply sharp if you thought you were going to intrude on 
what went on as far as that violation. Fighting Eagle, particularly their fundraising here at best 
policies said they have my eye, my potty implosion army of people now 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:10:06 ​) 
you used to go, oh, David Lady money called shows. Yeah, it's a huge operation. But Ah, I 
mean I attended a conference week before last, uh, called the convention, which is organized 
by having reporter, um, in the, uh, convention center out in the cold. And I mean it was of the 
thousand people in the room talking about electoral transparency and sort of never again and 
stuff. And there's also, there's a big push around, um, facts and information being accurate and 
tracing for 350 million panelings on the side of the past and all that, which I don't think you can 
start that. I think that's going to scroll down, but that's a whole [inaudible] scrutiny. Laura 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:10:58 ​) 
said [inaudible] about it. Yeah, I mean yet somebody's telling a lie in the campaign. I'm not 
squeamish about my trade, I disapproved in strongly, but the idea of you change the every time. 
That's not the remedy. Pain House been done in transparency anyway. So the affinity look 
pediments can turn around and say several times have about the battle loss. That's a lie. We 
Miss Medicine. True. Um, but, but uh, things like there's fundraising and producing bogus out 
proof by your opponent, which isn't your opponent's at all. [inaudible] I mean the Cambridge 
Analytica stuff, there's a lot of people who are increasingly concerned about psychometric data 
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projection. That's a really good move for that to tagging data protection issues. So [inaudible] 
Facebook accounts, your name, whose name I'm driving, cause Facebook, I'm going to post 
twitching, check out until it was cause striped themselves. The, and I bought them together. All 
the people who claim to be on Facebook close down any amendment they can come out to sell 
out rage. Just stay out. And for some students it was about politics. 90% of the public would not 
leave my assertion it wasn't used. 
 
Kyle: (​01:12:30 ​) 
Um, yeah. And just on that, the digital side. Absolutely. And I think that, um, the broader issues 
around digital and the use of psychometric data and you know, trying to push emotional buttons 
over informational buttons, um, the impact it has on democracy and, um, democratic debate is 
the, the highest risk area. So I do think it's definitely for us to discuss because it will ripple out 
into the broader, you know, but if you're, you're getting the asa right now, the advertiser senior's 
authority is doing more than any other entity right now around this because of a brand. Um, 
what's it, when you have been negatively affect the company's brand brand reputation, that 
reputational damage to brand is seen as such a huge issue, but for whatever reason, we don't 
view it with the same regard in elections and democracy. You know, God forbid, you know, 
Unilever, Coca-Cola's brand to be damaged. What about like, you know, the brand of 
democracy itself, which is why people are turning away from, you know, the need for it even as 
an essential aspect of society. You know, the statistics on under thirties, who don't believe 
democracy is essential to their, uh, to their society. It is shocking. I mean in some countries it's 
over 40% who are like, oh well, you know, benevolent dictator. What's the difference? Good 
grief. 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:14:01 ​) 
If you had a pretty [inaudible] it all the time, come from a strong man, a smaller sort of maverick 
American rules, it's fine. 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:14:12 ​) 
We're going to get one of those and that would be primarily where we have the ICO coming in. 
So we've got a meeting coming up with the ICO and we're hoping Elizabeth Denim will be noted 
as clear about what parties got then what Philip files exactly, exactly. In particular regulating the 
big social media journalists. I mean, I think awesome pictures that we want to turn them from 
just being platforms but actually behaving like publishers with responsibility for war. They would 
argue that they're just platforms. They're just startling. 
 
Kyle: (​01:14:52 ​) 
My name is [inaudible] [inaudible] Nick Clegg's argument was that they weren't publishers 
because it's not like mark Zuckerberg sitting around deciding what's on your newsfeed. No, it's 
far worse than that. An algorithm is deciding there is no human agency at all involved in the 
editorialization of your Facebook feed. 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:15:14 ​) 
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[inaudible] walking up to that that the regulation is going to come. Yes. While we want him to be 
a part of that particularly [inaudible] political activity and the other one, the challenge it is but full 
gate set the vocation, get this out in 52 plus both days generally seen as a thing where a little bit 
not when we talk about rushing into therre in the snow a lot. I sold the recreation [inaudible] so I 
think we found out the event what you've seen and we spoke to capitalism, you know [inaudible] 
100% I'll get in through remains and southern I talking, we said, but you know you could say 
this, you bring people off the streets, you vote lean into this room. I was just thinking, what the 
hell is going on there? These people look crazy vote. So there is a bit of a challenge there about 
breaking into that group with the general public. Don't. Why does it seem to go with industry as 
reaction? Always [inaudible] [inaudible] good consistent building stuff. Widespread contempt 
that low that all in give what they can get out. [inaudible] new polls that we need a strong man. 
Yeah, that's of course what they want to digitally meet is a strong man who agrees with me. 
 
Kyle: (​01:16:30 ​) 
Yeah, exactly. Exactly. 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:16:37 ​) 
Just the proximity. You can quite easily slip into just an authoritarian system without even 
learning. [inaudible] yeah. Even even pre voters, people need to be accountable and the, well 
that's what we want to try and achieve. So [inaudible] thing like that. But no, it's very useful 
frankly. Watch these totally. And actually didn't help me to touch on the things that the 
movements develop. Talk by tapping the Internet, like stopping 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:17:10 ​) 
foreign governments. Right. And it certainly dodgy donors are so universally unpopular, but 
parties would still want their donors left preserving their avenues if they wish. And [inaudible]. 
 
Kyle: (​01:17:25 ​) 
All right, we'll have to go in 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:17:28 ​) 
with all guns blazing and without fear or favor because they, that the parties are going to have to 
come together and be business as usual doesn't work anymore because, um, the trust levels 
have become so low now in the way the democratic system works. Well, once somebody has to 
stand up for keynote the subject to such, we restore confidence in the system. The trouble is 
you don't care for what you want. You can bang for, don't careful further under budget cause 
you could start illustrating some of the things that go wrong and all that means is to keep, you're 
not able at the end to do anything about it. [inaudible] yeah, yeah, yeah. No, she wasn't. There 
must be with America magnitudes. You has to be joined in these immense numbers. Still 
Rescue, recruiting ordinary people to join political parties. It's getting more and more difficult. 
 
Kyle: (​01:18:23 ​) 
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Hmm. I think you happened to you in the state. Yeah. The threshold's different. It's, it's Eh, and 
so yeah, nobody really joins the party. You're just sort of a register. Yeah. You're a registered 
supporter and therefore, um, but because of cause the electoral comp college under 
undermines, you know, actual democracy, you are socialized based on where you grow up as to 
whether your vote matters. So I grew up in California, it was going to be Democrat every time no 
Canada ever came to California except to raise money. So not all votes are equal save seats. 
And to the 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:18:58 ​) 
case here then maybe campaign, most people just told him their family was living conservative. 
About 3% of the population wouldn't be a swing to the left. And I'd be working individually with 
Edson as one of the hostility to be established. All of that. Yes. It's interesting to see as the 
extent to which cause the same seed concept brings down there. I think people have become 
more fickle. I mean this [inaudible] these areas, but should the European Parliament to sort of 
bizarre one off. But it was actually focused on one issue and people were really angry. So they 
all came out and voted. Now I've held my seat before the nine years and all that and it safety. 
Uh, we got 9% of the vote. The Labor Party will behind this and we might principle challenges 
for the last 22 years. And it was linkedin reps who dream conservative labor. A huge proportion 
of what? 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:20:02 ​) 
Say I got over 50% of the man and over 50% the lateral view learning was I have to be in 
Romania to here. Yeah. Suddenly all these automatic low tos, Oh, if I'm going to bed with, I 
won't say with a conservative, well four out of five in a box majority cause others didn't care at 
the vast majority of the negative actors didn't dare. Now it's quite amusing at the time. European 
populations in the [inaudible], it shows how collapse all in all boils is over. Put the system ease 
and you could have 11 people he painted, gone teaching that 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:20:50 ​) 
it'd become these English politics. She's sorry back. Do we want to formally close and I'll stop 
recording? Yes. So I think, did you have any? No, no. It's very useful. We're just building it up 
now. [inaudible] next Monday, next Monday where we have Bethany shiner confirmed academic 
and probably one other confirmed this Monday. Next Monday. I think my numbers should go up 
today. Yes, we sent them all through. We'll confirm with an email. Any other colleagues who 
might choose interest? We hope so. I mean we've split off the vice chairs and Kat Smith, so 
she's very keen to come along. Caroline knew crystal showed, so she'll come to the next group 
of hearings. It'll be kind of, you mentioned 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:21:39 ​) 
do will pass on that and do something kind of assigned to me and my phone, so I'll shut up, shut 
up, shut up, go to future meetings. 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:21:46 ​) 
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Ken is brilliant, but we do promise for the serious discussion on that. We have. Light's really 
good to just stop building this. It in the sense we sold these here. He does a bit of a test run 
because [inaudible] there's a little bit of kind of inside outside here, but so the next hearings now 
will, based on what we've done today will give us a good foundation for starting to draft the 
report there. We have links on four of the most well versed academics in these areas. We have 
full fact, we have demos, we have the ICO, we have, um, hopefully have paypal. So they're, that 
they come from lots of places. So I think, yeah, we sort of ere able to frame the conversation 
and then give it a test run. And then, yeah. And then we trying to figure out where the direction, 
bringing the electoral commission evidence or whether we produce the report and then ask 
them to comment or, because of course that are key. But [inaudible] this way, they are the 
agency [inaudible] they've been very good at so far. We've been working as a team with them. 
It's just a question of [inaudible] then they must be frustrated. They are. I mean [inaudible]. 
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Stephen Kinnock: (​00:00 ​) 
Well, thank you very, very much for joining us. I guess have you talked to someone about the 
scope of what we're doing and why we're doing it? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​00:10 ​) 
I've seen a briefing in terms of what it is you're trying to achieve and the areas you would like 
me to, to, to talk about. So I try to keep my sort of remarks in, in those sorts of spaces. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​00:21 ​) 
Okay. Fantastic. Well, I would suggest then without any further ado, what we have asked you to 
is just maybe give us a brief summary really of your thoughts on this issue and your contribution 
to how we might achieve what needs to be achieved that would be hugely appreciated and then 
we'll just go into having some [inaudible] after that. That's okay. I think we voted to, yeah. Yeah. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​00:46 ​) 
Okay. That sounds, that sounds lovely. Um, so, so first of all, thank you for inviting me today. I 
mean, it's really, I think, fantastic. You're doing this and thank you to fair vote as well in 
particular. Um, I e by training and instinct, although I'm in a department of Media and 
communications, I'm an institutional political scientist. And I think one thing that that sort of 
taught me is the institutions need to actually work, but they also need to be seen to work as well 
to enjoy the confidence of the people who use them. Um, so I think this isn't just the challenge of 
institutional design, it's also a challenge of trust. Um, and, and clearly trust is central to 
democratic life. We have lots of empirical studies that tell us this. Um, and I think it's broadly 
true to say that we have a crisis, an ongoing crisis of trust in our, in our democratic institutions 
and, and maybe politics more generally as well. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​01:37 ​) 
Um, I suppose I'd like to start by saying that I do think that any particular electoral regime at any 
place in the world at any point in time will face, um, challenges. Um, so I don't want to 
necessarily sort of imply that we're in a unique situation of facing challenges or this is 
unprecedented. But I do think there are particular circumstances at this moment in time that 
have highlighted longstanding problems with the way we run elections. Um, and also, uh, 
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created new problems, uh, that I will turn my attention to. And I think clearly the one that a lot of 
people are thinking about and rightly is the development of platforms like Facebook and new 
social media advertising, uh, tools. Um, this has created new opportunities for political 
communication and also new challenges for regulators. Um, let me address one question 
straight away, which is why does this sort of advertising in politics and particularly in British 
politics actually matter? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​02:36 ​) 
Um, and I would argue that really without any kind of meaningful debate or discussion, we have 
overturned a consensus that has existed for about, uh, 50 years on not allowing commercial 
advertising or commercial advertising or mass commercial advertising on the primary 
advertising medium of the day into politics. So for a long time we agreed that, uh, radio and 
television advertising, uh, political radio and television advertising, uh, would be forbidden, 
would not be legal in the United Kingdom. Um, but now political parties and campaigners have 
access to a new media, um, social media advertising where they can spend, uh, literally millions 
of pounds on targeted political advertising. So this is a really fundamental shift in how we 
communicate and the way we undertake politics. And coupled with that, I think there are a 
broader set of social and institutional changes that we need to be aware of that are 
simultaneously occurring. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​03:30 ​) 
So, uh, the political world is becoming more unstable. Party systems are more porous and 
public debate is much more diffuse. Um, and I think this raises important questions about 
exactly who it is we should be regulating. So what are the boundaries of electoral regulation and 
indeed what even are the objectives that these regulators should be seeking to achieve. So I 
want to be mindful of these questions as I turn my attention to the three headings I was asked to 
consider. So one is transparency, one is deterrence and one is monitoring. Let me start with 
transparency. So transparency is one regulatory solution you can employ to achieve fair and 
well regulated elections. Obviously. Uh, if we can see what people are doing, how they are 
spending money, where they are receiving money from, we can do a lot to actually regulate 
those electoral spaces. But I would say there are particular challenges for the model of 
transparency. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​04:27 ​) 
We currently employ, uh, raised by a Facebook type, uh, advertising environment. So there are 
a few reasons for this. And the first one is that Facebook is essentially a private, uh, media. And 
this actually I think is true in two senses of the word - the first thing is that anything someone 
sees on this Facebook page is inherently private. It is not a, uh, broadcast media like television 
for example, where anyone can access and catalog, uh, what is being seen easily. So this leads 
to all kinds of impossibilities. Um, so for example, parties making different promises to different 
groups of voters during an election or foreign actors attempting to purchase advertising to 
destabilize a liberal democracy. And I should say that these are two differing degrees, real or 
3 
hypothetical scenarios. One of the other problems is we don't have the empirical data to actually 
say the extent to which these things may or may not be happening. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​05:23 ​) 
Um, but also the other point to say is that Facebook is a private company and its product is the 
data it has from us and also the algorithms it uses to actually target information. In other words, 
the processes that lead to information actually appearing on an individual's Facebook page. And 
of course the problem with this is, um, we might wish Facebook to be transparent with these 
things, but that's actually quite problematic for them because that is their profit margin 
essentially, that is their secret sauce, the algorithm that they use to make their business model 
viable. Another issue is that this is a networked environment. So again, um, it may not be 
obvious the boundaries of what a political actor is in terms of a traditional regulatory model. So 
we, for example, might seek to regulate a political party, but in network environment, it's much 
harder to say what the boundaries of a political party actually are. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​06:21 ​) 
Um, so would it be their supporters posting things online? Would it be organizations that claim 
to support that political party or particular figures within that political party becomes very 
problematic. And of course we should also remember that there are consequences for 
attempting to regulate those sorts of networks in terms of freedom of speech and freedom of 
action for people who do want to participate. And it also, I think rangers particularly challenging 
questions about how we define a collusion in a networked environment. Um, let's move onto 
deterrence. So I mean, the classic question we would ask, I suppose about deterrence is do 
people actually feel they can get away with it and do they feel the price of being caught is 
actually worth doing it? And clearly I think there is an issue here, which is the electoral 
commission and I think they're on record of saying this, say that they lack the expertise to police 
these environments and they lack the resources to do that and they lack the means of 
punishment to actually, uh, do it. Um, 
 
Nick Anstead: (​07:22 ​) 
ultimately I think what we will probably find is that people will bend the law of any kind of 
electoral regulation as much as they can to achieve the advantage that they may achieve. Um, I 
will mention one really instructive example of this that I encountered when I was doing some 
research into the 2015 election, which is, uh, one of the first events where we actually saw, um, 
tensions emerging in our electoral regulatory system. And it particularly these tensions came 
around the definition of local versus national campaigning and what was defined as local versus 
national campaigning. Very important under the regulation, uh, that we have. And I ran a 
seminar group after the election as part of the research project for writing a paper, um, and we 
had representatives of both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrat Party in the room 
and they were furious with each other because in the eyes of the Liberal Democrats precent, the 
Conservatives had at the very least broken the spirit of the electoral law in terms of what they 
had defined as local campaigning. 
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Nick Anstead: (​08:23 ​) 
And at the eyes of the Conservatives prereq present. They thought this was a fair game 
interpretation of the law. So one issue here is to avoid ambiguity in terms of the law and in terms 
of what it is we actually think is acceptable. If we're going to have a definition of local and 
national campaigning, we need to actually make control that definition is operationalizable and 
also updated depending upon the nature of the campaign environment and how, um, how it's 
changing. The other interesting counterpoint to deterrence is of course incentives. In other 
words, what are the actual incentives that are in to break the rules? And of course I come back 
to the point I made earlier about Facebook advertising. In the past, it simply wouldn't have been 
possible to spend large sums of money very rapidly in an undetected fashion. But now we have 
this media where campaigns can actually do that. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​09:10 ​) 
That's changed the incentive structure for campaigns to actually potentially break the rules. Um, 
there's one other point I would make about, um, attempting to enforce these laws, which is what 
do we actually do when we enforce them? And I think one of the interesting challenges is, um, 
we only do this after the event. And so you have an election, you have a referendum and then it 
is found out that someone has broken the rules and of course you can fine them, but ultimately 
the actual act has taken place. Um, and the actual institutional moment has passed where the 
decision has been taken and it's quite a strange sort of counter factual to sort of think, well what 
would actually happen if we could discover these things in advance and how would we actually 
police that? Um, I want to move on to, to monitoring finally, which I think in the documentation is 
defined as identifying problems and responding rapidly to them. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​10:06 ​) 
I think this is really, really difficult. And the reason for this is that elections are by definition 
infrequent high risk events. They don't happen very often, but the stakes are very high when 
they do happen. Um, and also in this context, we are in a period of time where communication 
technologies are evolving very rapidly. So if you have an election five years later, the entire 
communication edifice might be completely different by that point. And, and of course in 
contrast, electoral law is notoriously slow moving and hard to fix. Um, so I suppose my personal 
view on this is the solution is probably some form of considerably beefed up electoral 
commission with considerable level of independent authority, um, and the ability to act 
somewhat at least outside the political sphere. Um, and indeed a sincere attempt to move, um, 
electoral law as far as possible from the political realm and give that power to the electoral 
commission. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​11:03 ​) 
But then this leads to my, I guess, last general point, which is, cause I've spoken quite a lot 
about Facebook. I've spoken quite a lot about technology in the last few minutes. Um, so I'm 
gonna say, um, something that then probably seems counter intuitive, which is to me it seems 
actually counter productive to spend your time worrying entirely about Facebook or whatever 
particular platform might appear in the future. Um, or to put it in a slightly different way, I think 
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the conversation we probably need to have is one about values. We want to regulate into our 
electoral system, um, and the behavior we want to regulate out of it. Um, and then we can start 
to build a robust institutional framework that can tackle not just current but future challenges as 
well. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​11:47 ​) 
Thank you. Thank you very much indeed, that was a really good framing of the issues that we 
face and some very good ideas around solutions. Deidre would you like to kick us off with any 
questions? 
 
Deidre Brock : (​12:05 ​) 
I suppose that some of the questions are about for me were around, um, when you say it's just 
counterproductive to worry just about Facebook, maybe you could talk a little bit more about 
what the values you might see being incorporated in future definitions around that would be 
helpful. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​12:24 ​) 
Yeah, so, so I think, I mean, to be clear, I worry a lot about Facebook and I spend a lot of time 
talking about Facebook. Um, but I, but I suppose my concern is it was that it was very, um, I 
think a really interesting point that the fair vote have put on this, which is monitoring, which I 
think is really is, is simultaneously an area where we can say regulation is definitely failed in the 
past few years. But it's failed for entirely understandable reasons that this is really, really hard. 
And I think if we spend our time focusing on technology, um, or even particular platforms and I 
think we necessarily end up chasing our tail, we end up - something bad will happen, then we 
have to react to it. I think the much higher level conversation to be had that allows us to respond 
to those challenges when they emerge is, well what is it we would actually like our electoral 
regulation system to achieve. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​13:17 ​) 
So for example, a, do we want a level playing field between political parties? And if so, which 
political parties? Um, it's interesting, something about campaign finance law in different 
countries. Sometimes it's designed to encourage new entrance into the system and sometimes 
it's encouraged to discourage new entrance into the political systems. The classic example 
there is actually is postwar Germany where actually the campaign finance system on state 
funding is designed to actually make it quite hard for new parties to enter. The bar is quite high 
because you get funding when you get MPs essentially. Um, and so there's a question about 
values and I think we've kind of missed the trick here because as I said at the outset, you know, 
we now have political parties that can essentially engage in an incredibly expensive form of 
commercial advertising. And I don't really remember ever anyone really ever having a 
conversation about this. Um, whereas as I say, for 50 years we've said actually no to the 
dominant form of commercial advertising. And it seems to be quite important that we have a 
conversation about, well, what is the, what are the consequences of bringing money to that 
degree into political life and electoral life? And that that is somewhat removed from the question 
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about how we regulate Facebook. It's related to it and it's triggered by it, but it's not quite the 
same thing. 
 
Deidre Brock : (​14:35 ​) 
Just your comment about being very worried about Facebook, obviously mystic said click, click 
a was talking today about the fact that even the same thing, much of an issue at all. Where do 
you think he's coming from on that? I mean I've only read the newspaper report and seen the 
tweets, but... 
 
Nick Anstead: (​14:53 ​) 
I think in common with a lot of people my view is he's missing the point. So I, I've only, I've only 
sort of read the brief, um, sort of headlines on this as well. But I think what he's doing is he's 
using an argument which we've seen in lots of which is it's not the case that whatever sort of 
behavior we've seen on Facebook, whether it's Russian bots or whether it's illegally purchased 
ads, that were over the spending limit or whatever it is swung a vote, we cannot prove that it 
changed the way people vote. Uh, and, and that of course is, is almost certainly true and we get 
into empirical questions here that are very, very hard to debate and political scientists are 
having a long conversation about how we relate to Facebook anyway, cause you've basically 
got two ways of researching Facebook. One is to get into bed with them and another way to sort 
of develop hacks to get data from them. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​15:46 ​) 
And neither of these are terribly good in terms of getting good robust data. But trying to answer 
that empirical question about: well did it matter in terms of, you know, swinging this many votes 
that then changed the outcome I think is missing the point. The question is do we have a robust 
regulatory mechanism that we can trust and robust institutions that can say we have a set of 
values about the role Facebook should be playing in elections and they breach those values or 
the people on it have breached those values. So I think, I think we can, we can, I think it's 
mischaracterizing the question. It takes us to a question we probably can't answer to say, Oh, 
you know, did 2 million people vote in a different way because of these advertsL? 
 
Lord Tyler: (​16:29 ​) 
[inaudible] and confession time. First time the Liberal Democrats begs for no constitutional 
reform, but I a hundred too long. Name was talking about [inaudible] write of course won't block 
people wasted a little blood money. That's past to be true. Um, I want to get back to the values. I 
mean since 1883 h has been politics, the UK is in absolute concrete firm proposition in terms of 
values that you don't buy seats. And we've had rigorous or regulations do that. And because we 
don't have a presidential system, we don't elect a president, we don't late to government where 
you're letting individual constituent representatives, um, that fall perhaps the critical bit in my 
mind. And therefore your reference to the difference between what the regulations for 
constituencies in candidates and work parties is critical now that we are bunch see a set of 
[inaudible] [inaudible] pap tests from the natural permission to make that explicit split more 
effective, which is precisely the point we are affecting. 
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Lord Tyler: (​17:37 ​) 
Um, I haven't been [inaudible] recently. I was first Trump standing for election in 1966 for God's 
sake. That should be one for when of course if you spent one penny extra, you could be in front 
of an electoral court. Now thousands of pounds, thousands and thousands and thousands of 
pounds are directed into constituencies by the national parties under the preparer regulations, 
which don't fall under the RPA. And that seems to me to be a big, big problem in the long as it 
relates to the move from analog to digital, not exclusively [inaudible] call centers can target an 
individual in a constituency to persuade that person to vote false, to know whoever that as much 
a directed, targeted buying of a vote as anything that happened in 1883 similarly with direct 
mail. So it doesn't get Facebook this point I'm going to make, you're absolutely right. I think it 
was a choice parties to look at that and that's where the big, big money is going. 
 
Lord Tyler: (​18:42 ​) 
But that's not the key issues. This how much money is being spent by parties to get individuals 
elected in individual constituencies. Digital helps stand and transparency is hugely important. I 
accept that. And again, of course the way which one is raised through the Brexit circle parties 
way of doing. So all of that is very significant, but the basic values, where did you find, so 
welcome from your presentation? Basically value is in this country, it is not possible to spend a 
lot of money buying the election of individuals in the individual decisions. Digital [inaudible]. It's 
not the only way. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​19:24 ​) 
Um, I would agree entirely with that. Um, and what I would, what I would slightly say is I would 
broaden the definition of digital, um, because I think the, uh, so, and that's why I was careful to 
sort of drive, I think treat Facebook as an example of this because I think if you look at those call 
centers, if you look at those leaflets, even if you look at those people knocking door to door, the 
ability to tailor messages and target those messages, particularly it driven by what I would term 
digital e, uh, data driven campaigning. Uh, and that involves things like mosaic. Uh, but it also 
involves overlaying that with data sets and places like Facebook. So it's this integrative 
data-driven environment that joins together these various bits of the campaign and makes this 
definition of local and national so problematic. But I completely agree with your point about the 
sort of subversion of these definitions. Um, that has been used very effectively, uh, by, by 
political parties. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​20:29 ​) 
Um, for me just coming in on that point [inaudible] what would be the solution to that? I mean I 
you suggesting that there should be some Cam Kotel money that could be spent on local 
targeting. So this, this way, listen, we really issues lead offs or national into how difficult that is 
to Tracy is a way of thing. Is there a way on, you know, there are 650 constituencies, so you 
say, well we're going to create a this much which is at a national level and we're going to have a 
beefed up the next commission that really clarifies the link between yes as genuinely, 
authentically national campaign. Okay. That can go into that bucket. And then there is another 
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bucket which is national, which is local companion and we're going to regulate operators as 
well. Managing each one of those should be kept to the times the way [inaudible] 
 
Nick Anstead: (​21:32 ​) 
I think it would be one way forward. I think the principle is sound. I think the problem and the 
thing that I probably don't have an answer for but needs to be thought about more is what would 
be the types of examples where we would define something as being local as opposed to 
national. So I am, in terms of my, my research, particularly on Facebook ads, I'm in the second 
category of researcher. I work with an organization called who targets me, who, I don't know, 
you may have heard of it. You make it good. Well that they're super, they're absolutely, they're 
wonderful people and they've done wonderful work because they, they devised a browser plugin 
where if you install it as a willing participant with informed consent, it would harvest all your 
Facebook ads. And they did this during the general election and actually we didn't necessarily 
find what we expected to find, which was we expected to find, um, sort of hyper localized 
campaigning. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​22:29 ​) 
So promising someone to build a ring road or something. We didn't find that what we did find 
those hyper targeted campaigning on national messages based upon an individual solutions 
and, and, and, and, and also obviously where they lived. So there was an element of 
constituency targeting going on, even though it was framed around the national message. So 
now the question I ask as an open question, because I say I don't necessarily know the 
answers, whether that fits into the category we're talking about. In other words, whether the 
nature, the nature of the targeting is sufficient to make it local campaigning or is it predicted on 
the magic words test where you have to mention the name of the MP or their opponent or 
something to make it. So we can imagine sort of different, uh, categories and hierarchies. And I 
guess there's a question about where we would consider it appropriate to draw the line there. 
But it's a, it's a really difficult question and I guess I don't have necessarily a kind of fully formed 
answer to it, 
 
Lord Tyler: (​23:29 ​) 
but I did notice that the commission thinks it has 10 stays [inaudible] with us relatively short tick 
what their [inaudible] says. It's absolutely foolproof. I'm going to snaze whatever weight getting 
this straight. But what they're saying is if the person that is receiving 
 
Lord Tyler: (​23:47 ​) 
this message by whatever means direct mail call center or more obviously in your text, 
indigenous is a specific person in a specific area. The purpose of that communication is to try 
and persuade that person to vote for a candidate and if the candidate has already been 
nominated at the beginning of the short period of the election, not just an election 
communication, what, what's the difference between that and actually not be on the door and 
getting somebody a message I'm sending piece right for Steven. It's just the same as just a 
more warm way to communicate. So the obvious one is as you were implying, just know if the 
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target is identified and you can do that in post with Facebook. I don't know enough about the 
other card books but if you do it with by post code, if you've been doing by direct mail, obviously 
it's to an individual. If you call somebody up and say I'm asking you to rate percent that should 
be a candidate expense, returnable by the candidate who is agent and should come within like 
the, the already very fun restriction on the amount of money. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​24:52 ​) 
Yeah. So it's not about the content of the message, it's about that the individual was receiving 
the message. And how targeted is that message that you gotten? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​25:02 ​) 
I mean been, I, I would certainly have some sympathy with that view. The problem I would see 
with that that we will come back to is it would require a massive level of transparency from the 
parties and from the platforms in terms of understanding how a message got from the point of 
its creation to the point where it appears on someone's screen or someone's doormat. Um, so, 
so it would require a considerably ratchet up form of transparency cause in terms of what 
Facebook has released so far in terms of their, their online platform for example, and their 
adverts where, cause they have gone a long way in terms of releasing adverts. But what they 
were leading is the content of the outbursts. They're not really saying 
 
Lord Tyler: (​25:40 ​) 
who CSUN that they releasing. Who is responsible for yes. [inaudible]. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​25:48 ​) 
yes, yes. I know. I mean I think there's certainly a consensus that there should be the digital 
imprints on that but the, the question then is would it be possible to get Facebook to share the 
information about who's receiving these messages? I don't have the, so that you can see that 
they are targeting. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​26:13 ​) 
I think you'd have to ask them. Uh, [inaudible] um, it, it could, I mean, part the problem is this is 
a very gray area in terms of who should actually be doing the regulation. Um, I mean I think 
they, I can't speak on their behalf, uh, but I think they have always been nervous about raising 
that sort of data a on the grounds that it's corporate and sensitive and B, they will make a 
defense of privacy as well. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​26:40 ​) 
All right. Okay. Well that's pretty useful for us to note something, 
 
Nick Anstead: (​26:44 ​) 
but as I say, I would, I would advise asking them 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​26:48 ​) 
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drove full. She called and haven't managed to get the chunks of our APPG here. [inaudible] 
 
Speaker 3: (​27:01 ​) 
did you want to just,. 
 
Deidre Brock : (​27:02 ​) 
Just returning to this notion of values being inserted into this whole issue is, that implies a 
certain amount of subjectivity. I'm just wondering what you think the electoral commission would 
need to do. How much, what would it need to do to be able to cope with that? What, who would 
it mean to impose, touch the people that need to acquire much more than just sort of what we 
were talking about in terms of trying to monitor intensely what's happening on social media 
platforms. I mean, surely it feels as if they don't cope and terribly well at the moment where, 
what do you think you need to do? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​27:38 ​) 
Well, let me, um, I probably wasn't clear enough in my opening statement on that because I 
think the question of values is probably an easy political question. There has to be a political 
question. So that has to probably be decided in this place, uh, in terms of what we consider an 
appropriate electoral system and, and, and how it's run. So something like the local national 
distinction, we consider that sacrosanct. Um, something like keeping big money out of politics 
and leveling the playing field. We consider that very important, uh, that then the, the, what I 
would then suggest is the question about how do we actually achieve that. That then becomes, 
uh, something that probably could be done with a beefed up electoral commission. Um, and I 
think the problem they, they, they really have at the moment or my understanding, and again, I 
know you're hearing from them, uh, later when this evidence session is that they are very under 
resourced. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​28:31 ​) 
Um, they have faced a number of challenges that I don't think that the legislation that created 
them was ever envisaged to cope with. Um, and, and of course the problem is that in order to fix 
that, they need new legislation. But of course it's a notoriously difficult area to regulate on, uh, 
and to legislate on. Uh, so I mean, my thought would be, you know, they are doing some very 
good things such as those definitions about local and national, but they need more resources. 
They need more expertise in different areas. And I think also the possibility of inter agency 
cooperation. I think is very important as well. So for example, these questions, these gray areas, 
what's ICO and what's electoral commission? Um, is there the possibility of pooling expertise at 
specific moments, uh, between these agencies and how well they can work together? Um, I 
actually sat on a commission that the LSE did the, the T3 commission, which was truth trust and 
technology and the end result of that was we advocated a new, a new regulator, um, for social 
media platforms, which would have a high level of expertise in these sorts of spaces. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​29:36 ​) 
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And again, it would be, I think quite easy to imagine a close or a succumbent between that sort 
of regulator and the electoral commission to provide them with the kind of fire power they need 
in a space where it does require a high level of expertise. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​29:55 ​) 
Just turning it a little bit then to the institutional capacity of the ICO and the Electoral 
commission, you talk about interagency cooperation. Did you see a potential role for the 
National Crime Agency? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​30:12 ​) 
That's an interesting thought. I mean it takes me slightly outside my area of expertise in terms of 
sort of criminal proceedings or legal proceedings. Um, I think one thing that is quite your to 
struck me in watching the past three years, um, of electoral shenanigans playing out is the 
extent to which it clearly it is a criminal offense, but in some ways it's almost been 
decriminalized that's not quite the right word, but in the sense of there's a very clear distinction 
between the electoral commission investigation and the criminal investigation, which in some 
ways softens the, certainly the public impact of these rulings. And something I certainly thought 
this, and again, I'm not a lawyer and a lawyer may well tell me this is a really bad idea, but 
something that struck me is that, uh, on the day the electoral commission released its report into 
the vote leave, uh, findings. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​31:07 ​) 
Well, they didn't actually get to release their report, of course the report was leaked in advance 
of them releasing it. And it struck me that why on earth or if it was found out who was 
responsible for this, does the electoral commission not have the power to hold them in 
contempt? Um, because clearly they were trying to seek a mediated advantage by leaking this 
information in advance. So I, I, I certainly, I, I don't quite know how the national crime agency 
would, would fit into this, but I certainly think there's an interesting question about whether this 
should be a more criminalized space, um, because I think that would change the nature of the 
public discourse around it as well. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​31:40 ​) 
Yes, and there are examples in other countries of course where it's within the remit of the - in 
the United States, within the remit of the FBI, so you know, you've got with that, um, 
 
Lord Tyler: (​31:55 ​) 
has it been at a nonsense rate and its opponents for awhile? Oppression. But we have two quite 
different statutes. One takes you in one direction and one the other parent goes in one direction. 
And the RPA, the RPA one is the lungs very beginning to the threadbare because it's taking so 
long to fit and the commission is always arguing this should come together in their interest. 
[inaudible] but the sad fact is that that would require quite major, uh, amalgamation of, to follow 
fiddly bits of legislation. So the likelihood of us getting guns shoot this short Brexit is this 
[inaudible] it's big job. Um, but the point I think that the commission has made and could be 
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dealt with in practice is that that past of fighting over community Christie in Eh, out of days, the 
information commissioner can go count what percentage but client consent or some money and 
individual, uh, um, things going wrong that could add an extra commission. You need to go 
through 2000. Well, if you're in the business of spending two or 3 million on something and who 
cares? [inaudible] that's upset, isn't it? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​33:13 ​) 
Oh, I completely agree. And I think it's, I think it's this, this junction between the possibility of 
deterrents and incentives. So actually the possibility of spending vast sums of money in 
nefarious and illegal ways is much, much higher, but the penalties for doing so have not moved 
in line with that. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​33:29 ​) 
I'm looking forward to the next big, uh, democratic event, which could be a general election, 
could be at another referendum. What do you think are the biggest challenges? Do you, do you 
think that there's a serious risk of, uh, some of the long journey? Okay, I'll go into here. Do you 
see any up that tighter regulation of this? 
 
Speaker 4: (​34:00 ​) 
Why are we heading full? Yeah, the same. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​34:05 ​) 
Um, I think many of the fundamental problems still remain. Uh, I think we have. Um, so I, I think 
they all have different, different contexts. I think that's important to say as well. Actually, I think 
the particular storm we got in 2016 was the consequence of having a referendum. In other 
words, a, an event where, um, voters didn't have traditional party allegiances in a clear way. So 
they were maybe more open to being persuaded and also an event where essentially, um, you 
didn't have the democratic safety valve of being held accountable for what you said. Because 
obviously in an election you can lie as much as you want, but then the election can sort of take 
their vengeance on you afterwards in a referendum. That's much, much harder to do. So, so you 
lose that democratic safety valve. So I think a referendum is a particularly problematic political 
environment for these, these risks. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​35:02 ​) 
Um, but I think the fundamentals are still problematic. The electoral emission doesn't have the 
resources, it doesn't have the power. There are still these very non non-traffic transparent, um, 
online, but also offline environments. I mean, as I said, we don't know how someone sees a 
Facebook ad. We don't really know how someone gets a leaflet through their door either and the 
data processes that lead to that. Um, and we may be slightly more aware of these things. So for 
example, I think again, if you, if you had someone from Facebook here, I can't speak for them, 
but I suspect they would say we've done a lot of work on, into increasing the electoral security of 
our systems. So things like fake news will be much more controlled. And that, of course is 
welcome. But then on the other hand, do we feel entirely comfortable with a, a multinational 
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private company taking these sorts of decisions about what things the sensor and what not 
sensor. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​35:51 ​) 
So you may see some improvements, you may still see some fundamentals in place, but I'll, I'll 
make another point, which I think goes back to the original, the very opening point I made, 
which is institutions have to both be trusted or have to work and be seen to work. And I think we 
now have potentially such a significant crisis in confidence in our regulatory institutions that 
whatever outcomes this referendum or election would generate would be contested, potentially 
would be undermined. And that could come from either side. It could come from a politically the 
left or the right or whatever kind of combination of forces we might imagine. Um, so there's, 
there's a rhetorical risk here as well as an actual regulatory risks that undermines confidence in 
our institution. 
 
Speaker 3: (​36:36 ​) 
Coming in terms of what you think the biggest risks are, I mean clearly the word [inaudible], but 
there's also the fact that quite dodgy phonation seem to be passed around as fat for you. 
Where's the biggest threat? Or is it just a combination of all the, 
 
Nick Anstead: (​37:05 ​) 
I think, yeah, I mean I, I think, I think it's a great question. I think the, the issue that I would see 
as the biggest threat are a combination of the various things we've discussed. So this might be 
political party seeking to bend the law to actually absolutely breaking point. It might be 
unaccountable extra party groups or groups of activists actually breaking the law. Um, it might 
be international actors seeding content and creating polarization, um, but they are all 
simultaneously, causes of something far more dangerous, which is growing mistrust, an 
instability in the institutional arrangements that we used to run elections. And I also think, I 
suppose just a good, my, my very strong view, and I hope it's come across in what I've been 
saying is I do think we need to really urgently revisit electoral regulation how we do it. But I 
suppose there was also a slight risk of a sort of dangerous dogs act effect as well, which is the, 
in the rust, Russ, the rush to regulate, we ended up drafting bad regulation or regulation that is 
designed to cope with the last crisis but doesn't necessarily provide the regulators with the tools 
they need for whatever unforeseen scenario. And this I guess goes back to the, the, the, the, 
the point that elections are unnecessarily infrequent, high risk events. And so actually we need 
to provide institutions that are robust enough and strong enough and flexible enough to cope 
with unforeseen challenges. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​39:02 ​) 
You mentioned this a t freedom trust and the truth trust and the technology and the key 
recommendation was to create a, an agency, um, regulation board. Can you just say a little bit 
more about your proposal? Was it, uh, and all singing or dancing? So looking at everything from 
fake news to foreign money to data targeting, to these issues about where the spending should 
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be allocated for the whole [inaudible] you're sort of saying let's merge ICO functions and actual 
commission functions. Even the NCA functions on the one [inaudible] 
 
Nick Anstead: (​39:39 ​) 
no, not quite. If you'd like, I can send a copy of the report that we produced and it was produced 
with my colleagues in the Department of Media and communications. Um, so we'd actually 
covered a wide, wide range of different areas. So, so my colleague Daymond Tambien, who's 
interested in regulation, my colleague Sanya Livingstone, who's interested in child protection. 
Um, but the key point was it wouldn't be a replacement for those regulators. It would be a 
particular regulator that focused on platforms, um, and the, the, the potential harm they could do 
in different, uh, in different areas. Um, but the key point was it would be a, it wouldn't be 
self-regulatory, but it wouldn't be government. It would be autonomous of government. Uh, but 
what it would do is have the power to actually, - and the expertise - to work with the platforms in 
terms of the types of content people were seeing. Uh, so essentially access to the algorithms 
and the mode of content organization, which is the hugely nontransparent bit that we don't really 
understand. And it means that so many of the conversations we're having about this are quite 
nebulous because we kind of have an assumption that there might be certain problems. Actually 
there might - these problems might not exist. We just, we just don't know cause we can't get the 
empirical data. And so it'd be a UK agency, 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​40:54 ​) 
the UK. So it would, it would engage with the platforms and say, right, we need to know how 
you're working around things and how much duration your content is covering and who's being 
targeted. Right. And do you have any sense of, I mean, I'm assuming the response from the 
platforms to that would be negative? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​41:18 ​) 
Um, well I, yes, yes. Um, I think, I think you think 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​41:24 ​) 
the government could legislate [inaudible] would the way, would that agency then have the teeth 
to do that regardless of whether or not the platforms resistance? 
 
Nick Anstead: (​41:34 ​) 
I think that was, that was the, the aim of the proposal we made was to create a, uh, an agency 
that was simultaneously removed enough from government to ensure confidence that it wasn't a 
censor, but at the same time had sufficient clout and power to, uh, enforce a level of openness 
and transparency from the platforms. In terms of the various issues that we were, we were 
interested in. 
 
Lord Tyler: (​42:05 ​) 
in the shorter term, the electric commissioners, we've got the Labor government sends it out. 
There's very strong support and from my Lord, but we made absence. Certainly it was to be 
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sufficiently arms length from government to make sure that it was not going to be always 
partially pre to the the the government position. And I think this is pretty urgent stuff that we just 
got mean shorter and you or choose, we've got to try and make sure that the electrical mission 
is properly maintained and is independent because it's been a site tab pretty regularly over the 
last two, three years since the reference. And that's why I think it's really important that we keep 
our eye firmly on these immediate issues about its role, values that you're describing. It's part of 
fine and the very important need to speed up its processes, which is not his fault, it's because of 
it's then handed over to DPP and the fleet police DB, uh, in the case of individual, uh, 
constituencies. 
 
Lord Tyler: (​43:09 ​) 
So I did that. We're not [inaudible] for us to be, as it were, like there's a good to be pursuing a 
longer term objective, which took an anybody's eyes off the immediate upon, thank goodness 
the government is beginning to recognize the scale of the problem. Not least because they may 
not be able to proceeding. And drivers and Damien in an advantageous position often that I 
pointed out in our house the other day, that buzzfeed knew more about what was happening 
than the government in terms of the amount of money that was being spent online before the 
started governments, far for the European public shame. Never Delay [inaudible] Nice. That's 
pretty amazing, isn't it? Presley didn't want to know. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​43:49 ​) 
Well, let me make a point which I want to make very, very clearly, which is, um, the electoral 
commission, as you say, has come in for quite a lot of stick in the past three years. And I think a 
lot of this does come down to the nature of the investigatory process and then the way in which 
that entered into the public sphere or as a, as a, as a form of essentially debating points about 
the rights and the wrongs of the referendum. Um, but my argument would be if the electoral 
commission failed, I don't think we should see it as a failure on their part. And I don't think it's an 
argument for less electric commissioners knocking, but for more electoral commission, 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​44:27 ​) 
it's whether it would have the capabilities to do this piece of regulating platforms. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​44:33 ​) 
Do you have that capability or do you need to create a thing tailored... 
 
Nick Anstead: (​44:37 ​) 
I mean, one thing I would say, which is I do think that the idea that elections are high risk 
environments, um, is actually very true for the platforms as well. Probably more so than with 
many other issues that they have to deal with on a day to day basis. So I think, um, 
 
Nick Anstead: (​44:59 ​) 
let's put it this way. I think if you, if in the unlikely event you could get mark Zuckerberg here, I 
think if you could say to him, we have a solution that means you don't have to worry about 
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elections ever again. He probably would be quite interested in that. I think he might be less 
interested in other spaces, but I think that the, this situation with elections in various parts of the 
world has been such bad publicity for the platforms. Um, the, the, this might be one area where 
they are more amenable to working with regulators. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​45:27 ​) 
Interesting. Thank you very much for fighting. We reached out to a 12. [inaudible]. Any 
questions? Anybody? I trust? 
 
(​45:39 ​) 
Well, it's just about campaign spend and regulating that, what you thought might be the best 
way of doing that too. Speaking about real time invoicing. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​45:51 ​) 
It, it seems sensible to me if it's possible. Again, I, I mean obviously the faster you have 
transparency and the more detail you have. I mean part of the problem is that the level of detail 
we have is so, I mean, not detailed, uh, the, the, the, you know, the more information you can 
give people about where money is being spent, uh, then that's clearly a very, uh, a very, very 
good thing. And, you know, real time is also very, very good. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​46:17 ​) 
Wonderful. Thank you. 
 
Nick Anstead: (​46:23 ​) 
Oh, forget it. We participated in the T3 commission report so I can get it and have it as like 
formally submitted to the APPG as well. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​46:31 ​) 
Yeah, that's great. Great. 
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Will Moy: ( ​00:00​) 
I mean to see it today, you've obviously got some of the background on hat we're 
looking to achieve, the all party parliamentary group was established quite recently with 
a specific objective really, which is to, uh, gather evidence from experts such as yourself 
on how we can restore faith and trust both in the legislative framework that underpins, 
uh, our electoral system, but also the institutional capability to regulate that flips as a 
framework and to enforce it. Um, to that end, we've established an all party 
parliamentary group, which will seek to, uh, produce a green paper, in the autumn and 
we are taking evidence from a range of experts and we will continue to do so at least 
until uh, the summer recess. Uh, inputs will include, uh, the electoral commission and 
the ICO. Um, and we're hoping as well to get some evidence from the cabinet office, we 
confirmed stage will evidence. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:11​) 
Oh, that's great. Excellent. Excellent. Uh, so, so it's great to have you here with us. And, 
um, I, I would suggest that we ask each of you to just give a kind of an overview if you 
like or maybe a five minute pitch on what you think of the priorities, key issues, uh, 
issues that needs to be addressed, problems need to be fixed, weaknesses in the 
system. And it would great be great to hear your suggestions for how we might do that. 
We want the green paper to be full of tangible, uh, practical recommendations, uh, that 
we think can be implemented quickly because there's all sorts of things I need some 
speed in all the best because we could well be having a general election or another 
referendum or whatever it might be quite soon. So we feel that some of these things 
need to be fixed quite rapidly, which is also of course the message from the dcms select 
committee or report today. So that in a nutshell is what we're seeking to achieve. Is that 
great clear? Dionne, did you want to add anything? No, I think that's an avenue. That's 
where we are, that's what we're trying to change. So great. I don't know who'd like to go 
first? Would you like to kick us off? Yeah. Give us your, you know, the top lines. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​02:31​) 
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Okay. I will do my best. So I know that you've wanted this kind of quick win before as 
you've posited and so our response specifically to the four suggested reforms that you 
laid out, um, in a while. Um, but also just want to, I know that, um, the green paper I 
believe, and will also look at kind of next steps and, uh, more broadly as well because 
yes. Yeah. Won't just be short term, because a lot of the suggested reforms I've come 
out so far from the m d c MSA after the ICO and the electoral commission. A lot of them 
are really sensible, but a lot of them are just incredibly temporary. Um, I'm really 
concerned that a lot of those, um, amendments would actually be made redundant very 
quickly. Um, and because of that, I tried to take a step back when I'm thinking about 
how the system maybe improved because all of these issues are contextualized within, 
um, our political system, which for many years has shown signs of growing 
disenfranchisement for example. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​03:47​) 
And so, um, and the issues I've recently arisen through the Brexit campaign, but also, 
three other campaigns and in the UK just heighten, um, that, that tension, um, and, and 
that problem. And so, um, my suggestion is that, um, we do have to kind of restore faith 
and trust in the system but also have faith in the electoral outcomes because, you know, 
we, we meet and we haven't had a situation where there's been an outcome that's 
been, um, accused of being somehow faulted. Except of course, um, there's been some 
accusations in relation to Brexit, but none of it can be, um, measurable anyway cause 
it's so hard to measure influence. And that's the one question and your way. And I think 
the question should be about the values and how we ensure that the value of integrity 
within, um, within our electoral system is built in. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​04:49​) 
So making sure that we're building those really basic values of integrity, of the 
transparency of, of trust, um, and making sure that it would make sure that those 
values, that the sense of renewal reforms when that also in that allows necessarily 
degree of flexibility that even needs in order to continue to safeguards in when new, um, 
campaigning methods come in. And already we have, um, the global use of 
WHATSAPP for example, which raises issues that aren't covered in, um, the select 
committees inquiry because it's a closed network. Um, so the same level of scrutiny that 
we can afford to Facebook adverts for example or means or whatever, um, isn't 
forwarded on whatsapp. So you've, you saw it in India for example, that what's, that was 
a massive influence and there was a lot of this information, um, being spread on, on 
whatsapp. And of course, whatsapp is owned by Facebook. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​05:56​) 
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Um, and I believe that it, soon they have plans to integrate the, the messaging system 
on Facebook messenger, Instagram and lots of, I'm not sure exactly what the 
implications of that would be for, um, that's just an example of that - that I'm using to 
demonstrate how quickly we could be actually still a few steps behind on how 
technology is. Because of course with DCM, s report is very much focused on Facebook 
necessarily. So well all the forms shouldn't necessarily be restricted to documentation of 
Facebook because that assumes certain level of openness that might not be there in 
the future. 
 
Speaker 3: (​06:42​) 
Um, 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​06:48​) 
so, um, just in terms of the law is about, um, more broadly, obviously it's there, um, to 
set limits or also it's that to protect the conditions in which democratic debate can 
flourish and, um, it's that protects individual, um, agency. And so of course free speech 
is a really big part of that. And, um, the high court recently, um, quashed the summons 
against and Polished Johnson, which is perhaps a reflection of the high level protection 
for this to free speech. And I'm just concerned that some of the potent forms put a lot of 
the, um, burden on the intermediaries. Um, so for example, the digital, um, bank of em, 
so the, the um, digital imprints, um, cause that we have there that would host all of the 
adverts. It's unclear who would be the smiles for that, what the suggestions from the 
electoral, um, cushion seems to be that intermediaries who would be responsible for 
placing all of those adverts. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​08:06​) 
Um, and there's just issues about putting too much of an emphasis and too much 
responsibility upon the intermediaries, um, who are not inclined to promote, to employ 
expensive human moderators to try and determine what, what counts as campaign 
material. Is there an adequate imprint here and then categorize it as being compliant or 
not. And so there's a chance that they wouldn't say, you know, use algorithms, which 
again raises a whole host of issues. Um, particularly when we have algorithms being 
used to determine whether or not political material is a breach of the law or not. 
Especially if there are sanctions attached to any failure to comply with the critical 
requirements or any of the requirements that we might decide to build in. Um, also 
these issues in the same vein regarding, um, Facebook's, you know, the potential 
removal of political material online. So if you do have an imprint requirement for digital 
material, and if a repeated failure not to include an imprint missiles in, um, that all of that 
material were being taken down as far as it's possible under the table goes by war. 
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Bethany Shiner: (​09:35​) 
Um, can that be appealed? And what, what type of, um, um, a better see what we're 
going to see is that for, for the campaign groups affected by that too, uh, have that 
decision reviewed. So for example, in the Irish, the appeal, the eighth amendment 
referendum prior to the election, uh, diverse material taken down because this, the 
funds [inaudible] said to be from outside of Ireland, which is a fair decision. Perhaps 
thought it was taken late in the day. It was, it wasn't transparent, it wasn't consistent. So 
just thinking about going forwards, um, um, the campaign groups clearly disadvantaged, 
um, um, it's not in the vehicle in the same way. The other administrative decisions are 
beautiful. So that's just some initial issues that I just wanted to, um, to raise on. Did that. 
Wonderful. Thank you very much. Thank you. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​10:41​) 
I'll try to do a quick counter across the territory and then you can decide where you want 
to spend your time. Um, two things you should know before I begin. First step full fact is 
a charity with a cross party board of trustees. So we come at this from the point of view 
of trying to ensure informed public debate. Um, and not with any point of view about 
what the outcomes of that debate should look like. WThe other thing is that we've 
received funding from both Google and Facebook. Um, so in talking about the role of 
the Internet companies here, you might want to know that we've also been publicly very 
critical of the role of both Facebook and Google. And I think having their money and 
biting the hand that feeds us gives us quite a good platform for that. Um, but I'm happy 
to talk more about any aspects with those. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​11:22​) 
We published a report last year called tackling misinformation in an open society, 
subtitled what to do when VQ and might be worse than the disease. Um, we are very 
aware that any talk about, uh, increasing government action and action rules, um, in 
online public debate generally is a very risky area. Um, protecting the ability of citizens 
to have free conversations has to be our starting point. Um, particularly at a time when 
we know that election campaigns are not the main determinants of your vote actually 
the main determinants of your vote is what, where you are when the campaign starts. 
So when we're looking at the future of protecting our democracy from interference - its 
very hard to imagine that it's just for six weeks before the vote that you need to be 
talking about. We probably need to be talking about the whole time and that increases 
the risks of these conversations. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​12:19​) 
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In tackling this, tackling this information in an open society, we identify two things that 
we thought can and should be done urgently. Um, this was last year. They have not 
been done and they are more urgent than ever. The first is extending the imprint rule 
online. That's well covered. The Cabinet Office is now more or less in a space where 
they're willing to do it, but they do need more political impetus to actually get on and do 
it. Um, the second is advertising transparency. Um, I'll probably go into that in more 
depth at some point, but you probably know that the Internet companies are making 
moves to establish a transparency of online advertising. The Internet companies I am 
referring to being Facebook and Google creating data bases of online political 
advertising. They are doing this in order to set the terms of what those databases 
contain. Um, and the transparency in their offering is completely inadequate. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​13:13​) 
What we need is complete transparency of the content of advertising, the targeting of 
advertising, the amount of spend and the amount of reach. And if you don't have all four 
of those ingredients, you don't have meaningful transparency. That all needs to be 
available in machine readable format so that computers can monitor it automatically. 
The reason why is that in the u s election last time, according to an internal Facebook 
paper lead to Bloomberg, Donald Trump's campaign ran 5.9 million different adverts. If 
we are generating advertising at computer speed, we have to be able to manage 
accountability at computer speed too. We can either ban the kind of advertising that is 
normal now or in a political context that's completely legitimate. We banned TV political 
advertising for years, but we either do that or we have to accept that we have to have 
machine readable computer powered accountability for computer generated advertising. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​14:15​) 
Um, so machine-readable full transparency of advertising content targeting recounts, 
Plan. The targeting is the targeting of a spend of a to where the Internet companies are 
most keen to avoid proper transparency. Obviously the spenders, their business model, 
if you read their regulatory filings, they both say explicitly -most of them say that we 
substantially, all of our revenue comes from advertising is for quote, these are 
advertising businesses. They don't want to let on their prices, they don't want to let on 
that auction models. On targeting similarly, if you knew the way election ads were 
targeted, you wouldn't be horrified, truly horrified and I mean you all know your own 
campaign some of what can be done. If you think about scaling that up to 5.9 million 
adverts and if you think about the inevitability of us election tactics being learned by UK 




Will Moy: ( ​15:07​) 
This is a space which desperately needs more transparency and mainly direct 
intervention as to what is and is not allowed. That's obviously a decision of principle and 
therefore not really for us but it's certainly a reasonable question to be asking. So those 
are the two immediate moves that must be made. A Trans um, transparency campaign, 
which was a digital imprint rule and transparency of advertising properly and not the 
half-baked version that the internet companies wants to do. There's a third thing we are 
getting very good at talking about the whack-a-mole version of protecting democracy 
from uh, interference, um, both potentially by domestic actors and by hostile state 
actors. We have to think about a world in which everybody is exposed to thousands of 
different sources of information and it is almost impossible to reasonably judge where 
you can and cannot place your faith. In that world we need to accept that there is 
greater fog around information than there used to be in a world where everybody 
watched the BBC nine and 10 o'clock news and there were 4 TV channels and 10 
newspapers and that was about it when it came to reaching millions of people. In this 
world, you can reach millions of people without the other millions of the electorate even 
knowing you're doing it. And thousands, if not tens of thousands of sources can reach 
very large numbers of voters. And when you take that down to the individual 
constituency, you don't have to reach very large numbers of voters to be influential. In 
that context of information fog, we need brighter beacons to cut through. We need to be 
providing reliable information that people feel able to trust. In that context, it is perverse 
that the purdah rules around elections insist that our public information bodies like the 
Office for National Statistics, the House of Commons Library, uh, the Office for budget 
responsibility, far from being out there informing the voters who pay for them, are told to 
sit down and shut up. I mean that is essentially self harm at this point. We have these 
resources, they are available to us and we're asking them not to inform our elections. I 
find that extraordinary. That is a very simple change that should be made. So those are 
the, if you like the easy wins on transparency, the harder winds are on spending. Um, 
now that you can run a national advertising campaign, which is in fact you had radically 
targeted and it doesn't have to be explicitly geographically targeted to be geographically 
targeted. To take a horrible cliche, and I do apologize if you target people who drink 
own brew and your advertising, you are probably more likely to get more of a Scottish 
audience than an English audience. You don't have to target children fee to get 
geographical audience and advertising companies make their fortunes understanding 
these linkages. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​17:54​) 
Um, so how do you understand where spend goes in this modern world? That's a real 
question about transparency. Our current campaign, uh, transparency and 
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accountability system is all based on spend and it's based on the split between national 
and constituency spending. That essentially does not seem to me to be very tangible 
anymore. The distinction is obviously important but how you maintain that seriously I 
think is a question that needs more thought from people like yourself with experience 
with actually running election campaigns. The other area of transparency which is 
difficult is coordination. We've obviously seen high profile examples of this being 
disputed as to what coordination has existed between different campaigns, between 
campaigns and overseas access and so on. Those suspicions are going to grow and 
grow and grow with every public vote we have. There is no meaningful way that we can 
maintain the law that has existed in this country for most of a hundred years, the lord 
haw-haw rule that you cannot broadcast from outside the UK with an intent to influence 
the UK election. That is over now in the age of Youtube. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​19:03​) 
And we have to think therefore what transparency can we have about interactions 
between UK campaigners and overseas actors and what accountability can we 
introduce? And that brings us onto the second strand I was asked to talk about which is 
deterrence, which is by far the hardest in some ways I don't see, and I am now not 
saying full facts position - I'm just - you know, one of our roles is to inform a 
conversation that you need to have. To me, I'm struggling to see a route that doesn't 
involve greater levels of individual accountability factions during election campaigns. It's 
one thing to have a transparency and regulatory system like the electoral commission. 
But if the question is how have you gone to a foreign oligarch and asked them to 
bankroll your campaign when the law says you shouldn't, I'm not sure where 
accountability can sit except at the individual level there. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​19:56​) 
So I think there are really hard questions as to what deterrence and accountability and 
liability look like given the nature of the threats that are going to be growing in parts of 
the system. And then finally, uh, the third strand I was also talking about was 
monitoring. And this is where I think we have an easier answer. Sections five and six of 
the political parties elections referendum act already mandate the electoral permission 
to report on every election that happens and to maintain a watching brief and to report 
when it wants to on a whole list of topics including anything to do with elections that it 
wants to do a report on. One of the things explicitly in that list in section six is, um, 
digital advertising and political advertising. The electoral commission hasn't done this 
because the electoral commission is staffed of resources. It doesn't have the time or the 
expertise to engage in those questions seriously. I would have thought one of the 
simpler wins that would be available is to allocate a pot of money to the electoral 
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commission to create the team that would be doing this kind of insight work because, 
with great respect to myself and our fellow panelists, you shouldn't just be relying on us. 
There should be a much greater body of work and much greater body of evidence, a 
much greater source of analysis that we can all lean on and the electoral commission 
has a statutory responsibility to do that but not the funding. Part of increasing that 
funding must be that they get a tech team that is meaningful, that actually works in the 
21st century. The recommendation that this group is pondering about reporting 
campaign spending online should be a statement of the obvious. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​21:33​) 
Of course we should be doing that. Of course we should be doing it in something very 
close to real time. Of course we should be doing that in high resolution detail. That's just 
the 21st century. The fact that the electoral commission is so far off the mark technology 
wise, the fact that our entire election system is so far off the mark, that we don't have a 
sensible accumulation of election results, of election spending, of election candidates in 
one place as open data is astonishing and it's the result of, well, a couple of decades of 
neglect essentially. We just need to fund that stuff. It's not difficult to do. And in fact 
some of it is now being done by charities and volunteers, but it shouldn't have to be, it 
should be baked into a system. So that's the high level view. Um, and the quick view, 
oh, just wanted to expand very quickly on advertising. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​22:19​) 
I think the, you know, you've all run election campaigns and you will know how this is 
changing, but I don't think the extent of the change is very obvious to most people and I 
think it needs a lot of education. We are not talking when we're talking about digital 
advertising, about billboards that everybody sees. We're talking about you go to a 
website and an auction happens immediately where people use data from your 
computer, data from your past, browsing history data from the social media network and 
data from other brokers that they might be able to get hold of labor credit networks to 
automatically design and deliver an envelope that is personalized to you. And then they 
crack what else you interact with and they might deliver a second followup app three 
days later, which is related to that. This the collective term for this dynamic content 
optimization, and it is a totally different understanding of advertising, than you stick an 
ad in a newspaper or a billboard. Your side can see it, their side can see it and 
everybody can have an argument about it. That's an election. That's an open 
democracy. That's what we want. You can argue about the money side, but these 
closed ads, these dark ads that the other side can't see and respond to for nobody can 
scrutinize the fact checkers are locked out of, they are a real threat. So the idea of an 
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election must be a shared experience for it to be a democratic experience. So that's my 
starting for. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​23:46​) 
Thank you very much. Really, really interesting for me. Very. Thank you very much. I'd 
like to kick off with a weird question and then hand it over to you, to yourself, just me on, 
on this, um, the point you made about digital imprint back and, uh, the burden of 
responsibility being placed on him, the intermediaries by which I guess you mean the 
platforms, so Facebook, Twitter, Google, um, and that they're not inclined to employ 
human beings to, uh, to regulate that bank. What, is that something they've said 
explicitly or do you think that, that, that's still up for grabs in terms of forcing them to, uh, 
to do that? Or actually, is there also an broader question of principle, which is, should 
they be doing it or should that be left? Should that be given to the electoral commission 
as a function? 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​24:45​) 
Well, um, they, I mean, in Germany's example, they have the, the, the hates, um, the 
hate crime law, um, per se. Yeah. And the M Facebook employees, most people in 
Germany that as a consequence of that local cause it has such a heavy sanction. I'm 
not going into the the merits of the law individually. So it's possible that they would 
employ human moderators but, um, indication so far, um, suggests that they would 
obviously much prefer to automate it. And um, a lot of, there's more regulation, these 
types of things that all are automated. Um, and if you want to read a bit more [inaudible] 
you can, if you look at the UN special reparative freedom of expression, David Kane, 
he's written quite extensively about the providence and the risks associated with you 
single to make sure to um, monitor and regulate political speech. Um, because in any 
attempts to regulate political speech from, there's a division between lawful content and 
own more for content that is such a high risk that lawful content will be swept into that 
matter as far alongside some before content. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​26:00​) 
So that's the primary, um, concerned with it. It doesn't necessarily arise. It depends on 
what the rules are and what the requirements are with regards to this imprint sort of 
requirement. and I know that the, um, cut this consultation at the moment and there's 
been no response to the protecting the debates, um, from the government and they said 
that the work count the technicalities of this policy, but it's just something to be being 
lazy, really careful about. Um, and also needs to be clear about what content would 
actually fall in to that increased requirement. Is it paid for content, not paid for content? 
There's so much content which is organic. Um, is it grass roots content that obviously is 
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half the size of Grenfell tower for example. That's a grassroots movement, but he's, you 
know, explicitly politicized issue because housing has become a bit of size issue. Um, 
so just, just those types of examples make it clear that it's actually a bit more 
complicated and depends on where the lines are drawn. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​27:04​) 
Um, uh, certainly this, um, I suppose this question, or at least this merit in thinking about 
both or not market targeted efforts should be bounced completely online. Um, so you're 
not content, not, um, not just, just only market targeted content. So at the moment 
Microsoft [inaudible], there's nothing will move forward with them. The unlawfulness 
arises when they infringe. Um, direct marketing, um, regulations and data protection 
regulations in my analysis, the, the primary consent data protection. So micro-targeting 
often violates data protection law in several ways. Um, but that doesn't mean that this 
fundamentally, um, anything wrong with them outside of those issues. So, but the, the 
does not be the in consideration of whether or not you still want [inaudible] in school too. 
Um, and I think it's worth just thinking about that even if it's little dark. Um, um, you will 
think no for these reasons actually we want to maintain this form of pre school 
communication. And then you asked me something else, I forgot some what it is. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​28:22​) 
Uh, no, no, I think that was it really. It was just about more specifically about what the 
responsibility of the platform should be. Um, and the extent to which that should be with 
the electoral commission or whether it should be there. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​28:35​) 
Yeah. Maybe we say actual commission, they've said that they're not what, um, some 
kind of truth and quietly, but she's fair enough because, um, the issues here isn't the 
content necessarily constitutes of material. Um, cause once we get into content and it's 
very, very enticing to focus our attention on the content of materials, but I think that 
initially at least we should really be focusing, focusing on the mechanisms of um, 
communication that skews debate or um, shares disinformation on this automated way. 
So the trial calms the box over methods of amplification. So it's the method of the 
communication that the content, um, did that shore commission could, um, could be a 
position to regulate the methods of communication without having to engage in the 
truthfulness of the content itself. Well, um, a lot of the electoral commissions were 
formed so far are just small tweaks to what is an archaic system and not at all. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​29:52​) 
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Um, um, yes, some of that it may be down to resources. I don't know if it's also down to, 
you know, the attitudes or whether the disease to be complete shakeup. And we just 
really need to accept that our whole approach to elections has changed. And that goes 
back to the building in the principles and the values of integrity within our election. Um, 
not just in terms of governance and parliament session and so forth, but in terms of the 
information that we're receiving and the ways in which people make decisions, um, the 
information they're relying on to make those decisions. Um, and the way that the 
representatives communicate, um, in a communication between elected representatives 
and those big represents represented has to be, you know, open, honest, transparent 
that, that, that and that can sort of integrity has to come through. So, um, I think the 
electoral commission itself probably needs a bit of a reform, not just the laws that is 
meant to be monitoring it and enforcing. Yeah. Yeah. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​30:59​) 
And I mean, as you pointed out, fine point. Knowing media adverts views by Trump, 
how, and you sort of said, well that would probably, that presents for the choice 
between either banning the use of these adverts at all because it's such, the volume is 
such that it's impossible to regulate for, to make it machine readable and to have digital 
regulation capability. Which, which of those two options would you favor? 
 
Will Moy: ( ​31:34​) 
Well, she finally intervened. I think we've got this problem now than the past and now 
you've got the transparency confer plays two sides to the same coin via elections. And 
in the past, in the old days you could see fairplay and transparency because someone 
puts a leaf for that same photo for Stephen connecting in his constituency, a photo labor 
in this constituency and accounts against the limit and the live it now might be a clock 
and say 50,000 pounds or something like that. What's changed is you are very 
eloquently describing is that while that is all transparent, what's not transplanted, the 
sake of argument, 200,000 pounds worth of Facebook adverts talk to people with post 
codes in your constituency. So once your party, say for example, the Conservative 
Party wants to say, you've got to stop Jamie Coughlin becoming prime minister, you 
must vote conservative. And it doesn't actually put the name of the Conservative Party 
candidate into the advert. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​32:31​) 
It doesn't need to, but it can see you must have been conservative to stop him from 
becoming prime minister and it can do to 2000 pounds with a f that measure 5,000 
pounds worth of adverts into one constituency and it doesn't count against the limit. So I 
think the way to try to get the transparency and the first play is we need to be able to 
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say that if you're using data in this way, this, I think it is a neater solution than I, the two 
things you were proposing that actually if a party spends money on targeted advertising, 
which we mean Google or Facebook in a constituency using data belonging to 
individual voters within their constituency based on the post code, it must count against 
the limit of expenditure within that constituency because all the expensive limits are 
completely negated at the minute. There will be an attempt by the Conservatives to put 
forward the Craig McKinley. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​33:26​) 
I'm calling a bill Craig Mckinleyville, his Conservative Party campaign headquarters 
person, but you did get prosecuted and would have gone to jail, but for the ill health, for 
her husband, for Conservative Party national expenditure, uh, supposedly in the fan of 
south constituency to get Craig [inaudible], Craig McKinley elected rather than Nigel 
Farage. And they were caught out of actually doing what should have been constituents 
expenditure and call it a national expenditure. But actually the fact that this was going 
on in hundreds of seats didn't touch you get 10 minutes tanks from the police. Cause 
they said, well, you know, okay they're doing these Facebook adverts, but that's all 
national expenditure. And the electoral commissioners say, well actually the 2000 
legislation political parties election through a friend of the actually allows them to do 
national expenditure. And if it's national expenditure up to the 20 million limits for a party 
standing 600 candidates, you can theoretically spend 20 million in one seat if you want. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​34:20​) 
So the whole principle of being more than buying the election, the purpose of the 1883 
legislation to say you can't buy a seat and [inaudible] has all gone because it was social 
media advertisers. And the way in which I think to regulate it properly and make it 
transparent is to say if you are doing children, all the parties do the parties narrow. 
Basically using the Ellipta register across all of Scotland or across all of good Britain or 
in Northern Ireland. They're basically getting all of that data and they're getting from 
Expedia, whatever we used to get from returning officers in Indian Wells, it's 405 
battalion officers. We used to get it from all of them and then arguing [inaudible] but now 
actually we realizing that people like speed, you do this anyway cause that's what 
they're doing for credit card companies because credit card companies won't be able to 
verify the address. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​35:08​) 
So if experience, I've acquired the 400 sets of where just as fitting in the whales, you 
might as well go for experience and get it from them. You get it from them and it's 
postcode linked. So you know, for example, if you're in sw nine you're in the box, all 
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constituency. So actually if you want to say, so the your log in, did you want to get Keto 
way out? You can do 2000 pounds worth of adverts and to estimate you nine swa 
tested before whatever it is, and there's no limit on that. So I think the best way of 
regulating cattail is to say the law must be clear and I think it's good clients, a change in 
the law to the 2002 selections where Phantom Act, I've talked to the commission about 
this, they say great. In principle, if you're having a limited and considered to expenditure 
a targeted expenditure, whether it's direct mail, telephone calls, or social media 
advertising should be within the contingency limit. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​36:01​) 
But the saying that the 2000 legislation allows this concept of party spending. So 
providing the advice that goes out to your constituents. He doesn't say don't vote for 
Steve and connect or do red for Steven Kennedy. It's appropriate to the design label of 
a consensual vote. [inaudible] for these reasons and you bust the whole limit. So I think 
one of the clearest things we ought to try and do to regulate this is, so that sort of tied to 
expenditure must be the consensus limit, but that will deliver to commission. Lawyers at 
least say the climate change legislation. I'm not so convinced it doesn't quite change the 
legislation because I think if I spend money running a campaign to try and get Stephen 
King, the Cagney's constituency, the fact that I don't put the name of my Arctic Canada 
knowledge shouldn't really mean it doesn't count against expenditure. That's the code. 
Yeah. Yeah. But that is how the electoral commission on interpreting on thirdly legal 
advice, the 2000 legislation at the minute, which led a massive loophole and the entire 
system. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​36:58​) 
Hmm. Would you agree with that? Do you think so? Well, I think if you look at the set of 
leavers you have, one of them is about what kinds of appetising are available. Um, 
banning TV advertising decision that was taken decades ago. It's almost over now. 
Online video is a free for all and there's no reason to think about online videos less 
influential than television. Um, and actually even on the numbers now, no reason to 
think that, um, one is about campaign spending. I agree with most of what all ran outset. 
Um, with, uh, two caveats. I think one is that, uh, attributes, the effects of adverse to 
geography is more than about targeting atrophy. Um, if you advertise to fans that would 
lead to an FC, you get people who live in Luton. Um, so there are plenty of ways to work 
around, um, a strict geographical, um, basis for, uh, tracking campaigns. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​37:56​) 
Oh, that's your arm [inaudible] yeah, exactly. How do you, how do you regulate that? I 
don't know. This is really hard. I mean, parties will do that. I mean I get lots of stuff 
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advertising most salar t-shirts because I will have like some things on Facebook. I'd look 
for football club, my team. So yes, you can do things like that. And actually I'm in the 
Gong geographic group because you know, I live in Eastborne or in London. I don't 
have a vote in Liverpool but they can target me in that way. But I can tell you that all the 
political parties and I think possibly the s and p were Copass in leading the world. Some 
of this in terms of data management, let's to actually say that all build up this data and 
then they will, they will all live the data to constituencies because, um, the Lib Dems 
probably won't waste our money in your constituency, but we might've been dominant in 
Richmond Park. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​38:47​) 
So actually we were not wanting to target, um, say loophole supporters living in London 
or in Eastborne we will want the postcode and it is by the political parties or match the 
electoral register. So this is what Cambridge Analytical doing very cleverly for the leave 
campaigners matching electric registered data. So you actually matched up with voters 
cause cause a lot of people, there's another issue who are honoring their register but 
should be, but they're not interested in them because they haven't got a vote cause 
they're not on the register. And you only want to go in an election for the module seats 
now. So actually, even though you might see in target earned group or LFC supporters, 
the parties do postcodes. So my view is that commission should be able to police assist 
them and which parties are limited in their expenditure in specific constituencies. And if 
they say, well actually we don't keep a record, this is what probably UKIP would do if we 
don't keep a record of which constituency we're genuinely going for Luton town 
supporters. Well we'll say you must have a record of which voted, you're talking with 
seeds and this must be limited. And it is a nonsense. He was in 15,000 pounds saying, 
you know, vote for the wonderful MP or get the NP out. We want to change, but there's 
no limit. Hundreds of thousands of pounds can be spent on social media advertising. It 
should all be limited, but there's an interest and it could be policed. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​40:12​) 
There's an interesting addition you could make to the transparency about advertising 
there which is to say that the campaign has to give a reason for for targeting choice it 
and that it would be an offense to um, dishonestly, give a reason for the targeting 
choice, which would do something to create a harder link between those constituency 
level choices and what is done right. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​40:35​) 
It is all after the election audiences. And what else was trying to stop abuse during it if 
you can. And I would say if a expenditure has to be targeted in such a way as it's 
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transparent, this is the cumulative transparency. It's got to be transparent as to which 
consumer two goes to. So the arguments and what are seats in the 2015 German 
election where you could send 200 young conservatives and coaches to a constituency 
or with a script saying, vote conservative in this constituency and you obviously only do 
it and the consistencies you interested in, you didn't get too into doing conservatives in 
your seat, but the Vince cable, they didn't tricking them. But this was, oh, this is the 
national campaign. We weren't interested in Vince cable and tricking them. We were 
only campaign with the Conservative Party. But why did the coaches send 200 young 
conservatives that took some kids [inaudible] and another leaflets or put them in 
premiere ins and travel lodges and equivalent and all given free meals and beer, et 
cetera. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​41:31​) 
Big expenditure but not on the constituency. So I think just get transparency into back 
into the system, which is what Gladston said. We had to have an 1873 to repeat 
yourself. We have to go back to the level of which this national campaigning, if it's 
targeted for a seat, that's clearly constituency expenditure. If perhaps you do an advert, 
say in the Scotsman, you might say, well actually that's covering all of Scotland. So 
actually it's not a particular state or the my child go down with the scholars have small 
edge and grow the herald traditional is more, ideally I'd worry less about something like 
that. But I would say if there's a link between the consumer's identifiable, and actually I 
think it applies to phone calls and phone banks and applies to direct mayor here in the 
last or willing to certainly 2015 journal auction. Uh, David Cameron and Samantha 
Cameron were writing two days apart to people in marginal seats. Now they weren't 
from across the whole country, so have a conservative, but I know people in the 
bathroom, you see the letter from Samantha Cameron say, you know, they've got one 
from David County two days earlier. Then they got a letter from Samantha camera 
saying, you need to vote conservative in this seat because my husband has got to win 
this seat to be prime minister and stop the liberals to the SNP. And the lame, the 
ganging up on US [inaudible] campaign had about 1 million letters and I knew him 
personally. I was charged to [inaudible] from memory. [inaudible] 
 
Will Moy: ( ​42:59​) 
mentioned the candidates and then I tried to get it as national expenditure. Yeah. In 
2017 the electric commission, I think with very foolishly advice, you could mention the 
name of the constituency. So like in 2017 people were saying in tricking the news, I've 
now got them to change their own guidelines. That is not published yet, but they'd 
guidance will say, if you mentioned the name of the constituency, it must be attributed. 
But my view is if you say you must vote conservative and you need to vote conservative 
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for these reasons or whatever, but it's targeted to a constituency as opposed to the 
whole country. And then I think the whole Daily Mail is probably a national conservative 
party ad it in elections. But it's a bit hard to say our mayor and should be probably don't 
have too many of them. And you also, you said, well no, absolutely loads of people read 
the daily [inaudible] and I come from, they don't get the sun for obvious reasons. 
[inaudible] 
 
Will Moy: ( ​43:53​) 
and actually that's one good thing about low problem perhaps where Liverpool voted 
with mailing because we don't have the son who little call it, you know, boycotted. But I 
think it's impossible to try and say national newspapers like that should count in 
constituencies. I think it does raise social media, the rest die mail and telephone calls 
from phone backlinks, because if you're bringing someone, you do not ring every voter 
across different little 45 million UK electors, so the low party wins. We don't try to own 
the 53 million votes about Scotland, something like that. It's five total five point points 
you do in 5.3 million doesn't make sense. Listen, we need do that, but you will 
 
Will Moy: ( ​44:32​) 
ruin all the people you do to get emotional seats, so if you're going to fill the marginal 
seats, that should count [inaudible]. Yeah, and all of our campaigns stay where the 
liberals are there adequate, be transparent about it. Then some billionaire from Russia 
or America just stones to spend money on a particular issue. Let's talk about opportunity 
particular issue with this question. Where do you feel on one side of the debate and let's 
make it much more prominent here in the Alexian campaign? Anyone can do that. 
There's absolutely nothing stopped them doing it and it will have effects on elections. 
The thing about online campaigning is it's a fact thing about election campaigns in 
general is where they have marginal the facts. They don't fundamentally change voters 
opinions usually. But there are many marginal constituencies which swing on marginal 
facts. If you can depress or increase turnout among a particular group, which is a 
completely plausible communications go, um, then you can merely try to have an effect 
on election. You can do this for political ends, you can do it for financial ads. You can do 
it to get an MP you would like to see in the house or out of the house, in all out. You can 
do it because it will move markets in a way that you can exploit. There are an awful lot 
of incentives for people outside of the UK to have skin in the game. That's just going to 
be the new normal now from now on. Bethany wants to come here. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​45:59​) 
Yeah. In response to that. Um, there was quiet minutes, um, currently from Facebook to 
um, you know, um, prove your eye location for example, before you can, um, have paid 
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for advertisements in relation to specific speak, easy to, to change that. Um, so having, 
you know, do you can change your IP address in with VPN. Okay, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​46:25​) 
no, nine to two do political advertising on Facebook. Now you literally have to send 
them a copy of your passport. I know, because I'm literally doing the payments so the 
full fat can run ads. It's an absolute pain in the that and I went, okay, 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​46:37​) 
who has session? Who has to send the passport? Is it everybody who's an Admin on 
the account? But potentially could still be ways around that. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​46:49​) 
Yeah, you could buy people in the UK to do that for you, but that's the point of which law 
can fill the gap if you just honestly represent yourself with something in order to 
influence little action that that could very easily be Alexis offense even. Yeah. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​47:02​) 
Yeah. Well, currently the reason that that requirement, what I'm saying is the coping 
mechanisms by which we truck we're trying to exclude from an interference is through 
those platforms. So all I'm saying is that this, this [inaudible] and that yeah. [inaudible] 
you have to do something and leave it to, to the platforms. Yeah. Um, um, and then, 
um, the um, an action and local watch 
 
Will Moy: ( ​47:33​) 
it, this was about targeting first of carbs and national and local campaigning. Okay. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​47:41​) 
Yeah. I just wanted to come back. You were talking about enticing though it is to focus 
on the content of that, um, digital advertising, political advertising. But you said we 
should be focusing on the methods of communication more such as troll farms and bots 
and I'm just, how do we get round that? I mean if there's someone in, I don't know 
Kombu or something set up and big trove, um, uh, what do you call them? A troll farm or 
what foul do we get around that? 
 
Will Moy: ( ​48:11​) 
There are essentially a few different ways you can amplify messages online. One is by 
paying for it. That's your advertising. That's the conversation we've been having so far. 
Yeah. One is through automation. That's the bots and bots that, um, potentially pretend 
18 
to be human beings, potentially can have been set up several years ago who had been 
mocking up the appearance of real human activity online and are there to selectively 
amplify certain messages. One is a troll farm which is essentially paid groups of human 
beings, uh, acting online in coordinated ways. The fourth is volunteers. Um, so actually 
something like significant online campaign interventions start as groups of likeminded 
people, not on Facebook or other high profile Internet sites, but on more marginalized 
forums collectively planning to intervene in the campaign by making something go viral 
by making a particular topic takeoff. So four Chan is the most famous example of 
assault policy. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​49:18​) 
Officer Becky was in the corner who probably knows more about this. The Mesa, please 
jump in if may be good. So a four channel is a community online, which is named for its 
essentially vicious, um, misogynistic. Um, what is it for? How to just for Channel Four, 
for number four, followed by c h a m. Um, it is a sort of nihilistic community of people 
who get their kicks out of I'm mucking around with things essentially. And um, they, that 
has been the, uh, ground in which, um, election if attempts to influence elections have 
come out of that where people agree here is a line that we will all push and Erica told 
you need to push it out, here are some ready made means and off you go. And that is 
capable of sniper moving from fortune on to um, Clo, straight off Twitter trend on 
Twitter. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​50:16​) 
That couldn't happen very easily right into the mainstream media. Maybe that's a very 
easy line to draw in. There are case studies of that happening. Exactly. Well that's just a 
group of people on a point of view are hijacking the agenda in a way that wouldn't have 
been possible in the era when the political parties dominated campaigns. Behind that 
kind of thing, sometimes you get hostile state actors trying to instigate that kind of action 
and that kind of collective action or to simulate that kind of collective action. So that's 
the kind of range of, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​50:49​) 
but uh, do you have any ideas or recommendations for how that space could be 
 
Will Moy: ( ​50:53​) 
regulated more effectively? Well, actually I think you just sort of have to live with that. 
That's free speech. That was individual citizens doing, yeah. They liked you in the 
election. So you might want to talk about what happens when groups of people come 
ordinate during the election to influence all action. That's what a political party is. Yeah. 
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And it's reasonable to think that a coordinated effort to influence all action is something 
about which there might be rules. Um, but if it's just a group of people agreeing on 
something and all saying it and it's all for the police to Watson elections meant to be, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​51:28​) 
hmm. Shooting the box side is something you could because yeah, you could, you 
know, regular that and say, well this should be, this should be about human beings. 
Yeah. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​51:37​) 
You can, you can. Um, bots can be detected of thoughts, examples of thoughts with 
Internet institute. Um, they do a lot of research on, on bottom line. Um, um, I do think 
that there is, um, you know, there's a malign issue there that it's not people necessarily, 
um, cause one problem is that people would interact with something that I bot has said, 
thinking that it's a human. And so there's a huge element of deception. So it's not just 
that there's huge automated power to shape discourse and spread this information. And 
there's been so many examples of that, but it's also the deception of people thinking 
that they're engaging in a genuine, um, debate and they're actually talking to a bot 
based in it, a third country who's being paid for by someone with financial motives or 
political motives. Um, because, because our political discourse is so much more online 
than face to face, you know, be, have to think about, um, how we, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​52:39​) 
there should be a basic minimum of that. It should be human beings interacting with 
each other, not 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​52:44​) 
probably daily. Yeah, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​52:46​) 
no, both [inaudible] that would be then, uh, where you'd need legislation or you'd need 
a, a way of cracking down on that. So you would, you, could you sort of talk about the 
electoral commission for example, you said they need a tech team. Yeah. Could part of 
that tech team be bought into this [inaudible] and some of the alternatives that institutes 
the research in this area as rubbish and some of the other academic research in this 
area of rubbish? The reason 
 
Will Moy: ( ​53:13​) 
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it's harder than it sounds is that if you're outside of the Internet companies, you have to 
try and understand who are bots by looking at their behavior. So how frequently they 
post, how many times they post day, for example, what kinds of things they post, who 
else's stuff they post. That kind of thing is all used as suggestive evidence so that things 
might be bots. sometimes and frequently on the front pages of newspapers, those 
results have generated completely wrong results. Um, and when you, uh, go and talk to 
the Internet companies, they will say, yeah, some of these things are true. And then 
some of the things are actually, they turned out to be genuine political activists or when 
we looked at for login details and so on, that only they have access to, they're clearly 
not bots. What the missing ingredient is, is that even the Internet companies don't 
necessarily know when, where, and who these people are or where and who their 
accounts are. Um, so if you are using hosted computing, cloud computing, like Amazon 
services or Google cloud or anything like that to run a Bot farm, what Twitter or 
Facebook or whoever sees is the IP addresses, the Computer IP addresses of those 
hosted cloud computers. They don't see anything behind that. Who is the end user 
controlling the power computer. So nobody has visibility of the whole chain from an 
individual at one end all the way through. Um, and that makes bot hunting a difficult 
task. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​54:43​) 
Could you, could you force the, uh, the likes of Twitter to actually, as you, as you just 
said earlier, in order to do these adverts, you have to, you have to send in your 
passport. Could we, could we raise the bar significantly on what it takes to actually open 
a Twitter account? Yes. You can [inaudible] one way. It's called decision essentially 
amounts to ending anonymity online. Yeah. So that, so the big point, sorry. That's a very 
big point. Yeah. So you can either accept 
 
Will Moy: ( ​55:12​) 
that elections will be anonymous, people talking to one another and there are massive 
downsides to that. Or you can say online conversation has to be identified annual close, 
whole online communities overnight. There are lots and lots of groups of people who 
would not want to talk online using their own identities. Um, and you know, I have online 
accounts which are not in my name. I have a publicly exposed job. I want to be able to 
talk to my friends without it being blindly, blindingly obvious to a journalist where you 
can see me talking to my friends. I suspect other people in this room probably do a 
similar thing. You can make that illegal incessantly within your power, but recognize 
what a big decision it would be. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​55:58​) 
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[inaudible] so despite a strong case of that for people trying to influence elections to say 
you end anonymity, I'm trying to think about that. How would you had to identify, how 
would you every vote if you're Twitter and you say, look, we've got a, we are now going 
to make it a obligatory for anybody that wants to open a Twitter account to send as a 
passport and a piece of Id with proof of address. You know, the same way you have to 
open a bank account example. Yeah. Now that would I think inject a huge amount more 
transparency into online communications back. There's, you either have, I think you 
probably need a one size fits all. You can't, you can't say, well if you're going to be 
involved in political communication, you need to send us your passport and all that, but 
anybody else doesn't need to because it would be impossible to, I was thinking out loud 
and maybe again 
 
Will Moy: ( ​56:45​) 
there are women, I'm trying to think about, you know, the abuse just Phillips has and 
things like that or harassment or prejudice or things like that. Twitter in my experience is 
very poor. People can make an obviously defamatory, obviously very hostile. I always 
have a Harrison comments as a, this does not offend Twitter's policy, et Cetera, and 
people in politics are subject to this more than I would suggest in many other areas to 
should be. In my view. Some way, if you open up an account with Twitter, the Twitter 
can know and Twitter should have a responsibility. They should. Facebook, I think nick, 
take Brooks who trying to deny that Facebook should be responsible for this. I actually 
think these organizations have a responsibility to know who is doing these things and to 
have some sort of public guidelines about removing or taking action or you can do a lot 
of things that are clearly defamatory. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​57:34​) 
You content actually is in social media was if I put a leaf as ask me your constituency, 
so you know terribly defamatory things about you, you didn't mean to catch it against 
what you can pursue. I think it's one of, if I did an election one oh six and go send tests 
to people's act to say I said these terrible things about Steven get to stop with being 
elected and uh, it had an effect on the voters and I'm, if I'm doing this as a talented it, I 
can be disqualified for saying things like, yes, exactly brother Phil Wallace was, you 
know, disqualified. There was an attempt to have Alster Carmichael disqualified on the 
grounds of making false statements or that hums in elections, but it costs hundreds of 
thousands of pounds. I think the floodwaters case actually cost [inaudible] to the ability 
and quit and he lost his seat. This is very expensive to do but actually it seems to be the 
basics of any law about libel and defamation or political interference should require 
knowing who is saying these things. 
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Will Moy: ( ​58:30​) 
And then first things I learned, you know, 45 years ago as an agent that you produce 
any leaflets you have tried to printed and published by the bottom. Now the form of 
words is a bit modernized. You have to say who you are doing it on behalf of not just 
printed and published in a way, but it's a criminal offense and the police can be after if 
you do some that was created by the newspaper, local and registration out until the 19th 
century because the newspapers suddenly became a thing for the powers that be, were 
concerned about the powers that gave to people who weren't powerful at that time and 
they didn't want the disruptions, political debate of anyone going out and being able to 
print a newspaper, say whatever they like and potentially be on through and call it on it. 
It's almost a mirror of what happened two centuries previously when the printing press 
was essentially invented and we licensed the printing brass and said, you cannot have 
one and actually get your license first. Every time communication was, we 
 
Will Moy: ( ​59:22​) 
have this reaction allowing anonymous communication can first power to a wider group 
of people. That whole will be abused. The question you then have to go to is what price 
are you willing to pay in order to reduce the likelihood of that abuse and in the online 
era. I think that question is even harder because whilst it's quite hard to hide a printing 
press in your basement back in the 17th century, it's pretty easy to set up as a system 
that will do for same as Twitter. I can literally write it for you before the end of the day. 
So if you actually are determined to bypass, uh, government restrictions on online 
communication, realistically you are going to be able to bypass government restrictions 
on online communication. So there is both the free speech argument and the 
experience of centuries of responding to democratizing communications technology and 
the pragmatic argument of never passed a law that can't be unforced saying actually the 
question we have to face is much more around how do you build an open society which 
is resilient against the kind of false information that is just an unavoidable part of an 
open society. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:00:38​) 
We can do things to limit it. We can do things to hold people more accountable for it, but 
there is no option that says switch this off. I mean Nick Clegg was trying to say this 
should be a regulator as possible. Consent should be regulated for good with Facebook 
and on, but I think very hard we get to do, I didn't see why you can't say that. If 
somebody says on Twitter I'm going to physically assault an NP or something like that 
or physically assault somebody that you should be able to get Twitter to provide the 
details of the person who has made that online threats. How can, as long as they're 
doing that, as long as it's a real person or as long as, as long as if there, if there is, uh, if 
23 
the police are investigating a potential offense, they can go to the Internet companies 
and get all of the details the Internet companies hold. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:01:24​) 
In fact, even as a private [inaudible] libeled online, you can sue in the high court and 
required the company to hand over those details to you. That was the case recently with 
Mumsnet doing exactly that to enable somebody to assume so easy, not easy. I mean, I 
think the expensive police now have established mechanisms, but the label mechanism 
is obviously, you know, once you've hired a barrister to go to the high court, you're 
already outside of around the world. Most of us can do and so very more widely known 
and cheaper, cheaper boots and people to be able to do this. That's a reasonable 
person. What's the small claims court analog here? But it's an interesting question, but 
as, I'm sorry, can I just ask, there's no sort of like a middle ground with just having an 
independent regulator that you appeal to who deals with these requests based on 
statute. Right? So you don't have 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:02:20​) 
to take a suit to the high court. Every time you know you report something to Facebook 
is harmful. They say, oh no, it's not, and that's it. Yeah. Where's the appeals body? 
[inaudible] for? Just say, sweater. This person's in bottoms. Twitter says, no, it's not. 
You say, well, I think it is and I want someone else to, I want to appeal that decision to a 
regulator. The regulator looks into it as opposed to every time pushing massive 
legislation, which also clocks the courts on what are obvious and basic matters 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:02:48​) 
to tell me what did I have a number of accounts, a Facebook full fake accounts or 
Facebook takes down in a month. I've seen 52 months of numbers, two a million in a 
month for 20 million blind me lines. Yeah. The scale of this is mind boggling and so 
whatever you do, there will always be some things that cross the threshold but they go 
to courts or whatever mechanism exists and that those mechanisms will always be 
more available to rich people than the rest of us. Um, but actually if we're talking about 
responding at Internet scale to these challenges, we are talking about letting lots of stuff 
go because it can't be perfectly policed. We are talking about automation and when 
you're talking about automation, by the way, you're talking about false positives. As 
Bethany said earlier, we're the world leaders in automated fact checking. We just won 
the Google AI social good impact challenge. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:03:51​) 
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2,600 applicants around the world. We're one of 20 winners on automated 
fact-checking. It's incredibly difficult and by and large the role of automation, the 
narrower the question, the easier it is to provide reliable answers. So if the question is, 
is this imagery of child sexual exploitation or not, that is a relatively narrow question that 
computers have got relatively good at answering quickly. If the question is is this an 
advert intended to influence an election or not? And that is a much broader question. 
You know, as we know from the history of us election law for example, humans have a 
million ingenious ways of making something not quite look like an election ad that 
actually is so you know, we need to be realistic about the role automation feasibly can 
play, which takes us right back to we are going to live in a messy world and what do we 
want to do to make us slightly more resilient? And that again, I think takes us to the 
question of not just what do we do to play whack-a-mole with the problems, but also 
how do we positively build, as Bethany said, values in to the system. How do we build 
the bright beacons that cut through the fog and provide reliable information? How do we 
reward and amplify effective methods of debate? How do we be more available for 
them? 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:05:12​) 
What do you go from, what do you say? What's the view on that? Is that an issue of 
education locations? So, um, your issue is that a lot of the materials on say let's stick to 
Facebook even though of course it won't just be Facebook from the younger, um, it's, 
you know, the clickbait. So the material that attracts most clicks would be the one that's 
most Jeff because I'm not guessing most of the toes in there, the noon that is more 
likely to be negative scandal, hyperbolic material. Um, if Facebook won't reveal its 
algorithms, that generates that and, and, and that secure that model. Um, there are 
currently global conversations about whether and how we, we demand that, that kind of, 
um, revelation of algorithms. The eg is looking at it in certain contexts. So that problem 
is, I'm certification goes back to the kind of algorithmic design in my very limited 
technical view. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:06:20​) 
I'm just going back to some of the things that you've just been speaking last minute, few 
minutes or so. Um, in relation to this distinction, I remembered what I wanted to say 
between local and national campaigns. A lot of those issues that were being talked 
about, uh, picked up by, um, direct marketing roles. So campaign, there are walls on 
spending but in the examples that you would give in, they would be caught by data 
protection laws because you're not going to send that type of direct marketing to people 
who are already going to vote conservative. Therefore, the question is have those 
people who aren't already concepted voters in the example of the letter from David this 
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month apparently have they given consent to receive. And so that's an example of 
where the niece as well that needs to be reformed, more reconsideration of the 
relationship between the ICO and the electoral commission. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:07:20​) 
There's so much crossover and I know that the recent investigations that they've been 
doing into, um, um, the, the, um, Brexit reference in campaign has opened up kind of 
like channel of communication and they have a secured channel of communication. But 
that needs to be much more formalized because a lot of these issues cross over several 
different areas of law where area of law might not apply in one case and another area 
will. So yes there are issues of the um, spending limits for first and foremost is data 
protection implications as well. And that ics is very robust and the electoral commission 
needs to be just as the box is lagging so far quite and it really needs a complete reform. 
The virtual commission needs to just be, you know, it needs to think okay, how they've 
kind of, I don't 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:08:15​) 
know the extent to which they read it, they're really upset but they have acknowledged 
that they are not fit to purpose. Yeah. They recognize that actually to be honest, they 
should be a big thing like sort of off gem or something like that. And actually they're 
quite big compared to some of the parties but they're very small compared to the 
regulators of other big industries and they know they need more powers. And it's 
mentioned within the back on this, you know, the 20,000 pound fine is nothing. My view 
is their level of finding should be proportionate to the level of expenditure that the party 
could make an election or something. Cause actually 20,000 pounds is a lot and I did all 
the debates and the lords in 2001 we considered this and we went to hold firm parties 
will need to be fine. It was a bit nervous and 20,000 possible if you're naughty, 20,000 
pounds, but we didn't know how often you need to be fine more than that. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:09:02​) 
But actually if you seriously seriously breached the rules, try and alter the election by 
spending millions of pounds illegally. The fines should be millions of pounds and if you 
would like to spend 20 million nationally saying something in my use things like the 
maximum fines should be 25% of the budget permitted part expenditure or something. 
Um, that would be more proportional. 20,000 was is after, as you look at what off calmer 
doing and other people sort of finding organizations and they can find out what the EU 
is doing, finding Facebook 14 billion or something like that. Yeah. Um, in Europe, I think 
proportionate to the, uh, admitted expenditure should be small parties and smaller these 
26 
forms, not just that one form. There's a few of them that could have that. You mentioned 
this idea about, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:09:57​) 
um, changing Moodle rules around pagoda. Yeah. Would that require a change in 
primary legislation? Swayed Helen McNamara who was the, um, tt in the Cabinet Office 
responsible for ethics and uh, whatever it is. Um, [inaudible] she's, when you see great. 
Yeah. So she writes the [inaudible] guidelines. Cabinet secretary sends them out. 
They're, uh, they're a purely civil service administrative document. They'd been modified 
recently to make it clear that individual scientists who have research funding are not 
being told to shut up. Um, but what I would say, what full-fat would say is we need to 
completely turn around I thinking and say, actually we should regard organizations like 
UK research and innovation for research counselors, the academic funders, the Office 
for national statistics that [inaudible] strategic assets. The imfs, well, the ifs is not state 
funded. I mean, it gets read. It's not subject to the rules. And you know, well, it's a really 
interesting example actually. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:10:56​) 
The IFSC gets funding from the Economic Social Research Council, which is a 
government body or be arms around funds, academic research. Every time there's an 
election, the Economic Social Research Council says to the AFS, please take our logo 
off your stuff. We know that we're giving you 5 million years to your very important work, 
but you must have our logo on your staff during the election. Absolutely bombing. You 
know, nobody thinks that this is an attempt to sort of sway in the election. Everybody 
understands the ifs has role and its value and whether the assets C's logo is on it as 
Nova handle that, but in order to fulfill these ridiculous guidelines, that's what they insist 
on. So turn it around and say, actually, we need reliable of information during election 
time. We invest literally hundreds of million pounds, millions of pounds, and having that 
information between the research councils and the rns and others, we should be 
charging them with a duty to communicate what they know to the public in a strictly 
impartial way. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:11:59​) 
This thing about dynamic content optimization, is that something, an area that could be 
regulated more effectively? And is it the, the issue there is particularly that this kind of 
dark ads in the sense that it's not something that your opponent can see and give a 
counter argument. Is that something that could be changed or is that, are you then 
straying back into this similarly the territory of, well, you know, that's the way the Internet 
works. It is much more a kind of hub and spoke model. 
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Will Moy: ( ​01:12:34​) 
No, no, not at all actually. It's, it's one of the simpler things. Um, there's a caveat to this, 
which is that there's a long tail of Internet platforms and advertising hosts, but the 
market is dominated, as we all know, by Facebook and Google. Um, until the 1990s 
there was consensus on what political parties or political advertising and what's covered 
by the advertising standards authority. And that consensus broke down, I think around 
the irritating Blair and demonize. But then winter a time when the asa did political 
advertising. Nowadays, it wouldn't have been to except for the fact that they said 
political advertising speak recognizably political advertising so that you couldn't, um, 
massive tried to do by the front page of the Daily Mail and say you must have vote 
conservative. Yeah. And bought adverse. And that was the only thing that they had. I 
didn't think they could actually regulate where if you said as in 1992, uh, voting Labor 
will cost you 1200 pounds. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:13:36​) 
Really they don't do that. They couldn't touch something like that. So there is a question 
on two levels. One is what consensus can the political parties build that you have more 
shared interest and establishing trust in elections. Then you have independent interests 
in having tactics which you can beat each other with. I think there might be a 
conversation worth having about whether there is a consensus on rules of the political 
parties can overeat to abide by, um, in terms of how you use advertising. Um, and I 
think that that would be a locum signal to the public. Um, which is we will native Sabzi 
tell us not trust. Um, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:14:17​) 
so can you just say the rugby, the mechanics of that then would be political parties who 
come together and sign a memorandum of understanding, whatever, which says we 
will, what, what does it say about dynamic content optimization? What am I say about 
this kind of, it might say we won't use it. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:14:36​) 
It might say we will publish all the adverts we run, um, and be transparent about all of 
the advertising we'd run. It might say that if we're using dynamic content optimization, 
we will provide not only the sort of template but all of the possible variants that go into 
that template so that they are publicly visible. Um, and it might say we will all commit to 
being honest and we will appoint a third party to test us on our honesty, but I think that's 
probably not going to happen. Um, 
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Bethany Shiner: (​01:15:07​) 
can I just jump in at this point? Cause this, um, proposal has forward you've been at, it's 
been suggested by I think two, maybe three different policies in the format of them. And 
though you've got other code comes up, um, the co the ICO is called for it. Um, the 
constitution is called for it. And um, I think the d s m and s c um, has, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:15:33​) 
do you think [inaudible] has also 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:15:38​) 
I'm endorsed it. The main question though is whether it would be statutory on [inaudible] 
and what, what it would be underpinned by and how it could be regulated, stormed 
focused. A memorandum of understanding might be more amenable to cross-party 
consensus, but then what people just, well, what is that? Who's going to check that 
people don't use dark efforts when we know that it's really hard. Someone's that 
anyway, um, if don got adverts all reported as being used by one or more political 
parties than one. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:16:13​) 
If you had a beat finger direct all permission and perhaps with this tech team or you had 
an actual standards teach, yes, you'd need the new content standards. You could do it 
within the c but they would, their job would then be to actually enforce the code of 
conduct has been agreed between the parties. Yeah, 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:16:32​) 
same slate. And this goes for general before employee. There needs to be processed 
with complaints and the pills that can be made and issued by physical parties if they're 
subject to decisions by electoral commission, for example, on the base of this could 
come to force into vigils who may have had their content removed or suspended in 
circumstances where they think there's a right to an appeal at moment. There isn't really 
any of that, but that of course requires quite a difficult conversation potentially between 
intermediaries on the electoral commission. But there's no reason why we can't try and 
have that conversation. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:17:06​) 
I'm by intermediaries you mean? Sorry. No political parties on 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:17:10​) 
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the platform. Yeah, they're the intermediary, so no, just that. The other thing you can 
found the code of conduct is how political parties can target. So you could simply say 
the only way you can target is based on constituency seat and you can't pick out within 
the constituency who you've targeted. Yeah, yeah. To see what I've done. No, no sense 
of past evergreen Chiquita that, 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:17:30​) 
but you know, in France they've, they ban political parties from holding lists of people 
based on the religion, the ethnicity, the employment on employment or do those things 
in the UK we've been mining gold borders that information. Yeah. And then third piece 
of core beliefs, if that's not made explicit, but she's sensitive personal data. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:17:54​) 
It's true. But in some of the trends I think thinking like holiday, it goes back to when did 
you ever in the, and they went to the RT headquarters and they had all these canvas 
records. Yeah. All on cards. And then you all about who was their opponents and they 
send more to concentration camps. Yeah. But they're not hard to go back to that now. 
And within the constituency parts of it always do that. I mean, if I'm running a biodex to 
beat a seat that's held by the conservatives, I'll talk. The most likely Labour supporters 
are the poorest people the googly x council has or whatever. Just say, now come off a 
labor conduit in potter. Always do that. But I think something about identification of 
advertising. Um, I just meant as an example, you know, these are that you could also 
limit how you target as an aspect of so long as it's declared within the constituency you 
live. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:18:46​) 
This is the key principle which we resisted by some, but how much you spend in one 
constituency, Wolverhampton, southwest or whatever should be transparent and at the 
minute, 90% of it can avoid any transparency because it's declared as national 
spending and it's only the stuff that has the candidate's name on it, which might be 10% 
of the campaigns with [inaudible] campaigning there. The tip of the iceberg is the stuff 
that has the candidates name on, but 90% is below the water and not seen. And that in 
my view is in bleach of all principles of fair play. Transparency as also is conscious. I 
think that times are here before long, we've got to have the third party expenditure rules. 
Now in the 2000 legislation, I argued that when they brought in this idea that you could 
spend 500,000 pounds, has you interested third party that would drive a coach and 
horse. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:19:39​) 
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The principles of fair play, but you could have several organizations all saying, but we'll 
all spend 500,000 yeah, I went to five guys, went to 700,000 I said, that makes it even 
worse. And this was what was shown to happen with a um, leave campaign giving to be 
that youth 700,000 pounds, which they then decide to give to Cambridge Analytica just 
spending the same way. Now I think the first principle on referendums ought to be that 
the limits have the same on both sides. It's not such an a different argument. Listen 
elections, the principle is they can still spend the same section. Say if we consistently 
for referendums and with third parties can all spend 700,000 pounds and get away with 
what they're doing. So I think we ought to say referendums a little to be exactly the 
same. And then any third part, I want to say one thing, what they can do outside of the 
limit has got to be so small and not coordinated that or 50,000 that would be more 
appropriate. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:20:36​) 
And in elections, you can spend nothing, 500 quid in the constituency. And if you 
wanted to, you could set up 10 different organizations spending 500 quit. Now this all 
came in because Spock used to campaign constituencies and they used to try and say, 
nobody who supports the unborn child should vote for this candidate. And then the 
election law was you could spend to Fiverr and this went to the European court or 
whatever and it was deemed gushy. It was a restraint of being able to campaign it. And 
everyone thought, well, the five has got to be increased. But I think find it could actually 
was a bit much. But now we've got limits for people. The third party expended chip in 
general elections and in referendums. And I think we should reduce the third party 
expense. The limits be tougher on people spending things without the authority, the 
election agent. So you essentially question building as says, I'm going to spend a million 
pounds in this constituency. You want to, it is an offense to spend money in a 
constituency without the authority of the legislature, which it shouldn't be. Um, is the 
basic principle that the Tribune forced. Can 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:21:40​) 
I quickly pick up on the question of why is targeting online different from targeting within 
a constituency by a local political party? Because I think they are imprints for the same 
thing but I think qualitatively it is different when somebody can sit in London and run a 
national campaign or 650 separate campaigns, you know, one spotty teenager or you 
know, machiavellian campaign manager or whatever. Um, you know, when you're 
running a local campaign from 300 miles away from local, it's a very different thing. Um, 
in terms of using targeting than it is when you're a local constituents and seat doing 
what it wants to do and what online campaign, particularly online advertising is making 
possible is exactly that scenario. But it could just be a tiny group of people in one place, 
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whether that's London or Barbados who are running pointedly local, highly targeted 
campaigns that is qualitatively not in principle but qualitatively different. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:22:38​) 
I think from the local campaigning that we were already used to and kind of targeting. 
We're already used to. And it also quickly, men mentioned animal rights defenders 
International, which is the lead case on, um, the extent to which is legal to ban TV 
advertising on politics. Um, that went right to the human rights court and they upheld for 
British ban on political TV advertising. But it's a very, very close decision based on 
essentially the margin of appreciation. So if there was a move to restrict political 
advertising, say online, it would be purely to get expert lawyers to weigh in on what the 
boundaries of when that would hit freedom of expression laws. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:23:22​) 
Okay. That's really, really useful. Thank you so much to both of you. It's been an 
absolutely fascinating conversation for, I think it's been really interesting as there is 
some, some of these things that we can be talking about as relatively low hanging fruit 
that could be implemented quite quickly. But we've also, I think, um, on earth a lot of 
really fundamental, uh, which is not going to be sold overnight. So I'm sort of already 
thinking the green paper that we produced probably needs for quiet clear delineation 
between low hanging fruit and then a, and then fundamental, uh, ethical questions 
around free speech and getting a political consensus to develop about actually 
changing our political culture. Yes. So, um, that's been really, really, is there any, were 
there any final words that either you would like to just give us as we go on our merry 
way? 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:24:16​) 
No, no, I think I've put fluid mine, my main button points I can follow up with written 
deafness or I've got an article. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:24:25​) 
Yeah. Anything we did in the bathroom. 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:24:28​) 
Yeah. So I can send through some of that in my article takes up on all of these points. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:24:35​) 
Great. Yeah. Thank you so much Bethany. [inaudible] and I have one focusing on the 
electoral register is currently only available to political parties, um, charities that seek to 
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promote citizenship, um, for participation. And um, to a large extent academics can't get 
access to electoral register in the U S MUFG. Greater access to the electoral register 
who has waited and who has not been marked. Register lets us understand what kinds 
of interventions actually are successful in persuading people to vote or not. How do we 
try and turn out up? We are in a horrific place with turnout of the moment. We really 
need to be doing more work on that. If charities like full facts and other citizenship 
charities and proper academics had that access subject to ethics review and that kind of 
thing, we will be able to run field experiments to actually test how do we make a 
difference to voter turnout in different places and actually start to really study rest. So 
that will be a small change and would need to be carefully controlled in terms of ethical 
approval for any work done. But it would make a really big difference and it's completely 
normal in a lot of countries. Might stress obviously how people voted. A secret about 
whether or not people voted is crucial information for studying participation in politics. 
That would be great. Yeah, 
 
Bethany Shiner: (​01:25:50​) 
for sure. It's very sad. I mean, even in the good recent European elections, when we 
have Brexit as a backdrop, we have the local, the lower specimen European folks turn 
up profitable. So you leave, you know, 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:26:04​) 
lower than some East Asian stuff. Yeah. Cause [inaudible] um, so would you be able to 
give us something written on that, which would be how it would actually work in practice 
because obviously you'd need also to be a Reggie, you'd be a need to be an accredited 
body to be able to do it when you started, who they would want to keep a pretty tight 
handle on the deterrence because that's what happened with we study you, right? They 
took, they got the electoral role and gave it to Alton Insurance and NASA, we don't 
actually know where the electoral role is. That was transferred three weeks at a year. It 
could be we're pursuing a lawsuit in Mississippi and because there's a lot of indications 
that it exists there. So the data control. So do you think there's, in Mississippi there, 
there, there are, there is strong evidence to suggest that lead the electoral registers 
given two leaves out at you as a third party campaign group. 
 
Will Moy: ( ​01:27:04​) 
It was then merged with Elvin insurance data and [inaudible] and it was sent off short 
first to intended to be out from Scotland. But then they got a sweeter deal in Mississippi. 
They got several hundred thousand dollars in state aid and so then moved to there. So 
we're where the places I've been to Mississippi twice because of this lawsuit. You know, 
we sit in courtrooms and go over this stuff. Um, the ICO is backing our case on this and 
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they'll be the biggest ones to raise the alarm around. How easy to, I mean, you could 
put the electoral register on a Google drive and share it with everyone on earth with a 
link. Truly, you know, so that's the, sorry, the risk of the offers already very carefully with 
that. Of course you could just have compulsory budget. Well, [inaudible] in Belgium. I 
also just wanted to say thank you, particularly, um, you know, you're not going to get a 
lot of plaudits for doing this. And it's incredibly important and incredibly difficult. So I 
think pollutants from the public, not so much from our political masters. 
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Stephen: ​It would be great to come over to yourself to just maybe give the first few minutes of 
an exposé, really, of what you think are the priorities and challenges and opportunities. So the 
APPG was formed a few months ago now, off the back of a series of concerns that a lot of us 
had from the referendum. Although, I would like to emphasise that we are in no way looking to 
do a report specifically into the referendum, and we’re not looking to make recommendations 
either way about the validity of the referendum result in the context of the forward that has been 
discovered by the actual commission – that’s not in the scope of our work. What we are seeking 
to do is to future proof our electoral systems and the APPG on electoral campaign transparency 
has been formed with that purpose in mind. And we’re going to focus on three main areas of 
work: transparency, monitoring and deterrence. On the side of transparency point, we’ve got a 
whole range of issues there, for example, the imprints on digital advertising is one example of 
that. Also things like how campaign spend should be allocated, national or local. Monitoring is 
about ensuring that we have a regulatory system that is able to keep pace with the incredibly 
sophisticated and rapid-moving landscape of electoral campaigning. We feel that we have 
analogue regulators in a digital age, and I mean that relates both to data and to the market. And 
then deterrents is how we ensure that we have a watchdog that actually has teeth. And that’s 
really about what kind of fines can be metered out and also looking into the possible 
connections to the National Crime Agency, and ensuring that we have real disincentives and 
real deterrents in the system rather than just what now amounts, basically, to a slap on the wrist 
with rather desultory fines that we see in this context. So it is with those three objectives in mind 
that we are conducting an enquiry. We have received evidence from a range of absolutely 
outstanding experts and you will, I know, continue in that tradition. And we are hoping that in the 
autumn we’ll be able to produce a green paper, which would be – which would contain what we 
hope will be tangible and implementable recommendations. Some of it will be what we might 
call “the lower hanging fruit,” short-term things that can be done very quickly. We really do feel 
the need for speed in all of this because there’s potential for another general election before 
2022 for sure. And we will also be looking at some of the things that will take longer and are 
really about reforming at a more fundamental structural level, and that is more of the kind of 
radical reforms and ideas going forwards. I think the report will probably have short-term “easy 
wins” and longer-term reform, particularly around institutional capacity building and giving our 
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regulators the forensic capability they need to really do this job properly – that is – that’ not 
something we can do overnight. So, sort of legislative changes and institutional changes will be 
two big parts of the report, I think, that we hope to produce in the autumn. So I hope that’s given 
you an overview of where we are. Kyle, who I’m sure you know, and Fair Vote are brilliantly 
providing us the services of secretariat to the group, and Kyle does often chip in to these 
discussions, and of course others are welcome to chip in. But if I may start with each of you just 
giving a couple of minutes, really, on what you see as the top priorities, challenges, 
opportunities, then we can go into some Q&A after that. I don’t mind who starts, it’s completely 
up to you. 
 
Sam:  ​So I’m going to take this from a kind of a position of expertise in political party financing. 
So all the issues that I’m going to talk about – I’m going to try and draw some issues and then 
just – perhaps try and – in everything that I say, outline where there could be a solution. It might 
be an easy win – it might be an easy solution, or it might be a harder solution, but just try and 
give – go through the list essentially. On transparency, I would argue that in Great Britain we’ve 
probably got a transparency regime in reporting and disclosure requirements that is effectively 
kind of world-leading at this point. The disclosure in the reporting is effectively world-leading. It 
provides a pretty good official story of election campaigning and how people are spending 
money and indeed getting money at elections. However I don’t think that means that it is perfect 
by any means. I’ve got sort of three examples. First a very simple one, there’s currently nine 
categories in which political parties report their spending on the electoral commission website: 
advertising, campaign broadcast, manifest or referendum material, market research, media, 
overhead to general administration, rallies and other events, transport, and unsolicited material 
to electors. Now that’s been the case pretty much since 2001 - or 2000 - and the introduction of 
the political parties elections and referendums act. And as stephen said, er Stephen, I think 
there’s a case in which we’re dealing in analog in a digital world and indeed these categories 
could fairly easily be updated, I think, perhaps to take into account targeted advertising not just 
advertising, that’s where there’s a slight worry about how things are going on. There’s been a 
recent point that can’t be the case. Secondly when talking about spending online, and the way 
in which political parties spend money online, “The Official Story” has some gaps. So some work 
that me and Kate have done, suggest that we do know that about 3.1-3.2 million pounds were 
spent on facebook at the 2017 general election. But I think we can be pretty certain that its 
considerably more than that that actually political parties are spending on facebook. To use an 
example, the conservative party spent something in the region of 550,000 pounds with the 
messina group, and the messina group did work on market research, advertising and transport, 
and I would suggest that some of that pot went towards either targeting or doing something in 
and around facebook or spending money in that way. So again with regards to kind of 
disclosure and spending requirements, there may be a case for companies that receive- these 
kinds of companies that receive significant proportions of money from political parties to do this 
kind of work to actually release more detailed  spending returns as well so we kind of know how 
they’re cutting the cake in a broader sense. Finally, on the transparency front, political parties 
are required in around August of each year to provide a yearly return inclusive of spending and 
donations, but, and this is what I would say is one of the easier wins or easier changes, but 
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within those spending returns there’s not necessarily any common accounting standards or 
common accounting practices​. So every different party kind of releases completely different 
returns with completely different categories, which makes it very hard to kind of 
cross-reference how and why political parties are spending their - or how political parties 
are spending their money or getting their donations. And I don’t see a reason why you 
couldn’t have common accounting standards and practices as a requirement of releasing 
these returns. On to deterrence and monitoring, the kind of sanctions the electoral 
commission has to offer are insufficient, and I think the EC have recognised this on a 
number of occasions. They’ve sent a number of fines and sanctions imposed, they think 
parties see that as a cost of doing business. So I think you’re quite right the EC needs 
more power, more resources, to effectively sanction against this kind of activity.​ And 
covering proposal one on the written questions that you gave us, and there’s no reason why that 
can’t be the case, that perhaps unlimited fines or indeed give them greater sanctioning powers, 
so it’s a more effective deterrent. ​I think the electoral commission is also underfunded and, 
if we’re talking about analog and digital, there's a good case for the EC to have a serious 
kind of digital specialist unit to more accurately reflect the current challenges that the 
electoral system presents. It might well be inclusive of a team that can track in real time 
the way that political parties are spending this money online and the way that they’re 
spending money actually during a campaign and if possible perhaps applying sanctions 
there and then​ - rather than in a year down the line, when an elections been well under and 
decisions been made - and actually a fine is a fine to a political party. So whether there’s 
actually perhaps, again, if it was possible perhaps a way in which you could actually apply 
sanctions and even perhaps freeze out certain types of campaigning that’s happening in real 
time. But there’s two important considerations I would argue on both deterrence/monitoring, and 
when we’re talking about the EC. Firstly, no one likes the EC, ok? And i say that with the 
greatest respect for the EC but in the same way that a referee isn’t the most popular person on 
a football pitch, and no one is cheering for the referee in a football game, they get attacked from 
all sides. They get attacked from the left, they get attacked from the right, they get attacked from 
remain they get attacked from leave. So getting any extra funding towards the EC to do this kind 
of thing is going to be very politically difficult. And all of this - what the EC require is more funds 
to do this kind of thing. So in some way we need to - its gonna be very politically difficult to do 
that. ​So when we consider these recommendations it’s always worth bearing in mind that 
very real financial constraints the EC operate under, the very real resource constraints 
the EC operate under, and the political environment which means that any decision that 
they make ends up with them getting called to be shut down essentially for the people 
that don’t agree with their decision.​ I’ll move on to the proposals and then just have sort of a 
final thought. Proposals all seem fine to me, essentially, yeps all round. Proposal 2, this might 
just be me being dense, but I couldn’t see how thats functionally that much different to the 
system we have at the moment, but that might just be me and we can sort of think about it in 
other ways. ​Proposal 4 is the one in many ways that's the most achievable, in the digital 
imprint, the most achievable thing. It’s something that’s pretty much recommended 
across the board now, and from my understand of the way that the government even 
talks about it, at various things that I’ve been at, they seem to accept that that’s 
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something they want to do.​ So yep, digital imprint, all that sort of stuff. The thing I’ll just end 
on is to say with regards to money in politics, its kind of - this is an analogy that I always use, 
and any of my students of mine will know that I’m one for a really bad analogy about anything 
really, but this is one of my better ones I think, or its one of my best ones since its not actually 
mine. But money in politics is like water, right, it flows in an uncontrollable manner, so you can 
try and put up dams and barriers, it’ll always kind of find a way through, it’ll always push through 
various things. Eventually as legislators, you need to kind of make a decision on whether to 
patch up these holes that you find, or to kind of build a whole dam entirely. But I think three 
recent controversies have shown where the most blatant leaks in the current system are - in the 
current “dam”- are.​ So most recently, many political parties but in the precipice the Brexit 
party, that got covered on this, had an option on their website to solicit 500 pounds or 
less. Now they solicit 500 pounds or less, because its not a donation, under my 
understanding of the Political parties and elections and referendums act, anything under 
500 pounds doesn’t count as a donation, so the usual rules don’t apply. So that includes 
foreign money essentially. Now when this was set up, I imagine that the idea was that 
actually 500 pounds - physically giving someone 500£ - its very easy to track that kind of 
thing. But a potential solution seems to me, and another easy win, just lower the 
threshold for something that’s considered a donation in the internet age. 50£, 25£, I don’t 
know. So that actually then normal rules apply if practical. Secondly, Britain’s Future 
caused consternation earlier when they were the biggest spender of ads on facebook in 
march the figure stood at about 340,000£ and there’s little to no requirements on 
organizations like this or indeed individuals to declare where these funds come from 
outside of regulated collection periods. But we know from research that elections aren’t 
the only time when these debates can affect real political outcomes. Just because there’s 
not an election, it doesn’t mean that this money can’t have an effect. So there might well 
be a case to tighten up rules around third party organization and individual spending 
both online and offline with regards to disclosure, year round if you’re spending over a 
certain amount of money advertising in this way ​. And then finally going to the local and 
national party spending in the conservative election expenses episode, ​what I would suggest 
is that it is the case that local and national spending limits are becoming increasingly 
cosmetic and I think that’s across the board. However, there’s utility in keeping local and 
national spending limits. If you got rid of the distinction between local and national, then 
it’s very likely that parties would just focus all of their spending on very specific areas 
and just leave kind of whole swaths of the country - leave them completely neglected. So 
there’s an argument to say tightening up the regulation in this area so that spending and 
targeting that looks local, and is considered local actually is understood as local under 
the law. ​I’ll leave it there, because I’ve already gone on slightly longer than five minutes, but 
that’s my thoughts.  
 
Stephen: ​Thank you very much. Very helpful and detailed.  
 
Kate: ​So I’m going to focus just on transparency. My research has mainly been looking at 
political adverts, and looking at what political parties are doing, both at a national level but also 
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at a local level in terms of actually utilizing digital tools in their campaigning, and then I’m also 
doing a bit of work about public perceptions and how these things are actually affecting the way 
people are interpreting information that they’re account in the digital sphere. So the distinction 
that I want to talk about, and I will largely leave the first one because I think sam has covered it 
pretty well, is I think you know - the existing electoral regulating system is set up around 
financial transparency, but what I want to focus on today is the importance of actually thinking 
about source transparency but also data transparency. There’s two areas where they might be 
able to go beyond - what I think is actually, and I’m going to agree with Sam, a growing 
consensus around things like digital imprints.​ You know I would just say I fully endorse all 
the recommendations that are there, but I would like to do is maybe look/ think about 
where we might want to go further than that and what some of the practical - what some 
of the areas that we might want to consider more could be. And I think a useful way of 
doing that is actually by thinking about imprints. And actually what is - what is 
meaningful in terms of an imprint and what data might we actually want to give individual 
citizens about what they’re seeing online. ​So ive been doing a piece of work recently which 
has been looking at source transparency. ​So the idea as I understand it behind imprints and 
digital imprints is that the system should have information about the source of 
campaigning material which they use to navigate and understand what they’re seeing. So 
it should be the same on and offline, I think that’s widely accepted and I think there is 
growing consensus around that.​ But I think if there is that desire to give citizens enough 
information about the source of an advert, then we need to think a little bit about what imprints, 
both in digital and non-digital, actually look like. And I think that’s particularly important in a 
campaigning landscape in which we’re seeing political parties are no longer the exclusive actor, 
you know, ​we are seeing a large number of these third party organizations which are 
increasingly unrecognizable which pop up, which are transient from election to election 
and are subject to very, very limited oversight.​ So whether that’s Britain First, which Sam 
mentioned, or Keep Britain Afloat or MoreUnited there are hundreds of these organizations and 
you can find them in the Facebook ads archive which is actually quite handy for that purpose at 
least. So I think the problem of these third party organizations is much more acute online 
because it is much more easy to create and settle and design and deliver content on online 
mediums through things like Facebook advertiser, youtube, [unintelligible].​ It’s very very easy 
to create content and disseminate into a very large audience with minimal know-how, as 
I’ve found through talking to activists around the country. And I think we need - I’ve been 
doing some research looking at whether badging and what - how information provided 
about adverts is perceived and affected by systems. We’ve only got the pilot results back 
and I’ve been having a look at them on the train this morning as I’ve been on holiday, but 
we - its only a pilot but we found strong evidence that the badging of an advert affects 
how people will interact with the content. So we had a look at people’s interests in an 
advert, people’s trust in an advert and their likelihood to click on it. And we found as 
you’d expect, a partisan effect, so if its badged as labour or conservative, labour and 
torie voters will interact with it and they’ll trust it more or less depending on their 
affiliation. But what we found is that when an advert is badged ambiguously, from an 
organization that isn’t recognizable easily, which there’s no real obvious path (?) about 
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which party it’s promoting, then people are more likely to interact with it. So the 
strongest effects is where you see an advert from your favourite party, but then there’s - 
the next strongest effect is where it’s ambiguously badged. So there’s a big advantage 
for campaigners to badge and to create these organizations which aren’t obviously from 
a political party. So if you’re trying to reach out to undecided voters or voters who might 
instinctively be put off by a political party, this can overcome some of those - the kind of 
queues we use to navigate information environment online. ​So I think it has interesting 
implications in terms of, well what would we need from a digital imprint to actually make it 
meaningful, because if a digital imprint just says - an advert from Britain First is printed and 
promoted by Britain First, that’s not actually helping you gain any more information about that. 
So I think this leads to some of the points that sam was raising about - ​well we actually need 
more information about who is placing advertisements, where money is coming from, 
and what the source of that money is. And I think the EC have existing organizations for 
non-party campaign organizations, but only 31 organizations have registered on that 
since 2014. Clearly there’s a lot of more of these organizations out there. So it suggests 
to me that there’s a big loophole there that needs to be looked at. ​And I think one obvious 
response that i would like to see explored and pursued is actually thinking about - do - I think 
every campaigning organization spending over a certain threshold should have to register and 
declare what they are, where the source of their money is. One idea that I’ve been interested in, 
but you know I wanted to explore further is actually​ should you require non-party 
organizations to affiliate or declare which side of the aisle, or come out of neutral? In a 
campaigning environment, it raises a lot of questions about when the campaigning 
environment is, how you would deal with “neutral” organizations, you’d have to have 
some reporting, so there’s a lot of questions but you can kinda see the logic of actually if 
we need to provide citizens with information by which they can navigate the online 
information environment, then these kind of organizations that are very unrecognizable 
and difficult to interpret, there needs to be some kind of response then.​ And the other 
thing I wanted to raise about is about data transparency. And obviously this has become a lot 
more prominent in the last GDPR and individual’s right to know the provenance of data, but I 
just don’t think we’ve seen this play through in the political campaigning environment. ​You 
know political parties have long gathered data, but this is a bit of a game-changer in 
terms of citizens having the right to know where data came from, and currently the 
system is not set up to show people where data came from, and especially in an area of 
data brokers and campaigning consultancies, I think actually the provenance of so much 
data that’s being used in political campaigning is completely opaque. And even political 
parties with the best intentions could not tell you where a lot of their data comes from. I 
think that is a really big problem in terms of making GDPR meaningful.​ Now, some of the 
platforms have actually made some quite useful interventions here. ​Facebook, I think last 
week, created an additional page where you can see where the list for the data that 
you’ve been targeted on, the basis of it, come from. I think that potentially offers an 
interesting way forward in terms of thinking about, you know, should there be some type 
of requirement in terms of campaigning actors showing where the data came from? I 
think if they had to do that they would have to clean up the provenance of the data that 
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they’re using and think quite carefully about the sources there. So, I’m quite interested in 
platform based interventions, which is obviously difficult for legislators to compel 
platforms to do this, but I think its - working with political parties to make them require 
data provenance information to be available and to actually think through what that 
would mean in practice is a very important area.​ ​So, just to sum up, I fundamentally 
agree with all the proposals that have been made, but I think it’s really important to think 
beyond that and I think in terms of the long term, you know the ambition for those longer 
objectives of actually, you know, what do the - what are these principles aiming for in the 
long term? ​I think it’s important to think about the other aspects of transparency or, you know, 
indeed deterrence and monitoring and what that might mean in terms of thinking beyond the 
solutions that we’ve already got in place.  
 
Stephen: ​Thank you very much.  
 
Kate: ​You’re very welcome.  
 
Rachel: ​Ok so I’ll go third. So - and actually in keeping with the - we talked about monitoring 
and moved to transparency so I’m gonna look at deterrence. And I should say from the start that 
I’m not a, sort of, policy expert really in terms of electoral law. So my interest in this area is more 
from a political organization and political behaviour perspective. And I do think on this, so on the 
question of deterrence, looking at it from the perspective of the person who is engaging in it in a 
way, and the kinds of ways in which you want to try and stop that. ​I think there’s two main 
issues within deterrence. One is the issue of detection, so I think that’s a kind of a prior 
that you have to build in, before you deter, you have to actually detect some practices 
that are going on. And​ then I think its deterrence, and I think there are sort of different range 
solutions that you could think about applying, some of them short term, immediate perhaps easy 
wins, some of the more medium term and then longer term as well. And I think probably on 
detection in terms of - if we look at it like a prior step, and again probably bring the academic in 
terms of: we need to take a step back and think, well what is it that we’re actually wanting to 
deter. So mentions of illegal activity, and I’m assuming its the online illegal activity. ​So we need 
to sort of think about a scale of activities, or some sort of stepping up, starting with 
activities such as posting, obviously people putting up content, people sharing that 
content, that has some kind of anti-democratic harmful subversive content. And beyond 
that I think there are sort of more coordinated, collective, orchestrated kind of 
approaches that are using fake actors, like bots and trolls, to try and discredit an 
opponent or to build your own profile artificially through astro-turfing. And I think finally 
perhaps if we look at it on a sort of scale of activities that we might want to deter and 
detect, there’s sort of hacking and I guess much more sort of explicit illegal activities 
where organizations, institutions, records are actually - information is stolen effectively 
from them and then used and leaked to discredit an opponent.​ So I think that it’s helpful to 
think about what it is you’re actually wanting to deter, and perhaps putting it on some sort of 
graded sort of scale. And I think within that, obviously there’s also a question then about - what 
is the content or how, if you wanted to sort of then say well it’s about deterring people from 
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posting, sharing, coordinating to distribute illegal content, again the question of what is illegal - it 
kinda comes back to the question about free speech as well, I mean again I think we can 
probably think of it on some sort of scale, with the idea that perhaps political advertising as we 
know it now or what you might want to call propaganda, in terms of going back in time even to 
the time of the - in the US we see things like the daisy girl ads in the 19 sort of 50’s very early 
sort of examples. Through to things like the poster, the demonized poster about blacks - these 
are kind of sort of i suppose political advertising which is sort of at a lower level, and certainly I 
think that sort of would be struggling to pass over into this idea of illegal. ​Then there's the sort 
of question of well misinformation, perhaps that’s another scale up. What does that 
mean? Well that’s sort of more talking about - it’s incorrect perhaps its false, misleading, 
there’s perhaps something credible in it and it’s genuinely - somebody is sharing it, or 
believes in it, so there’s kind of no malintent. Then there’s disinformation which I think is 
when content is obviously deliberately false, so it’s deliberately designed to mislead 
people into thinking something which is untrue and the person who is sending that 
round knows that to be untrue. And then finally, we can probably call, what I saw called 
malinformation, which adds another category in, but it’s an idea around this idea, 
particularly around this question of orchestrated kind of hacking into organizations or 
obtaining material illegally, but it actually - the information is true, it has just been 
obtained unlawfully and used attack an opponent. So that’s the kind of other way in 
which perhaps we can see this content as being illegal. So I think that we’ve got a sort of 
scale perhaps of thinking about activities, we’ve got a scale of levels of illegal content or 
false content, so I would say that probably in a way, in terms of the idea of thinking about 
regulating it or deterring it, the easy win, if you think about it, I’d say one and two, this 
idea of propaganda in political advertising and also perhaps this area of misinformation, 
where people are convinced by something or sharing something which is perhaps false 
but it’s credible and it’s not done with intent to mislead. Maybe it’s out of scope to a 
certain degree, or let’s prioritize where action can have most of its impact. But perhaps 
the area of disinformation, this idea of knowingly and falsely sharing, and 
malinformation, the hacking in and obtaining information illegally, those would seem to 
be perhaps easier actions to at least detect if not deter. ​So if we sort of perhaps pull those 
out or extract them, then the question becomes, how do we detect and deter these things? ​I 
think on this idea of this malinformation or this sort of hacking and leaking of 
information, I guess that’s quite difficult to deter, I think you probably only find that out 
once it’s happened. So there’s this sort of post-hoc element to that where sanctions 
would and should be applied, aligning with probably what you’ve already got in criminal 
law and applying it to things of - I mean, theft, it’s information theft, so I would imagine 
that there are practices and sort of statutes that would be applicable and should be 
applied. So I think that the area where perhaps most focus is needed at the moment, is 
this rather amorphous but problematic area, this area of - this disinformation. This is this 
idea of perhaps coordinated or individual attempts to spread false information that is 
deliberately designed to mislead and as I said this can be done by individuals or this can 
be done collectively by groups and coordinated through astro-turfing. So how would one 
go about - or what’s the way of tackling this? I think probably the, maybe the first meet - 
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short term solution or way of looking at this is probably by using AI to kind of help you 
tackle the problem that AI is creating. So I do think there’s a role here for, I think what 
Sam was talking about, I mean, say like a democratic defense team. Some kind of unit 
that would have data science skills, would understand ways in which machine learning 
and computer science techniques can be used to track and trace. Because there are 
patterns, and there are detectable aspects of these behaviours, which ideally you could 
do in real time, but I think that that should be a focus of our resource. There are quite a 
lot of academic attempts at the moment to sort of do that, I won’t talk about it here, but 
there are, you know, there have been ways that people have looked to try and design 
things like bot-ometers that are out there trying to kind of pick out when are bots active. 
So I think there’s a kind of focus here on: you find them and you remove them, you shut 
them down, or you find some way of shutting down those accounts once you’ve 
discovered them.​ ​Then I think there’s a second and perhaps short-medium term 
response which is more about rebuttal.​ ​So I think there’s an important role for 
fact-checking organizations to play. ​And I think the question is : where does the responsibility 
of that lie in a campaign? ​ Because obviously I think as you were saying about the EC, you 
know in a way everyone is going to have sort of an axe to grind, or they’re going to see 
that their case was not properly, you know they have been discriminated against, so that 
would be quite difficult but I think it doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t be done. And I think 
there needs to be some way of making that independent and think about ideas for doing 
that, but I think some trusted service during election, where it’s easy for citizens to go 
and find out what stories are true or untrue, and some kind of, I don’t wanna say instant 
rebuttal, but certainly something whereby these stories are countered. ​I think ​the final 
step, and this is the longer term thinking about it, is more about education and thinking 
about digital literacy programs, thinking about how do you get people to understand and 
perceive what they need to look for ​, so Kate’s work is fascinating in the sense of showing that 
there are ways in which people are making decisions, they’re understanding what they’re 
seeing, they’re trusting it more or less, we need to know more about those kind of decisions that 
they’re making, and help people reach those decisions better. And I think things like kind of 
citizen juries are very sort of popular at the moment but I do think - I saw one recently that was 
looking at AI and health, decision making and health, and it reached some really interesting 
conclusions about where people want to draw the line between accuracy of health diagnosis 
and speed and the use of computers and AI. And I think there’s definitely a question here about 
freedom of speech versus catching sort of subversive messages. And I think starting with 
something like some kind of citizen jury would be a really interesting way of sort of approaching 
this question of what would work from a citizen perspective. And just more generally I fully 
support just to kind of add to the echo of support for the recommendations, I think they’re spot 
on. I think t​he only thing I might add in is that I wonder in a way whether or not why there 
wouldn’t be a possibility of a regular kind of review and inspection of parties’ databases, 
because I think getting to Kate’s point, I don’t think necessarily parties are putting 
together these databases thinking: I’m gonna skirt the rules and we’re going to not do 
what we’re supposed to do, I don’t know if necessarily they do understand all the data 
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that they have, and so they might welcome actually having some kind of scrutiny on a 
regular basis to keep them on the right side.  
 
Stephen: ​Membership databases?  
 
Rachel: The databases that they’re using for targeting during elections, so not 
necessarily private membership databases, but more what they’re building from 
combining their own records with data brokers. But I just think that that would be a really 
good step to finding out and helping them sort of keep them on the right side of the 
GDPR, so they may, as I said, welcome it.​ The other thing, I think, is about social media 
companies is, just, I think echoing the points that have been made,​ I think that there should be 
some requirement about the sourcing of any ad that is posted, so anyone that is taking 
that out needs to provide X/Y/Z information that is then - people will be able to 
click-access see who these companies are. And then it needs to be more than just the 
name of - there should be more information.​ So I think I’ll stop there because that’s probably 
around, I’ve got a couple other things I could say but I’ll hand over.  
 
 
Duncan: ​Thank you, Duncan Hames, policy director at Transparency International UK, and full 
disclosure I’m a former member of parliament and I’m married to a current member of 
parliament. So we are a worldwide corruption campaign in over a hundred countries around the 
world and we define corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain and so we are 
interested in all of the interface between those who are elected to serve the public, and those 
who hold private interests, and so money in politics is a central theme of our work in all sorts of 
parts of the world. We wrote subsequent to the referendum this paper, “take back control” which 
is freely available on our website and which I refer you to, including a couple of case studies 
and analysis from the referendum itself. ​We are happy to actively support three of your four 
recommendations, the first, the second and the fourth. The third one about transferring 
funds between designated campaigns, really is out with our area of interest and so we’ll 
take a pass on that one if you like. ​But, I think if I step back at this picture I think what would 
be really helpful for you would be to articulate your objectives. ​The objective as it exists in law 
at the moment is not that electoral campaigns should be honest or fair ,but certainly that 
they should be of our society, that they shouldn’t be the subject of international 
interference.​ And that’s why in terms of controls on donations to political parties, there’s a bar 
on those who are not eligible to vote in the UK, or indeed on businesses that are not doing 
business in the UK funding our electoral campaigns. So there is an objective there, which is to 
stop foreign interference, and given the need to have a degree of cross-party consensus for any 
progress you might make in relation to these questions, and an objective like that which I think 
is still adhered to on a cross party basis, is one that might be a basis on which we can coral 
consensus for change. ​Our concern as we’ve documented in this report is that I think there 
is something more than transparency, deterrence and monitoring that you need to 
address this. And its certainly controls. So our existing controls , even if they were 
adhered to, and enforcement wasn’t an issue, our existing controls are insufficient, given 
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the ingenuity with which people have sought to test the limits of PPERA and other 
legislation.​ And then, and well I’ll come back to that, and then secondly in relation to 
monitoring, ​one of the reasons why the slow timescales involved in both monitoring and 
the subsequent enforcement are problems, is because what we really need to be able to 
do, subtly or otherwise, is disrupt the intervention which is cutting across what you’re 
seeking for the way, I don’t credit - electoral process should operate. Now one has to be 
very careful before those kind of interventions. But if monitoring is such - a journalist can 
write about what is really going on and that can reach a wide audience, and that can 
happen during the course of a campaign, so before the electoral verdict has been given - 
then you have a feedback loop which enables some disruption of whatever unlawful or 
otherwise malicious activity is that you’re concerned about. At the moment, monitoring 
gets published across the intervals and sometime after the electoral event has passed, 
the opportunity to identify issues, someone earlier referred to the fraud that was 
identified by the EC, takes a very long time. I mean, it took the electoral commission 
sometime after we’d published our case study about the better for the country limited 
donations. And then there’s the whole process of enforcement which takes even longer, 
and one of the panel pointed out earlier on, some of these actors that are participating in 
our democratic process, are here today gone tomorrow. We have legislation which is 
written on the assumption that the players are all political parties which were invented 
you know a hundred years ago or decades ago at least, who wish to have a reputation 
and to be taking part in the democratic process, but for decades to come. And so that’s 
not what we see in terms of who are the actors that - there needs to be some 
accountability or controls around their actions ​.​ So I think if there were to be even the 
most light touch of potential disruptions or consequences for malicious activity, there 
needs to be a feedback loop which is much, much quicker.​ On to controls, we identified in 
this report that although acting as an agent for someone else’s donation is outside of what is 
lawful activity under the PPERA. The operation of companies and the payment map - ​the 
making of payments between companies and from companies into our political system is 
- creates a vehicle through which such channeling, such agency, can occur in a manner 
which is very hard to prove, is directly against the law. So we have here, and it may not 
have been the intention of the donations that we reported on to work around these rules, 
that’s still an open question, but nonetheless the consequence of that donation has been 
to show that there is this big hole in our electoral controls, that means that making 
payments to a company that may clearly be set up for the purpose of making and 
receiving money which will enter our democratic electoral process is a means of evading 
controls which might otherwise prevent for example foreign interference in our 
campaigns. And the government here is really weak. So the nearly 2 million pounds that 
better for the country unlimited spent on behalf of, because that’s how it was reported in 
the donation reports, grassroots out, was something that at no point in any of the 
subsequent coverage of that funding, that anyone involved in the governance of that 
third party campaign organization was able to give any account for. And so, the ability to 
declare a donation in kind, expenditure on behalf of a campaign, has totally undermined 
any accountability for the appropriate reporting of that campaign expenditure. So the 
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recommendation that we have in relation to strengthening the controls, is in relation to 
company donations, and I appreciate that the role of corporate donations in our 
democratic politics is in some quarters a matter of dispute. But given that it is currently 
lawful, our proposal is that there should be a requirement that the donation is made out 
of profits generated from business done by the company - so, if you like, out of its 
earned profits, rather than simply as a result of flows of cash between different corporate 
entities. This is not a million miles away from the approach that has taken to rules in 
corporate governance around when dividends can be paid to shareholders by a 
company, the dividends have to be paid out of profits. So we would recommend close 
attention given to a control there that need not therefore be very controversial, but would 
establish that a corporate donation in British politics is indeed that, it is a donation made 
out of the profits of that corporate, that it is not acting as some kind of agent for a 
donation which may or may not otherwise by permissible.​ So I have spoken on disruption 
and on control, the last point I would make is that whilst we recognise your need to have some 
focus to this inquiry, ​we do not believe that the matter of money in politics, or the efforts to 
seek influence over elected or subsequently elected public servants is something which 
happens in isolation within a four week period of an election campaign event. And so the 
challenge that you have here is how to develop a response which recognise that the 
tactics happen far out with an electoral campaign or even a long period of an electoral 
campaign. And so our other recommendations in our ten point plan around money in 
politics are about addressing that wider context of the environment, the relationship 
between elected representatives and their need for funds and where those funds come 
from for various activities, because I believe no matter how transparent you make four 
weeks or even four months, depending on whether you know there’s going to be an 
election or not, you will leave plenty of room for things to be happening which you are 
not responding to outside of that period. And what is at stake here? The ability to 
interfere with the democratic outcomes in this country or to secure undue influence over 
future holders of entrusted power in government is worth an investment that you would 
make over a much longer period of time than the kind of periods that we’re looking at 
controls in our electoral process. And so those controls, the responses, need to measure 
up to the same scope of opportunity for influence ​, so I’ll leave my comments there. We are 
very much supportive of what you’re doing, but we do think there are other components that are 
necessary to be successful in your aims.  
 
Stephen: ​Thank you very, very much. My goodness there’s a lot. There is so many - everytime 
we have one of these sessions, new angles and new issues are surfaced so its extremely useful 
to have your input in that sense. Lord Tyler, I don’t know if you’d like to sit over here. Just on 
this issue of party funding and donations so a number of you spoke on those items, I was just 
trying to get a sense of how much overlap we do have in terms of views and agreement across 
the panel. ​It would be quite good to identify areas where all four of you say yes this really 
is somewhere we should go. So a lot of your focus is on party-funding, based on what 
you heard from the other panelists, for example this idea of donations only coming from 
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corporate profits not just from other [unintelligible], would you agree that’s a good way 
forward? 
 
Sam: ​Yeah so that makes sense to me. I think one of the things that is always important to think 
about is the practicality of these things - now that strikes me that’s entirely kind of like a practical 
solution, in that if you have corporate donations, then it’s fairly easy to track where that money 
has come from. ​So if its corporate donations, it needs to come from the top line, that to 
me, strikes me as perfectly sensible.​ I think that - the thing that Duncan said that I think is 
really important to think about is the - what the legislation that you’re thinking about is trying to 
achieve. Because legislation is always trying to achieve something and it strikes me that the 
legislation like the PPERA and all the discussions around political financing legislation are 
based around sort of this idea that foreign donations are something which are not welcome in 
the system, and then also it strikes me that the idea behind political financing legislation in 
particular, but perhaps electoral legislation generally, is actually one about providing some kind 
of public confidence and legitimacy in the electoral process, and I think if you’re thinking about 
those kinds of things, then that’s where you - that’s where the recommendations can come from. 
Because It has  - so if you think about what the legislation that you’re actually putting into place 
is trying to achieve, then dependent on that, that’s how your recommendations will follow. So 
transparency, deterrence, monitoring, presumably transparency the idea there is that with 
transparency, that provides some kind of legitimizing mechanism. So yeah particularly with the - 
on kind of thinking about what legislation is trying to achieve, money in politics is not happening 
in isolation I could talk about that all day, and yeah the company donations, that makes perfect 
sense to me.  
 
Stephen: ​[Unintelligible] … just thinking as well about the issue of imprints and well, just the 
practicality of the imprint. Do you think its possible to have an imprint which the person receiving 
the advert can click on it and could immediately go to the information about the source?  
 
Kate: ​Yeah.  
 
Stephen: ​Is that what you had in mind ? - I’m just sort of trying to visualize it  
 
Kate: ​So I’ve been doing some work with the center for data ethics, - “who targets me”, we held 
a workshop two and a half weeks ago which was about designing actual - or what an alternative 
digital imprint could look like. And they’ve actually mocked something up, which is going to be 
trialled through the public opinion research at center for data ethics, so what’s done there is a 
little, so above - it’s on Facebook, because the organization that Who Targets Me work with, but 
normally you’ll have a little thing above the advert and it just says “sponsored”. So what they’ve 
done is change so it says like: this is a political advert, and it’s highlighted. And then underneath 
- because out of that workshop there was a particular interest in wanting to give people more 
context about the scope of an advert, but also the variants of an advert.  
 
Stephen: ​How many political buyers the organization (?) 
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Kate: ​We didn’t do that. But this specific intervention gives you - ​so it says something like 
“this has been paid for by the labour party” and kind of a round-about one percent of the 
people in this area are seeing this. And then so this is one of six variants of the ads and 
you can click on it and it took you then to the six variants of the ad that were in the ad 
archive. You could also click on the labour party and it shows you the labour party - all 
the adverts that they’re running. So its possible to have like a click-through system, 
where you give people more information on the front page and then you click through to 
additional information and I think that kind of response to me seems a very logical way of 
going, whereas actually it’s providing people with a bit more contextual information, but 
also the ability then if you’re interested to go through and click through and I think this 
comes to the point about, that you were raising, about you know who is the transparency 
and additional information for? I think a lot of the time we want to give more information 
to citizens but actually most - the work that’s been done in this area shows that most 
people are very unaware, they largely lack [unintelligible] especially younger voters but 
then when they find out more their trust decreases and then they tend to become quite 
panicky because there's no response you can make. So in that instance, maybe giving 
citizens more information isn’t necessarily the response, maybe what we actually want to 
be doing is thinking about - we need to provide information for researchers and for the 
press who can do the scrutiny and provide the accountability that transparency should 
be there for. I think there is a potential danger that, if we focus interventions on giving 
citizens information without giving them power to actually do anything with that 
information, there is actually a potential for kind of increasing distrust and enhancing the 
effects actually I think the APPG wants to mitigate.​ So I think it is really important to think 
about: who are these interventions for and what is the intended goal there?  
 
Lord Tyler: ​Yeah- just to tie in, there’s two points here: the money and the information. Long 
ago before politics, I was a sort of journalist and a shrewd veteran of free streets (?) and follow 
the money, follow the money, follow the money, which is really what you’re all saying, and 
contrary to what I think Sam said earlier,​ I am not particularly critical of the electoral 
commission. Its our fault. Parliamentarians set this thing up with inadequate powers and 
inadequate resources and of course, successive governments have been very too 
pleased to keep them in their box. Because when they’re answered to, they actually do 
move quite quickly. ​I think the classic interesting thing is the issue, and you can’t - ​I think that 
Mr Farage has found a way through the system, which is impeccable because its not only 
true that you can contribute 500 pounds from Monaco or California without anybody 
noticing, but you can do it every day of the year. ​So if you’ve got that sort of money, Sam, in 
there, you can buy up some politics (?). ​Because not only do you not have to prove your bit, 
but if you do record it, the electoral commission may fine you for over-reporting. Now 
that’s our fault, as Parliamentarians, we’ve set up this regulator for our own business as 
it were, and tried to make it as toothless as possible. And that’s where this comes 
together I think because we do have to rely on investigative journalists being able to see 
where the money has come from to do this. That’s why for example, we have to make 
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sure that the EC, and I’m a friend of the EC in this, I’m far from the critic that you’re 
applying we all are, if they were able to actually to actually fine on the scale of the 
damage that’s been done, rather than the 20,000£ being the maximum they can fine, then 
we’d get somewhere. So if you spend 1 million pounds illegally on something, you 
should be fined a million £.  
 
Stephen: ​Thank you. Very important comments… 
 




Kyle: ​What are people’s views on a maximum donation? So its you know - the historic 
difference between the US and UK is that the UK has spending limits, the US has, bizarrely 
actually, has donation limits, should there be a maximum gift for an individual, a maximum gift 
for a corporation, in per year or per election cycle or… ? 
 
Sam: ​So my position on that is - so that’s the solution that’s always mooted, that’s the solution 
that was mooted by Hayden Phillips in 2007, that’s the solution that was mooted by the CPSL in 
2011, I think they put it at 10,000£, and that’s all very well and good but ​the British political 
system as it currently stands is a system that runs on donations. They don’t really get 
much money from membership fees, labour do pretty well but its still only about 20% of 
overall income and you don’t get much money from other sources. You don’t get much 
money from the state. So its all very well and good capping donations but if you want 
political parties to run in this system, then you need to make up that shortfall somehow. 
And that would be for me one of the main reasons to introduce more state financing, but 
again thats something a little bit like the EC, that no one wants to back up, because - 
especially close to an election. So it’s all very well and good talking about caps on 
donations but that needs to be part of a whole bigger kind of holistic solution. You can’t 
just cap donations and expect political parties to be  fine with it, equally, the cap on 
donations is one of, as I understand it, is one of the hardest wins out of anything you can 
get when you’re trying to reform particularly British party funding regime, and that’s 
because actually you’ve got these two kind of historic institutional locks, of the trade 
unions and institutional donors on the conservative party side. And the minute those 
debates start happening, the minute it kind of shuts down.​ So my understanding about 
Hayden Phillips was that was where the reforms fell down - it was around those institutional 
locks. My understand of the CSPL review, what I have argued is that there’s these three locks. 
You’ve got the trade union institutional - the trade union and company donations issue, you’ve 
then got the fact that introducing state financing is incredibly unpopular with the public, almost 
as unpopular as the current regime, or as unpopular as the current regime, and the fact that 
politicians don’t want to do that anywhere near an election time. Because who is going to run an 
election saying “oh by the way we’re going to raise your taxes so that we can have more 
money,” nobody is going to run that in an election. Then there’s issues - so capping on 
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donations might well be a good idea, but its by far and away the hardest win and my 
understanding is that’s when any kind of financing reform has fallen down over the past - since 
PPERA if not before.  
 
 
Duncan: So it maybe the hardest win, but it’s something we’d whole-heartedly support, a 
cap on donations. We’re happy to support the level that has come out of this 
independent process, that most recently those that committee on standards in public life 
set. But you know if the argument against it is - what it does for the state financing of 
parties and the need for public funding, that is not an argument against it in principle 
that's just an argument about the level at which it’s set. Granted that there’s a degree of 
brokering if you’re trying to get cross party support behind a particular number, but it’s 
not an argument against it in principle. We consider that it is invidious for politicians to 
be dependent on certain donors, who, by virtue of their generosity, are a very small 
number of people that are all that matters as far as those politicians financial supports 
are concerned. So much of the other fundraising that happens, as you suggested Sam, is 
almost a smokescreen to that. And in our analysis of the funding of the referendum 
campaigns in 2016, half of the reportable donations, across both sides of that campaign, 
half of the reportable donations came from just 10 people.  
 




Duncan: ​Indeed. I mean when we think about how that one democratic event has so consumed 
everything that’s happened since, and of the reportable donations which are by far and away, 
I’m sure, the vast majority of the money that was spent. As it happens fairly even in value across 
the two sides, but there was no guarantee that that was going to be the case. ​But that it was at 
the mercy of 10 individuals, the half of it, and not that many more for most of the next 
half of it, I think fewer than 100 people were covering the vast majority of all of the 
expenditure of that referendum. That lacks legitimacy in the kind of broader definition of 
what democracy is. It sets up really high risk relationships between politicians and their 
backers. And it undermines public trust. So even if the - you know its nine years old now, 
even if the CSPL limit is not the number that is agreed, but there should be a limit, is I 
think something which has not been argued against in principle. And you only have to 
look across at the atlantic at what has happened to - citizens united - how the absence of 
any kind of control has totally fuelled the influence of vast amounts of expenditure in 
their politics. Take the financial influence that the NRA has over some congresspeople 
and why it is that that country has legislation which, you know, we couldn’t imagine that 
we would have the same situation in this country. So I think there’s pretty good evidence 
that it makes a difference, and not in the public interest. So whatever the level is, we 
should be looking for a level, otherwise we lose - the public loses their grip on what are 
supposed to be the public’s representatives. 
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Stephen: ​Thank you very much. Just thinking about timing - what would you say that the major 
risks that we face with another democratic event coming in the next 6 months? Is the system fit 
for purpose by the current standards, and what could we do rapidly urgently to at least try to put 
a  thinking past that 
 
Kyle: ​The context of that is we’re thinking about like a quick link section and also like the next 
big things that need to be addressed so what are the quick fixes?  
 
Rachel: ​So well, I just had one, just on the last point, maybe just to say - not to say I’m the kind 
of sort of nay-sayer, because I think money and regulation - ​money in politics is very 
important, but I do think there’s a need to think about the role of data as a kind of a focus 
for regulation, in the sense that data arguably is becoming the new money in politics. So 
in campaigns, you know, you don’t necessarily need a huge amount of money per se - 
but what - you know, if Mark Zuckerburg gave you access to Facebook, and obviously 
that’s gonna be less likely given the last sort of debacle with Cambridge Analytica, but I 
mean it’s that which actually becomes the really critical factor now I think.​ And I think we 
need to sort - we talked about the analog and the digital and I think that - not to say that the 
focus on money is incorrect, but there is this sort of old [unintelligible] where we’ve always 
focused our efforts on regulation, and there’s this…  
 
Stephen: ​We have a dual focus, this is money and data and that’s absolute within the scope… 
and then we have the information commissioner’s office tomorrow.  
  
Rachel: ​Right, ok. And so actually I would then say - that leads into the point about what can we 
do and - im not aware how this has changed but ​I know a recent session I was attending 
where the ICO were there, I think they have appointed perhaps one data scientist to the 
ranks that they have, which to me seems a very small resource to be using to be able to 
try and do some of the things which I think could be done, to do this almost sort of early 
warning kind of detection scenario. But yes I think something around having some kind 
of system whereby there will be people - data scientists - a team of data scientists - who 
would be able to use machine learning techniques, social network analysis, sentiment 
analysis, topic modelling and there’s a lot of skill out there basically around this idea of 
looking for patterns in the data. And also then sort of working out does that signal 
there’s something happening here that we need to look into in more depth. So I think that 
does strike me as a really important next step, is increasing the resource.​ So either in the 
EC or the ICO, with regard to having people with those skills, and not being a data scientist, I 
guess I have a lot of respect for what they do. I’ve worked with people that would be the sort of 
people I can think of who would be able to advise more on this role. Perhaps you need more 
computer scientists as well that you would talk to as part of the… 
 
Kate: I do agree I think there’s a potentially very quick win in terms of - if the EC is going 
to be resourced with more finance, it strikes me that the ICO is doing a much better job at 
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equipping itself for the digital age than the electoral commission currently is, and some 
form of fellowship or research exchange system within - you know, having tried to work 
with the EC as a very sympathetic academic, they’re not an open organization and they’re 
not able to draw in that external expertise in a way you would expect them to at a time 
when they’re very under-resourced. So some kind of very basic low level academic 
partnership / fellowship scheme within the electoral commission, like - thats what 
happened at the ICO, they appointed an academic to come and work with them, could be 
an easy way to get in some expertise to allow them to do things that they’re currently not 
able to.  
 
Stephen: ​There’s some confusion I think about the roles of the EC 
 
Kate: ​There’s a lot of overlap.  
 
Stephen: ​- people often aren’t clear on where one - where certain functions should sit, what are 
your views on that? Do you think that the sort of lead coordinating body should be the electoral 
commission, that they could perhaps draw - maybe there could be a level of understanding or 
service of agreement between the EC and ICO to draw their expertise, but the key player is the 
electoral commission? or do you think there should be some other sort of definition of their 
prospective roles?  
 
Rachel: ​I imagine that there would be probably some sort of turf, in terms of you know, being 
able to - so having something that was a shared - ​something that was perhaps joint, that sat 
in between them, I don’t know if thats naive but I think something whereby that would be 
perhaps new, independent, it would be sort of seen as having a focus around elections, 
particularly around - some focus around the use of digital technology, AI, within 
elections would give it a kind of- maybe a sort of remit that would be looking ahead 
towards this year, for instance.​ If there was an election held at this point, what would we need 
in order to be ready to be able to kind of defend against sort of cyber attack?  
 
Stephen: ​So a focus on data, and cyber and sort of the other uses and misuses… what about 
sort of a long distance relation that’s for the electoral commission really to lead on, and is that - 
what are your views on - does that require a new agency or a new institutional kind of 
capability? Or could it be just better use of the ONS? Of the IFRS? Of [unintelligible] in a 
previous session - apparently OIFS is not allowed - you’re not allowed to use information from 
the institute for fiscal studies in campaign election, in the short campaign which strikes me as 
being insane. So this whole thing about information and disinformation, how do you regulate 
that, how do you decide what - and you know there’s 350 million on the side of the bus, how 
could you decide - what’s the fact checking capability, how could that be improved?  
 
Kyle: ​And who is the fact checker?  
 
Stephen: ​And who… yeah.  
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Kate: ​It’s very very hard. There’s even - so there’s been some really interesting research about 
what Facebook did in terms of flagging stories that were spreading this information, and when 
they actually flagged them, it reinforced people’s tendencies to actually agree with - so there’s a 
lot of - 
 
Stephen: ​the more you tell people this isn’t true, the more they -  
 
Kate: So there’s a huge backfire effect and I think actually it’s, you know, politics doesn’t 
actually have many uncontestable facts, right? It’s a values game its about interpreting. 
And I think maybe reducing it to there is a right and a wrong answer, I think is personally 
the wrong way of framing the debate. You know there are contestable claims and there 
isn’t a single truth out there and I think the fact that we have moved to this type of debate 
in which you know there are right and wrong things, there are certain bits of factual 
information which you can say that is just a blatant falsehood, and I think there is 
potentially a role there, but it becomes, as soon as you start arbitrary-ism between 
different claims and it’s - I think that it’s just messy and there isn’t an easier way to do it. 
And it’s especially difficult to do it in real time. The only interesting solution I have heard 
of which you may want to look into is reform political advertising, we’ve been doing 
some interesting work looking at the sign-up process for advertising,  
 
Kyle: ​Who is that sorry?  
 
Kate: ​Reform political advertising.  
 
Kyle: ​Oh is it like an action group?  
 
Kate: ​Yeah they’re a campaign, led by Alex Tape, and they’ve been doing some interesting 
work looking up at the sign off content to factual claims in advertising outside of politics, and 
they’re advocating that it is possible to have some kind of real time fact checking on political 
ads, but they’d be able to tell you more about that.  
 
Duncan: ​I just want to attend to your question on quick wins. Because the time-table you’ve got 
is pretty challenging, I think it rules out regulatory change. The time-table doesn’t rule out 
voluntary action by political campaigners, you know, a consensus, a compact set of standards 
that [unintelligible]. But perhaps the current political climate does. But maybe that could work 
within that tight timeframe, which I think leaves you with the platforms, and the platforms are 
capable of acting far quicker than the legislative cycle. And if there’s enough public and political 
pressure on them to act, and indeed if they have the will, which is I think an open question, at 
the end of the day, these advertisers are paying for a service, or indeed users are, you know, 
they’re at the whim of the platforms. So they have some leverage which they could utilize in a 
much quicker time frame than anything else we’ve discussed, so ​I think probably the best 
prospect for an early win is around this imprints question, or as they call it in the States, 
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the honest ads campaign. So if you’re wondering where to focus for the next few months 
on the basis that other things won’t be baked and ready in time for november or 
whatever, I would suggest just exploring what either the political campaigners or the 
platforms they use would be able to introduce perhaps on a pilot basis, but on a 
voluntary basis rather than waiting for legislative change.  
 
Stephen: ​And the format has already been worked on so…  
 
Kate: ​100% agree with that and it would be very, very important to do that cross-platforms. 
Facebook have actually been leading the way in terms of transparency on this, but for example 
the facebook ad archive stores in for 7 years, twitter - 7 days. The variation across platforms is 
absolutely huge and I think if it was possible to come up with a standard template that could 
work across platforms, that provided you with the same information and the same click-through 
format, in terms of then what you were seeing behind the scenes. You know these companies 
are all doing quite a lot - you can actually get a lot of your - you can see, you can download lists 
of who has targeted you on twitter, but it’s all in a very different format to how it is on Facebook 
or on the Google transparency, so by letting the platforms lead in this area, we’re ending up with 
an incredibly disparate landscape which i find difficult to navigate, let alone average citizens, so 
I think it important to really press platforms and not let them lead and define the terms of 
debate, and I think that given the degree of consensus around digital imprints, I 
fundamentally agree I think that’s the place to push because the government have 
already said that they might need to act on this, but what I think they haven’t said is “well 
what does that imprint look like?” And if it’s just the case of reproducing whats on offline 
material I think it’s a missed opportunity because it won’t be reopened again.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​Yeah well, [unintelligible]. I think Duncan is absolutely quite right, you’re all right 
about imprints and work is being done. Got the EC, Cabinet office doing the work, and I think 
that will happen. ​But I don’t agree that it’s right really to leave it to the commercial world to 
regulate, we should be responsible for regulating the way in which our democracy works. 
There is an all-party, cross party, set of legislation ready to run for referendum, don’t 
hold your breath, but it’s there. Tabled earlier this year by Dom McGree (?) could go 
anytime, could be done, could be ready for november. More tricky actually is I think the 
general election issue because that’s where the whole Thanet experienced the supreme 
court - the difference between national funding pouring into target seats which was 
referred to earlier - that’s much more difficult to legislate for, and there will be huge party 
interest in that.​ But I want to go back to the point that came a bit earlier, and just see if you all 
agree with this - I think you said, if I got it right, that you were expressing a neutral view that 
young people, when exposed to where some things were coming from, became a great deal 
more cynical - or questioning. And I think actually we should all be a great deal more cynical 
about what’s being thrown at us. Would you all four agree with that? In which case, anything 
that makes it more transparent and we’re more cynical about it, I’m up for it.  
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Kate: ​Just to clarify, young people are in general less cynical to start with, but across the board 
when you give people more information everyone becomes more cynical. But it’s - older voters 
are far more cynical to start with than younger.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​Not the very old.  
 




Sam: ​They’re… So one thing I would say about that - and I think its an important point about 
transparency - is that if you look at the debates in and around the implementation of PPERA, 
and indeed in effect if you look at kind of the debates around the Hayden Phillips review, what i 
would suggest is that in and around this electoral legislation, built in is this idea about the 
importance of transparency, but also the you know, if you make things more transparent, if only 
the voters could see what’s going on, they would realise that the system really wasn’t as corrupt 
as they think it is. ​And theres all of this sort of stuff - it’s like the sunlight is the best 
disinfectant approach, which it might well be, it might be the case that if you make things 
more transparent, that reduces the likelihood of wrongdoing, because people might not 
want to get caught up. But I think there’s an equal point that if you introduce 
transparency, it might well make people feel a lot worse about the working of a 
democratic system. And a debate I often have with - so I’ve done a lot of research in 
denmark as well, and I have been quite evidenced by saying in the UK we have an 
effectively world-leading transparency regime. Now in Denmark, I would argue that they 
have an effectively world-losing transparency regime. Transparency regime generally for 
political financing in Denmark is very poor and when they talk about reforming the 
regime, they’re having the exact same debates that we were having in the year 2000 - 
they’re saying: if only people could see what was going on in the Danish system, if only it 
was more transparent, then people would feel a lot better about the system. But it might 
well be the case that Denmark, the Danish system are very- they think their politics works 
pretty well, thank you very much. They’re constantly at the top of the transparency 
international corruption perceptions index. It might well be the case that that transitive 
effect that there’s a lack of transparency in the way that these things work, makes 
citizens considerably less cynical, right? So actually we’re designing these transparency 
regimes around - we’re pushing transparency as a way to improve legitimacy in the 
system, when actually transparency might be bringing down legitimacy in the system. 
Now that’s not an argument against transparency, but its something that needs to be 
thought about, but if we think transparency is important then we need to think about why 
transparency is important and what transparency is providing. ​And I think what Kate was 
saying was sort of bang on in that ​transparency does not necessarily provide citizens with 
more information, but it certainly provides a mechanism for monitoring.  
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Kate: ​Then that leads to deterrence, and ​ I think that then there needs to be teeth, whether 
that is at a citizen level, when you can report an advert or something, you know, as 
misleading material, or whether its an institutional level where we actually have the 
electoral commission able to make some response in a timely way. I think the weakness 
of the institution at the moment is a real problem.  
 
Rachel: ​Maybe a sort of more general point you know on the issue about cynicism, obviously 
there’s a point where we need more people to be cynical. And just sort of looking at the sort of 
political science kind of perspective on this, so at the time there was kind of a point where there 
was a general sense probably in the late 1990s, sort of early 2000s that people were generally, 
were becoming more critical citizens and they were expressing sort of more healthy attitudes 
towards elites, they were questioning - education was playing a role - and so there was a sort of 
optimism perhaps that we were sort of changing from being sort of - perhaps blind loyalty. But 
what I think what’s happened probably since the last - maybe even since the mid 2010’s is that 
people have begun to sort of say: well actually this critical citizen is morphing potentially into 
sort of a deconsolidation of democracy. And that - there’s a point, ​there’s perhaps a tipping 
point where cynicism is altered to good and people should be critical and have a sort of 
healthy kind of distance from elites, but also that when that becomes that people lose a 
sort of support for the democratic project as a whole, and that specific criticism turns 
into more of a diffuse disengagement, and this is the sort of thesis about democratic 
deconsolidation, we’ve entered an era where more - and this is the argument for younger 
people as well - there was an article that was published some time ago in the journal of 
democracy, but basically what their argument was, was saying we see now that people 
are less inclined to say that democracy is the best system, of the range of alternatives, 
and that’s going down in a way that it hasn’t done before, and also more inclined to 
favour authoritarian sort of alternatives, and that is going up. And they found that this 
was actually seemingly stronger amongst younger voters in the US, and so this is sort of 
this point perhaps about the idea of: it’s good up to a certain point, but then we are in a 
time now where actually, more cynicism is obviously not good.​ And I think just to pick up 
on the point of - I think, maybe I’m wrong so I don’t want to misinterpret, but I think what you 
were saying was that people should be encouraged to check these things out, they should be 
allowed to sort of get the transparency and know what’s going on, but if they’re empowered then 
to do something about it, so the efficacy is the important bit that that leads them to then feel like 
well actually its a mess, I don’t understand what’s going on but I think its bad, and I actually 
can’t do anything about it so you’re kind of further back than you were.  
 
 
Duncan: ​So we, on transparency, what we see with the corruption perceptions index, is that 
there’s a bit of a bow way (?), so you have some major corruption scandals, you have some 
enforcement action taken place, and although - and you open things up - and although people 
ought to have more confidence at that point, it takes a bit of time before they do. Because 
initially the memory of what has recently come to pass, is raw, and of course although what has 
come to pass had been happening for a long period of time, they didn’t know about it until it 
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came to pass, so you get this wave that I don’t think in the long run it acts against public 
confidence. So take the MP expenses scandal for example. We now have vast amounts of data 
put in the public domain about how MPs spend the money that’s made available to them, it’s, 
you know, as dull as dishwater, it’s not sensational. Recently an MP was convicted and thrown 
out the house off the back of some of this, but for the most part, it is, compared to the febrile 
atmosphere in this place 10 years ago, it’s very different, and you can’t argue that public 
confidence isn’t higher off the back of that, then where we were at that time. In terms of healthy 
cynicism, I would turn it round the other way.​ I would say where we actually need some more 
healthy cynicism is on the part of the recipient of funding. Whether its the MP who 
wonders whether the person being very generous to them, or in offering them a second 
job, really values their time, they need to be a little bit more humble in assessing what the 
possible motivations are there. Indeed the political parties that engage with very wealthy 
donors, who are not yet in the house of lords, but statistically speaking, one might 
conclude that there was a regional change that they might end up there. I think there 
needs to be a much healthier dose of skepticism on the part of those receiving money 
into our politics, because until there is, they’re still going to be a long way away from the 
public attitudes of the people who see these transactions happening.  
 
Stephen: ​Then again, ​I guess sunlight is the best disinfectant, because it’ll be public 
scrutiny of where that money’s coming from and transparency around where it’s coming 
from that will be the strong incentive for those MPs and those political parties to behave 
with probity. Its the loop of accountability, transparency, information is made available to 
the party, affecting the behaviour of the recipients of those donations.  
 
Duncan: ​And it’s - someone mentioned journalists at the beginning - was it you Kate - ​it’s 
absolutely essential to have this information for journalism to provide some 
accountability here. Because even if the public aren’t going to act on this information off 
their own accord, they’re not going to be armchair auditors of our politicians, they have a 
free investigative media which has an appetite to do this. But if the information isn’t 
published, I mean, the chances of this information coming to light become miniscule.  
 
Kate: ​It’s a huge war, like - one of the things I’ve been doing is convening workshops around 
the challenges of studying campaigning, where we’ve had policy makers, regulators, journalists, 
academics in a room, and everyone is confronting exactly the same problem, in that it’s 
practically impossible to get data. The electoral commission have been sitting in on those, and 
have been voicing the same frustrations about not understanding what’s going on. You know, 
the don’t have the ability to look at content because it’s outside of their scope, so they -  
 
Stephen: ​Content is in terms of -  
 
Kate: ​In terms of the content of, like, campaigns, but like online…  
 
Stephen: ​Oh I see. So not the provenance of funding?  
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Kate: ​No, so not funding, but I mean I think a lot of these challenges are getting information 
being experienced across the board, so t​here does need to be an opening up of - firstly 
gathering more data. I think the point about going into parties and auditing them, 
something that has been done in Canada, and to quite great effect, they’ve done some 
really good work on the data that parties gather and going in and auditing different party 
systems.​ But also on like origins finance I think there’s potential for a scope -  
 
Stephen: ​I mean, it strikes me that the connection between the transition from paper based 
political campaigning and lets say audio and visual based, and digital that - the difference really 
is that everything on this paper based and out there on advertisements or TV, there was a right 
to apply built in because everybody could see it.​ The difference with digital campaigning is it 
is a send and receive model. That pops up on somebody's screen and there really - 
there’s no right to reply because - so that thing that pops up on your screen could be 
calling the other side wrong, accusing them of all sorts of things that you think of under 
the sun, and the other side doesn’t have the right to reply because they can’t see it. And I 
think that that’s potentially also a link from a democratic culture to an authoritarian 
culture, because its a foreign propaganda, where there’s no right to reply built it. In 
totalitarian systems, there is no right to reply because of fear, that if you do stand up and 
call something out the likelihood will be that you get sent the gulag. Now I think it’s really 
pernicious for our democracy, because it goes almost through tunnel vision, i mean it 
just is - you send something out and the person at the other end, on their screen, sees it. 
But it’s not part of a debate. It’s not part of a dialogue. There’s no answer to that​.  
 
Rachel: I think that’s where it throws it back to the social media companies, in that in 
terms of being able to track and trace what is actually being shown to people or what 
they’re actually seeing. As consumers we’ll never know - how do we actually measure 
that exposure? It’s really impossible, it’s only the social media companies that have that 
data. So maybe they don’t regulate themselves, they need to be, you know, told that they 
need to keep this - but there needs to be some accountability of what is being shown at 
source.  
 
Stephen: ​That’s kind of what happens when you atomize the system. Because it’s atomization 
by definition is far more difficult to monitor and to hold to account.  
 
Kate: ​It has happened in the past - I think​ I would just caution against the online/offline 
because this has - it has been difficult to delete this offline, you know, to gather leaflets 
and materials. It’s not done systematically by anyone, gathering leaflets. The issue with it 
going online is that the resource that you need to be able to spread messages online is 
so much lower. So offline you need a leaflet distribution network. Online, anyone can do 
it, and you can have multiple iterations - it’s far easier to do it in a far quicker time. So it 
is different but I think it’s more about the content and the kind of resource barrier - I think 
the right to reply, I can see why it’s there, but I think that has - I think there have always 
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been issues even in the offline before. It’s just that it’s the speed and scale that it’s 
happening offline [she meant online] to me that’s distinctive about it.  And i do think its 
important not to just address the digital, but actually to address the overlap between the 
two of these things, because I think a lot of the problems that we’re not diagnosing 
online equally apply offline, and it’s just that they feel more urgent because it’s amplified.  
 
Kyle: ​One of the ideas is to have - and this has come into a question, I’ve been trying to bring 3 
things together which are all linked in my head, but we’ll see if they’re actually linked - so we’re 
reporting online on candidate expenditure, obviously right because the national expenditure is 
online, and the candidate expenditure is sitting with the local returning officer, at the time you 
have these weird split - so national level and so forth. That online repository would also have 
offline leaflets, so we would bring it up to the same level. All the digital data, all of the offline 
data, together. But the - I want to just finish on the local and national spend, at the differentiation 
because one of the main points about digital advertising that’s been made repeatedly, is that 
you know it can all be national spend, but it’s obviously geo-targeting or its astro-turfed in, like 
the IRN-BRU example, right. If you want to get people in Scotland, look for people who like 
IRN-BRU on, you know, as a replacement for geography. So we’re looking at, like, potentially 
one about limiting how you can target political ads. So you can only target based on postcode or 
something, and that’s just a random example but - and you have a cap per seat of combined 
expenditure for national and local - so, you know, the most you can spend on a seat is x, 
10,000£ or 60,000£ of whatever, but as opposed to like this idea of the two splits, because as 
you said, if you spend 100,000£ of digital ads in one seat, that’s just national, and spend nothing 
on other seats, is that a way to potentially like bridge the divide? 
 
Sam: ​I think that with local and national spend, one of the reasons why it’s really hard to kind of 
find a solution to this problem, other than that some people just say: actually it’s so hard that this 
is about as good as we can do it. But I think this is, and I couldn’t agree with kate more, the idea 
of like online and offline needs to like, there needs to be less of a distinction there. There’s 
challenges offline and challenges online but they might indeed overlap. But where the kind of 
national and local spend thing is key is this idea that actually you can pretty easily target 
anything at a very concentrated area, now you can do that offline as well. But you might say that 
actually it’s - so the example I always use is,  I live in Brighton so when there’s a general 
election on, there’s lots of billboards - green party billboards - up in brighton pavillion, just 
because that’s kind of the nucleus of the city. Now, i would posit that there’s not many other 
constituencies with big national green party billboards in, and that would be considered national 
expenditure, right? Because it’s a national billboard, it is saying vote for the green party. Now I 
don’t think they’re putting that down at south- I don’t think they’re putting that billboard in many 
places - they might be putting it in Norwich, they might be putting it in Bristol, but that is national 
spend. Now how do you then -​ there’s clearly always going to be areas where you are 
going to be able to get slightly around rules and use some of your local spending as 
national spending. But I think that one where there’s not necessarily an easy win, but 
something to think about, how to bring targeting into the legislation, and that might be a 
solution. If you’re specifically targeting very clear amounts of money at certain 
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postcodes which looks pretty local, that’s something that you can build into the 
legislation, but with this legislation it always needs to be realised that there’s always 
going to be ways to get around it, but you just need to find where the most egregious 
examples of this sort of thing are happening. ​So the Caroline Lucas example, fine, you know 
what, there are green party billboards in Brighton, you’re not always going to be able to regulate 
against everything, nor should you. But there’s areas of targeting where I think that’s key, and I 
think that is where the online distinction there is absolutely key as well.  
 
Stephen: ​I have to run unfortunately because I’ve got a three o’clock meeting. But thank you so 
much and this is great that we’re in touch, we’re of course going to be working on framign the 
paper together and it’d be great to get some inputs from you again, you’ve given us some really 
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Stephen: ​Fantastic thank you very much everyone. I’ll just say a couple of words about, er a 
sort of a reminder - I think we’re very aware of what we’re trying to achieve, but just as a recap 
really - and then it would be great to hear from the ICO and the electoral commission your view 
on the top priorities, opportunities, risks that we face as move towards the process of 
synthesizing all of the evidence for our report (?). So just to briefly recap, the all parties group 
has been set up by a number of parliamentarians who have been concerned about the erosion 
of trust in our democratic systems and processes and the institutions that are responsible for 
regulating those processes and enforcing them. A lot of that came off the back of the 2016 
referendum. But it feels to us like some of the challenges that we face do actually predate the 
referendum. Broadly speaking, we’re looking at both data and money. So theres a kind of a 
cliche that we like to roll out, that we seem to have analog methods and tools for a digital age, 
so how do we upgrade our capability in light of the increasingly sophisticated methods that are 
being used for political campaigning. And on the money side, how do we ensure that we are 
able to get maximum transparency and enforcement capability? We can incentivize good 
behaviour and clamp down hard on bad behaviour. The report that we are looking to do - we 
hope we will be in a position to publish that in the autumn. We have received a fantastic amount 
of evidence, both written and oral, from a diverse range of stakeholders, quite a lot from the 
academic and think tank world, and obviously from yourselves, people who really are the 
decision makers in this. We’re looking to pool all of that together into a report which will focus on 
three main areas of activity: three main challenges really or aims or themes: transparency 
deterrence and monitoring. How do we ensure that citizens have transparent access, really 
knowing what is the source of the funding and the institutional power behind the information that 
they’re receiving in terms of political advertisements and other forms of engagement. 
Deterrents, how do we ensure that we have the institutional capability, forensic capability to 
really go after those who are abusing the system, and also how do you set the punishment so 
that it fits the crime and is also not just a slap on the wrist but much more adequate and 
appropriate than that. And then on monitoring its a sense of the way that the landscape moves, 
rapid and fluid, and how can we have a system in place which ensures that we are up to speed 
and indeed whats come through in a lot of the evidence we’ve seen so far - how do you focus 
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more on prevention rather than cure? So what are we doing to nip these issues in the bud? 
Because often by the time the illicit activity has taken place, whatever it might be, either in the 
data or the money side, its too late, the horse has bolted, so how do we actually build the 
capability and capacity to disrupt and prevent this behaviour not just to react to it after the event. 
So those are the sort of 3 main areas that we are going be focusing on in our report and clearly I 
think theres gonna be some of these issues which are very much low hanging fruit, what can be 
done rapidly particularly given the possibility of a snap election in the autumn. Our feeling is that 
the system is absolutely not fit for purpose and we really worry that another major democratic 
event across the UK, which is again being kind of polluted by this sort of behaviour is going to 
have a very negative impact and erode trust, so feel theres a kind of need for speed. But then, 
we also recognise that there are some sort of longer term structural more fundamental issues 
that need to be addressed. So we’re hoping that the report will both have some kind of tangible 
deliverable recommendations in relatively short order, and then we’ll also address some of the 
long term challenges. So that in a nutshell is what we’re seeking to achieve. My colleagues is 
there anything youd like to add? …. So if we could then start, I really don’t mind whether the 
electoral commission or ICO would like to start.  
 
Kyle: ​ICO is starting.  
 




Stephen: ​So yeah if you could just give us your if you like pitch on what you think are the 
challenges, threats opportunities in light of what ive just sort of set out. And then we’ll go over to 
the electoral commission and then we just open it up for Q&A.  
 
Steve Wood: ​Thanks very much and really pleased to be here to speak on this topic, and we’ve 
engaged really extensively on these issues since 2017, we’ve also given evidence to a DCMS 
select committee, and we see this as part of our ongoing engagement highlighting the key risks 
and issues in a really important area. ​So for the ICO, this is a matter we started to look at in 
2017, so when issues were first raised about the use of data relating to the Brexit 
referendum, and we have had a strong sort of systemic joined up program of work to 
look at the issues emerging from how data is used in a democratic process since then, 
and I think its been of vital importance to us at the ICO because we see the confluence of 
different fundamental rights as well as the fundamental rights relating to data protection 
and privacy - a confluence there of all the important rights relating to free and fair 
elections and freedom of expression as well.​ So for us the commission [unintelligible] 
prioritized this work back in 2017. But to go to your theme, as well,​ for us at the heart of this 
was a lack of transparency and the concern really that the public were unaware of what 
we call sort of “invisible processing” which is behind the curtain and actually had 
become very sophisticated perhaps without the public being aware. The sort of use of 
techniques which had been developed in the commercial sector had quickly been applied 
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into the political sphere really without an ethical pause as well to consider what the 
implications were of using these commercial techniques in this particular unique context 
of elections and democracy and we feel that is what really heightens the importance of 
this issue. As well though, we have ongoing concerns about how this type of advertising 
works in a broader commercial context as well. So for us as well at the ICO it was very 
important for us to look at the issues in the realm so our investigation really covered 30 
organizations. So we looked at all of the key actors, so we looked at critical parties, 
referendum campaigns, analytics companies, obviously famously Cambridge Analytica, 
we looked at the data brokers who were supplying the data, we obviously looked at the 
social media companies, the internet platforms that were playing a crucial role in the 
delivery and the microtargeting of the adverts that take place and the profiling that takes 
place behind the scenes, that service of profiling and ad-targeting, the internet platforms 
provide the political actors, the parties, the referendum campaigns who want to take part 
in the particular process. So for us as well we talked about political data ecosystem, to 
use that term, in terms of all of these different actors sharing data, data flowing between 
them in different parts of the process with all of that leading to that greater 
micro-targeting of the customer being in the middle. We’ve got a number of sort of 
diagrams that explain that in our democracy disrupted report, we show how the 
individual voter can actually can lead up to being targeted about different aspects of their 
characteristics about how they’re analyzed and profiled and how that leads to very 
specific and targeted messages being delivered to them. We also commissioned a piece 
of work from demos as well which set out where this could go in the next 5 to 10 years as 
well, so what does this look like when the world develops artificial intelligence, concepts 
like sentiment analysis, taking data from a wider range of sources such as the internet, 
so a large number of devices which produce patterns of people’s behaviour. So that led 
us to the point of last year where we set out the outcomes of what we’d investigated. So 
we took specific enforcement action against certain actors in the process so we used our 
powers, we fined facebook, which was the maximum under the old law, of 500,000£ for 
their role in the gathering of the data which led to that data being supplied to cambridge 
analytica. We fined one of the data brokers a company called MS Diary who supplied the 
labour party, we also instigated formal use of our audit powers to go and do formal 
audits of all of the major parties as well as part of that process. We also made clear as 
well, although they went into administration and then heading towards liquidation, but we 
made clear that had we taken cambridge analytica to the full conclusion we would have 
concluded that they broke the data protection law as well. ​So we set out those particular 
findings and showed how we used our powers, but equally as well we had reached a point in a 
way, luckily for data protection, we had a once in a generation opportunity to modernize our law, 
so the introduction of the GDPR last year gave us stronger powers to fine ultimately up to 4% of 
global turnover up to 17 million pounds, we have strong audit powers of investigation which also 
we successfully made the case to the government to, during this investigation, as we realised 
the limits of our old powers to be able to get data from cloud servers, to be able to do a modern 
digital investigation as well. So that was part of our work. And then just lastly, and I hope we can 
explore this in more detail, ​we made a series of recommendations in our report which was 
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entitled democracy disrupted which I’m sure you’ve seen - but just to highlight a few of 
those, the most crucial one to us at the moment as well given - the improvements in 
other areas like our powers we feel like we’re well tooled in that area - but the key issue 
for us is a stronger set of rules of the road if you like - in what would be a statutory code 
of practice under the data protection act 2018 for use of personal data in political 
campaigning. So we made that recommendation to governments and it was also 
endorsed by the DCMS select committee - but we’re still sort of waiting for a full reply 
from government on that, whether they have indicated they are willing to examine it. We 
feel that as well would make it very clear what the risks are in relation to personal data 
and political campaigning and also how political parties can actually utilize data in digital 
campaigning with that being a positive aspect in terms of engagement of voters. The 
code of practice would also show where political parties, particularly, can actually make 
use of data in campaigning so they feel empowered to know how to do that within the 
law. ​So that’s particularly one of our crucial recommendations, we’ve also made 
recommendations about raising voter awareness. ​We also want to work closely with the 
electoral commission on that about raising general awareness using some of the 
campaigning tools we’ve already got at the ICO that we use for the introduction of the 
data protection law last year. And to generally raise awareness about what data 
politically parties generally hold about individuals is an important component of this 
work as well.​ I’ll leave it there in terms of my opening section, happy to take any questions 




Stephen: ​We can maybe do a couple of questions, just before moving onto the electoral 
commission, and we’ll try to come back to you if we can. Just on the statutory code of practice, 
have you drafted something and do we know what that looks like?  
 
Steve Wood: ​Yes I should have said that actually. We actually have a draft version, although it 
won’t be a statutory code because we don’t have the primary legislation in place to underpin it, 
we are going to produce essentially a draft to say this is what it could look like, and also 
because of the urgency the point you made of “there could be an election in the autumn” we 
want something to be out there from the ICO to guide the process, so we should be in a position 
to publish that next week.  
 
Stephen: ​Next week? Oh ok.  
 
Steve Wood: ​Yeah, the 25th.  
 
Stephen: ​Ok.  
 
Steve Wood: ​and that will be for consultation as well it will give the chance to political parties to 
consider it over december and provide input about how it works practically for them as well.  
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Stephen: ​You talked about raising awareness on the data that political parties hold on people, 
how would you propose to do that?  
 
Steve Wood: ​Well we did make a number of recommendations in the report which were 
probably maybe slightly for the longer term about whether there could even be some sort of 
standard information which is provided to voters, we didn’t completely prescribe how that should 
work because its not our particular area but we did just give one example. For example - 
information -  ​there could be a special website which people could be directed to from the 
polling card but we’re aware thats a very specific part of the electoral process which is 
highly regulated but we think there needs to be a key place where voters can go to, to get 
standard information - so sort “mypoliticaldata.org” or just a direct url for people to go to 
a website which very clearly sets out to them how their data is used in general terms in 
the political campaigning process, with alongside that the parties and the other actors 
still having their direct responsibilities to provide their own privacy notices on their 
website, but a more general awareness campaign would only be one part of it, its only 
one part of the jigsaw but we’ve had some positive discussions with the electoral 
commission about where we could start to do that. ​We’ve also got a branding that we use 
generally for data protection called your data matters which is for the public about their data 
rights in general terms so also about how their data is held by companies which we’ve used - 
we’ve got a series of animations which just make people aware that we’re planning to - we have 
made soem initial work on the branding there to get that working there in the election context as 
well. I think we ran it for the European elections for the first time.  
 
Stephen: ​On digital imprints, do you have a template or do you - what is your thinking about 
digital imprints, I’m assuming you think it’s a good idea, but how would implement that and then 
do you think it would be something that you could click through? 
 
Steve Wood: ​Yeah. No I didn’t mention digital imprints immediately because its probably an 
area which is a bit of obviously its a combination of interests obviously the electoral 
commission..  
 
Stephen: ​We’d like to get into that.  
 
Steve Wood: ..​a primary interest because it’s about the transparency of who has paid for the 
but we feel it just goes to the overall transparency and fairness about how someone’s data is 
used, so ​we’ve been supporting the cabinet office consultation and we’ve provided input 
into  that in terms of digital imprints for ads. I think we’ve seen also there’s a self 
regulatory system at the moment that facebook have got an archive up and running 
which I think people have tested that and looked at the short-comings of it. But I think it 
is important that that’s put on a statutory basis. But i’d obviously point to the electoral 
commission’s specific interest in that, so it’s partly an understanding of how your data is 
used in that context but its got that particular campaign financing aspect which would be 
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outside of our sphere of influence ​, so whether it’d be the ICO to oversee that it’d be more 
likely to be towards the sphere of the electoral commission rather than us.  
 
Stephen: ​Right.  
 
Steve Wood: ​Yeah.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​Going back to your main task, it sounds from what you’ve been saying that you see 
that political parties has been your main area of interest, but as we call it one of the 
extraordinary developments of recent years both sides (unintelligible) has been the non-party 
campaigners. We in the coalition work jolly hard, we thought, to try and deal with that. But given 
that for example in the run up to the start of the European parliamentary elections, the non-party 
campaigners were outspending the parties tragically in this field (?). I assume that you are as 
well aware of what’s going on there and as interested in what they’re doing as the parties. 
 
Steve Wood: ​Yeah I think we put the parties at the core of it in the most direct way that voters 
are reached with political messages during the election period and obviously they are spending 
the money and commissioning and using these different online services to target the adverts but 
I think we are aware of that point of a number of different actors who are in the political 
space who are pumping more money in so we’ve got an investigation running at the 
moment into a group called mainstream network who ran a number of pro-brexit 
messages in facebook ads over the last few months. You know we’ve - it appears you 
know spending into the hundreds and thousands of pounds so we’ve actually got a live 
investigation running into that which is perhaps an example of the area you’re thinking 
of. So I think those are often characterized more as dark ads so its really unclear where 
those ads are coming from - and we’re in the middle of an investigation - we’re actually 
using our statutory powers also we’ve been on record about this publically with the 
DCMS committee but we’ve served information notices to get information from facebook 
so we can understand who was directing those adverts and how individuals data was 
harvested from the adverts because also we’re asking people to sign up provide an email 
address and then that data might be used in an onward fashion.​ So does- ​I think you’re 
right the risks sort of can proliferate in terms of a number of different actors in this space 
and i think what we’ve learned from investigating the referendum as well is -  its a 
different space compared to an election in terms of different number of actors and I think 
that can certainly be something to think about for the future if as a country we have more 
referendums about how the data governments and the oversight works for referendum 
campaigns for groups who may set up and then disappear. When the recommendations 
we made as well as there should sort of be a third party audit before the campaign closed 
down to make sure all the data governance is done properly ​ as well but thats in our.. 
 
 
Lord Tyler: ​I think Stephen and I may disagree there, I think we are just as likely to have a 
referendum in the near future as to have a general election. See also on how the MPs don’t 
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seem to be very enthusiastic about elections and that. But given that, before the campaigners 
are officially designated by the commission theres a period of very influential online activity 
before 2016, and that is frankly going to happen again. And these are people who can come 
and go and disappear 
 
SW:​I think as well the point we make is that we’re lucky in a away with our remit, because its a 
general protection remit, we’re not bound by election periods so we’re on this 24/7, which is why 
we’re continuing this investigation into the mainstream networks so for us, we can look at how 
any organization is using data for political purposes at any time if we’ve got the intelligence we 
want to go with and look at it so thats the one benefit we have with the General Election data 
protection law because its constructed in that way.  
 
Deidre Brock: ​Can I ask - do you think, or can you tell us what the ICO is doing about sort of 
future-proofing? Because I’m thinking about something - evidence we received from all this 
about WhatsApp its heavy use in one election I think in India, the indian election, and that being 
a sort of closed international system and very you know very difficult to scrutinize and very - 
clearly things like this are gonna be coming up all the time, So I’m interested to hear what you’re 
doing around that.  
 
Steve Wood: ​Yeah ​I think its a fair point that we could easily just get too interested in one 
platform therefore even a lot of our activities last year were focused on facebook 
because of the interaction with the cambridge analytica scandal, but I think you would 
have in future a number of different platforms maybe utilized in different ways depending 
on the way the campaign has seen their ease of use - if some platforms were becoming 
harder to use because of certain types of practices - the platform maybe puts in place 
people who could shift which is why I think its important that its horizontal we don’t just 
focus on one platform. I mean WhatsApp particularly has proliferated in certain 
countries, I know it was an issue in Brazil, I think whatsapp have now put some 
constraints on that in terms of the size of these whatsapp groups which can be used to 
target people but I don’t think we’ve seen a large profileration of use of those tools but if 
we think about other emerging platforms like Snap, thats very popular with a younger 
demographic of users so its very important these messages go across the board to all 
the platforms about their responsibility. So the draft guidance/code, what we’re gonna 
put out next week, will be sort of platform neutral we won’t be talking about facebook 
we’ll be talking about how different political actors use platforms in general terms so that 
our guidance is applicable, really the sort of key concepts and principles which could be 
applied to a number of different situations. But the challenge for us as the regulators is 
keeping up with the Tech​ so we’ve got.. 
 
Deidre Brock:​ I know.  
 
Steve Wood: ​We’ve got like specialist forensic investigators so really we learned a lot I’d say 
from the investigations over the last two years they were the biggest investigations we’ve ever 
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undertaken, we had 50 ICO staff, ​we seized 700 terabytes of data from cambridge analytica 
which is a large amount of data we’ve had to crunch through, we’ve had to learn in a lot 
of detail how the different platforms work to microtarget so its important that quite a lot 
of our resource goes into that side of making sure than when we look under the bonnet 
we understand whats going on there. ​So I think it’s sort of a good question and a pertinent 
point to raise the nature of the changing tech. The other important thing to look at if you haven’t 
looked at it we commissioned it for demos its like a companion to our report but that sets out - 
we’ve sort of asked demos to question where could this go in sort of five to ten years -  and 
particularly it was Jamie Barber, I dont know if you know the author whose written in this area 
he led some of that work at Demos and he put in that sort of future gazing, also looking at whats 
happening in the US because it is a bit more advanced there in the way its proliferated in terms 
of where it could go.  
 
Stephen: ​Demos is giving evidence next Monday.  
 
Steve Wood: ​Perfect, it’s all coming together.  
 
Deidre Brock: ​I just wanted to - you mentioned that as a result of GDPR you can now impose 
up to 17 million pound fines, and we’ve just heard about facebook and their fine of 5 billion, and 
then their share prices went up on the back of that. I mean 17 million yes that’s a significant 
chunk of money for most people but would you like to see that raised?  
 
Steve Wood: ​For corporations as well it can be up to 4% of global turnover, yeah so that’s the 
other point.​ But the message from us as well is that fines alone probably won’t solve 
these problems we think certainly from the angle of data. Also I think when we’re thinking 
a bit more generally about how the risks are proliferating for people online in terms of 
how their data has been manipulated and used and the aggregation of data the platforms 
have and the power they have its probably gonna need us to use our powers so we’ve 
also got powers to order companies to stop processing data. So some of this actually in 
terms of - these are slightly wider issues about how the whole online economy works and 
how people’s data is used and it will probably need to lead to an evolution of business 
models as well. So fundamental change in practices won’t just come from fines, fines are 
an important level and tool because you [unintelligible] serving a large enough fine you 
get a message into the boardroom and you set out the magnitude of what someone’s 
done so we’ll always use fines in certain circumstances but we’ve got other tools 
available to us. So ultimately as well we want to be outcome based so how do we actually 
change the behavior of those who have done wrong. That’s why we also think it’s 
important that the parties - we’re actually doing these audits so we actually go in and 
look at what the different political parties are doing and actually provide practical input 
into what they need to do to change the way they’re using data as well. So it’s probably a 
joined up use of tools for us is the mechanism, and the fine as well for us is not about 
putting an organization out of business but about serving a dissuading and effective but 




Stephen: ​So just final question from me on trolls and bots - is that in the scope of what you do? 
 
Steve Wood: ​Its less - its less in our sphere because we’re particularly focused on how 
individuals personal data is used. ​So particularly where you’ve got issues about sort of 
trolls and bots particularly coming from state actors or from other parts of the world- 
that\s more potentially more of a sort of a cyber sort of resilience type risk which I know 
other parts of the government are looking at in terms of I think NCSC and the cabinet 
office are also looking at those areas. There’s also the work that the government set out 
in the online harms white papers also going to that area in terms of disinformation and 
the new online harms regulator may probably take more of a role in that particular area. 
What we have flagged up actually about the online harms white paper was that it didn’t 
say enough about data in elections actually so that was a concern that the commission 
has set out a little while ago.  
 
Stephen: ​Ok fantastic thank you very much.  
 
Kyle: ​Can I make a clarification? 
 
Stephen: ​Yeah of course go ahead.  
 
Kyle: ​Do political parties have any explicit exemptions under the GDPR in terms of what data 
they can hold?  
 
Steve Wood: ​No I think that’s - there are no explicit exemptions but I think it’s a bit of a myth 
sometimes that we will be seeking to clarify that in the guidance ​so rightly in the data 
protection act of 2018 which implements the GDPR in section 8 theres like a condition 
which means that political parties don’t always need to look for consent to use data so 
there’s an alternative to consent which is essentially if the processing of the data is 
necessary for democratic engagement they can use the data but its not an exemption its 
just saying as political actors you don’t have to get consent you can rely on this 
alternative legal basis but you still have to comply with things like the transparency 
requirements, giving people the right of access for their data I think some, sometimes 
refer to that as an exemption, but we need to sort of myth bust and sort of explain a bit 
more about that. But I think its right that there is that provision in the data protection act 
because democratic engagement is a vital important activity therefore parties do need to 
use data to some extent, thats why thats there, but what we’d say is its not a get out of 
jail free card, theres still the concept of necessity means proportionality therefore that 
should be guiding what the parties do.  
 
Kyle: ​And then my other one was about - I mean you talked about third party data audits after 





Steve Wood: ​In terms of audits of parties, we’re gonna conduct them ourselves. What we’re 
also saying is that particularly after referendums we made a recommendation in the report to 
highlight the concerns we had actually in the investigating of some of the actors because they 
actually shut down really quickly. So what we’re saying really is ​there should be an obligation 
on them before they wind the campaign down they should bring in a third party auditor to 
actually asses what they did with data during the campaign and make sure the data is 
either deleted or put beyond use and there’s that full audit trail. That was a 
recommendation we made but at the moment it’s just a recommendation so there’s no 
sort of statutory requirement or underpinning on that but it’s - the useful thing for us was 
just teasing out the difference between elections and referendum campaigns.  
 
 
Kyle: ​Right, ok.  
 
Stephen: ​Thank you, over to the electoral commission.  
 
Craig: ​Well good morning, thank you. And can I say that we really welcome the work of your 
party group. Clearly this is an issue which is very close to our hearts. It’s something we’ve 
worked on intensely for a number of years and it\s great to see parliamentarians providing a 
kind of support for our agenda so thank you. Obviously we were set up by parliament nearly 20 
years ago with three main roles. One to oversee the delivery of well run elections and 
referendums, one to regulate the flow of money around the political system, and the third to 
effectively keep an oversight of electoral law and to make recommendations to parliament and 
government whether we think the law needs to be changed. And this is obviously the main issue 
raised in front of us today in terms of digital campaigning. Its something that like others we’ve 
been looking at much more intensely since the EU referendum, but actually our interest in this 
area goes back as far as 2003 which was the first time that we made a recommendation about 
digital imprints being brought into law so it’s something that we’ve looked at for a long time 
although our interest has obviously grown in recent years. ​Our base position on digital 
campaigning is that actually it’s a good thing, and I think it’s really important for us to 
keep saying that. Digital tools provide a really important new way for political parties and 
campaigners to reach audience, reach them with their messages and actually engage 
them bilaterally rather than just one way. But that’s obviously if they’re used properly. 
And ninety nine percent of the time we have strong compliance within the system. But 
what we’re obviously looking at is the outliers here, and that’s the particular place where 
we’ve been focusing our attention and that led up to  our digital campaigning report 
which we published last summer although obviously we’ve continued to monitor the 
issues as well, as the last years gone on, and looked at ways in which we can continue to 
make sure that we’re finding new ways to address issues that have arisen or indeed look 
for new issues as they come up.​ You talked about data and money in your introduction, 
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obviously we’re the money side of that, following the money is the basis of our system we’re a 
financial regulator fundamentally, so when we’re looking to work in terms of digital campaigning 
we increasingly collaborate with others to ensure that we’re drawing in best use of expertise, 
particularly from around the public sector, so that we’re making best use of the expertise that 
exists in the public interest. So actually you know we have a great working relationship with the 
ICO which we really value and appreciate, similarly the NCSC for example who you mentioned 
on cybersecurity we work increasingly strong with them, and also we look forward to the new 
regulatory of online harms - which the DCNS has proposed and - to working with them and 
we’ve already put a submission in suggesting that that system needs to bake into it - 
collaboration between that regulator and us on the type of misuse that we’re talking about today. 
A really important point for us as well is that reform around digital campaigning sits 
within a much broader agenda of electoral law reform which is needed and we’ve had 
many long conversations about that - there’s a huge range of things that need to be 
changed to make sure that our democratic processes and elections are fit for purpose. 
We’ve obviously got one specific issue to look at today but to us there’s a much broader 
agenda.​ So just picking off your three headings hopefully helping to give a little bit of an intro to 
where we think changes need to happen in each of those areas. ​There are legal changes 
which are importantly under each of transparency, deterrence and monitoring - but that’s 
not to say that in making the case for those, we’re sitting back and waiting for the law to 
be changed. In each of those areas theres actually lots of things that we’re already doing 
to change our processes where we can to make sure that we have been more fleet at 
foot, more proactive to regulate in each of those areas ​. So in terms of transparency, 
obviously ​we talked about imprints, thats a really important thing for us and we do see 
that as a low hanging fruit which could be achieved relatively easily.​ ​A key change as 
well would be changing the spend and return categories which are currently specified in 
law. It would be great to see that requirement require more detail be provided in spending 
returns so that we and members of the public are able to see much more granularity 
about what spending is and how its been targeted. And then the ad libraries that we’ve 
talked about - actually some of the social media companies have stepped up really well 
to do voluntary action in this area. But there are deficiencies, there are areas where they 
could be improved, and for us and for voters, there are really important areas where they 
could be standardized and made much more easy to use so we think actually changing 
the law to make those a requirement, to make some specifications about them, would be 
a really important step. ​In terms of the things we’re doing, actually public awareness is a really 
good example of where we’re doing much more to try and raise awareness once the public have 
- of what they need to consider when they’re looking at political advertising in the context of 
elections and referendums.​ In terms of deterrents there’s a lot of work that we do to 
encourage more compliance, one of the important things for the group to be aware of is 
the work that we are doing in terms of introducing a prosecutions capacity to the work of 
the commission, at the moment we don’t take forward our own prosecutions, but its 
absolutely within our gift within the law to do so. It actually is the bread and butter of 
many other regulators so actually its the natural progression of our work to just step out 
a bit further and start doing some of the low level prosecutions where actually the police 
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simply dont have the time to be able to take them forward.​ Thats something which we’re 
gonna be bringing forward for consultation in the autumn with political parties and other 
interested bodies. So that’s the kind of example of the things that we’re doing to improve work in 
this area. But in terms of changes to the law, ​actually looking at our sanctioning regime is a 
really fundamental part of this. We do look at the ICO with some envy, actually its well 
known that our limit is 20,000£ per offense, I think we - our position is that you know that 
is a cost of doing business actually for a campaign or political party that looks to breach 
the law. So actually significantly raising that cap would be immensely helpful to us to 
make sure that we can use it as a tool to ensure compliance.​ ​Also there are a couple of 
ways in which we’d like our regulatory powers to be increased. A really important part of 
that is the ability to go in and obtain information and require provisional information from 
bodies which are not regulated by us. At the moment the regulation provides for us, for 
political parties and campaigners, and then during an investigation, when we head into 
that very formal process of investigating the suspected wrongdoing, we have a broader 
remit. But actually in the assessment phase which comes before which is really 
important for us in terms of the real time monitoring aspect, the ability to go into for 
example a social media company and request them to provide us information about who 
is funding a campaign for example would be really helpful to us in being able to speed up 
the regulatory activity that we take forward. And then onto monitoring, as I say the ability 
to obtain information would be really important part of that, and also again back to ad 
libraries, actually they are providing a really useful tool for us. During the European 
parliamentaries we were able to use them to really understand some of the detail of what 
was going on, who was spending what where, it was very - it was disappointing to us not 
to have been able to participate in the European commission’s work in this area.​ They 
learned a lot of work in the lead up to the polls across Europe, but obviously because the UK 
wasn’t participating, we were not round the table. So that was disappointing, but we have been 
able to learn some other things from their experiences afterwards. We are as well asking for 
those regulatory changes, doing a lot more work ourselves to deliver real time monitoring, so 
actually using the ad libraries and other aspects of our work to go in and regulate and talk 
publicly about the regulatory work that we’re doing. So for example actually having gone into the 
Brexit party to examine their financial processes, thats probably not something that we would 
have talked about publicly a few years ago. Actually I think it was really good for us to be able to 
talk about it publicly for people to know that we were doing it and to see that there was a body 
who was acting in their interest. There’s one thing which doesn’t really fall into those three 
specific areas. But it underpins a number of things which we’re looking for, which I know the 
group is interested in. And thats the split at the moment between the party and the candidate 
regime. ​At the moment, we have this kind of two part structure where we regulate as a 
national level what parties and campaigners are doing, but actually candidate expenses 
in an election are regulated by the police effectively. And that creates a disjunction which 
is really unhelpful, we think,  for parties, for the candidates themselves, for the public to 
be able to understand how things are regulated, where they go to complain and also for 
transparency. Just one example would be that actually we have an online system where 
any member of the public can go online and see what parties and campaigners have 
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been spending in an election or in a referendum. If you want to see what a candidate has 
been spending, you’d need to go to a local authority, speak to the returning officer, and 
probably consult a hard copy of the records. We don’t think that’s good enough, and 
that’s just one example of how we think bringing the candidate regime under the control 
of the commission would be a really helpful way of making the system fairer and much 
simpler and more transparent.  
 
Stephen: ​Thank you very much. Just on that last one - do you think the whole system should be 
put online as well?  
 
Craig: ​In terms of spending returns?  
 
Stephen: ​Yeah. Both candidate and national.  
 
Craig: ​That would be immensely helpful. I mean actually transparency is a core thing for the 
commission so we’re never gonna argue for less transparency. Actually its our system which we 
currently have which we’re actually reviewing at the moment, we’ll be updating next year with a 
much more accessible online portal which will be easier to use for parties and campaigners but 
also for the public. Actually downstraight (unintelligible: 40:36) transparency can really help trust 
in the system. Journalists go in there, they use it all the time they’re constantly phoning to our 
press office asking for clarification about details. And there are examples of where actually that 
system has flushed particular issues out which have then become either a regulatory issue, or 
something in the media. Having that kind of exposure for the candidate level would be 
immensely useful.  
 
Stephen: ​That would be helpful. Paul mentioned earlier this issue of all these new organizations 
springing up that aren’t political parties, which call themselves all sorts of kind of relatively bland 
names I suppose “Britain first,” “Britain’s Future,” “Best for Britain.” Can you say a bit about 
registration of those? So we took some evidence yesterday and one of the panelists said that 
since 2014, only 31 organizations have registered with the electoral commission. Organizations 
that fit this description which are not political parties but which are involved in political 
campaigning.  
 
Craig: ​Since 2013??  
 
Stephen: ​Since 2014.  
 
Craig: ​2013… I don’t think that can be correct because we had - I’m remembering - 120 
non-party campaigners registered just for the referendum alone. But we can certainly check on 
that data for you.  
 
Stephen: ​Yeah. I don’t know which category it was a sort of passing comment that was made 
yesterday, I don’t know maybe there are different categories but there was a concern around 
14 
the way in which organizations which are not political parties but which clearly have a political 
agenda are just growing like topsy. What are your views on that? Should registration be 
compulsory? Registration with yourselves.  
 
Craig: ​So I suppose an important point on that is that we look at regulated periods in the lead 
up to polls. ​So actually outside a regulator period, what non-political parties are doing to 
campaign around political issues is not currently within our brief. Because what we’re 
looking at is where people are trying to influence a vote at a particular poll. We have 
made some recommendations about whether the regulatory period should be extended 
to cover more length of time of activity. When a poll is scheduled, clearly there’s 
sometimes an issue where a poll is not expected, so for general election, actually if that 
is called outside the remit of the fixed-term (?) Parliament act, there is a backdated 
regulatory period of a year, political parties generally use - my understanding is that they 
work on the basis that an election might happen so they keep their accounting up to 
scratch on that. Non-party campaigners don’t do that. And actually one concern which I 
think we need to bare in mind is that, for the charitable sector, who might want to 
legitimately campaign the lead up to a poll, they’re not keeping their accounting up to the 
scratch of the kind of financial reporting thats required for us, constantly. ​Because that 
wouldn’t be approved use of funding for them. And they have expressed significant concerns, 
directly to us and publicly, about the chilling effect which happens for them, particularly where 
polls are unexpected or when multiple polls happen in succession. So I think that, as with many 
things, there’s a balancing act between the transparency that’s provided but also the potential 





Tom Hawthorne:​ I was just going to say I think that particularly in the last four or five years 
we’ve really ramped up that monitoring approach that Craig mentioned, which means that ​we’re 
constantly looking out for organizations or campaigns that might need to register up with 
us if they reach the threshold spend and their activity is captured by the rules on election 
campaigning, so in the course of an election - pre-election period we will be in contact 
with a number of organizations to tell them about their obligations, to tell them what they 
need to think about in terms of keeping records and to ask them whether they need to 
register with us, because their spending looks as though they should be captured. ​So, 
that’s improved over the last four or five years and actually as Craig said, with the ad libraries 
and the monitoring of data that social media companies provided more of, thats been really 
helpful for us to pick out much more detailed data to look at who might need to register with us.  
 
Stephen: ​Because that links through to the digital imprint issue as well so where you - there’s 
so many of these facebook ads coming in and you don’t know who has funded them and if 
they’re not - if its not a registered organization, where does that organization - sort of you know - 





Craig: ​One of the really interesting things about the way that the [unintelligible] regime has 
grown up in terms of the voluntary activity of social media platforms is that they’ve actually 
defined what is political much more broadly than our regime currently does. So we’ve - we are 
very much about influencing the vote in the lead-up to a poll, in a particular period. They’ve 
actually broadly - there are some areas where there isn’t enough of an overlap - but broadly 
they’ve actually gone for a much wider definition, particularly in terms of time period. I mean one 
interesting by-product of that is that actually our public awareness activity to get people to 
register to vote is caught within what they class as being political activity. We have obviously no 
issue about being transparent, we fully support that and we want our advertising to be clearly 
badged electoral commission, but what it meant was that actually when we were wanting to 
place adverts to encourage citizens who were living overseas to make sure that they were 
aware of the responsibilities to register to vote, we weren’t able to do so because we didn’t have 
anybody based in the territory where we were wanting to advertise. In some ways it was a really 
heartening example of the system working. That they’ve actually made a lot of effort to put 
controls into try and put foreign - to control foreign influence in our elections. Unfortunately we 
slightly fell flat on that we’re talking about how we can move around that with them. ​But 
actually having that broader definition of what is political, I think is actually quite helpful 
for the voter, because I think it will get more organizations in the habit of putting that 
kind of information on their advertising just as a matter of course, rather than thinking, 
“actually we’ve got to do this in an election period” 
 
Stephen: ​Just another question I had on donations. So this 500£ issue. What would be your - in 
an ideal world, how would you deal with that issue? Should it be that information should be 
made available for any donation over 1£ or 1 pence? Or would you set the bar at a different 
level or would you change the way that the information should be made available?  
 
Craig: ​So I’d like to pop to Tom to go into more detail on this, but I think this is one of the issues 
where there’s a balance. ​Actually putting a huge burden on political parties and 
campaigners to check permissibility if you were going to go down to 1£, that’s going to 
create a very, very large burden administratively, which isn’t necessarily going to deliver 
the kind of confidence that we need from the public against that cost. So actually I think 
we have to make sure that where we are setting the threshold, is one which is 
proportionate to the influence which is what we’re effectively trying to stop. So we’re 
trying to identify where people are exerting a disproportionate influence on a political 
party, on a campaign, on campaign messages, and actually setting a threshold which is 
at the right level, which is not creating a huge administrative burden, particularly at a 
time when obviously we want political parties and campaigners to be out talking to 
voters, potential voters about their messages.  
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Tom Hawthorne: ​I was just going to add in I think it’s really useful to reflect on the fact that 
parliament has had a really keen interest on this figure throughout the life of the regulatory 
framework. So when the political parties in referendums bill was introduced in 1999, the figure, 
the threshold figure that was set when the act was introduced was 50£, and that was consistent 
with the recommendations from the committee on standards in public life. As the bill progressed 
through parliament, that was actually changed to 200£, because of concerns expressed by the 
political parties about administrative impact of requiring checks to be carried out on all of those 
donations other than that level, and then in 2009 government introduced changes in parliaments 
approval to raise that to 500£. So there has been that key debate about “whats the right level?” 
The direction of travel has been to increase the threshold rather than to decrease the threshold, 
but obviously times change and maybe theres more of a debate that needs to be had about 
whether it continues to be set to the right level.  
 
Kyle: ​Even 2009, the volume that would have been coming in online would have been far lower 
and that’s the new threat, you could just set an automated function to donate 499£ over and 
over and over again for a website which is the risk to…  
 
Stephen: ​Yeah I mean we’ve been really struck by some of the statistics around the Trump - 
the American election where some 63% of Trump’s overall campaign fund came from donations 
of under 500£. Twice as much as Obama secured. Does that not ring alarm bells? 
 
[People talking over each other, unintelligible]  
 
Kyle: ..​that came in within a 36 hour window.  
 
Craig: ​Well yes, I suppose the important thing to remember is that this is one piece of legislation 
which is actually future-proof in that what it does is it places a responsibility and duty on the 
political party on the campaigner to ensure that it has the right processes in place to ensure 
permissibility no matter the level of money, no matter where its coming from, if its coming in a 
cheque, if its coming in via paypal or if its coming in crypto currency. The responsibility sits with 
the political party or the campaigner to check that permissibility and ensure they’ve got the 
processes to do so. And that was actually the conversation we were having with the brexit party, 
was what are your processes that you have to ensure the permissibility of these donations? And 
that the people who are donating under, that you are looking for signs of things which are not 
appropriate or where the system is being misused, where somebody is trying to get around the 
system, however you may ensure that you are able to identify that.  
 
Stephen: Thats sort of where the overlap is between transparency and deterrence 
because if the sanctions for the political party not doing what it should be doing to 
supervise those small donations aren’t sufficiently severe, they will just - they’ll take the 
hit.​ I mean that also - what - on  sanctions and on deterrence, can you just say a little bit more 
about what your sort of ideal world there is. What are you asking for in terms of - clearly I think 
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everybody agrees the 20,000£ fine is ludicrous, so i mean  what do we do there? What would 
be your proposal?  
 
Craig: So we haven’t set a figure effectively as our wishlist of where we want the cap to 
be. We’d like that to be a discussion with parliamentarians, but something north of 
500,000 is where we’d like to start. Actually anything below that really we don’t think 
gives us the kind of latitude that we need for some of the more egregious breaches that 
we have seen and that we risk seeing again.  
 
Stephen: ​And you’re applying that to political parties but also to anybody else, some of these 
sort of new amorphous organizations that (?) is bringing up. Would they also be subject to that 
or …?  
 
 
Craig: ​So that would be the cap, that would be the ceiling.  
 
Stephen: ​So whatever for whichever actor?  
 
Craig: ​Yes. But ​effectively we have an enforcement policy under which all of our 
sanctioning happens - that’s the document which has been consulted on with political 
parties - actually we’re going through a cycle at the moment of consulting on the 
document again because this is the vehicle for us extending to prosecutions, and that 
document is the thing that provides the framework for our sanctioning. And what we’re 
saying is that what we want the cap to increase, its not saying that actually we’re gonna 
be hitting that mark often if at all, because actually we would hope that we could ensure 
compliance, that our monitoring process would work at spotting breaches before they 
became egregious, but actually what we want is that stick in the bag. So theres actually, 
if it gets to the point where serious breaches have happened, we’re looking at the matter 
after the fact, we can go in with something that’s proportionate. Because obviously we’re 
thinking about political parties that can spend up to 19 million as a general election, the 
kind of figures that we see that designated campaigners are able to spend in a 
referendum, and actually having something that’s proportionate to that is what’s 
important.  
 
Stephen: ​So your view would be on the 500£ donation thing, you can leave 500£ as long as the 
sanction for not managing it properly is sufficiently severe, rather than… 
 
 
Craig: ​I think that… Y​es, i mean youre right that the two things work hand in hand.​ I think 





Tom: ​I think, as you pointed out, that ​we really need to keep looking at the data thats 
coming in and looking at the impact that has on transparency. So if we’re starting to see 
an increase in proportion overall of funding for political parties and political 
campaigners, that really hasn’t got that transparency because it comes in at that level, 
then there’s a big impact on transparency ​and (unintelligible) 
 
Craig: ​A really important part of that is obviously looking at the most recent national polls so 
with the european parliamentaries, our work is really just starting on those in terms of the 
regulatory work, so we will get some of the spending returns in, in the next month or so, but 
actually for the larger parties and campaigners actually they wont come in for another 3 months 
after that, and that’s the point where we actually get to look at the detail of what’s been spent, 
so that we can really understand how the money is moving around, what the campaigners and 
parties have been doing. 
 
Deidre Brock: ​Just one of our witnesses was talking about whether the geographical spread of 
expenditure is going to be included in terms of transparency and you pointed out that you know 
you can theoretically spend most of your national spend in one seat and i mean you can find 
that out obviously by going to local authorities and so on but really - is that something you are 
going to be spending more time on making sure that information will be readily available to the 
public and also the reasons - he was suggesting that the reasons (unintelligible) to give for 
expenditure in those particular areas should be requested as well.  
 
Craig: ​So the side of this which we are spending a lot of time on is actually making sure the 
spending is properly recorded. In terms of whether its party spending or whether its candidate 
spending and making sure that there’s - the split between those is well understood. We’ve 
actually got a code of practice which we developed on this area which we’re actually going to 
administer next week. We’ve developed those in consultation with the political parties, and 
feedback from them is actually - we find these really helpful vehicles to understand in more 
detail how the split between the two can be policed, and we’re hopeful that the minister will then 
bring those before the house and then will be made  into - alongside the law. The issue that you 
raise about transparency though is something that comes back to that point about the candidate 
regime. At the moment its not responsibility that sits with us, but its part of what we would love 
to have.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​There is a point of serious principle here. We’ve had this conversation before, so 
forgive me, but for others, there’s a serious principle here, i mean we do not have a presidential 
electoral system in this country, we don’t elect parties, we elect individual candidates. And I 
think it - frankly parliament - gave you an up-hand when we, at time of (unintelligible: 56:38) we 
didn’t bring together the two regimes. We should have really seen it as being…  so both in terms 
of your prosecution capacity, which I’m very interested to know that you might go there, 
because clearly the police can’t cope with that, and also much more substantially in those whole 
issue that you’re referring to, the mismatch between the regulation of the national parties 
targeting into a relatively small number of seats, and the responsibility of candidate natured (?) - 
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I don’t do it anymore, thank GOD, but in the days that I used to trust my agent, they’d do 
absolutely everything for me, and now I’m beginning to look a bit wooly frankly, because if he or 
she, and they’re mostly volunteers these days, does not fill in the return, they end up in court. 
We both do, candidate and natured (?). So I’m very strongly of the view we should be 
re-establishing that principle, which really goes back to 1883, that you can’t buy a local election, 
you can’t buy a local MP. So parliament has really got to get this sorted, and it’s got to be pretty 
quick, we talk about the low hanging fruit but - this isn’t low hanging but its such a (unintelligible) 
cause.​ The fact that you can now spend your national fund on a few seats to effectively 
change the whole plank to the next house of cards without it being properly recorded as 
though that’s what you’re doing, we get into a very bad statutory basis. ​Now I’m noticing 
that you’re going to be publishing some of these things next week when there may be other 
distractions there, I tell you, I wonder whether your timing is terribly good - but setting that aside 
for a moment, we really do have to find some way of - in very quick order as well, and this is 
why this report is gonna be so significant - we have to find a way of trying to rationalize this. ​It’s 
not just a little bit of tweaking on the edges of our electoral system, its the whole of the 
integrity of electing individual members of parliament to the house of commons, which is 
truly representative.​ Sorry.  
 
Craig: ​No I think that’s - you’re exactly right. And actually the interwoven nature of so many of 
these issues is why we wanted to make the points in the opening remarks about the more 
fundamental changes to electoral law of which digital campaigning is a part and actually the 
responsibilities for the candidate regime is a key part for us. ​Actually one example in terms of 
sanctioning, you pointed to the fact that there is this cliff edge between effectively an 
offense being prosecuted in courts or not at all. Actually by bringing it under the 
electoral commission’s control, the ability to then have a civil sanctioning regime would 
mean that actually if there were breaches of candidate returns that an agent had taken 
forward which were just mistakes, honest mistakes, or were errors because of time, then 
actually we would have it within our power under our enforcement policy to take a 
proportionate response and to sanction accordingly on that, as we do with political 
parties ​. So where political parties and campaigners might make that kind of small mistake, we 
can levy a fine of a few hundred pounds, that might be a similar thing we could do. Whereas at 
the moment, we see nothing happen up until that cliff edge of criminal prosecution.  
 
Stephen: ​Ok, so more of a sliding scale. This issue of national and local of course is important 
in the context of the debate about digital campaigning, so given this huge increase in the use of 
facebook ads for example, how would you ensure that facebook ads that are actually quite 
clearly being targeted on winning a seat rather than fighting a national campaign - the spend on 
those ads and the transparency around them is anchored where it should be which is the local 
impact not the national. ​Because it feels like there’s a lot of shovelling of as much money 
as possible into the national campaign for messaging in the digital world, which is 
actually quite clearly local and about winning key marginal swing seats in particular. ​I 
think that - that feels to me like an area where the ICO and  - I’m not entirely clear where - 
whose sort of leading the debate on that so it’d be great to hear from you both.  
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Craig: ​So yes I mean I think much of it falls in our area, there are two particular 
recommendations which I think relates to the sort of (unintelligible) but I have points to add. One 
is ​about the ad libraries themselves, actually if we can go in there and scrutinize what 
people are advertising, if journalists can go and scrutinize it, and actually if political 
opponents can go and scrutinize it. You can then see, everybody can see, is this an ad 
which is legitimately targeting people generally on national party messages, or is it 
focused on a specific constituency?​ ​And then similarly the kind of changes that we want 
to see in the spending return criteria, where we want much more detail included, about 
what the spend is, so we don’t want an invoice that says facebook campaign 4 or 
campaign 5, which doesn’t tell us anything about the geographical spread of the 
campaign, where its targeted,  what demographic it’s targeting, what the message is. We 
want to see much more detail included in there ​, so that actually again we, journalists, and 
other people who are interested can actually look at those kind of returns and say: hang on a 
minute how does this tie up with the advertising which we can see.  
 
Stephen: ​What about using postcodes - so when you - with a lot of these facebook ads you put 
in a range of postcodes don’t you? So could you just simply say right as soon as you put a 




Tom: ​And I think that’s where - although we were really pleased with the progress that the 
social media companies had made in some of their transparency - the targeting of data is the 
one area where we want to see more progress, because thats actually, thats meaningful 
transparency for us in the regulatory role but [unintelligible] 
 
 
Stephen: ​So would you agree that if there’s a postcode thats immediately local? 
 
Tom: If there was much more information about why the campaign has chosen to target a 
particular voter or group of voters that would be much more helpful for us, that includes 
obviously geography, it could include other things as well. Much more helpful for us to 
determine:  is this campaign spending that should be regulated under the party rules, or 
under the campaign -uh- the candidate rules, and without that information i think it’s 
great that… with - we can try and gather more information from the campaigner, it’d be 
much better if we could see that information up front so that we could take a more 
precautionary approach and use our resources ​ in a better… 
 
Stephen: ​and what needs to happen to facilitate that?  
 
Tom: ​That’s where action from the social media companies needs to come to - the next step is 
more transparency around - I think most of the targeting comes from..  
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Stephen: ​But what - do we sort of ask them nicely or? How can we make it happen ? 
 
Tom: That’s where we can see a real role from the online harms regulator that’s been 
proposed to take up that role of ensuring that the social media companies meet the 
standards, and that those standards are built in from the start, and they reflect as craig 
said the reality of the election funding transparency rules that apply in the UK. And so 
that they can use their new powers to supervise and regulate the social media companies 
in a way that wouldn’t be for the electoral commission to try and take on that regulatory 
responsibility for the social media companies. This is we see a really important role for 
them, online harms regulator to help us do our job much more effectively.  
 
Stephen: ​There could be a long time before this online harms regulatory is online.  
 
Tom: ​Yeah. ​In the meantime, I don’t think we’d ever sort of sit back and wait for that, we 
will continue the discussions with the social media companies and use our efforts 
collectively to persuade them that that’s something that would be beneficial and helpful, 
and would help us to improve transparency and confidence ​, and after that [unintelligible] 
 
Steve Wood: ​In the meantime, as well, in terms of the just moving to the platforms first, I have 
endorsed what the colleagues from the electoral commission have said about, there being a 
good start, a voluntary start, in terms of what Facebook and others have done. But there’s 
probably, there’s better levels of transparency which could be provided to better understand the 
targeting data, to give a more effective level of transparency. We obviously have jurisdiction 
over the platforms if they’re processing personal data under the GDPR, so we have the ability to 
be able to investigate them to that extent. The position within the EU is just slightly more 
complex with the platforms, because we work on the basis of where the main establishment is 
within the EU for the big platforms, which for a lot of them is Ireland. So actually as part of our 
work as well we made a major referral to the irish data protection authority under the GDPR 
because some of the alleged infringement we felt were there - were ongoing.  So they were 
under the GDPR not the old data protection law where we did take some action. But we will 
continue to make sure the platforms uphold their responsibility in terms of transparency in terms 
of telling the public how their data is used to target them online including in the context of 
political ads. In terms of that national/local split our interest in it is really making sure there’s an 
understanding of who is responsible. So data protection law sort of operates from the context of 
the data controller, so who is making the decisions about how people’s personal is used, and 
well we’re actually unpacking a bit and giving some examples in that guidance / draft code that 
we’re publishing next week, is - we’ll try to draw out some distinctions to when the national party 
is - called the data control - or whether its actually a local constituency or a candidate, and we’re 
gonna try and clarify those situations but then that’s where the accountability will flow as well, in 
terms of how they’ve used data, but also ​we’re highlighting the importance of making sure 
the national party does have a very clear governance and oversight structure to make 
sure the whole of the party organization understands their responsibilities in respect of 
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data, and certainly the parties themselves should be respond - should be appointing 
what’s called a data protection officer, which is a new requirement of the law, we’ve gone 
in and actually met  a number of these data protection officers since they’ve been 
appointed - when the requirements of the law came in - and last year as well it should get 
more set as sort of a kit, a clear point of accountability of someone who is overseeing 
how data is used in the parties, that will probably be at the national level, where the data 
protection officer is appointed, rather than at a local level.  
 
 
Kyle: ​Can I just ask a quick -  
 
Steve Wood: ​Yeah.  
 
Kyle: ​So, obviously we have the online harms regulator, ICO, the electoral commision. It has 
slowly over the last couple years gotten more messy in terms of the different agencies that have 
to work together, specifically on elections and democracy. Is there - What is the ideal scenario? 
Is there a coordinating office that emerges, like the office for democratic integrity or something, 
that in that election works with all the regulators to ensure that everyone is on the same page 
around issues? Because I think the concern is sort of - bad actors will divide and conquer. You 
know they’ll figure out how to violate one but appease the other and then get lost in the shuffle.  
 
Steve Wood: ​You know I mean we worked more closely than we’ve ever done in the past in the 
last two years and we’re working on a number of - an understanding to make sure we’ve very 
set out very clearly how we can work together and where appropriate in the bounds of the law 
we will share information about specific investigations with us through the gateways we’ve got in 
our laws to allow us to share. I think there’s good potential in our ability to join up and I think as 
well before - several months ago, the electoral commission very helpfully, sort of called a round 
table, didn’t you, with lots of numbers of different actors so we had Ofcom and a number of 
others who are interested in this space, so ​ I think some form of coordination and us getting 
together is very helpful, but equally I think our remits are quite distinct, that we’re 
focused on different sort of core rights, and sort of fundamental issues in society, and 
those probably are quite distinct areas in terms of data and how money is used, but 
clearly they’re getting closer together, we see those as quite distinct remits but we must 
make sure they work closely together. The online harms regulator is what we’ve already 
been already been on record to say we would need to work very closely with them, as a 
regulator for us, cause we’re horizontal we operate across all sectors who use data - so 
another example is we work very closely with the financial conduct authority as well you 
know that sort of financial regulation. We’re working very closely with the competition 
and markets authority into their investigation into the digital platforms. So for us it’s 
absolutely a crucial activity - is joined up regulator activity - is really important.​ ​But I 
think some people talk about: do you want just a sort of a super regulator and putting it 
all together, we don’t think that’s sort of a silver bullet or a universal panacea, but some 
form of a light-touch improved coordination, which everybody really knows their 
23 
responsibilities is probably important, but it’s getting that to work in the right way, to 
make sure things don’t become too heavy handed, we could equally - we need to be fleet 
of foot and work quickly, particularly in the context of elections from both our experience 
over the last year ​ as well but ill let you say a few words about…  
 
Craig: ​I can’t remember everything you said actually but I think the - in some ways its complex 
but not messy. And actually we’re working really hard to make sure it isn’t messy. And actually 
the fact that its something - what we’re talking about is specifically about elections, actually 
gives us a really clear sense of who owns it. Actually in this occasion, actually it usually is us. 
Certainly in terms of coordinating the activity. So the round table which Steve mentioned is 
something that we’ve had ongoing now for probably about 18 months, which was really 
following the referendum and all the discussion about whether there should be a truth 
commission, about you know disinformation. We called together this group of regulators and 
other bodies, so its Ofcom, advertising standards authorities, the main statistics bodies, we also 
have representatives from the broadcaster liaison group which represent all of the major 
broadcasters. Round table to talk about that issue, to make sure that we all understood each 
other’s positions. But that’s kind of morphed into much more of an information sharing group 
which does meet occasionally and actually in the lead up to the european parliamentaries once 
we knew the poll was happening, we called a meeting of that group to make sure we were all 
doing what we needed to do and -  
 
Kyle: ​Like election COBRA.  
 
Craig: ​Yep, exactly. Exactly. We actually used to be neighbours. And that’s the kind of forum - 
we talked a little bit earlier about public awareness activity that could happen, and that’s actually 
the forum in which those kind of issues will surface, and I would see on those kind of things 
actually there’s a strong lead that we could take about communicating to the public about what 
they need to give them more confidence in elections. But actually what that campaign would 
probably do is draw together all the sorts of bits that are already going on, ​so you know the 
ICO already has a really strong campaigning work, which looks at data and giving the 
public assurance about how its data is being used, but in a much broader context and we 
would look to draw that in, and  - similar for how statistics are used - and for us it would 
be around you know who is spending that money to target them. All those things draw 
together, but actually doing work jointly in the public interest is going to be really 
important, and that kind of collaboration provides the forum for us to achieve that. At the 
moment really well.  
 
 
Kyle: ​That’s good to know.  
 
Stephen: ​Yeah I think Deidre wanted to say something.  
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Deidre Brock: ​Thank you. Listen, I’ve got a few just quick questions, really about 
micro-targeted local advertising and what discussions have been around the possibility of even - 
and this is largely based on witness’ evidence to us, and just suggestions that have been put 
forward - about banning micro-targeting political advertising altogether. So, what discussions 
have been around that? Can you tell us more about what powers currently exist to take down 
political advertising that, in your view, transgresses guidelines, and how quickly that can take 
place? There was mention from one of the witnesses of a recent case in an irish election of -  
 
Kyle: ​The abortion referendum.  
 
Deidre: ​Was it the abortion referendum, right, there were some concerns about where the 
political funding was coming from for that advertising campaign, and then there were questions 
asked about who would - that a group in that situation appealed to, i mean, under those 
circumstances, and the last one was - there was talk about trying - in order to do - the 
suggestion was made that in order to political advertising of any kind - this was the sort of quite 
specific suggestion - was that all those who administer an account should have to send in their 
passports in order to prove that they were actually based here. In an effort to try and get round 
the troll, the bot farms, and overseas trolling and so on. Sorry that’s quite a lot but, yeah..  
 
Kyle: ​I think the last point was that it’s only Facebook who does the checks. There’s no 
accountability done on facebook checks - with who is advertising.  
 
Craig:​ Yes ok,​ ​So just taking those in order and Tom you can chip in. ​On micro-targeting, I 
think our main position on this is that actually it’s about achieving more transparency not 
about stifling communication, and actually by trying to place some kind of a bar on 
political advertising, wherever you set that level, I think it would be - its quite harder in 
some ways to define  what is targeting and what is microtargeting, where you draw the 
line. But actually it’s about really making sure that there’s the transparency that comes 
with all advertising within that category. ​So that it’s actually- the public is able to interrogate 
it, understand who is funding it where it has come from and why they’re being targeted.  
 
Stephen: ​That’s an imprint issue as well, isn’t it? If you’ve got the right digital imprint…  
 
Tom: ​I’m just gonna chip in, I think the research that we do, that informed our digital 
campaigning report/recommendations last year, did ​some research for the voters to try and 
understand what they thought about some of these issues, and actually they thought that 
targeting, in and of itself, could be really helpful for them, because it meant that parties 
were thinking about what might be of interest and importance to them, but they were 
worried about being sure about how parties were using their data. Also they were worried 
about misleading information so for them it was much more about the content and truth 
from us than necessarily the targeting techniques themselves.  
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Steve Wood: ​I just have a little bit more on that as well. I think I was actually asked that 
question I was at the open rights group conference on Saturday about whether there should be 
a ban on micro-targeting and I responded in a similar way actually, to the electoral commission, 
that​ I think the transparency aspect and making sure it’s fair are the crucial aspects, 
rather than, I think, trying to balance everything. You have to be very still - still very hard 
to regulate and pin down in any case and there are some other tools like the inference 
which should help as well but I think what in effect will happen is that certain types of 
targeting will essentially be regarded as unfair, and you can’t do it. So, for example of 
very intrusive types of data analytics, you gather vast amounts of data you have 
someone’s credit reference history, all sorts of types of data and then you infer things 
about people as well so you infer something about someone’s religion and then use that 
to target them based on other characteristics. Then probably there will be a build up of 
case law which will say: if you do that, its likely to have a sort of significant impact on an 
individual, it might even really be seen as manipulation. Now that’s likely to be unfair. ​So 
certain types of targeting - and we particularly know that facebook offer a very broad range of 
categories - you can target people on the basis of [unintelligible], Facebook call them interests, 
but they have an interest group called homosexuality, so you can target people in that way, but 
we’ve actually called that out in our report and that’s one of the issues we referred to the Irish 
data protection commission, we’re making sure the types of targeting that happen are fair 
because theres a number of quite sensible and straightforward uses of targeting which actually 
sometypes are based on sort of geographic characteristics and other types of information which 
we’ve seen to be quite expected and reasonable ways to use the targeting tools but theres other 
ways it could be used and therefore an outright ban is probably a very crude way which would - 
to the point which has already been made - would stifle communication methods to voters which 
might actually have an unfair effect.  
 
Stephen: ​So will you be producing a sort of list of what type of targeting is ok and what isn’t, 




Steve Wood: ​We’re gonna provide some guidance about how the parties and the political 
actors should use those tools and that guidance we’ll publish next week but that won’t quite 
have a list of categories, we’re equally as well - because its a combination of things,​ it’s also 
about the services but the platforms like facebook are offering to parties as well and its 
particular that aspect as well we want to tackle because actually that runs more broadly 
than political advertising, people can use those sorts of tools in other ways and there’s 
actually been issues in the US about how it’s been used to target information to ethnic 
groups on different issues such as people’s rights to housing and all sorts of issues so 
it’s actually a broader issue about the platforms as well. So I think it’s gonna take a while 
to tackle it - but we’re -  for us that’s at the crux of it, because it’s about the fairness and 
about how people’s data is used in a way they wouldn’t expect and it has an impact on 
them at the end of the day. ​So there is also a requirement in the law for any processing which 
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presents a risk to do something called a data protection impact assessment, and that will be an 
important tool that we’re expecting the parties and other actors to be using to assess what the 
overall impact of what it is they’re doing.  
 
 
Stephen: ​Thank you.  
 
Craig: ​Shall I just come back to these two about [unintelligible]. ​I think this is a complicated 
picture and it would depend on what the issue was with the advertising which people 
wanted to raise a concern about. If it was something which was a potential breach of 
election law, they would come to us. Thinking about this public awareness campaign 
which is kind of gestating this idea of trying to draw each of the regulators together to 
aid the public and understanding where to send their complaint, that’s the kind of 
function that would use. So they would come to us and we would then look at the issue, 
to raise it with the party or campaign, ultimately we’ve got the potential to issue a stop 
notice, to get them to cease a particular behaviour, that’s not something which we’ve - I 
don’t think ever - had to use - actually the threat of it has been sufficient, which is a really 
good example of actually where a deterrent can be provided by a legal tool.​ Interestingly in 
some other aspects, facebook had us on the list, across the order, of kind of trusted 
organizations which they could go to with queries where either they felt or a member of the 
public had raised a concern about disinformation in advertising. Indeed they did contact us a 
couple of times in the lead up to the polls to say: “well this advertising has said a particular 
thing, either we think it might be untrue or misleading or a member of the public has 
complained, can you verify it?” So that’s the really interesting thing i think of where things are 
happening outside of regulation to try and make sure that things are a little more truthful.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​Can I just get back to the splendid visit to the Brexit party, which I think was 
significant on two accounts. Firstly, as you’ll be only too well aware, the commision has been 
criticized, unfairly very often, on the slow progress of investigations and you were able to move 
extremely fast, so I think that was important and I think it was you who - craig- you mentioned 
earlier the fact that that was known, was publicized, was I think itself a very useful deterrent. 
The more significant point was of course, that the PayPal method of raising cash is 
extremely difficult to then audit, isn’t it. You can’t see where it comes from. And 
presumably, you could paypal every day of the year your 500£ without you subsequently 
being able to see where its come from or indeed the party can  see where its come from. 
If that is the case, I hope that somehow or other you’re going to prevent others following that 
example in the near future. Am I being over-optimistic?  
 
Craig: ​Well hopefully I can give you some good news on this. Actually pretty much all of the 
political parties accept donations by paypal, but have configured the way that the money is 
coming to them and there are things that they require of people when they put are putting a 
donation in, to enable them to get the information that they need to ensure permissibility, so 
actually the tools are there in the hands of the political parties to be able to take the donation in..  
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Stephen: ​Regardless of the size of the donation. It’s one size fits all.  
 
Craig: ​It can be. Yes.  
 
Stephen: ​But is it- are they using it? Are the political parties actually implementing it?  
 
Craig: ​So of all the other political parties that we’ve looked at, so we looked at all of the major 
ones as part of our work in relation to the Brexit party, they were all - they all had sufficient 
processes in place to ensure permissibility. ​What the Brexit party had done, was they had 
effectively said we are only taking donations over paypal up to the threshold of 500. So 
that’s effectively meant they didn’t need to, for individual donations, have those checks 
in place. But clearly what it left was a risk that they then carried that somebody would 
misuse the system and make multiple donations. One of the recommendations that we 
made to them to implement is to actually remove that threshold so that people can pay 
over, but then to balance that, to have the necessary information coming through so that 
they can sort of ensure permissibility, which is actually what all of the other political 
parties that we looked at already do.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​Am I right in thinking that ​although in aggregate, you may be able to see over a 
period of time how much has come by that means, you can’t at the moment tell whether it 
comes from 100 individuals or 2, and therefore there is a danger. But the parties tell me, 
indeed, that at the moment if they were to report every 500 pound donation, you could 
wrap-bag a pole over the coals (?) for over-reporting.​ Indeed I think you could even fine 
them for over-reporting is that correct? 
 
Craig: ​Overreporting... I think we’d have to have a look at that as a technical thing, but to come 
back to - the fact is your underlying point is absolutely right. We will know in aggregate the total 
amount thats received by the party through the fell underneath that threshold but we wouldn’t 
necessarily know how many donations they received that built that up.  
 
Stephen: ​What they’ve basically done - my understanding is - that you sort of put the ball very 
much in the court of the parties, and say here are the rules that you have to obey, and its for all 
donations, and if we find out that you haven’t been doing it properly, there will be fines, but that 
goes back to this issue of the sanctions and the kind of desultory fines that you can meet out. 
So I mean I can understand that system but its kind of - ​well the risk is that there’s not 
enough of a disincentive for - and also parties, you know, who knows there may well be 
somebody in Moscow who decides to send in 10,000 donations of £499 to the Brexit 
party. And if that happens, you’d - I suppose we just need to be clear and confident that 
you would be able to see that that’s happened when you go in and do an audit, and that 
the audit would happen automatically, and also that the audit would be a sort of dawn 
raid thing where they don’t know it’s coming. ​Would that have - is that how you see 
enforcement of this? 
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Craig: ​So on that issue that is actually a power that we already have. If we felt that we needed 
to go in unannounced, we could do so and effectively having gone and got a magistrates 
warrant, a warrant from a magistrate to do so, it’s not something that we have had to do yet. 
And indeed in this example it’s not something which we felt was necessary, because what we 
were going in was effectively to look at whether the right processes existed. It wasn’t a concern 
of the data for example would be destroyed before we got there, which is obviously where we’d 
want to have that kind of unannounced… This was much more looking at whether the 
processes and documentation was in place to make sure that they were assessing the 
permissibility in order  to comply with their responsibilities.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​And this is another area isn’t it where candidate and agent in one hand, and 
national party on the other, have different reporting timescale. That’s right and one thing that - 
and again the campaigning situation in a referendum where its alright to say the day after, you 
know, [unintelligible] may go. It sounds as if you’ve got specific recommendations to govern on 
that, is that gonna be part of what you’re announcing next weekend?  
 
Craig: ​So what we’re doing next week is sending the codes of practice up to the minister for him 
to consider. In terms of other recommendations… 
 
Tom: ​No i think ​in terms of deadlines, post an election, for spending returns in particular, 
there is three months for campaigns that spend under 250,000£ for example, and six 
months that spend over 250,000£, and given I guess advances in how campaigns can 
organize their spending, and can record their spending, we would like to see whether 
those two deadlines could be brought closer. Because once you get to six months after 
polling day, that’s the deadline for the campaigns to send the returns to us, and then 
theres a period of time that we need to work through those returns to make the 
appropriate redactions before we publish them and begin investigations. So it might not 
be until seven or eight months after polling day that we’re actually able to publish that 
information and make it transparent and available for everybody, so thats a long time 
from polling day, and we’d really like to see that be brought forward.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​and its different again for referendums? 
 
Tom: ​Referendums is roughly the same as for a general election, three months and six months.  
 
Lord Tyler: ​Ok.  
 
Kyle: ​And there would be - there is no way really to confirm that those donations didn’t all come 
from the same person. Insofar as theres no credit card details stored, so it could have been the 
same card run over and over, just with a different name and a different email address, through 
PayPal, that’s it.  
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Craig: ​It is possible for a political party to do that.. . 
 
Kyle: ​Because it wasn’t 500£ they don’t have to confirm who the money came from as a 
permissible donation.  
 
Craig: ​So what the party has to do is ensure that the donations that are coming into it are 
permissible. At an individual donation level, obviously over 500, they know they have to check 
permissibility. But their responsibility is also to ensure that under 500£, nobody is trying to avoid 
the rules by making smaller donations multiple times, so they do have to have processes in 
place to ensure reasonably that they've looked at those donations to ensure that the rules aren’t 
being invaded. And actually that is what most of the political parties do, they do it all the time 
and do it well.  
 
Kyle: ​Right, but if there - if you don’t even have to be a citizen to give less than 500£, how are 
they checking, what is the political party doing to confirm that bob smith is not a pseudonym for 
the same person who has made 500 gifts of 499£. What I’m saying is, we’re in a situation now 
where we sort of have to plan for the absolute worst actor, right? Which we, a lot of people 
didn’t think was necessary even ten years ago. So I’m just thinking about how would I obfuscate 
this rule and if that would be a way to do it. If the party can sort of put their hands up and say, 
well we did the best we could, they’re the one who broke the rule by, you know, cheating the 
system. If you see what I’m saying.  
 
Craig: ​They could say that and they would be wrong, complete legal responsibility is on the 
party to ensure permissibility. I’m not an expert on the detail of how the systems work but I do 
know that paypal specifically in question does afford the processes to have that kind of 
information captured so that we can feel confident the party has taken reasonable steps. And 
again thats where the - its actually not for the party to say whether they’ve taken reasonable 
steps or not, it’s actually for us to say whether they’ve taken reasonable steps. Does that make 
sense?  
 
Kyle: ​Ok. Yes I guess, just if you dont have to verify that the person’s a permissible donor until 
500£, I don’t understand what the checks would be. Do you see what I’m saying? 
 
Craig: ​I do see what you’re saying. I mean I think the point is ​they don’t have to check on one 
donation, but what they do have to check is that there is nobody within that field of 
donations below 500£ who is trying to avoid the system. ​So they do have to have some 




Tom: ​and it would be, names addresses and bank details, patterns of behavior that mean that 
parties can be confident that they’re not getting multiple donations from the same individual, that 
would add up to something that went over the threshold and would give…  
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Kyle: ​Just seems that the level of work involved in that would be even perhaps more than just 
saying everyone has to be on the electoral role. Which would be a much simpler threshold as 
the tests were given, if you see what I mean.  
 
Craig: ​It would be much simpler, yes.  
 
Kyle: ​So we’re talking about this threshold level but really actually its how its gonna be 
difficult…  
 
Stephen: ​You could have a much clearer constraint on the source, and making sure the source 
is on the electoral role.  
 





Stephen: ​It just - just to go back to that Trump example, I think 63% of his total campaign 
donation under the threshold, and most of it came in a 36 hour period, that would raise that 
massive alarm bell I think. We invited PayPal to give evidence to this inquiry and they declined.  
 
Craig: ​Yes, and we have failed so far to be able to have a meeting with them to talk about the 
issues ourselves which is disappointing.  
 
Stephen: ​Yeah, I think there’s a big red flag there. One final question from me, going off in a 
slightly different direction, you’ve mentioned the idea of fact-checking and dealing with 
disinformation - where are you on that? Because i know thats an extremely difficult and complex 
- we don’t want to be sort of limiting free speech but on the other hand and you know theres lies, 
damned lies and statistics. But on the other hand there seems to be a big push in society more 
broadly for having at least some sense of what is the truth. And that campaigners should do 
more to stick to that. So can you say a little bit more about your thinking in that area? 
 
Craig: ​So it is something that sits outside our brief currently.  
 
Stephen: ​Ah OK. Because you mentioned those round tables and things so I thought that you - 
 
Craig: ​Yes, that was more about seeing effectively what could be done about it and whether we 
were able to point members of the public in different directions depending on concerns. We’re 
very concerned that - we don’t just say anyone in the public oh we don’t deal with that. What we 
don’t want to do is find a home for that [unintelligible] wherever we possibly can. So we want 
them to understand in detail, actually what ICO is able to deal with, what the advertising 
standards authority is able to deal with, what the statistics bodies are concerned in, so that we 
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can make sure we’re directing members of the public, where we can, to the right home for their 
concern. And this I think is the idea of where this public awareness campaign might come from. 
So that we can actually say to people effectively: have you seen something in a political advert 
which you’re concerned about? And then below that, is the concern something around how your 
data has been used? Is it something about not discerning who is spending money to influence 
you, or is it about the content of the advert, and directing that query off. But if its around content, 
it’s not something which is our responsibility.  
 
Stephen: ​So you’d sort of assign those to different agencies, the INS the IFS whatever it might 
be.  
 
Craig: ​Yes and some of those things would be straightforward, and some of them would not be 
very pleased to have those [unintelligible] in their direction. And some of them actually draw the 
line very very distinctly. The advertising standards authority, for example, does not deal with 
political advertising, because they’re a voluntary regime and their view is that they have to have 
the support of the regulated community, and at the moment the political parties have not 
expressed a wish to be regulated, so they, at the moment, step back from that and say well 
actually unless want to come round the table and be regulated by us, its not somewhere where 
they want to go.  
 
Stephen: ​Ok thank you very much.  
 
Kyle: [​to Steve Wood] do you have any thoughts on that? 
 
Steve Wood: ​In terms of the content, I think thats set out very clearly its definitely not within our 
remit. We’ve also pointed to those gaps in our democracy disrupted report. We didn’t 
neccesarily recommend a solution to deal with gaps in terms of that point about the 
[unintelligible] but we think it does need to be discussed and debated.  
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Stephen Kinnock: (​00:00​) 
Creating this all-party parliamentary group came out to back and that recognition 
realization of this, the regulatory system wasn't fit for purpose. And so we decided to 
hold this inquiry, which is going to focus on three main areas, really transparency, 
monitoring and deterrence. On the transparency side, very much around making sure 
that people know what is behind the message that they're receiving. Uh, how can we be 
sure that the money that's behind it is clean. And also that the data and the way in 
which they speak is shared, is transparent monitoring is very much about making sure 
that there's a system which in this incredibly fast moving, uh, situation, we've actually 
got a monitoring system that has, it is fit for purpose, where you've got the right 
expertise and the right legislation and the right regulatory capability. And then 
deterrence is very much on picking up on the concern that we seem to have a system 
which is only really able to administer - assess risk rather than actually have this 
incentives and punishments and reactions which are really going to help clean out the 
system. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​01:21​) 
So those three areas will be the subject of a report that we're hoping to produce in the 
autumn based on a very rich, diverse range of evidence that we've received from a 
whole range of stakeholders. Um, and from the Cabinet Office to the ICO to the 
electoral commission and then a lot of uh, academics with a real expertise in the area. 
And, um, you know, what we want to be able to do is produce a report that is uh, both 
looking at kind of the short term, let's say low hanging fruit that we can really go for, how 
to get things fixed quite quickly because there's an increasing risk of a general election 
coming quite soon. And we really do worry that trust in the system is already at an all 
time low. And if we have another general election on the faces of what we currently 
have, um, then we could either, you know, democracy is seriously under threat in terms 
of the erosion of trust that we would see. And then there's, uh, there's longer term 
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fundamental, more structural changes that we know realistically are not going to be 
doable very rapidly. But, which are no less important than those more short term quick 
wins. So that's, I think what the report's going to look at. We know that the government 
is doing a work in this area as well. I'm a keen not to reinvent the wheel, but we hope 
that our report be able to compete with what they do and we hope ultimately to be able 
to turn our recommendations into legislation, into changes 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​03:00​) 
in terms of statutory code of conduct, et Cetera. So the way we run each of the sessions 
is that we just ask our panelists to give up a relatively brief overview of what you see are 
the main priorities, challenges and opportunities in your area of expertise. And then we 
just open it up to colleagues who were on the APPG for, for some Q and a. So Caroline 
and Deidre anything you'd like to add there? Um, so yeah, over to you. I'm not sure who 
would like to start, i don't know if you had a preference. 
 
Jim Killock: (​03:39​) 
Sure, so Pascal and I from the open rights group, we've been going about 12 years or 
have 3000 paid supporters who work on various online issues. So particularly online 
privacy, online surveillance and online free expression. Obviously this is an area that 
impacts on - particularly on online privacy, online free expression and very critical to 
handle on things about political advertising is about sensitivity around that. 
 
Jim Killock: (​04:10​) 
And the key insight for us is that, uh, you can sort of see this as an input and output 
problem. It's like the input is all personal data. The root of this problem, for us, is very 
much about the use and abuse of personal data. Um, and you can try to deal with it at 
that end or the end of the symptoms, which is the resulting, you know, malign use of 
data that adverts themselves. All of those things. And, and the way we've been trying to 
think about this in other areas about online advertising, we made a complaint to the 
information commissioner about the lawfulness of some of the techniques used in 
advertising and the ICO a couple of weeks back agreed with us that the sharing of 
personal data between different systems of ad buying looks to be unlawful. And they 
said, well, that seems to break every rule in the book. 
 
Jim Killock: (​05:10​) 
We'll give you six months to sort integrity. Obviously they didn't feel as a very 
satisfactory approach. Um, but in this particular - in the context of things like Facebook 
and so on where data is sort of held within one system, it's not necessarily shared 
between different actors. There's still a basic question, did anyone agree to be profiled 
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for adverts in the way that they are profiled and, and Facebook would claim yes you did. 
Uh, after we've, you ticked a box and said, I agree. We would say, no, you didn't. You 
agreed to be part of a social network, not a profiling engine. And the way that data 
protection rule has evolved, there is a strong case that actually profiling people without 
a separate consent to be profiled or potentially a further consent to be profiled for 
political purposes. If these consents are not available, they all rely on single sign up 
consent, then the whole thing may be unlawful. 
 
Jim Killock: (​06:14​) 
And there are legal challenges on the form Max Schrems to kind of see whether that in 
fact should be [inaudible] really think about what you're after, which is to regulate 
political advertising. What this is saying is that the legal basis for the current model of 
advertising sales is itself unlawful at this point and nobody's been asked and therefore 
there is no basis for all that processing of data in that way. And that's pretty 
fundamental. And so that's kind of where we would start. Um, we would start from a 
point of view of trying to understand the data protection and privacy issues here and 
trying to address those, um, as well as they are going on and thinking about how the 
data was used. And I guess the other thing I think we would also throw in here is that, 
and this is going to be quite politically challenging, while it seems at this sort of first 
stage to be about the political consequences of particularly bad actors, I think once you 
start scratching the surface, you will find a lot of malpractice in every single political 
party that will be quite bad uses of data. 
 
Jim Killock: (​07:19​) 
Um, and obviously this seems like the political exception exemption or we're just trying 
to sell out in greater use of data and less reliance on consent and so on. And those 
things will need to be addressed on that. That's going to, I think, be quite challenging. I 
don't think you can separate necessarily the worst people out from the people who are a 
little bit better. You've got to assume that everybody's got to abide by the same set of 
rules and actually data practices probably gonna have to be cleaned up across the 
board. On to Pascal, who will go into a bit more detail about what we're currently 
researching things. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​07:51​) 
So I'm just gonna speak briefly in reference to the three strands of things. APPG. I'll try 
and gloss over topics that have already been kind of endorsed or said in previous, uh, 
sessions. Um, so with regards to transparency, and it seems clear that the two main 
problems are financial transparency. IE who's paying for an ad, and that's transparency. 
Uh, how people's personal data is being used to target them and the lack of awareness 
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of amongst people, how that data is being targeted and how it's being used. Um, I'm 
going to give one brief example of the lack of financial transparency, um, on Facebook 
ad library. That is they ads the Brexit defense force who are the declared sponsors of 
ads on the Brexit votes matter page. This group has actually already been raised in the 
media as a problematic group and they actually had their own page taken down 
Facebook. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​08:43​) 
Um, but they've since resurfaced as the sponsors of ads on a separate page. Not only 
does the disclaimer on the Facebook ad, which should contain information about the 
kind of beneficial ownership of the ads not clear - it just says it's paid for by Brexit 
defense force - but it also shows that a bad group that's been banned from Facebook 
for breaching its guidelines, has seemingly been able to easily bypass the Facebook 
moderators. Um, and there's a, there's an interesting, just for the sake of balance as an 
interesting counter example called the EU flag mafia, um, who are essentially 
capitalizing on the market, uh, in order to sell paraphernalia like, um, the Brexit, 
vegetable growing survival kit. And they also has huge humorous example. But neither 
of these entities are listed anywhere, you can't find out who owns them, or who is 
actually behind all these things and the longest, some companies house. 
 
Kyle: (​09:40​) 
Um, what was that second one? Sorry. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​09:41​) 





Pascal Crowe: (​09:44​) 
And they market kind of flags and various products. So there's kind of two examples of 
how you can't find out who's paying for an ads on the current Facebook ad library. And 
in terms of data transparency facebook ad library provides very basic information about 
how you're being targeted, which I think has been covered. But actually the options 
available to an ad buyer are much more granular and you could target target specific 
locations, connections, demographics and interests. And you can mix that with 
additional data from outside advertisers to build the custom audience. So in terms of our 
recommendations on this area, um, with regards to financial transparency, um, the 
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electoral commission shouldn't play a part in deciding what is or what isn't a political ad, 
but the process by which platforms currently do should be opened up to public scrutiny. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​10:36​) 
Um, any political issue ad should be registered with the electoral commission and they 
should have a record of contact deals for the sponsor of the ad. And the reason for this 
is because registering with a company's house is actually quite a slow and expensive 
process and we think that electoral commission could expedite that process essentially 
of making it clear who is paying for an ad. Um, watermarks with disclaimers should 
include elements of this information and an easily identifiable click through to the 
electoral commission database. Um, and any database must be user friendly, clear and 
easy to use and widely available. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​11:12​) 
Um, and with regards to data transparency, um this has been said before but there 
should be information parity between advertisement and user for political purposes and 
it should be easily understandable and accessible. Uh, with regards to data 
transparency, there should be information parity between the advertiser and the user, 
um, as far as possible, and it should be easily accessible and understandable for users. 
So moving on with regards to deterrence, we think there are three kinds of rules, 
reasons why the current electoral regulation is not as effective as it could be. The first 
two have already been covered. So I'm going to slightly gloss over those. Um, one is the 
concept of the regulated period and there is no shelf life on social media and posts. 
Political content can be generated long before the regulated period and linger online. 
Um, now obviously the regulated period applies to, um, political content that has been 
paid for outside of regulated period, but used within it. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​12:16​) 
But what can happen is that, um, content can be shared organically online and it seems 
difficult to be able to parse out how you would regulate material that has been shared 
organically that was paid for in this content and production outside of the regulated 
period. So in a networked online environment, it's difficult to determine if shares are 
happening organically or not. Um, and a lot of conceptual effort goes into gaining 
organic shares and likes and making things, uh, shares seem organic. And in addition, 
third party campaign groups can come pop up and go out outside of the confines of the 




So can I just ask a quick, just as a clarifying point so that what you're saying is someone 
could pay for the ad originally, then it's shared and after at that point it seemingly 
organic, but actually it was originally a paid for ad. So the spread is organic. It's 
origination is paid. Okay. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​13:16​) 
Um, there's also been, um, I think it was said in the previous session that the distinction 
between candidate spending and poverty spending is now essentially a cosmetic. Um, 
but I think what all of these point towards is that data and digital is all about making 
spending more efficient. Um, initially the committee on standards in public life, um, was 
seeking to prevent the arms race between campaigns for non-broadcast media 
advertising. And that was because the value of the campaign was located in how much 
money you could spend on getting an ad in the newspaper or on the billboards. But now 
it seems that location of value for campaigns has shifted to data sets and how you can 
effectively target and use your campaigns effectively. Because the use of personal data, 
it allows you to eliminate costs for those who you think would be unlikely to vote for you. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​14:04​) 
Factors such as share-ability and virality reduce the marginal cost of digital distribution 
to almost zero and technical innovation is driving down costs, for example, with 
automated content generation and AV testing. Um, so what we think would be a good 
way of, uh, capturing the value of data sets within the remit of the the spending 
regulator would be for the ICO and the electoral commission to carry out joint data 
audits. And this is similar to something that's already going on within the ICO, but we 
think it would encourage both bodies to fully carry out their statutory duties. So before 
the commencement of the regulator periods, um, the ICO and the electoral commission 
would have a joint task force that A. assesses the commercial value of datasets bought 
and sold before an election and have incorporated that into their spending limits, B. 
Doing a legal and ethical audit of data, Um, because most of the most valuable data is 
obtained, at least [inaudible] potentially might be unlawfully obtained. Um, and thirdly, 
the ICO and the electoral commission should reserve the right to do "drug tests" any 
time during the electoral commission to see if political actors are already doing anything 
unlawful or unethical. Um, I know that they both already have powers in relations to this. 
Um, and we think that could be more fully fleshed out in terms of their cooperation. Um, 
and there should be clear guidance for regulators on how they do that. Um, finally 
moving on to monitoring. Um, we think the need to, uh, reform laws immediately could 
be problematic given that during a campaign, parliament will be in recess, campaign will 
be underway. Um, I'm questioning if it would be appropriate for a reform of the law to be 
undertaken at that time. Um, but we, but we do think that the electoral commission 
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could create an expert group made up of electoral commission representatives and 
external stakeholders looking at electoral innovations, um, to discuss whether they are 
challenging or circumventing campaign goals. And this would at least allow the 
commission some opportunities for horizon scan. 
 
Jim Killock: (​16:15​) 
Great. Thank you. Thank you. Very tangible recommendations there. Thank you. 
 
Kyle: (​16:19​) 
And you'll submit all that in writing as well? 
 






Polly Mackenzie: (​16:23​) 
Fantastic. Um, so I'm Polly. I run demos, um, and we've done a lot of work looking at, 
uh, digital campaigning including an extraordinarily naive report, which we ran in 2014 
saying that social media was gonna re-engage people in democracy. It's all going to be 
tremendous. Uh, which I wasn't involved in. So I can just say yes, it's so beautifully 
cheerful and optimistic. It's slightly depressing to think where we have got to. So, um, 
we wrote a report about this time last year, which was commissioned by the ICO. That 
was essentially a kind of a bit of futurology, looking at how, uh, how p how amped the 
advertising industry is developing and innovating and will continue to innovate over the 
course of perhaps the next 10 years and what we might expect political actors to do with 
those capabilities as they evolve. And that includes thinking through, uh, how voice 
recognition, uh, might be used to establish mood, for example, uh, sing into people via 
their voice enabled devices, the Internet things, how personal data would evolve far 
beyond what we have now, which is personal data to do with, um, all shopping habits 
and what we've looked at online to start to include the kind of stuff that this thing 
produces. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​17:36​) 
Uh, so you know, my heart rate, you can imagine a world in which people know that I'm 
trying to, I don't know, exercise. So they advertise the sugar tax policy to me or you 
know, a whole range of kind of personal innovations. So, um, I haven't got to the sort of, 
I mean, we've got our full report, which I mean, I can send over if you haven't seen. Um, 
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but I think what troubles me is actually, uh, the whole concept of this hyper 
personalization of political offers and campaigning. In that of course, a political party has 
lots of different policies and they may particularly appeal to individual voters in different 
ways. Uh, and that's okay. But on the other hand, at the fundamental level, democracy 
is not a consumer choice. Democracy is not me getting what I want. It is us getting what 
we collectively choose. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​18:34​) 
And so as things are hyper-personalized you get, uh, into this situation where 
democracy is sort of chasing itself further and further away from a kind of common 
space and into individual offers offered to individual voters, which in the end can't be 
delivered on. And we saw that with the Brexit vote. Uh, even though obviously they won 
a majority, that's partly because at least three different Brexits were offered to different 
voting groups. And that enables you to get to the situation where something has won a 
majority, but we're not really sure what. Um, and that's particularly acute in a 
referendum, but I think it's really problematic for the future of democracy as a whole too. 
How do you get the sense of what the country has chosen if every individual person 
was promised an entirely different set of things? And so I completely endorse everything 
that you guys and other people who've come to give evidence would say about 
increasing the transparency of what it is that people are being offered. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​19:34​) 
But I think we also need to think kind of at the very highest level, how, how can we limit 
that personalization as well by perhaps, uh, finding ways to protect people from being, 
um, from being targeted in these ways. It's interesting to think that in the UK we, uh, we 
took quite an aggressive approach in comparison, certainly to the u s of how we 
regulate political advertising, right? We don't have political advertising on TV. It seems 
to me that political go advertising on TV would be fantastic and better than what we 
have now, which is political advertising in these microscopic, uh, narrow casting actually 
broadcasting a single advert to the entire population or even 12% of the population 
would be a fantastic step forward for political parties cause they'd have, everyone would 
then be able to see approximately what, um, what people are saying instead of that, that 
narrow costing approach. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​20:31​) 
So, um, I guess so the, the, that's my kind of overarching theory about personalization it 
undermines the very principle of democratic legitimacy in elections. Um, there are other 
concerns. You've talked a lot about privacy. We've done a lot of work at demos as well 
about fake news, which you've covered on a little. I mean, I think it's worth remembering 
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that the electoral commission has never really offered any recourse against lies in 
political campaigns. I once slightly misguidedly, stood for election as a councilor in 
Lumbough If I'd got 50% more votes, I still would have lost. So I didn't do very well. But, 
um, and there were literature saying that the Lib Dem candidate stole a council house 
and it was nothing I could do that wasn't a direct libel against me. You can't libel a 
political party. Of course, it was addressed to me on the doorstep and you know, it's a 
long time ago and I don't feel peevish about it, but, you know, it's not just, it's not just on 
buses. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​21:32​) 
It's in all sorts of ways that actually people saying stuff that is misleading on political 
leaflets and in campaigns has always been a problem that we have not sought to 
regulate for understandable reasons. Because who guards the guards? How do you, 
how do you create a system that polices electoral campaigning that isn't in and of itself, 
uh, on Democratic or unfair? Who, who would, who would choose that? Uh, 
nevertheless, it's something that I think is really troubling. Again, during the referendum, 
there were all sorts of, and I mean, obviously they lost by a long shot, but it's, uh, it's so 
even if there's shifted some opinion perhaps, uh, yesterday we would, would've lost 
anyway. But, uh, some complaints for protein by the yesterday campaign to the, uh, to 
the electric commission about some of the adverts from the no campaign and they were 
told, no, that's the job of the advertising standards authority. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​22:32​) 
But of course, if you complain to the advertising standards authority, who are perfectly 
happy to tell us that we can't have, um, gender stereotypes in soap adverts, which I 
support, but they're totally happy to regulate that, but they're not happy to regulate 
basically just pathological lies being put on leaflets and on posters and billboards. So it's 
not just a digital new phenomenon. It's a, it's an endemic phenomenon. And in the end, 
one of the biggest challenges that we face is that we need to regulate spending and 
donation, um, beyond exactly what we do about the digital space. Then just I guess, 
um, one, one more thought is to just recognize the kind of imbalance of arms between 
regulators and the advertising industry and the innovations that it is developing on which 
political campaigns can, uh, can build in that, you know, the Internet has many virtues, 
but there are two ways on the Internet to make money without actually doing anything 
valuable. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​23:38​) 
And that is to get into either the payments supply chain - value chain - or into the 
advertising value chain. And as a result of that huge wall of r and d money goes into 
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advertising innovation. The kinds of things that I'm talking about, you know, how do you 
spot somebody who's feeling a bit sad in order that you can sell them chocolate to cheer 
them up at precisely the right moment. Or, um, uh, I have to look to, uh, Amazon and 
Ebay who target people in the middle of the night with emails. Cause that's the time 
when people are more vulnerable, like all of that incredibly sophisticated and the 
regulators are tiny, absolutely tiny in comparison. You think about the size of the FCA in 
comparison to the financial services industry, and then you compare the size of the ICO 
with the data industry, which is not just huge, but growing at an extraordinary pace. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​24:38​) 
It's obvious that they're gonna lose, let alone the electoral commission, which is a 
minnow in comparison even with the ICO. So the the idea that of these regulators can 
keep up with the move fast and break things ideology of the advertising industry, which 
the political industry will exploit is simply for the birds. We need to find -again, it's a sort 
of macro level point for all industry, but especially poignant in the political domain is how 
do you create such a thing as an agile regulator. We don't know hold of the West is 
starting with this, but that's, that's where we need to go. 
 
Jim Killock: (​25:13​) 
Great. Thank you very much. I'll just kick off. Please do jump in, Deidre and Caroline. 
I'm just thinking particularly about this issue of the digital imprint. And it seems, I mean 
I'm not an expert in the technology, but that seems to be the most obvious way to go to 
improve transparency is to every single online ad that you see has got a clear political 
ad has got a clear statement of who's behind it and who's paying for it. Um, do you feel 
that there's already a template out there that would work and how, how easy would it be 
to roll this out so it actually is, becomes illegal to not have an imprint? 
 
Jim Killock: (​26:05​) 
Well, an obvious thing to look at is a companies as [inaudible] isn't it? Where when the 
registration details that you give to companies hang Saul displayed in a machine 
readable format where it's very obvious how you find that company you can very easily, 
um, and we'll all political out of need is a link to a similar standard of is by the electoral 
commission. And you know, you could just click and you suddenly have the contact 
details, the view it was. So I think that's actually just a capability that electoral 
commission need to build. Then Facebook need to integrate with that sort of fat adult 
stuff. But it's not, it's not hard is it? 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​26:48​) 
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But I think the one of the challenges trying to decide if something's a political advert or 
not, uh, you know that the Iceland case about the orangutan thing, is that political or not, 
which then became controversial and then in the end, why should I not know who is 
talked to me for lipstick adverts to like, so I would be more aggressive and say, because 
it's so difficult to draw the line between a political and nonpolitical advert and knowing 
who funds organizations who funds adverts and who the beneficial owner of stuff is just 
fundamentally good. Uh, and an economy is just regular lepers 
 
Jim Killock: (​27:24​) 
perhaps. I mean, you know, you could argue that with commercial, like that slot that's 
already in place. If you advertise the product, you go to the website, then you know, 
you're like companies, all sets of the website has to, you could come with these 
information. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​27:40​) 
Yeah, it's true. But then that you then also get scammer boats with, you know, Marty 
Lewis, my old boss on that are selling fake blockchain stuff or fake, I don't know, diet 
pills. You, there's plenty of malice in online advertising, which is not lipstick by L'Oreal. 
 
Jim Killock: (​28:00​) 
I think the question there is how is it that Facebook gall be Facebook continue? How is 
it the Facebook car that does take place to kind of a date is, it's kind of perplexing that 
at this point that the more the larger companies are taking a lot of money, I'm not able to 
police the people that are taking money from, I mean they, they, they shouldn't be, it 
shouldn't be something that they can do. It's harder when it's kind of, you know, spam in 
your inbox and fake covert, you know, fake websites are just throwing people naively. 
But when it's kind of in platform, you know, you'd think they kind of do a bet. You 
diligence. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​28:42​) 
I mean, again, in my previous job we tried to post out adverts to recruit people to a 
community about mental health problems, uh, as part of the policy development 
process. And that was, we went through like 17 different integrations of the phrasing in 
order to get past phase Facebook's rules and regulations [inaudible] capable of setting 
complicated rules and regulations. It just, it's about how, I mean that's a good thing. 
Don't we put it to people with mental health problems, but again it's not, uh, it's not 
beyond that capabilities. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​29:12​) 
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I think. I agree. I think the issue is not that I know we're all talking about Facebook and 
Facebook is still a one stop shop for political advertising assessment partner. Um, the 
issue is not that you can't show who's paying for an ad on the Facebook ads, it's that If 
you choose not to put in identifiable information, they don't follow up, I've got no way of 
enforcing it and their take downs can't keep pace with the speed at which these ads 
without any beneficial ownership information are going up. So 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​29:42​) 
if we took that more comprehensive approach that is proposing how, what kind of 
regulation would you require? It would require a legislative change to force the platforms 
to do this as a matter of [inaudible]. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​30:00​) 
It's like it's a know your customer requirement just as you have with money laundering. 
Banks do it. They're not allowed to take money off somebody and they must, they know 
who they are. Yeah. I mean you're probably right that you would either need to do it 
through the new, assuming that they go ahead online regulator, uh, off off Internet, what 
they're going to call it, a 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​30:22​) 
well straight new legislation that would grant regulation pass. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​30:26​) 
Yeah. Is there anything, do you think that could be done more or are you suggesting is 
not, that is extremely difficult to distinguish or to identify that group that is Katie political 
maps that you end up with some blurred lines, but is there a kind of a, is there a way of 
at least picking the ones that are absolutely clearly with a political agenda? Or would 
you say it's best to just cash every single fishing event? 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​30:58​) 
Well, I mean I, it's easy to get the low hanging fruit, right? It's easy to say that if you are 
a political party or registered political campaigner,, then you have to go through this 
process. The question is if I am uploading something onto Facebook, what is Facebook 
doing to establish whether I am in some way one of those or if I'm just somebody else 
posting a political advert. What is the, cause the, the boundary of political for uh, on the, 
in the Iceland case was the fact that had been created by an organization who had a 
political mission rather than [inaudible]. Yeah, exactly. And so actually if Iceland had 
made to that exact effort themselves rather than bringing in food was agreed to be one 
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of the, I can't remember, it would not have been political. It's hard to understand. I'll 
draw that line. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​31:54​) 
Okay. And that's a major growth in the number of political organizations was getting 
physical properties. Yeah. There's a question about the registry ration of those 
organizations. Is that something that you've looked at as well in terms of what, how, how 
can you ensure that organizations that have a political agenda are registered as 
organizations? [inaudible] what more could be done there if the electoral commission, I 
think a, they haven't registry, but one of the things we've discussed is how few 
organizations are actually registered on that. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​32:33​) 
I think the problem with the kind of third party campaign groups is it's incredibly difficult 
to know, um, often who is just an interested citizen who wants to get a message across 
and who is a kind of subversive astroturf group. And that's partly because the barriers to 
entry to, uh, participating in online political activity havebeen so massively lowered, by 
the growth of social media, it's so easy for an average citizen to take out an ad and 
have real impact and reach with relatively little money. Um, and so it's always going to 
be quite difficult to pause out. Um, the third party campaign groups, uh, citizen interest 
groups, astroturf groups. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​33:18​) 
And also you don't have to be a bad guy, right? To be a third party interest group to 
whatever a friends of the [inaudible] might want to say, you should vote for the Green 
party. Uh, and it's quite difficult for them to do that. Partly because it's a project listed 
probably to charity, all sorts of things. Again, I think often in this space we expect there 
to be, and I was sort of involved in the, what was it called, the third party political 
legislature we did in 2014. Um, is there a sense that um, bad guys will not to be able to 
advertise but good guys should and that is the view on both sides of the argument, 
which is a bit weird. I think people should be encouraged and enabled to participate in 
the political system in whatever way they choose included at party campaigners, 
including local people who just want to stand up for stuff. The question is how do you 
make that transparent and clear as to who those people are? So that, so that I as a 
consumer can differentiate between grasping straight tech. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​34:24​) 
I'll think about another interesting example that we came across. So we signed up to all 
the Tory leadership campaigns. We receiving kind of vote voting for various candidate, 
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get out the vote initiatives. Um, so we're getting emails from Dominic Raab, Sajid Javid, 
all those guys, um, asking about how we could volunteer, giving them an email address. 
And after Dominic Raab's campaign, um, closed down, I got an email from him saying 
I'm backing boris with like a link to the Boris campaign, a website asking me to sign up. 
So essentially, uh, a third party campaign has helped out another third party campaign 
group for almost no money just by using that previous history of my email address, 
encouraging me to click on a link. So even though they are wouldn't say coordinating 
but then working together and because there's been for money spent and send like an 
email outs, um, as part of this that you've had for a long time, um, they're not currently 
being sufficiently captured by the, uh, by the electoral commission as a spending 




expense limit of the Boris campaign because it's effectively campaigning material for the 
Boris campaign. Yeah, 
 
Jim Killock: (​35:44​) 
but you're suggesting it should be based on its value, not its cost, 
 
Speaker 4: (​35:47​) 
which it, there should be some kind of been cool. Right. Some of the fact that the fact 
that dominant ropes go up, let's say 10,000 email addresses, that should be way of 
putting a financial, 
 
Jim Killock: (​35:57​) 
well this is, this is tricky because at the same time there's supports his more qualitative 
information and good reasons for that. I think the thing that's probably most easy to 
[inaudible] to think about from a regulatory point of view is the data in Richmond. So you 
think of things like the Experian databases for, you know, coding up postcodes and then 
the, these are some points rather, um, you think about your sort of scraping of Twitter or 
Facebook for profile information, potentially automated profiles generated form that 
information to decide what kind of supports you might be. Um, all of those are 
enrichments that nobody particularly agreeing to. They've just kind of happened. So, 
you know, you might sign up to a party email list, you might have, um, you know, giving 
somebody your name and address or you know, on the doorstep. But did you expect 
that to result in your Facebook, Twitter experience data all being munched up in 
deciding exactly what they are worthy? 
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Jim Killock: (​37:01​) 
You are for rare canvassing of support asking the donations. And so, and similarly the 
kind of political exemption, you know, rang consent and then there's causes similar 
problems because they're sort of related to a lot of people to sort of flood into the 
system and then have that data enriched. And then, you know, have they agreed to any 
of this? Probably not. Um, but it seems to happen. So they've come from a regulatory 
point of view. You can at least look at the indenture in Richlands as something that is 
cost money, has added value. Nobody consented to, um, therefore it is, you know, as 
part of the electoral practices that need to be looked at and regulated because they kind 
of suddenly could afford that. At this conference, 
 
Speaker 4: (​37:48​) 
the ICO last week said to us, cause I raised the political party exemption in the GDPR 
said to us that that is a complete misinterpretation and that is not what the law says. 
And the political parties do not have exemptions. And they're actually going through a 
process now of clarifying now with political parties to make sure they understand they 
don't have exemptions. But I think to the point that the fact of the matter is we all 
collectively thought they have exemptions. Um, 
 
Jim Killock: (​38:16​) 
so I think so, I don't know Decisely where they Spraberry, Lens Butler, I suspect it's 
more mental function, more as something for nps to work with their constituents and be 
able to communicate with their constituents about things they've raised to them. And 
that's why they kind of have an ongoing exemption for that relationship. I suspect those 
words meant to the draw in May also apply to kind of canvassing issues again for the 
low plan P and not none of that necessarily relates to the central policy organizations. 
So that may be how they're trying to distinguish that. But I'm, again, I'll be slightly 
unsure. Is High those boundaries operating the practice in policies, you know, now you 
have the [inaudible] separate that databases are on. Um, you know, is it realistic to say 
that an email that centered this way is really treated differently from an email at center 
that way? 
 
Jim Killock: (​39:07​) 
Um, I kind of think the core point is actually GDPR and straight to data protection is all 
quite new. And the likelihood of there being less say poor practice in political parties is 
extremely high. Um, so the question is to what extent, and I think you also have to add 
into that, that the incentives or political parties to use data in manners, which is fairly 
poor, is also this stuff is cheap. You get the law of reach, um, who's going to notice, I 
may as well use this data because it will bring me this thing and the worst thing that's 
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gonna happen, someone's gonna say, Oh, you didn't use the protection laws properly 
and didn't support and consented information properly, but it doesn't feel like a 
particularly problematic thing. So you know, all of that said the gene, you know, GPR 
lives the ICO to find organizations including political policies up to 40% turnover cause 
should stop worrying them. 
 
Jim Killock: (​40:08​) 
If they start issuing guidance and they target those people that are genuinely the worst 
offenders or people who are behaving with the least responsibility, then that can 
improve. Um, behavioral, again, this probably a little bit of a sign as you've used a 
committee, but it's worth flagging. And in terms of what, how you get better data 
protection, uh, practice. One of the ways you do that is by collective complaints. And 
one of the ways I could that could happen is through something called article 80 packets 
to um, in the GDPR, which alliance privacy organizations or would align with, had been 
implemented in UK law. Would I privacy organizations to make complaints about, uh, 
privacy of abusive as where individual sub data subjects are finding it quite hard to 
understand that they too had been abused. And in cases like political parties or uh, you 
know, participants, your organizations using your data and advertising in general, these 
are exactly the sorts of things. It's quite hard to get individuals to comply so they don't 
feel like their credit cards been more so don't feel like, you know, there's huge ponds to 
them, but there is a systemic issue and those of us who are concerned like an avenue 
to say it's a serious problem. So that would be another thing you could recommend to 
just kind of empower the privacy organizations to make those collective complaints. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​41:35​) 
I think fines in the end we'll only ever have relatively limited impact and unless election 
results can be overturned because of procedural accuracy, then the political parties 
won't really care that much. Uh, and I know that like the sort of controversial thing to 
suggest, but you know, we, we, we run trials of murderers and rapists because of 
procedural mistakes because the procedure is important. The process of a trial is 
important. The process of democracy is also important. And you know, if you could win 
an election, win a majority and then get fined even a million pounds, man, like there's 
plenty of rich people who put money into politics and if they still thought that a fine was 
the pathway a, it's a bit like, I know basketball people deliberately foul because the cost 
of fouling is, I have friend who was a professional basketball player. Women is 
basketball anyway, and it turns out, let's just, that you just thought really tactically the 
best thing to do in that situation was to foul. That's the problem in political campaigning 
is in the end, tactically, the best thing is to just cross your fingers and don't misuse the 
data. I think we need to go further in terms of what the, 
17 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​42:54​) 
or you can force a buyer action with surgeries on the [inaudible] case. If they have been 
convicted and they were living the products understand standard. It's extremely difficult 
to do if there's national, if not parties that are national level Burger. Does it? Yeah. That 
the logic of that is then you need to learn a term. Then we run the entire election. Of 
course, that relates to the same question when it comes to a referendum and there is a 
science standard from 2016 there is no legal basis to turn 16 restaurant. It wasn't, it 
wasn't in shrine British snoring in that way and it was also [inaudible]. Yeah, and of 
course it was [inaudible]. Sorry. Um, yeah. How would you, how would you do that? 
Would you look at this EAP, DDG, 
 
Speaker 4: (​43:54​) 
oh nine electro [inaudible] transparency. Are you, so it's the ABG on electoral 
campaigning. Transparency. Yeah. Okay, great. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​44:06​) 
Would you mind just introducing a cooling on a low day voice for changing a okay. 
Correct. To me that's coming up. Um, uh, another meeting [inaudible] service reviews. 
So, 
 
Speaker 4: (​44:17​) 
okay. If you were running from one thing to another, yeah, sure. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​44:20​) 
Uh, d, I mean, do you have any thoughts on that in terms of the national picture? How 
do you, 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​44:29​) 
that has terrible space that has be serious jeopardy if you screw up and you know, we're 
having this spy election in Brooklyn and Radnor at the moment and Chris Davies is very 
upset about that because he's like, you're 700 pounds and I paid it back. That's because 
we just signed it through the legal, the bail. But that actually your parliamentary 
expenses, even if it's a relatively trivial, somethings you've paid back, is just something 
that it's so important for MPs to abide by the rules that yes, you can be forced into it by 
election for 700 pounds that you've paid back. And I think fair enough, um, that that was 
the right call we need. You need to create proper jeopardy in the system, that if you 
break these rules, it has to be reworked. And that, that's kind of Matt, I recognize. But if 
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you don't do that, I honestly think that the kind of the game theory incentives are to 
break the rules around data for this because it's so hard to scrutinize, 
 
Jim Killock: (​45:25​) 
I think. I think not is broadly right for the day. I don't think it's the whole story. I think it is 
possible in your question is what ruins people's political grades. And at the moment, 
apparently nothing at the moment. [inaudible] 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​45:41​) 
well, I'm not telling the truth. Yeah. Yeah. 
 
Jim Killock: (​45:44​) 
On the other hand, there were periods in our history when, you know, telling my is 
broken the law, uh, fiddling with things were things that concerned people. So, you 
know, maybe there's also something around the political culture. Um, but I don't, you 
know, we, we, we think a lot about data protection and enforcement and certainly in 
other, and it's got plenty of scope to, to improve the laws. Um, whether in this case, you 
know, party officials losing their jobs or people being fired from standing seat kind of 
had, you know, various things as judgements against them, whatever it has to be. I don't 
know if those are sufficient. Our agreement, you, you kind of do you need, you do need 
people to feel 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​46:26​) 
just thinking about that further, it's the concept of the sort of the responsible person both 
within the party and then the agent within the local campaign is a weird kind of 
separation of responsibility from the candidate. And the, that means that if the acts does 
fall, it falls on, on the party. Yes. But potentially on an official who is relatively 
anonymous rather than in the context of, you know, the leaf campaign that you could 
actually lead it in with the public champions. They are never the responsible person who 
has to fill out the forms. Of course, that's because probably if I got to filling out forms, 
but it's also because they want plausible deniability. If the campaign turns out for 
breaking the law. What about bar? If it's in trials, um, you know, been undermined by 
the way that the procedures have been, could've been used. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​47:23​) 
Then I'm trying to think about whether that's an easier assessment to make, whether or 
not we had to have another actions done on the mind by of the spending by 60,000 
pounds. Well, so we just give the [inaudible] power in terms of making those judgment 
and it is really at the moment we have, we end up having this conversation about 
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whether did it affect the outcome and, and I think we need to get away from that being 
the test because it is impossible to prove and it will always be possible to prove. Plus 
you speak to a voter. The last thing they want to believe is that their opinion was 
swayed by the adverts that nobody believes that even if a district just did you break the 
rules. So, even if it was overspent of a quick, we're going to read on the whole my 
friend, I mean I'm a really good example cause this advisor, but you know what 
[inaudible] 
 
Speaker 4: (​48:21​) 
or if the, so if the seat instead of spending that, let's say it's roughly 14,000 pounds per 
candidate, is there a percentage threat that traffic for that threshold or are we looking at 
absolutes or, so for example, one of the things we're looking at as well just for more 
context is the idea with a gifted kind, which is a huge issue, um, is guidance from 
electoral commission of based on, you know, the regional area of what you have to 
value that as. So otherwise you often see rent in central London for six weeks at a 
hundred pounds, you know, which is, that's not an actual reality. Um, so guidance to 
what things you have to do to put, uh, for what something is actually valued at. So clear 
guidance on what you spend. But then what is the threshold for overspending? Or what 
is the threshold for 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​49:10​) 
the, I guess, uh, um, you guys mentioned it and I think it's probably come up before, so I 
didn't sort of dwell on it, but the, this, the, the idea that there is a separate thing, which is 
the constituency competing in the national campaign and it's just complete fiction. Now. 
We've talked about that at length from the sessions as well. Yeah. So, yeah, so any 
system which retains that fiction is clean on work. So I guess I challenge the question, 
but yeah, and you have to look at it. The next level, the party has to be responsible, 
 
Speaker 4: (​49:43​) 
so, oh, sorry. So even so, and under a new regime we said, okay, the spending limit per 
seat is 40,000 pounds. Local, national doesn't matter. That's as much as I can spend in 
the seat. In what two, what threshold are we saying is, um, immediate rerun one p that, 
and I'm not being [inaudible] because for example, the other side of it is we're, we're, 
you know, we've covered coming around to the idea that every donation from one piece 
should be verified as admissible for the same reason. Right. If you cannot escape 500 
pounds, you cannot escape 20 pounds. Like, so what would be the threshold from 
 




Speaker 4: (​50:24​) 
no, but I mean that's, that's a, you know, a percent. Yeah. Like, 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​50:28​) 
I mean, what does it with, uh, the speed limit? I don't know. They said that [inaudible] 
hour over, isn't it? 10% of spirits. So it's not seven miles per hour. 30 [inaudible] 70 I 
think. But the digital transfers of money because we've didn't set Brexit campaigns. 
Yeah. It's got 
 
Jim Killock: (​50:51​) 
this issue or 25 pounds, hundreds of thousands. What do you think needs to change to 
be able to prevent that small today you're taking away, no, my, we'll think about the data 
that, the more mistakes, yeah. One thing would you send us to turn in the conversation? 
Right. But we genuinely think at this point it is likely that Facebook has no permission 
whatsoever to run. Police can talk to that or any other kinds of targeted tots at all. And 
I'm running those ads. Is a breach of the law asking Stan Cause I didn't ask anymore. I 
was going to ask about that. Cause the suggestion to be made about actually just 
banning micro-targeted ads altogether. Well at this point they can't, we don't think they 
have a legal basis for serving when you were talking to that third space. So because 
you didn't agree to it and he's like, so you kind of, from our perspective, the first thing 
that you do is to say, well because somebody can take it through this. 
 
Jim Killock: (​51:52​) 
GDPR requires that you get consent for specific purposes for your data to be 
processed. When you joined Facebook, you joined a social network so it's got a clear 
purpose of running your social network. Running. The social network happens to be 
monetized by advertising, but it is not necessary to utilizing to run a social network. As a 
result, it is pretty likely that Facebook has a separate or dissect the consent to 
personalization, that from the consent to where you use your data to run a social 
network and by failing it probably also needs a further consent or maybe deferred 
consent for special category processing. Now it's the same targeting around factors like 
religion, politics, Tree Jeanne manage like. And because it doesn't separate those two 
or three things out and it doesn't ask you for a separate permission for each of those, it 
may simply be breaking the law. 
 
Jim Killock: (​52:58​) 
And so there's a legal challenge that um, an organization or an Austrian conversation 
called none of your business, a boy rather mine, Max Schrems who ran the challenge 
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against the data stage agreements for the USA, which famously just fell apart once he 
challenged them. Um, they, they're taking that out through the Irish. Um, DPA don't go 
to the courts of justice. UPV In itself is quite likely that Facebook will have to ask you 
separately whether you wish to have different sorts of targeting. You'll have to decide 
with what that's about. And it seems to me that that's quite completely changed their 
business model. It would somewhat, cause they can still send you adverts. I ticked the 
box. So yes you can be, you can be given to patterns, but what you can't have is 
personalized adverts based on all the data 
 
Speaker 7: (​53:53​) 
which you already we go to, we already go pages. 
 
Jim Killock: (​53:56​) 
You can say, well I don't want that except those cookies. And they say, well in that case 
you won't get personalized ads tailored to that. That's right. That's the way it's working. 
They're sort of going outside of a Facebook consultant, but within Facebook it's still, you 
know, they, they're still bubbled up. So, and yes, if that was changed, they would need 
that. If you would kind of be able to say, well, if you wanted to be micro-targeted you 
want, you could, we can kind of build an argument within that. Um, you know, the 
people could, you know, particularly the political targeting is very separate from the 
social, commercial type team. I think that's point to it, sorts of thing. And I think a lot of 
people would say, no, thank you very much. And that might well can alleviate a lot of 
these pressures from, from the source. So I think that's something, you know, you could 
really think about it and it's almost like putting no cameras. I sort of know 
 
Speaker 7: (​54:51​) 
why not. 
 
Jim Killock: (​54:57​) 
It did. From what you're saying is do you think that potentially the GDPR could end up 
just taking care of all these issues, including the political side, if, if the law and secondly, 
so supplemental questions for that as well. What has to happen? Will that be whatever 
the call to justice of the European Union concludes? And if it concludes that yes, GDPR 
is this and the place that needs to do that, does it then just look after itself? I don't think 
just [inaudible] I don't think, I don't think you can cure everything because there's still 
gonna be bad actors. Right. And people are always going to try and bend the rules. 
Also. Some people will agree to this not thinking about it and they are still vulnerable to 
the targeting, but know because of, because of that. And you still need and I guess I 
guess there's also a very big question which kind of comes, I think a lot of the points you 
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were making polysorbate the kind of future data that gets used and there's a big gray 
area about what the meaning of a legitimate interests and fat processing is, so just to 
take the art, you think of all the discriminatory practices that are involved in 
micro-targeting a lot. 
 
Jim Killock: (​56:06​) 
This is simply unfair. It's just telling people things which are misleading. It's using your 
data to kind of manipulate you directly. I question whether that's reasonable under the 
data protection because it doesn't feel like fair processing to me. That's a bigger 
argument and a harder one to make and one that will take more time to sort out. But for 
me the whole issues of data discrimination are very linked to this idea of fair processing 
and the lack of a kind of a - at the moment either people do stuff which I don't feel is fair 
processing. Maybe getting caseload or that thing. But you know, I'm only arguing that 
I'm on, I guess we would say this is gonna help a lot and kind of help. Like I don't think 
you can solve everything cause you know, there are nasty people in the world, 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​56:54​) 
but a lot of it is dependent on, as you said, case score and therefore active legal 
challenges by third sector organizations or you know, we saw Martin Lewis challenged 
the scammers on Facebook, correct. Sued Them for defamation and easily it then they 
end up in court. They've introduced a new team and new regulations and new rules 
around that. Proactively taking on these organizations is incredibly important. But partly 
because our regulators are so kind of small to uh, you know, in the u s they have like 
basically no enforcement, really other qualities, law antidiscrimination or it's all based 
on, uh, individual people suing individual restaurants or individual offices. And we have 
enough, we have that situation in the UK around protecting our democracy and 
protecting us from this punished advertising. We are relying on either individuals whose, 
or kind of proactive organizations. And I think the suggestion that you guys have made 
around enabling that to be, as we've seen in consumer law, which has taken on these 
powers to be, to make super complaints, 
 
Jim Killock: (​58:06​) 
it as a child, girl 82, two, yeah, I want to meet does that, is that something that needs to 
just be transposed into the should? So the GDPR, that piece of the GDPR could just be 
transposed. Yeah. Drywall. It was optional. And uh, the government in its wisdom 
decided to not do it. So we can take on individuals who complain and they say, my data 
is being misused and we can represent them. But if it's a broader thing where it's kind of 
harder for people to identify that abuse [inaudible] alliance too. And it's also when it's 
the, it's the impact on the group, which is problematic rather than the impact on the 
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individual obsolete discrimination. And it becomes apparent at the, at the large grade 
level. So there's that super [inaudible] as yeah, the harm as well. The level of harm it is. 
 
Speaker 4: (​58:56​) 
Yeah. So that's when the, so for example, like with our class action lawsuit against 
Facebook, you know, we have to find every individual person who have their data taken 
without their consent. That became a gentle, like a scandal. Right. But the real harm to 
Facebook only occurs when all 1.1 million people have a thousand pound claim. Yeah. 
Then you have an 11 billion pound claim. But when you can't accurate, when you can 
get people to join the claim, the collective complaint becomes less and less relevant 
because the harm, the, the recourse in form of harm is so low. 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​59:27​) 
Yeah. Yeah. This is, it's what really matters because it's these broad things that matter 
to all of us. But only a little bit. We've been, we've been doing, um, subject access 
requests under GDPR two entities, including the political parties number, seeking to 
move on to data brokers, which, uh, tell us as individually as just what kind of data is 
being held on us. And we've got some interesting results. Um, some political parties by 
data, personal data from Experia and calf, uh, assign users, individual credit scores. 
Um, for example, Warren Valley, we got ACLUs. 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:00:08​) 
Uh, it was great to be labeled in uptown and leads by experience. Uh, and this kind of 
data is 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​01:00:14​) 
stuff that goes into the falling out. And I think as part of a broader campaign of 
submitting subject access requests, if we could raise public awareness, the ways in 
which their credit history is being used to target them, that might help. 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:00:27​) 
But then the great irony of course is that the two ad campaign by Experian, no your data 
self where they spin it to the public as if it's like this great thing you want to see all the 
data we have on you, you know, and yeah, get, get to know your data self. Right? So 
when you frame it that way, it's like, oh, I want to know data Maine. You know, 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:00:53​) 
you talked about the join data audit, is that, I mean is that something that could just 
happen and beautiful to just get a sense from you what you think can just happen 
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without any requirements of legislation because you never are challenging. It's going to 
be to get this legislation through some stuff from you potentially do through statutory 
instruments. But as soon as you bring forth primary legislation, you meet tremendous 
resistance. But I think just again, harking back to evidence given in previous sessions, I 
think the ICO and the electric mission are going to sign an MLR and, and are you are a 
corporation. I mean know that like from the electoral commissions for that they're kind of 
crying out for more capacity to help them understand the value of the data and the use 
of datasets. In the recent report, they said data sets and databases own increasingly 
valuable asset for running, targeted and actually campaigns. 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:01:49​) 
The declaration should include an estimate of the costs that campaign has invested in 
buying or developing the data they hold when they register. So it looks like the electrical 
commission, I'm moving in this direction anywhere in the ICO, as it says, said they were 
going to sign an mou. Um, so it seems that while she might need to get something on 
the statute, uh, that's wrong, that there was already a a will and recognize they 
recognize that they can and should work together on this area and maybe get 
something proceeding on the basis of an 
 
Deidre Brock: (​01:02:22​) 
[inaudible]. Yeah, cause you know, there was a suggestion at the most evidence 
session, maybe one for pilot just around targeted spanked and control over that. So I'm 
sort of moving away from the digital, forgive me, but I'm just interested in your thoughts 
on that because at the moment see related to Percy heretically you could use the high 
time national campaign, spend a lot into a political party in one constituency and two, 
there are some parties that do this quite a lot and it's, there's talk perhaps of um, 
making this much more transparent so that people could then, then, you know, the party 
would have to explain why they've decided to spend so much money in those particular 
areas and so on. Is that something that you're looking at or, uh, it's not something 
we've, we've looked at, but I think it is really important. There's also the question of 
making sure that data is published as swiftly as possible. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:03:18​) 
Yeah. Because it's no good finding out, oh, by the way, a million parents were spent in 
know that's been Sheffield talent topic. We've whatever sort of preventative action. Um, 
but you know, you, you cannot pretend that directly addressed literature that doesn't just 
cause it doesn't mention the local candidate is not, Tom's is campaigning, you know, 
that is affecting the constituency. Uh, and yeah, I mean the scale of, of, of that kind of 
concentrated spending. And I think again, it harms our democracy in that sort of a 
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structural way. This idea of only targeting those few votes that matter, which I mean, 
God knows what's gonna happen in the next general election now that the countries are 
four or five way module, um, who knows where people will be spending money. But you 
know, I, it's having lived in both a marginal constituency and in a safe seat, I, nobody 
ever tells me, nobody ever calls me, not some, like nothing. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:04:30​) 
It's just a dead zone. And, and we shouldn't incentivize the electrical system to, to do 
that to constituencies. Because there's no point spending money where I live in 
Campbell when I'm back home cause that money can be spent somewhere, you know 
useful. And that means that included really in the political system. So you would just 
click it. Yeah. For anything, whether it's digital or physical, whatever the post has to go 
to that level. Yeah. I think if, I think if, if it, if it is a physically distributed leaflets then you 
know where it's gone. If it is a physical poster, nowhere where it is that becomes local 
campaigning, not national campaigning in digital. I guess if you have chosen an 
audience, which is just the UK, then it's probably would qualify as national funding. But 
as soon as you've made a geographical tall cutting off your spending, there's been quite 
a strong consensus. Cause I [inaudible] most structural level, we should all see similar 
political advertising. We should all see how get a similar sentence of what the Labor 
party is or what the SNP is or what the Liberal Democrats are or the Brexit party. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​01:05:44​) 
We should. We should all, 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:05:45​) 
no. And, and again, micro-targeting enables us to all have a completely different view of 
what those bodies are sampled and mean. And that is corrosive to democracy, which is 
about collective decision making, not consumer choice. 
 
Speaker 4: (​01:06:01​) 
Just as an example of a third party groups. Um, if you target an ad as a third party 
group to England for example, you then have to distribute the spend across all the seats 
in England because third party groups have a per seat spending limit. So there is a 
precedent like it doesn't exist. You 30 have to meet. Yeah. That's what they were pretty 
campaigning groups have to do. So we're about communities you could just copied and 
pasted. Yeah. Yeah. And if you have an event in Leeds, you have to reasonably assess 
what seats that event would influence. Yeah. And there's an audit process that would 
say no, actually that's a complete misrepresentation of that event in Leeds for example. 
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But it does exist, you know, the precedents there. And I think the difficulty when data 
gets involved in this is the datasets stuff, 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:06:45​) 
policies have that all been captured by the regulation. And our big declares [inaudible] 
two, two and five who isn't going to vote for you and therefore a exclude large numbers 
of people. But B, you know, dramatically drive down the costs seven of the day with 
wasted money. Uh, and this means that it actually becomes harder to capture the real 
value of what these campaigning techniques and the resource data brings to a 
campaign. Just by looking at it purely through how much money parties are spending. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:07:14​) 
It's also true that the yes to ave campaign sent leaflets to 8 million people on a targeted 
list and spent the same amount of money on physical leaflets as the notary campaign 
who sent a to d store every house and decided to just take the whole country. So you 
know, you wouldn't have to be vaguely competent. Yeah, that's, that's it. That's it. As a 
political campaign to not waste money, it's very easy to waste money. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​01:07:41​) 
You, you talked before about value, this kind of data enrichment, scraping Twitter, 
Facebook for profile information. And then he said, how do you, or you were kind of 
talking about monetizing that, right? Did you mean in terms of well, what, how much 
money should be coming out of a political parties campaign budget for that. When you 
talk about, can you say a bit more about what you mean by a family in terms of things 
are in Richmond, you also talked about value that, well I think, I think 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:08:13​) 
the first test is Jim said is, is these all these processes, uh, lawful, unethical. But then 
the second, the second test is, um, particularly with datasets that you buy commercially, 
is there a way of incorporating how much, uh, those data sets have worth financially? 
Um, and particularly in the case of data sets that are scraped off the Internet for free, is 
there a way of incorporate of working out, assigning the financial value to those data 
sets? 
 
Jim Killock: (​01:08:44​) 
And what would you then do with that? Something of value and court incorporated into 
the standard of that and see if that bridge is spending the mess in that way. Too many 
of these data sets. My roping forwards, whether I'm assigned to the data, you know, the 
electrical areas, I suspect that even this effectively is going all the time and it's not 
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therefore, but the real value to the parties is within the elections. We're not necessarily 
having to declare it within those periods. So there's kind of a potential and we haven't 
investigated, we don't know how parties declare their spending rate, he says, but there's 
an obvious loophole there that if you do all of your profiling and to read in Richmond, uh, 
techniques outside of the electoral periods, then you can boost the valuable data and 
the actual ad spending. Certainly when it's targeted, you know, you can get all out of 
under that point, even though the investment was several million quid several months 
ago. 
 
Jim Killock: (​01:09:41​) 
So what would a proposal look like? It would say we need a new rule or statutory code 
of conduct phoned up by the parties, which says that we will show the electrical 
commission all of the profiled data that we have. So wherever there's, there's been 
value at and the electoral commission will have a formula which says when you have 
this sort of profile information, we think that it, it probably was this much cost went into it 
in terms of staff time and expertise and we're going to put a value on it of this and that 
value. You're going to have to declare it against your ongoing, uh, so that we got the 
kind of methodology that you propose. 
 
Speaker 3: (​01:10:29​) 
And I think this is a great opportunity for the ICO and the electrical [inaudible] policy 
issue. But I'll have to find that back. I think it would be a good opportunity for the ICO 
and the electoral commission to kind of pull their expertise because you know, up until 
this point over the past year, there's been like a degree of kind of regulatory chafing 
almost between the ICO and the electoral commission over who exactly is responsible 
for this like slightly murky area. Um, in the meantime you've got these practices going 
on and obviously you shouldn't have to declare spending outside the regulated period if 
you use it inside the regulated period about the processes 
 
Pascal Crowe: (​01:11:14​) 
by which data was acquired. So murky and multifaceted and quite often the value of the 
data is less than you might pay for it initially or it might be free because you scraped it 
from the Internet given all the native player in the banks. Given all those factors at play, 
there needs to be aware of signing and financial value to that data and incorporating it 
into the spending. Then [inaudible] an off the shelf methodology for doing assigning 
value. I guess we leave that to the ice expected to activities. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:11:42​) 
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You know, it's also just worth remembering how complicated some of this algorithmic 
decision making or data targeting are in the, you know, there's not really anyone at 
Google who really understands how their search works. That's part because it's not 
possible for any individual based grown up over, you know, 20 years and ecology. You 
know, there's now a whole like academic discipline of the explainability of AI decisions. 
And so it putting a value on things, understanding things, you know, this is an area 
where again, you need much, much more regulatory heft. They should be, you know, 
big teams working on this stuff. I was gonna say [inaudible] data scientists. Yeah. 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​01:12:30​) 
[inaudible] your point in telling them micro-targeting and democracy is not a retailer for, I 
think that's absolutely right. As one of the things we've raised quite a lot of disgusting in 
the sessions is it's also this, um, the way it's kind of hermetically sealed information so it 
just delivers to 1.1 the house one screen and there's no right to reply that it's not, it's not 
like a available or an advert in a newspaper or where everybody sees it and everyone 
can reply to it and everyone can have a debate about it. It's real one way 
communication, which, which feels very corrosive to democracy as well. Yeah. I don't 
know that kind of, we then get into the area of I suppose political education and so 
there's a regulation of this and then there's also changing the culture. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:13:25​) 
It looks like, I don't know, but there is a, a database of all of these adverts, the kind of 
people who will go into that database and look for stuff that they find offensive so that 
they can respond ostentatiously or build their own social media profile by having a go at 
the Brexit party, but doing something they don't like, you know, in the end has risks as 
well. Right. That what you do is you further amplify the voices of, uh, of the extremes in 
our politics and further drive out moderate voices who are a bit less interested. And you 
might hope that, uh, the, the oxygen of publicity on hateful racism or whatever it might 
be, would help to stop that working as a political tactic. I worry that in our current 
political climate, actually, you know, you see this with Trump that having some people 
who are, you know, snowflakes who are offended by your advert might be a deliberate 
tactic that people would use. Do something offensive micro-targeted to 12 people create 
a liberal outcry suddenly everybody sees it. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:14:42​) 
Exactly. And so again, the question of, you know, how do you make sure that this 
database is not just a factory for clever political tactics, uh, is is a challenge. I don't 
know what else to do it yet. 
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Stephen Kinnock: (​01:14:57​) 
On changing the culture. Do you have any thoughts on, if you like the education side of 
this, the awareness raising and what sorts of thing could be done both through 
parliament and through civil society? 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:15:15​) 
Um, although it's sound that is that I think there's an increasing body of evidence to 
suggest that younger people are more cynical about what they see online, that, that 
older people a lot more readily. Yeah. So the rest of hope, uh, except that you then get 
into this other territory, which is where there's no comments at all because nobody 
believes anything that they see. And that's one of the risks that we kind of, we've talked 
about with, with deep fakes, the idea that you could create a fake video of, of Steven 
Kinnock, I don't know, saying something doing a racism or whatever and it looks totally 
real and oh my God, there's the initial fear is, oh my God, this will lead to extraordinary 
kind of take downs of people with their political careers, uh, with, with just falsities. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:16:07​) 
On the other hand, that the bigger risk is that nobody believes anything. And then, and 
then, because when you can't rely on your eyes or the evidence of what's before you or 
you've mind is your gut. And we know that our gut instincts are massively corrupted by a 
whole host of kind of cognitive biases. And just the assumption that the people we 
already agree with that the open ones we can trust. And that then, you know, how do 
you, how do you build the kind of common set of facts even as it's really troubling. Sorry 
[inaudible] I was just thinking about micro-targeting news dominate departments cause 
I'm one of the reasons why I became interested in this was discovering the Scotland 
Office with microtargeting certain constituencies, um, with things like, um, well 
particularly targeting people around. Uh, Lucas airbase isn't, you know, this was sort of 
in the run up to the snap election. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:17:02​) 
So we asked questions about that. But you know, you just wonder where does the line 
get drawn between appropriate and inappropriate? Like micro-targeting. Is there still a 
place or do we just say ban all together or you know, if a government is going to be 
using it to target, say, um, young women who have just had children and you know, this 
particular policy they want to promote, um, you know, just sort of interested ways you 
think those decisions should be made or draw, you know, who draws a line about where 
it is appropriate or it's, and all of you ever, well we did, our goal by this event is quite 
tricky in order to targeting all the delivery efforts on [inaudible] cause for balls. He's a 
30 
little boy, he's done a degree of this is a particular messages that want to get active in 
particular place. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:17:58​) 
Do that well, what perhaps is these different areas, the ability to do that, not just 
geographically on the constant basis. And then, uh, the fact that this is so invisible and 
it's kind of a bit depressing to hear your analysis of hiring people might react to a sort of 
transparency database. Because you know, the first thing you might think is, well, let's 
have some light on this. And those kind of gets all that. I kind of think maybe one of the 
things there is you need the, you just need to Kinda think about all of the information 
you might need to really understand and advert. So perhaps things like how many times 
I've displayed, um, how many people saw them, where they ever clicked on that kind of 
information may also be important. Bring people to understand, which is just an attempt 
to troll them in, which is like something which is actually had some influence or even 
some things saying you are being sent. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:18:50​) 
They said that because we believe you are that we'll just fast child or something. That's 
absolutely got to be what you mean when you have, you tried it, you clicked on an 
advert on Facebook and it tells you and you like, it might be because of this because 
they want to reach women. You're like, oh well that's helpful. That doesn't really tell me 
anything. No, absolutely needs to change. I think, again, we have to, you know, we 
have, we have the equality act right, which sets out a number of protected 
characteristics and we've decided that, uh, except in Northern Ireland, the political 
affiliation is not to consider it a thing which we've decided to protect under quality law. 
Um, we, we've managed to have that conversation and make a set of decisions about 
what is and isn't not, isn't acceptable to make decisions on the basis of that, you know, 
spreads the toll. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:19:36​) 
So that feels like what kind of private members clubs you can have and all sorts of 
things. I just think we need to have a conversation. What is it okay to talk about 
advertising on the basis of, and you know, the insurance industry has, uh, a sort of 
self-denying ordinance that they don't look at people's HIV status, uh, because we as a 
society and they decided that that wasn't a rabbit hole that they wanted to get into. We 
can have those conversations at the moment. You can talk on the basis of whatever 
Facebook happens to have. And maybe we just need to think about that a little. And you 
know, the tiny one line for me is a very dangerous thing because we know that people's 
motivations are really, uh, uh, people's self control is really impaired at night. That's 
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more kind of consumer things often than a political thing. But I think it's a real problem. 
People's mental health status, uh, is a problem is so, so, so the question is 
 
Jim Killock: (​01:20:30​) 
you can [inaudible] so like you can, in terms of the technology and what it delivers, can 
you legally, I'm not so sure. Um, so if you did target somebody on the basis of - you 
were assessing them mental health status - I think you would be breaking data 
protection law because you would be assessing people for something that they never 
told you and therefore you did something to them without their consent. And as we've 
added to getting [inaudible]. 
 
Polly Mackenzie: (​01:20:57​) 
Yes. And it's possible that they still will evolve in this space and a set of things which are 
currently happening and also the ICO, guidance and many other things. But yeah, I'd 
just say, would it be okay to regulate this space and to make some decisions? And 
some of us will take a more aggressive approaches to things. You shouldn't be able to 
tell them the basis. So um, I'll have a conversation and say actually is quite good for the 
government to be able to talk about, you know, child benefit application forms to people 
have just had a baby. Maybe that's okay. I think it's so when government does things he 
kind of needs to grant yourself permission for specific sorts of incidents. That's nice. 
 
Jim Killock: (​01:21:32​) 
Explain why the social purpose is important and it also needs to take care but it doesn't 
explain it as well as include. Cause obviously if you've kind of decided to rent the micro 
targets then you might also just fail to notice all these other people over there didn't 
quite fit that profile. Then effectively deny them access to services, not get it. The 
company says, I've got a whole set of balances that one time I did want to just draw 
attention to there is because political data is special category data. I'm just really, 
there's kind of a plexing that people can politically target in the way that you can on 
Facebook. You know, you should sort of just not be something you can do. You 
shouldn't be able to sell your thoughts and labor voter, uh, or that's a liberal democrat. 
She didn't really get to do that. 
 
Jim Killock: (​01:22:18​) 
And the way they way they've done it, this is what we do at my slight to pattern you like 
a page, you know, I'm like delete policy page, Democrat page that and the result is that 
you've made public information about political beliefs because these are public pages 
and who likes the Paisley, the public and that face we get to weighing all these issues 
with consent. So you've agreed to broadcast your political opinions. I would really like to 
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know Facebook's justification on that because um, again, that just does not seem how 
data protection should work. You should be, it should be up to you who gets to know 
your political beliefs and you deliberately share that. That's just kind of gone out the 
window the way that these things, some micro-targeting 
 
Stephen Kinnock: (​01:23:06​) 
things. And then sort of further to that, you know, if you're making inferences about 
people's political beliefs from other factors, again, the lawfulness and Asco. So there's 
some really huge question fed around GDPR. Thank you very, very much. I think that 
was from me that yes, we've heard so much of what you said is complemented really 
well. The other evidence you've taken to any concluding remarks you'd like to make? 
Anything you'd like to add? One thing. So let's say that this might seem like an obvious 
statement. I think the current data ecology and the concentration of digital money or sort 
of just expertise or financing for Dubai purchase data between second parties risks are 
really concentrating campaigning power even more so than the rds amongst two big 
parties a, which seems to not make sense. Even we'll add it from around the country. 
There's effectively a four, five way marginal. It's probably said the current environment 
risks not getting the minor parties that fat sheriff campaigning attitude because the data 
collection capability just become so concentrated and the cost is certain concepts. So 
it's a kind of vicious cycle for concentration. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. 





All-Party Parliamentary Group on Electoral Campaign Transparency 
Written Evidence, Responses to Online Questionnaire 
 
In addition to the Oral Evidence found at Appendices A - F, the All-Party Parliamentary Group 
on Electoral Campaign Transparency conducted a call for written evidence through an online 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was open to all members of the public. This document 
contains the unedited responses from that survey. The names and organisations for each entry 
have been included in the interest of transparency. 
 
The text of the questionnaire is found at pp. 2 - 3. It indicates which question each response 
corresponds to. 
 
Note: The second response from Professor Justin Fisher, Brunel University London was 








From your/your organisation’s perspective, WHAT are the top issues we should be aware 
















From your/your organisation’s perspective, HOW would you propose dealing with the top 

















If not previously addressed, do you have specific thoughts on the below four proposals? 
Provide the Electoral Commission with the resources they need to promptly investigate 
and prosecute those who break electoral law with specialised electoral offence officers. 
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Fines for electoral offences should be unlimited rather than a maximum of £20,000, which 




Report campaign spending online. Even candidate campaigns should be required to 





End financial transfers from the designated campaign. ​The Electoral Commission’s 
current rules in a referendum allow the designated campaign to give up to £700,000 to 




Ensure parity between political offline and digital advertising in the election period. This 
includes creating an online repository of all digital ads, enforcing imprints on digital ads 










1. Mr Thomas Marechal 
 
Response A City council 
Response B  
Response C  
Response D All citizens should be able to votes 
Response E  
Response F  
Response G  
Response H  
Response I  
Response J Yes 




2. Mrs Helen Salmon, Bristol for Europe 
 
Response A Very important issue as the 2016 EU referendum was not transparent. I was also very 
concerned that EU citizens who were entitled to vote in recent elections were denied 
the vote 
Response B There has to be effective deterrence for those who deliberately flout the rules. The 
current system seems to be very slow. 
Response C Sadly our recent elections have been compromised so more rigorous independent 
monitoring may now be necessary. 
Response D Clear published guidelines. Clear procedures for infringements. Chance for those 
entitled to vote on the on the day to ask fir guidance and clarification. 
Response E Stronger penalties for deliberate and sustained fraud. 
Response F Trial the use of monitors at key polling stations 
Response G  
Response H This is vital as the misuse of online platforms unfairly influenced the 2016 referendum. 
Response I This also happened in 2016 
Response J  
Response K  
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3. Francesco Gianni 
 
Response A Undeclared sources of funding. 
Response B Punishment need to make breaches unattractive, at the moment the advantages of 
winning an election far outstrip the disadvantages of getting caught for example 
breaking electoral law. 
Response C Sufficient resources should be dedicated to monitor parties/grassroot movements 
behaviours. 
Response D Ensure all funding is traceable, no grassroots/pressure group should be allowed to 
operate unless sources of funding are declared. 
Response E Campaigning of any kind from a group not complying with the requirement to declare 
funding sources should be prohibited, and made a criminal offence. Every organisation 
must nominate a responsible person whose role is to ensure transparency. To ensure 
proper deterrence punishment must include the exclusion of groups/parties/individuals 
from future elections, and the annulment of a past vote. 
Response F Breaches should be easy to identify as likely members of the public will flag them up. 
Resources need to be made available to investigate reports and discard false 
positives. 
Response G Deterrence must include, for more serious cases, criminal prosecutions and annulment 
of election results should significant breaches be discovered after a vote has taken 
place. 
Response H Also sources of funding need to be declared. 
Response I  
Response J  
Response K  
  
7 
4. Ms Sapphira de la Terre 
 
Response A funding for the referendum... there seems to be one scandal after another which is just 
swept under the carpet. If the referendum had had a large majority then I might not 
object, but with only 52-48, I think it needs to be looked into. If the Brexit camp had 
been more transparent and honest about funding I doubt they would have won. 
Response B  
Response C  
Response D I think there needs to be an enquiry to look into what actually happened, and then a 
legal decision made about whether the referendum was actually lawful. 
Response E  
Response F  
Response G I agree with this. £20,000 is not enough of a deterrent for large corporations 
Response H Definitely 
Response I Yes 
Response J Yes 
Response K Just that this should have been looked into already. 
  
8 
5. Dr William Tobin 
 
Response A It should be very clear who has financed all electoral advertising material 
Response B The Electoral Commission requires bite, and must act quickly 
Response C The Electoral Commission requires bite, and must act quickly 
Response D Laws & active investigators 
Response E Laws & active investigators 
Response F Laws & active investigators 
Response G Exactly. The fine should have deterrent maximum - at least equal to the amount spent. 
And electoral agents and candidates should be personally responsible fpr misdeeds by 
their campaign. 
Response H Absolutely. 
Response I Coordination is very difficult to prove, so transfers should be prohibited. 
Response J Good idea. Good luck, though. 
Response K Also needed is a fair franchise, something which is sorely lacking. For example, some 
7 million directly-affected people were not allowed to vote int he 3016 referendum - 
absolutely shameful. (When I started a petition to Parliament about this in 2016, I 
estimated 5½ million excluded voters, but the Cabinet Office has since produced an 
increased estimate: http://bit.ly/2cn7hrO ) 
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6. Mr Robert Jenkins, I am a registered elector 
 
Response A  
Response B  
Response C  
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G The EC seems to be lacking in most things - not just money, not just people of 
expertise and influence, but most of all in POWER. It has virtually NONE. 
Whereas in pre social media days people worried about personation in elections (as if a 
few dozen people voting in place of others could make a difference in any but the 
tightest of marginal seats!), these days the problem is malign influences from (usually 
external/foreign) powers seeking to subvert the true intentions of bona fide electors. We 
are talking about covert and very large scale interventions, which are on a par with 
what might have been achieved in the past only through military means. 
To stay ahead of these, the EC needs at the very minimum its own police powers, in 
my view. There should be no wondering (years after the alleged infraction of electoral 
procedure) whether the CPS might have enough evidence to prosecute. Instead there 
should be instant arrest by Electoral Police Officers on suspicion of involvement with 
actions aimed at the subversion of electoral procedure. 
Such subversion should be treated as equivalent in severity to the crimes of perjury or 
perversion of the course of justice - and the sanction imposed should be multiplied in 
severity according to the number of people in the electorate affected, up to and 
including the UK electorate as a whole. 
There seems to be a concern about the level of fines to be imposed. I don't think 
criminals involved in such crimes are bothered by fines - no matter what the level. I 
would make such offences subject to lengthy terms of imprisonment. Criminals who 
seek to manipulate democratic processes are seeking to deprive the electorate of their 
freedom to influence the political process. Such criminals should by the same token be 
deprived of their freedom as citizens - period. What is happening is already on a par 
with a third world war using the vastly hyped-up propaganda tools of disinformation, 
rapidly conveyed via social media to largely ignorant and unsuspecting masses. It is 
essential that counter measures to combat this must be commensurate with the degree 
of large-scale international cyber criminality being executed by people who, let's face it, 
are the political equivalent of big-time mafiosi. 
Response H Self-evident. 
Response I No further comment. 
Response J Yes. 
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Response K All these proposals are well and good, and though I realise my proposals are outside 
the terms of reference of the APPG in this case, I do think it is impossible to come to 
realistic conclusions about what are essentially mere procedures without also 
addressing wider issues of the current political context that have been highlighted by 
the massive car crash that was the Brexshit referendum - so I will put forward my 
proposals anyway. 
Electoral reform - yes - but not without complete and utter bottom to top 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM aimed at granting much greater and much more 
effective powers to AND PROTECTION OF electorates. 
I have been a voter for 50 years. I have NEVER EVER voted for a party that I wanted. I 
have always voted for the least worst option. This is NOT democracy. 
I regard myself under the current constitutional crisis not even as an enfranchised 
citizen, but as a hostage to forces over which not even the UK's elected parliament has 
adequate control. THIS IS UTTERLY WRONG. 
What I want: 
>>Abolish the House of Lords, the monarchy and the honours system (except for 
community service) Westminster Palace to be re-opened as a Museum. 
>>Introduce proportional representation for all elections 
>>Introduce compulsory voting and an option in every election of None Of The Above. 
>>Recall of elected representatives under agreed circumstances should be possible at 
any time. 
>>MPs should work for their electorate and no other employer. 
>>Move the House of Commons to another location outside London 
>>Introduce parliamentary procedures (include non-adversarial layout of the chamber 
and electronic voting) that are fit for purpose in the 21st century 
>>Broaden democratic discussion and involvement by the adoption of citizens 
assembles, especially for more contentious issues (Brexshit) and issues of conscience 
>>Find new ways of rewarding through commendation the participation of ordinary 
people in democratic processes. 
>>Massive increase in funding for education about constitutional matters. and 
democratic and political processes at all levels in society from primary school up to and 
including MPs. 
>>All to be encapsulated in a WRITTEN CONSTITUTION and monitored by a 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. 
YES to electoral reform. But let's not just tinker at the edges. 
If we do not instigate much more thorough-going CONSTITUTIONAL reforms - and 
SOON - then we should not expect democracy to even survive let alone be enhanced. 
REFORMS SUCH AS THESE ARE LONG LONG LONG OVERDUE! 




7. Dr Mike Campbell, Private citizen 
 
Response A Since confidence in politics generally is at a low ebb, transparency is imperative as it 
must be the bedrock upon which renewed trust in the political and electoral process is 
built. 
Response B Given the decision not to prosecute Boris Johnson MP over his deliberate (knowing) 
use of the claim that the UK pays the EU £350 million a week, the unscrupulous can lie 
with impunity. These lies were stated in all media (digital as well as traditional) and in 
public meetings. Unless our leaders (in Mr Johnson's case, perhaps a different term 
might be more appropriate) abide by an unwritten code not to knowingly spread false 
information and to uphold the standards that the public rightly expects of our politicians, 
then some form of criminal sanction should be available when such breaches come to 
light. The democratic process is not a game, cheating is not OK if you don't get caught. 
A sanction of a criminal penalty, or being dismissed as an MP might be sufficient to 
improve the integrity of our political environment. It is plain from Johnson's behaviour 
and disclosures about the conduct of Leave, Cambridge Analytical and so on that the 
current system of a "gentlemen's agreement" to play by the rules is not working. Many 
members of the public lack the sophistication to question what they see online and 
believe that the internet is a bastion of truth. This has been expoloited by the 
unscrupulous is the knowledge that it is a zero risk game for them: this must stop. 
Private individuals, businesses and organisations must be open to sanctions if they lie 
online - at least to the extent that defamatory statements and falsehoods could be 
punished currently under libel or slander laws. Unless their is strong deterrence, your 
group is wasting its time. I would suggest that you convene a small working group of 
legal experts to look into what might be done, in parallel with this groups work. 
Response C The internet is vast and cannot be effectively monitored. Therefore, you need to 
establish a kind of ombudsman service where people with concerns can flag them up to 
a body which will evaluate them - this body must either have the power to take 
sanctions or be readily able to recommend that further action be taken by a competent 
body if the situation warrants it. 
Response D The work of APPG can be delineated online such that interested parties can see what 
is being done/proposed. In a campaign such as Brexit, actors could be required to cite 
source information to back up their claims (as I would do when authoring a scientific 
paper). These sources can be provided as hyper-links online. The absence of 
confirmatory links (or use of bogus links) would be easy to spot by interested observers 
in the general public. APPG should take advantage of the fact that there will be 
thousands of interested individuals willing to help scrutinise future claims and 
statements - one example of this type of thing is an online document which uses 
specific sources to show that Mr Johnson has made diammetrically opposed claims on 
the merits of being in the EU - it readily shows if not his mendacity then the flexibility of 
his deeply held views. 
Many, many people will be willing to help police the behaviour of politicians and interest 
groups should you provide the effective tools to allow them to do so. 
Response E It is one thing to offer an opinion, it is quite another to lie about factual matters. If trust 
in politics and the media is to be re-established, the telling of deliberate falsehoods (not 
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errors or opinions) must be susceptible to significant sanctions which are proportionate 
to the gravity and scale of the offence. The powers of the electoral commission must be 
greatly increased if they are to police this area. 
Response F As noted above, engage the public. Make reporting of infractions a simple process, but 
ensure that there is an output. Make the required standards of conduct clear to all 
interested parties. 
Response G In many circumstances, money is no object (let us assume that there was Russian 
state involvement in the Brexit vote). Consequently, it must be possible to set custodial 
sentences for significant breaches and a clear chain of responsibility must also be 
established - this could include fines to organisations such as Facebook if they allow 
false information to be continued to promulgate online once they have been notified of 
it by (say) the EC. Such fines must be uncapped because of the financial resources of 
such internet players. Equally, whilst FB cannot police all information on its site, it could 
be placed under a responsibility to investigate and inform the EC should its users flag 
abuse to it. It is therefore imperative that what is and is not permissible is clearly stated 
and understandable. 
Response H Absolutely. However this must also include " a million gifts of £25" just as much as a 
single gift of £25! In a digital age, the restrictions on campaign funding can easily be 
flaunted by making multiple donations below the threshold - both are of equal 
importance. With online donations (of any value) it could be required to record the IP of 
the donor. This is problematic with donations via banks, of course. 
Response I The EC should look more closely at whether such organisations are genuinely 
independednt in the first place! However, there is no logical justification for one 
campaign to fund a rival (althoug allied campaign), so make it illegal. 
Response J Digital advertising is significantly more important than traditional print media advertising 
- legislation must reflect this. It must be under regular review as digital media is in an 
almost constant state of flux. 
Response K I applaud your valuable initiative and am happy to help in any way that i can. 
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8. Mr John Leonard, N/A 
 
Response A Who is paying for political advertising 
Response B The toothlessness of the EC 
Response C That social media is almost impossible to monitor, therefore some certification of online 
content is necessary, plus a massive public awareness campaign (even that will only 
go part way there) 
Response D Attatch some sort of digital certification (cryptographic signature) to all official political 
ads and tie that back to payments. Make small payments subject to the same laws as 
larger ones (down to say £10). 
Response E Vastly boost the powers of the Electoral Commission - it is worse than useless at the 
moment and quadruple fines (or more) so it's no longer thje cost of doing business. 
Ensure law enforcement acts much more swiftly - have a dedicated task force rather 
than palming things off to the Met. 
Response F Monitoring social media is next to impossible, but bot sites should be taken down as 
soon as they are spottede and social media firms should be made more responsible. 
Requires multilateral coordination. 
Response G Agree 
Response H Agree 
Response I Yes - this whole system needs rethinking ground up for the digital age 
Response J Yes, the problem wil be stopping 'independent' third parties from sidestepping the rules 
though 
Response K Good luck! 
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9. Charlie Fisher, Teignbridge District Council 
 
Response A If a candidate withholds their home address from their nomination paper, they 
potentially still have to include it on their campaign material imprint. Meaning that the 
provision to protect candidate’s anonymity is pointless. 
Response B Nothing to stop students voting twice at the same election. Student could vote at a 
polling station and then receive a postal vote from another authority. People should 
only be allowed to register once, as it takes 5 mins to register online, it’s easy to keep 
re-registering. 
Response C Electoral commission does not check all spending returns from candidates, they may 
only take a random sample. 
Response D Allow a change in the law around imprints so candidates are able to protect their 
addresses. 
Response E Remove the provision that you can be registered at two addresses. 
Response F Electoral commission should be stronger and monitor more. 
Response G Yes 
Response H Yes 
Response I Main campaign should keep their own money. 
Response J Yes but place the imprint on the add so it’s obvious straight away 
Response K  
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10. Miss Monica O’Malley 
 
Response A Campaigning must represent the best interests of the nation, not the vested interests of 
the politicians. 
Response B Prior to further Referenda preparation must be made for either a positive or negative 
vote. This due diligence would spare us from the mess we are currently in. 
Response C Promises made e.g. £345 million to NHS must be real. No false promises or deceit. 
Response D Hold politicians to account to their word. 
Response E Code of Conduct for campaigning. 
Response F  
Response G Yes 
Response H Yes 
Response I Yes 
Response J Yes 
Response K No. Thank you for this opportunity. 
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11. Mr David Ward 
 
Response A  
Response B  
Response C Knowing exactly who is contributing to election campaigning, in terms of both funding, 
staffing and data, and how much is being contributed 
Response D  
Response E  
Response F Clarity of the legal framework; requiring each campaign to give more detailed 
information of funding, staffing and data sources and resources, and more authority to 
the electoral commission and ICO to investigate any non private contribution to any 
campaign. 
Response G strongly agree 
Response H strongly agree 
Response I strongly agree, but would add that significant campaign resources may come from 
outside of the designated campaigns altogether and that these too need to be 
monitored. 
Response J  
Response K I am a client of Hargreaves Lansdown, the investment platform. During the EU 
referendum I received a letter from Peter Hargreaves urging me to vote leave. I'm 
assuming that all his other clients received the same letter. I have no idea whether the 
cost of this letter counted as any contribution, or whether the cost of it was funded by 
Mr Hargreaves himself. I am pretty sure though that he only knew of my address from 




12. Mr Brian Russell Littler-Gordon 
 
Response A photographic I.D. must be presented at polling stations in order to vote. Postal voting 
banned except for Armed forces personnel, and registered disabled people. 
Response B Prison sentences for any form of voter fraud. 
Response C Independent adjudicators at all counting stations, to ensure correct procedures are 
followed. Camera evidence placed above every vote counting table, (to be held for 1 
month in case of discrepancies) 
Response D Drivers license, passport, etc. Random checks by Electoral commission to DWP's on 
registered disabled postal voters, or checks to MOD on serving forces personnel. 
Political parties and affiliated organisations should be banned from collecting and 
soliciting block postal votes. 
Response E Stiff prison sentences for any form of voter fraud. The law must be applied vigorously 
for voter fraud. 
Response F A random police check or presence at voter stations, specifically looking for potential 
voter fraud, tampering, and ID fraud. 
Response G The CPS should be issuing prison sentences for any form of voter fraud, or election 
interference. 
Response H Yes 
Response I Yes 
Response J Yes 
Response K The two biggest factors that are threatening the democratic process in the UK, are (A) 
The media, and (B) the judiciary and the police. I would contend that OFCOM are 
failing to ensure that every political party is receiving a fair and equal amount of air time 
to get their policies over to the public, and that TV reporters and news anchors are 
deliberately wasting a candidates air-time on smear campaign type questions that 
prevent that candidate from getting their parties point across. This is directly interfering 
in the election process and paints a false and biased view to the public. The Electoral 
Commission should have the power to intervene to prevent this from happening. (B) it 
was also found on several occasions that the Labour party, and their affiliated 
organisations were actively lobbying venues (and using the county police forces) to 
close down any events or candidate rallies of the opposition because they deemed it to 
be it "hate speech". This should be a banned practice, because, again this is directly 
interfering in the election process, and should come under the jurisdiction of the 
electoral commission to ensure that "all" candidates receive a fair and equal public 
hearing. In a free and democratic country, every political viewpoint is equally valid, and 
as such, I believe it is the duty of the electoral Commission to ensure that no party 
resorts to the suppression of another parties voice to gain an advantage. That is NOT 
how democracy should work. It is for the electorate to make up their minds, not the 
media or the Police. 
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13. Mr Roger Hurst, Presiding Office for 40 years 
 
Response A Reduce the quantity of posters in Polling Stations. Make all posters clear and add 
colour and graphics to attract people to read them. Print statement on all ballot papers 
stating penalties for fraud and for coercion to commit fraud. Increase penalties to 
include prison sentences. 
Make it mandatory that photographic (passport. driving licence etc) evidence be 
provided to confirm a persons identity together with proof of residence such as a utility 
bill. Make it mandatory that a persons' face must be visible and not obscured by 
anything preventing that, including items worn for religious or cultural reasons. Provide 
Presiding Officers with greater legal powers to prevent the casting of a vote where the 
Presiding Officer suspects fraud or other misdemeanour. 
Ensure all media platforms, including social media, carry clear, informative and 
encouraging messages for voters. Endeavour to educate young people by including 
information about voting in education curriculums. 
Provide media information about the way voting has effected peoples' lives in the past 
as well as how it can in the future. 
Ensure all information includes clear statements of its' source and whether that source 
is independent to any political organisation 
Response B Utilise computer software to monitor statistical anomalies and to provide detail sources 
of such anomalies. Make data available for each Polling station and every counting 
centre. Provide information to Police forces about voting fraud and anomalies so that 
action can be taken. in particular where groups of people or organisations are 
conducting fraud and acting illegally to influence elections. This is especially important 
where such groups could be terrorist groups. 
Response C Require all Presiding Officers and Returning officers to provide feedback on the events 
of the election within their sphere. This to be followed up by face to face interviews if 
the Electoral Commission Officers feel it to be of benefit. 
Encourage voters to raise any specific issue they feel needs addressing, by offering 
them the opportunity to give feedback after they have voted. 
Response D All information concerning the election must include a clear statement of it's source and 
the basis on which it has been provided. 
Response E Penalties for fraud must be stated more clearly and prominently in all communications 
concerning the election. Including electoral publicity as well as the official documents 
and forms. Successful prosecutions must be reported ion all media including the 
various social and internet media. Where fraud has taken place the Electoral 
Commission must have power to require a repeat election and the person/persons 
convicted of fraud together with those who've benefited from such fraud, must be 
prohibited from participation in all future elections. 
Response F When analysing feedback from the professional officers involved in elections, it should 
include reviews of what would help increase voting participation. The feedback from 
voters should be included and schools. educational establishments and non-political 
organisations could also be regularly asked for their views. 
Response G Increased fines are essential as are prison sentences especially where organised fraud 
is conducted by groups and/or organisations. Such sentences must be mandatorily 
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reported in all media so that future fraud is discouraged. 
Response H All expenditure must be declared and this must include expenditure through offshore 
locations such as Gibraltar, Channel Islands etc and companies and organisations both 
UK and foreign based. Media must clearly state where reports and "news" has been 
sourced from any person or organisation contributing to the campaign costs of any 
person in the election. 
Response I This loophole must be closed as it clearly can lead to temptations to avoid declarations 
of expenditure. It serves no benefit to the electorate. 
Response J An effective and necessary action. It must cover all media wherever it's generated. 
Response K I trust that a fairer system will allow many of us who feel disenfranchised for living and 
voting in a "Safe" seat, will lead to all of us in the electorate to be able to effectively 
cast a meaningful vote which gives us a voice in a democratic system. It cannot be 
right that the future of the parliamentary membership is determined by only a small 
number of electors who vote in seats where there is a real chance of proper 
representation. Many people who are entitled to vote, fail to do so as they see little 
point when the outcome in "safe" seats is perceived to be pre-ordained. 
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14. Dr. Steven Ford, private citizen 
 
Response A The root origin of any funding, goods or services that any candidate or party employs 
must be known and the information easily and directly obtained by any person or 
organisation. The transfer of any funding, goods or services through any 
intermediaries, no matter how many layers, must be known. The origins must be 
named individuals and not organisations. The root origin must always lie within UK 
jurisdiction. 
Response B Deterrence will only be truly effective if the candidate(s) is/are directly penalised and 
they must bear ultimate responsibility for the conduct of themselves, their servants and 
agents and their party. Rather than imposing financial penalties on offenders, since that 
would unfairly penalise less well resourced candidates, I offer the suggestion that 
where an offence is detected the candidate should be barred from any and all public 
office, whether elected or not, for life - and that would include involvement in lobbying, 
think tanks or any such contributory or influential role in national or local affairs. 
Response C The very many potential sources of information or complaint need a single point of 
contact to the formal process of investigation. That process must command public 
confidence and should therefore be a genuinely independent statutory body, funded 
from general taxation and whose members should include lawyers, police, security 
services, representatives of the public, ethicists, academics, relevant bodies such as 
ERS, etc. When elections are due the body should be amply supplemented by 
administrative staff though between elections the staffing might be less. 
Response D All parties and candidates must receive and acknowledge receipt of the regulations. 
Response E The penalties must impose genuine severe jeopardy for the candidates or parties. 
The penalties mentioned on the previous page should be noted. 
Any funding which does not have an individually named and verifiable root origin within 
UK jurisdiction will be immediately forfeit to the crown. 
Where a root origin of funding, goods or services lying outwith the UK jurisdiction is 
known or suspected the candidate and party are immediately barred from contention (if 
the vote has yet to occur) until/unless the defect is remedied or the vote involved is 
declared invalid and rerun without the offending candidate or party taking part. 
Response F Please see answer on previous page. 
Response G As mentioned above - I offer the suggestion that non-financial penalties would be more 
effective and more equitable. Financial penalties must never allow the well resourced to 
treat the system with contempt. Eliminating offending candidates and parties from 
elections is easier and more equitable. 
Response H Fully agree. The information to be conveyed in such a way that the ordinary reasonable 
citizen can understand it. 
Response I So long as the root origins of all funding, goods and services is identified the situation is 
OK. 
Response J Should there be a mechanism for detecting and managing indirect or covert influence 
on line? 
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Response K Crucially, I believe, the electorate must be able to readily distinguish between verifiable 
facts, opinions, beliefs, aspirations and intentions. Candidates and parties must mean 
what the say and say what they mean. 
Where information is presented as facts, when the candidate or party knew or ought to 
have known that the information was not objectively verifiable, then there must be 
penalties of sufficient severity to end the behaviour. 
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15. Mr Norman Christie, Individual, Electoral Reform Society 
 
Response A Funding of pressure groups and their leaders. 
Response B Strict allocation of funds from an independent central fund. No private donations to be 
allowed. 
Response C The present monitoring by the Electoral Commission is not sufficient. They were 
unwilling/ unable to investigate discrepancies in the 2016 referendum until pressured 
by groups, ERS, 38 degrees etc. 
These shortfalls are still outstanding, and we are now facing the outcome of an election 
of another Conservative leader of a minority government. 
Response D A permanent independent judicial commission 
Response E Sequestration of funds whilst investigations are carried out. 
Lifetime ban on all party officers regardless if party found guilty. 
Response F A beefed-up electoral commission. 
Response G Yes 
Response H Yes 
Response I Yes, see my suggestion. 
Response J If this cannot be policed properly then ban it. 
Response K No 
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16. Madeline Peasgood, privare citizen 
 
Response A  
Response B  
Response C  
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G I hope this can be achieved 
Response H I hope this can be achieved 
Response I This needs attention 
Response J This needs attention 
Response K I would love to see our electoral system reformed so that we had a good form of 
proportional representation - not one dominated by party lists 
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17. Dr William John Tobin 
 
Response A Extensive reporting requirements, available on-line to the public 
Response B Imprisonment, disbarral (is that a word?) from office, fines; a monitoring body with 
teeth. 
Response C Proactive monitoring, not after the event 
Response D Laws and an enforcement agency 
Response E Laws and an enforcement agency 
Response F Laws and an enforcement agency 
Response G I think being barred from office and imprisonment must be available sanctions too, 
given the seriousness of undermining democratic processes 
Response H And the reporting must be done frequently e.g. every third day during a campaign, and 
must be available to everyone, not just the enforcement authority. 
Response I This is a difficult one, because it is appropriate that there should be coordination 
between different groups supporting broadly the same aim e.g. in a referendum. But it 
is also a way to get around spending limits. On balance, I think we have to prohibit 
money transfers between political groups. 
Response J Absolutely! 
Response K Not perhaps your remit, but the other big issue is gerrymandering. The Cabinet Office 
estimates that some 3½ million British Citizens were unable to vote in the 2016 
referendum because of the 15-year rule. (And then there are ~2.2 million EU citizens 
resident in the UK, and 1½ million 16- & 17-year olds.) This is a large number of 
excluded voters -- much larger than the Leave majority -- most of whom would probably 
have voted Remain. Parliament may have authorized this biased franchise, but as one 
of the excluded whose life has been upended by a decision in which I was not allowed 
to participate I am *absolutely furious*. I look at the UK and I am reminded of a bunch 
of slave owners who have voted to maintain slavery and are asking what the slaves 
could possibly complain about: it was a fair vote mandated by the owners. 
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18. Dr/Mrs Jill Brian, Labour Party, MDU, retired NHS 
 
Response A Vital 
Response B Laws and Increased sanctions 
Response C Electoral Commission 
Response D Every political donation however small should be declared. Fraudulent/illegal donations 
can currently masquerade as multiple small donations which do not have to be 
declared. 
I think all political donations should be declared, not just during elections. 
Response E Electoral Commission needs sufficient resources and staff. Also much greater 
sanctions, including imprisonment. 
Funds from outside the UK should be excluded. 
Response F Political parties should be declaring all donations, not just for elections, as I believe 
they have a grace period after an election has been held which makes a mockery of the 
election result. 
Response G I agree but would add imprisonment as an option. 
Response H I agree but I would add all funds donated, not just at campaign time. 
Response I I agree. At present this can be a way of hiding funds taking the amount over the limit. 
When caught out it is often the wrong person who is penalised ( eg: the young student 
volunteer who is being used) 
Response J I agree . Off-line advertising also needs monitoring for it’s veracity ( eg: £350m per 
week for the NHS) 
Response K A significant number of UK based EU citizens were excluded from the recent EU 
elections. Many work in the NHS & Care Services. They deserve to be represented. 
All young people should receive Citizenship lessons in school as a right, a compulsory 
subject. 
I am pleased that one of my grand-daughters, aged 9yrs had a school trip to 
Westminster. She lives in Sheffield. 
Many young people have strong views about remaining in the EU and when the new 
Tory Leader/Prime Minister is elected I hope that he will agree to a public vote on 
whether the people want to stay in the EU or leave. 
I hope that consideration will be given to lowering the voting age to 16. 
I also hope that changing the FTTP system for General Elections will be considered as 
it fails to represent so many people. It results in anomalies like the Green Party having 




19. Professor Justin Fisher, Brunel University London 
 
Response A Digital imprints; Frequency of reporting 
Response B Review the level of fines available to the Electoral Commission relative to party size 
Response C Regular review of electoral law 
Response D Increase the frequency of donation reporting 
Response E Review the level of fines 
Response F Establish unit to regularly review electoral law 
Response G See attached 
Response H Not practical at candidate level - see attached 
Response I See attached 
Response J See attached 
Response K See attached evidence 
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20. Mr Stephen Priest, Independent  
 
Response A Each individual vote will count without influence or tamper 
Response B Punishment in the form of a deterrent would be not be able to stand again..ever! 
Response C The system is still open to access and corruption. Individual (where possible currently) 
an independent electronic vote, after proof of identity perhaps similar to Airport and 
passport access and control 
Response D Every (as many as possible currently with current technology) vote recorded in real 
time as submitted. This would speed up counting also. Stop outside (exit) canvassing 
of vote information. 
Response E Anyone found cheating lose their right to stand again ....ever! 
Response F Individual electronic vote after Airport style I.D. proof 
Response G It is on the right lines but not harsh enough if actually proven to cheat! 
Response H Without doubt 
Response I OK!? 
Response J Sounds fair enough but some flexibility in the reform should be allowed for continued 
adjustment 
Response K I feel that in this age of false reporting and advertising that if we cannot protect the 
democratic system of voting by the individual and be as sure as the result as possible 
then there is little point in having a democracy. If, however, the accuracy can keep on 
improving to fairer reflect the individual vote than its time also to remove first past the 
post as a system of Government. 
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21. Mr Christopher Tradgett, None 
 
Response A We must have clarity on wheee campaign funds come from - and the vested interests 
behind them. There is too much influence exercised by dubious ‘research’ groups 
funded by God knows who 
Response B Fines for electoral fraud should be truly punitive - in to the £millions 
Response C MUST be independent 
Response D Specious lawsuits and NDAs should be outlawed 
Response E  
Response F  
Response G Agreed 
Response H Agreed - including the original source of funds channeled via ‘research’ groups 
Response I Agree 
Response J Agree 
Response K  
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22. Mrs Maxine CRADDOCK 
 
Response A Funding of campaigners 
Response B More powers to investigate and fine or invalidate result 
Response C More funding for watchdog organisations 
Response D Investigative powers - more due diligence type work - more disclosure 
Response E Bigger fines / disqualification powers 
Response F Proper Funding 
Response G Yes 
Response H Yes 
Response I Not sure 
Response J YES 
Response K  
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23. Ms Jane elizabeth hale, Retired 
 
Response A There is lack of transparency and it seems it is impossible to control the likes of 
Facebook and track and prevent foriegn interference and financing by powerful people 
who haven't got Britain's best interest at heart. 
Response B Those in the position of holding to account and protecting our democratic institutions 
are toothless and I would describe them as complacent.and that includes our politicians 
both in government and opposition. 
Response C Apart from afew brave journalists and whistleblowers and a small select committee,no 
one seems concerned that our democracy has been corrupted,my MP JeremyHunt 
certainly isn't ,neither is our opposition ,I have emailed, written , phoned the Labour 
party and apart from Tom Watson get no reply. 
Response D This needs to be transparent, all details of interference available for all to see,and body 
set up to protect our democracy that acts and has real clout . 
Response E The undermining of our democracy should be a punishable offence with a long prison 
sentence and an enormous fine ,I believe it as bad if not worse than treason. 
Response F A truly independent BBC ,a press that serves the public interest,and the body set up to 
protect our democracy proactive in protecting it ,by educating and informing the public 
as to the implications of a corrupted democratic process,and the value of 
democracy.An ability to hold companies like Facebook Google and PayPal to account 
.Our democracy needs protecting or otherwise, I like many others I know will cease to 
see the point in voting. 
Response G I fear I have lost faith in the Electoral commission,we need a body that has much more 
effective way in protecting something so vital for the future of our country 
Response H YES 
Response I This whole situation is unbelievable if someone wishes to corrupt our democracy they 
will find ways to behave deviously.How naive can we be. 
Response J Yes, but we need a worldwide control of what Facebook Google etc are up to,at least 
the EU is doing something about this situation but as with climate change Britain 
decides to have 3yrs of Brexit madness and does nothing. 
Response K At the the moment I can only describe my feelings as despair,increased tension with 
Iraq ,a racist and narcissist in the White house,the potential of having to accept that 
Johnson is going to be my PrimeMinister, a sixteen year old having to tell the world's 
leaders how urgently we need a climate emergencyand a defunct democracy,I only 




24. Mrs Julia Seiber Boyd, Cambridge Szeged Society 
 
Response A There seems no come back when people are told 1 week they can vote & nothing 
further is required - then on Polling Day find their name crossed off & nobody will take 
responsibility. 
Equally, people living abroad and not in receipt of their Ballot Papers - to whom should 
they make urgent contact to avert the situation experienced my millions on the last 
occasion? 
Response B The penalties for this kind of ineptitude or deliberate disenfranchisement should be 
severe. Nobody yet has even admitted there was a mistake, let alone a concerted 
attempt to deprive people of their vote. 
Response C local parties and Local Authorities should be far more alert to such attempts to skew 
the vote. 
Response D Local Authorities MUST check if any additional forms are required & warn people in 
advance - instead they gave the exactly opposite (and apparently erroneous) 
information. WHY? 
Response E Electoral Registers & eligibility to vote should be made crystal clear months in advance, 
with reminders & sample forms being readily available. 
Anyone found to have been deliberately or very carelessly implemented in the recent 
debacle should be summoned to give evidence as to why the acted as they did? 
why they should not lose their job? 
Response F greater clarity would make this a simple task. 
Response G Agreed - and there should be much greater provision for votes to be called NULL due 
to a) electoral fraud, b) disinformation, c) failure to apply voting rules properly and fairly. 
If Switzerland can do so, the UK should be able to do likewise. 
Response H Yes. And the source(s) of all donations. 
Response I Clearly they did co-ordinate their work/ expenses/ resources to a degree that was 
extraordinary - and what was the ultimate source? 
Response J The Media were also responsible for giving far more time to Farage & Boris (all good 
theatricals no doubt, but certainly not bias free) 
Response K The latest EU Elections outrage must be given a full Judicial Enquiry asap. 
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25. Mrs Belinda Taylor, None 
 
Response A Knowing - and having access to - what is being said/written on and off line by 
campaigners 
Response B Enforcable legal redress to ensure infringers are answerable, including serious fines or 
other penalty 
Response C Given fast-moving internet world, ensure that the law is adequate to meet the need for 
any up-dating 
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G Essential for successful policing of campaigns 
Response H I agree 
Response I This should cease 
Response J I agree 
Response K  
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26. Mr Darren Nelson, Unemployed 
 
Response A Crossovers between government employees and campaign organising 
Response B Ban ALL microtargeted ads. (I have been target of malicious ads) *Neural* 
Response C Campaigns restricted to TV, radio, leaflets, where 100% can be monitored. But now 
tech can microtarget tv's, special independent experts must be collecting info from 
viewers /consumers. 
Response D No microtargeting of ads. No pay-for outside political consultants. All must be done 
within *house*. Registered as a tory/lab/lib/green/ukip registered campaign team. All 
work checked for spending and technique. Tough penalties on breaking electoral laws. 
Simple old fashioned campaigning should be encouraged. US has turned into a circus 
and campaigns never stop. Wasteful. We in UK should lead by example and have the 
most honest campaign rules. Very strict enforcement on deliberate cheating. Those 
who cheat in elections should lose right to be a politician (if proven). 
Response E as above. 
Response F independent monitors picked by all parties. 
Response G agree 
Response H Not online. Use pen and paper. 
Response I agree 
Response J End digital campaigns completely. Restrict to TV, RADIO AND PRESS with restricted 
budgets. 
Response K Yes I reported being subject of an online psyops attack to my local hospital. They 
diagnosed me as having a psychotic episode and held me against my will for over a 
month. They did not believe what the Netflix Film #GreatHack will explain. My computer 
HACKED, my DWP apllications HACKED, my ebay purchases HACKED, my airline 
booking tickets HACKED, my business purchases HACKED, my comunication with 
NSFT mental health HACKED, my correspondence to government complaints 
proceedures, HACKED. I have supplied evidence of this to MP Sandy Martin. A couple 
of years earlier in desperation I phoned Caroline Lucas office and tried to explain. It did 
not help, Caroline's office were still unaware of what was happening at that time. Her 
receptionist said "perhaps you should take the tablets as they told you to". 
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27. Paula Emmerich 
 
Response A Money given by economic interests or lobbys should be fully transparent (ideally 
banned) 
Response B  
Response C  
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G Agree 
Response H Agree 
Response I Agree 
Response J Agree 
Response K When fake/false info has been used and the Commission sanctions this, there should 




28. Ms Helen Rushby 
 
Response A full and detailed information should be available to the public online with facts, impact 
assessments and expert reports on all relevant areas. Campaigns must be truthful, with 
anyone involved open to prosecution if they are not. 
Response B Any MP, candidate or other campaigner should be challenged if they say things that are 
untrue or just made up. If they are proven to be lying they should be disqualified from 
public office for 10 years and made to pay any associated costs resulting from the lies. 
This would prevent Johnson becoming PM and mean he is responsible for all the 
billions wasted on Brexit so far. 
Response C The electoral commission is totally inadequate. Things need to happen in real time for 
monitoring to be successful with ALL methods both online and offline continuously 
monitored and any areas that break the law or mislead the public closed down 
immediately. 
Response D Ensure adequate lead in time for a full and detailed website to be produced to which 
each candidate makes a submission. Publicise the web address widely and make it 
available to those without computers in public libraries and government offices. Extend 
opening hours of all public libraries in the 4 weeks running up to the vote. 
Response E Prosecute media, MPs, candidates, campaign managers or anyone else that puts out 
articles or information that are misleading or simply lies. 
Response F Set up an effective system to monitor all information that is shared with the public both 
online and through all media. Give the electoral commission (or a new organisation) 
more powers and the ability to act quickly. 
Response G Excellent - but fines are not enough. The perpetrators have to be banned from public 
office or running a company for at least 10 years not just fined. Otherwise it is not a 
deterrent to most. 
Response H again it needs to be more than money. It is not just about how much they spend but 
what they say and do. 
Response I This loophole should never have been created - it must go! 
Response J yes absolutely. 






Response A All should be transparent and accountable 
Response B Must be in place and easy to comply with 
Response C Should be done at all times 
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G Agree 
Response H Agree/Should be accessible to all 
Response I Agree 
Response J Agree 
Response K  
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30. Dr Stephen Lunn, Private citizen 
 
Response A Nothing to add 
Response B If deterrence is always a post hoc penalty, some people will always take the risk 
because the prize of winning is worth it. A zero tolerance approach to rule breaking, 
with severe punishment AND the annulment of any result that was achieved in a 
process where rules were broken, is the only way to deter such people. 
Response C Nothing to add 
Response D  
Response E Any transgression of the electoral rules should lead to automatic annulment of the 
result, and re-running of the vote. Without this, the rules are toothless. 
Response F  
Response G Of course. 
Response H Yes. 
Response I Yes. 
Response J Yes. 




31. Mr James Halsall 
 
Response A The funding of political parties. The present system does not seem to be working. 
Response B There is little deterrant in fining parties or individuals with amounts that are out of 
proportion with the funds they apparently use to influence elctions. 
Response C Our present monitoring is related to a bygone time. Comunications are much more 
sophisticated. 
Response D  
Response E Our present system allows for individuals to be subject to criminal law, but the penalties 
should be much harsher. 
Response F To monitor elections in the modern world of mass comunication is extremely difficult. 
Trust is at the heart of the problem. Both from politicians and those monitoring. 
Response G Yes, they should be considerably more. When large amounts of money are 
involved,they should be related to the amount of money used. 
Response H Yes this is a good idea. 
Response I Yes, end financial transfers. 
Response J Yes, this is a good idea. 
Response K The heart of our problem, both in parliamentary elections and referendums is the 'first 
past the post' system. There is no perfect electoral system. As its retention is percieved 
as being in the interest of the major parties I, regretably, dont see this changing. But. It 
is the cause of so much apparent apathy at voting time. A tribal voting attitude is 
inconsistant with producing a legitslature reflecting the make up of the electorate.Our 
present system is byzatine, and related to a fuedal time long gone. The present 
parliamentary problems have illustrated this with a vengeance. We absolutely have to 




32. Mr Wilf Forrow 
 
Response A  
Response B If someone overspends, they obviously aren't short of money, so spending a bit more 
on a fine is no deterrent at all. There needs to be punishment with teeth, perhaps 
including a ban on future political activity for individuals and organisations. 
Response C  
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G Fines are not enough. Overspenders obviously aren't short of money, so spending 
more on a fine is no deterrent at all. There needs to be punishment with teeth, perhaps 
including a ban on future political activity for individuals and organisations, and 
ultimately, nullification of results. In serious cases, they should have the power to 
suspend the offender's campaigning for a period. 
We need a mechanism to punish deliberate lying and fake news. Not just by the 
campaigning groups, but by the media in general. 
Response H This is essential, for transparency and compliance - I don't see how we can avoid it. 
Response I Agreed. 
Response J Agreed. 
The elephant in the room is the press - what's the point in restricting spending when the 
big 4 'political' papers (Mail, Express, Sun, Telegraph) are allowed to print front pages 
that are worth millions every day, with no pretence of balance, or even truth, 
Response K Your brief is much too narrow. 
I support the 'Make Votes Matter - The Good Systems Agreement'. 
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33. Mrs Natasha Prior 
 
Response A agreed 
Response B Agreed 
Response C agreed 
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G  
Response H Agreed 
Response I Agreed 
Response J Agreed 
Response K  
  
41 
34. Dr William Lees 
 
Response A Electoral communications on social media are opaque. There is no obligation to 
disclose who has sent them, or what they contain. 
Response B Fines imposed after an election are not a strong deterrent. Investigations are taking 
months and years to conclude. Deterrence isn't working - fines are just dismissed by all 
parties as a cost of doing business. 
Response C Monitoring is focussed too much on investigation after the event. Powers are split 
between the Electroal Commission and the police. The scope and progress of 
investigation is opaque. 
Response D All electoral communications on social media should be published publicly, along with 
details of who created them and how they were targeted. 
Response E The Electoral Comission should have the power to control and address unlawful 
behaviour during the campaign itself. There should also be much clearer and more 
enforceable rules requiring elections to be re-run where campaigns have been 
conducted unlawfully. 
Response F The Electoral Commission should have much greater powers of investigation in their 
own right. They shouldmonitor and audit campaigns while they are in progress, so that 
breaches can be identified and addressed during the campaigns rather than left to a 
subsequent inquiry. 
Response G The Electoral Commission should have equivalent investigatory powers to the police. 
They should have a duty to audit elections while they are in progress, and deterrence 
should focus on disqualifying participants who break the law rather than after-the-event 
fines. 
Response H Agreed. Online reports should also cover funding. Funding should be reported in 
sufficient detail to demonstrate that it is in line with laws on funding limits and on 
overseas funding. 
Response I The transfer of funds has demonstrably led to abuse and should be prohibited. 
Response J Agreed. This is very important in order to ensure that political statements made online 
are open to public challenge. 
Response K No 
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35. Mrs Geraldine Douglass, Retired 
 
Response A All matters claimed as fact should be backed by hard evidence. Where it is alleged that 
legislation (whether UK or EU directive) requires an outcome the the relevant section of 
the legislation should be identified. Where expert evidence contradicts a claim it should 
be acknowledged. Where statistics are referred to their source should be given. 
Response B Those claiming untruths as fact should be penalised if the error is not immediately and 
widely acknowledged. Failure to so acknowledge or repetition of the untruth should 
result in the the promulgator of the lie being a) fined heavily b) barred from further 
participation in the campaign. 
Response C The powers of the Electoral Commission should be increased. It should also be staffed 
sufficiently so that quick action can be taken. It is pointless having to wait months for 
results as delay prevents remedy of the ill. 
Response D The law of misconduct in public office should be codified and extended. It is too easy to 
say "I was not acting in the capacity/under my duty as a person in public office." Those 
seeking election or promoting a political cause during the period preceding a public 
vote should be held accountable for their lies. It was untrue to say "we send the EU 
£350m a week", or that Manx kippers had to travel with ice because of EU regulations. 
What policy each party means to bring forward to address facts, even if highly 
unrealistic, would not be actionable but basing the suggested policy on factual 
distortion would be. 
Response E As before : penalty fine and debarring from further involvement in the campaign. 
Response F Extension of the Electoral Commissions powers and staffing levels. A readily available 
complaints procedure to which fast response is required. Those asserting that a lie has 
been told should provide evidence of the false statement and also the reference on 
which they rely to show that it was untrue. 
Response G Yes. Additional powers and resources should be made available. I agree that the fine 
should be unlimited and their should be powers to enquire, under penalty for false 
reporting, into the funding of the particular party or person so that a deterrent level of 
fine can be imposed. Nobody knows where the Brexit Party obtained its money or how 
much it obtained or spent. I note that contributions may be from a UK resident person 
or company registered in the UK. That will, I think, cause difficulties for the EC when 
investigating the £25 supporters' donations. The payments were to the company which 
is UK registered so it seems that the Party would have been entitled to receive the 
payments passed on from that company. For that reason I suggest that the powers to 
enquire should include the capacity to investigate the origin of the money and to 
penalise those who sought to evade the current simple rule. 
Response H Yes, possibly. I think it will be difficult to deal with expenditure on social media 
advertising and paid or bot posting. Without the cooperation, enforced by law, of the 
social media companies, such as facebook and twitter, ascertaining how much has 
been spent and by whom will be impossible. Why would one declare an expenditure 
that cannot be discovered? If such companies were also required to provide on line 
information about such payments as they have received it would at least provide an 
opportunity for an assiduous whistle blower to identify omissions of which he was 
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aware. 
Response I Yes. 
Response J Yes. It should be a requirement that the adverting party deposit such material at the 
same time as they release the advertisement. Failure to do so should be an offence. 
Response K A restriction of polls, in the period prior to a vote, to registered polling companies 





36. Mr Matthew R Chadbourn 
 
Response A Sources of funding / lobbying 
Response B Avoiding the proliferation of "dark ads" which marred the Brexit referendum 
Response C Allow political parties or data companies to be prosecuted for ads without transparent 
sources (and, where practical, for false information) 
Response D Funding for ad campaigns to be publicly available, whether by "official" political party 
campaigns or lobby groups such as Emerdata 
Response E Increase maximum fine for political parties breaking electoral law 
Response F Adverts to be submitted for review by a transparency group before publishing 
Response G Agree 
Response H Agree 
Response I Agree 
Response J Agree 
Response K  
 
45 
37. Mr Peter Stanyon, Association of Electoral Administrators 
 
Response A Publication of returns 
Candidates and agent’s election expenses returns, and declarations are held by the 
Returning Officer and made available for public inspection. The Returning Officer and 
their staff effectively act as intermediaries in the regulation of election finance, with their 
employing local authorities meeting the costs incurred. 
We have recommended on several occasions that consideration should be given to 
developing an online facility for the submission of candidates’ election expenses 
returns, with provision for both the candidate and agent to signify secure approval of 
the final return. Such a system should also provide a means for inspecting the returns, 
declarations and associated papers. 
In the Government’s response to our 2015 post-election report ‘Elections and Individual 
Electoral Registration – The challenge of 2015’ when we made the following 
recommendation: 
2015 Recommendation: The UK Government and the Electoral Commission should 
consider developing an online facility for submission of candidates election expenses 
returns with provision for both candidate and agent to give secure approval of the final 
return. It is recognised that this would involve scanning all the receipts relevant to the 
return. Such a system should also provide a means for inspecting the returns and 
declarations, and associated receipts. 
The Government highlighted that the development of such a facility would likely incur 
substantial cost as an online platform would need to be developed, established and 
maintained. However, it was prepared to consider the recommendation further with the 
Electoral Commission, in consultation with key stakeholders such as Electoral 
Registration Officers and political parties. In addition, it should be noted that at a UK 
Parliamentary General Election within ten working days of the 35-day deadline for the 
submission of the expenses returns, Returning Officers are required to publicise in two 
newspapers circulating in their area the availability of the candidates and agents 
election expenses returns for inspection. They must also provide copies of these 
returns to the Electoral Commission, although in practice, the Commission does not 
request all of the documentation in every case. 
In our 2016 post-election and EU referendum report ‘Pushed to the absolute limit: 2016 
– the electoral year never to forget’ we made the following recommendation: 2016 
Recommendation 12-9: That the requirement on Returning Officers to publish the 
availability for inspection of candidates’ election expenses returns in local newspapers 
at all applicable polls be revoked and that Returning Officers be placed under a new 
obligation to publicise their availability on the web. 
The Association remains extremely disappointed as to the lack of progress being made 
on both these recommendations dating back to 2015 and 2016. 
Response B At a UK Parliamentary General Election and other elections, candidates and their 
agents are required to submit an election expenses return and declaration to the 
Returning Officer within 35 calendar days of the election result. It is an offence not to 
comply with these requirements. However, the Crown Prosecution Service has 
continually failed to prosecute in cases where candidates and agents have failed to 
comply. This begs the question whether the current legislation is either relevant or 
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effective. In our 2017 post-election report ‘AEA post-elections report 2017: It’s time for 
urgent and positive Government action’ we highlighted that an urgent review was 
required and, if the requirement to make such returns is maintained in its current or an 
adapted format, it be properly enforced by the authorities. We made the following 
recommendation: 2017 Recommendation – 26: A full and thorough review of the 
processes that deal with the recording of candidates’ expenses should be undertaken, 
including consideration of the return to, and subsequent reporting of, expenses to 
Returning Officers and the possible provision of online reporting and inspection 
mechanisms. 
Response C The Association does not have a view on this proposal as the AEA is not responsible 
for monitoring, however we fully support the Electoral Commission in their monitoring 
role. 
Response D Our responses above outline the recommendations we have made to the UK 
Government over the years which we have repeated below for ease of reference: 
Our 2015 post-election report ‘Elections and Individual Electoral Registration – The 
challenge of 2015’ made the following recommendation: 
2015 Recommendation: The UK Government and the Electoral Commission should 
consider developing an online facility for submission of candidates election expenses 
returns with provision for both candidate and agent to give secure approval of the final 
return. It is recognised that this would involve scanning all the receipts relevant to the 
return. Such a system should also provide a means for inspecting the returns and 
declarations, and associated receipts. 
Our 2016 post-election and EU referendum report ‘Pushed to the absolute limit: 2016 – 
the electoral year never to forget’ made the following recommendation: 2016 
Recommendation 12-9: That the requirement on Returning Officers to publish the 
availability for inspection of candidates’ election expenses returns in local newspapers 
at all applicable polls be revoked and that Returning Officers be placed under a new 
obligation to publicise their availability on the web. 
Response E Our responses above outline the recommendations we have made to the UK 
Government over the years which we have repeated below for ease of reference: 
Our 2017 post-election report ‘AEA post-elections report 2017: It’s time for urgent and 
positive Government action’ made the following recommendation: 2017 
Recommendation – 26: A full and thorough review of the processes that deal with the 
recording of candidates’ expenses should be undertaken, including consideration of the 
return to, and subsequent reporting of, expenses to Returning Officers and the possible 
provision of online reporting and inspection mechanisms. 
Response F The Association does not have a view on this proposal as the AEA is not responsible 
for monitoring, however we fully support the Electoral Commission in their monitoring 
role. 
Response G The Association supports this proposal in light of the need to ensure that public trust on 
elections is maintained. In addition, offences should be made clearer and widened with 
consideration being given to include an offence of electoral interference. 
Response H The Association supports this proposal. 
Response I The Association does not have a view on this proposal. 
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Response J The Association supports this proposal. 
Response K The Association of Electoral Administrators (AEA) would welcome the opportunity to 
work closely with the APPG, UK Government and other stakeholders in progressing the 
recommendations outlined in our response. 
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38. Mr Paul Adams, Somerset Loves Europe 
 
Response A Public access to information. 
Response B Prevent bad practice of sharing funds between campaigns and accepting funding from 
foreign extreme political parties & groups. 
Response C Modernise the voting system and keep it up to date. 
The British political system is crying out for reform. 
I would like to see proportional representation and coalition Government. 
Response D Access to information by the public. 
Response E Prevent malpractice of accepting donations from foreign political parties and/or groups. 
Response F Modernise the British political system; less traditional and more democratic. 
Better representation, perhaps by a proportional representation voting system, leading 
to coalition Government, preventing hung Parliament in the future. 
Response G Agreed. 
Response H Agreed. 
Response I I agree. 
Response J I agree. 
Response K I am very pleased with this initiative because it is what the country needs. 
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39. Joe Mitchell, Democracy Club CIC 
 
Response A Elections campaigns have never been completely transparent. For example, the only 
way we have any significant information on printed election leaflets before the elections 
is through civil society efforts: Democracy Club’s ElectionLeaflets.org tool. Nor will we 
ever be able to monitor what campaigners say on the doorstep. Voters deserve to know 
what candidates are saying, to whom, where they are saying it and how much they are 
spending on saying it. It’s then up to the voters to use that information as they see fit. 
We would urge the APPG to recognise the value of making campaign information (from 
content, targeting and spending) open not just to regulators or the media, but to voters 
themselves, in real-time. The latter must be the case if voters are to be able to use this 
information to guide their decision-making. 
Response B  
Response C The Electoral Commission regularly makes recommendations, but it is not clear to us 
whether government or parliament has any responsibility to respond to, or consider, 
such recommendations. We would be interested to learn how this model compares with 
that of other regulators, such as Ofcom. 
Response D We urge the APPG to consider legislation that would mandate real-time reporting of all 
election communication. When a campaigner sends a mass email, prints a flyer, 
publishes an advert, they should have to send a copy to a central database, linked to a 
candidate, party and area. The owner of the central database must publish those 
adverts and the meta-data in real-time. Then journalists can monitor more easily and 
voters can see exactly what is being said where. This wouldn’t cover one-to-one 
communication. Democracy Club runs ElectionLeaflets.org — a real-time election 
monitoring site that allows volunteers to upload leaflets, because there is no obligation 
for campaigners to record their leaflets. We do this in an effort to increase transparency 
and build a permanent record of election communication across the UK. We would be 
happy to see this project absorbed into an elections watchdog. 
Response E  
Response F  
Response G Fines are only one tool. Bans from participation in future campaigns, bars from public 
office or more serious criminal sanctions may be useful to consider, though care should 
be taken not to dissuade potential candidates/volunteers. 
Response H As we understand it, this information is already reported online. The problem is the 
timing: it happens after the vote. Voters must be able to access information on who 
funds campaigns/candidates before they make their decision. The USA has real-time 
reporting (triggered at certain levels of donation) — we should aim for something 
similar. Again, digital tech makes reporting and publishing extremely easy. 
Response I  
Response J There is no online repository of offline adverts either, so ‘parity’ is the wrong concept 
here. The online repository mentioned should be for all types of mass electoral 
communication, from emails to flyers to billboards to facebook ads and so on. Thanks to 
digital tech, mandatory deposits do not have to be in anyway onerous. The deposit 
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could occur automatically when using (e)mailing software, for example, or enforced at 
the platform end (the printer or social media company) rather than the campaigner end. 
For a very light burden on campaigners / platform-owners, this will produce very useful 
information for voters. 
Response K We would urge the APPG to note the importance of the lack of digital capacity within 
The Electoral Commission. It is now ten years since the UK Government set up the 
Government Digital Service and it has been obvious that digital is transforming every 
element of society and the economy for longer still. The Electoral Commission must 
catch up — perhaps through a ring-fenced budget for a cross-departmental digital team. 
We would also ask the APPG to consider whether there is another existing regulator 
that could take on a greater role here. Ofcom, the British Library (in its role as a 
copyright library) or the Advertising Standards Authority, for instance. 
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40. Mr David Greenlees 
 
Response A Lying to voters 
Response B Instant disqualification from election 
Response C Every election communication should include a link to click to report dishonesty in that 
communication. 
Response D  
Response E  
Response F  
Response G Agreed. The fines should reflect the potential damage of the breach. 
Response H Agreed 
Response I Agreed 
Response J All social media should be banned from displaying all political advertising (not just 
election advertising) until they create a public database of verified advertisers and their 
messages to each specific group of people. 
Response K  
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41. Dr Alan Renwick, Constitution Unit, University College London 
 
Response A Drawing on the report of the recent Independent Commission on Referendums, for 
which I was Research Director, and my own research report, co-authored with Michela 
Palese, on ‘Doing Democracy Better: How Can Information and Discourse in Election 
and Referendum Campaigns in the UK Be Improved?’, I would identify four principal 
concerns. 
First, some advertisements are readily visible only to those to whom they are targeted – 
the problem of ‘microtargeted’ ‘dark ads’. This means that the volume of campaign 
activity may be opaque (both to voters and to regulators), that different sets of voters 
may receive mutually inconsistent messages, and that campaigners cannot properly be 
held to account for the claims they make. While the targeting of different messages at 
different voters has always been part of elections, online campaigning stretches it much 
further. The advertising archives established by Facebook, Twitter, and others begin to 
address this issue but do not resolve it. 
Second, in some cases, advertising is visible, but its source is opaque. This, as you 
know, is because imprints are not required on digital campaign materials. This may 
allow campaigners to lead voters in certain directions without voters realizing what is 
being done to them. 
Third, spending is often opaque. Reporting of donations is sometimes required during 
campaign periods, but the same does not apply to spending. Spending returns are not 
required in some cases until six months after the fact. 
Fourth, donations are also sometimes opaque. While weekly reporting is required for 
general elections, that is not the case for other elections. In referendums, the recent 
practice has been to require reporting every four or so weeks. There is no obvious 
justification for such variation. Why, for example, are donation reports for the European 
Parliament election campaign still not available? 
Response B While this is not the area of my primary expertise, I am aware of at least two problems. 
First, the long time that it takes to conduct investigations means that any punishment 
often seems a distant threat. Second, the Electoral Commission has long argued that 
the £20,000 limit on the fines it can impose is inadequate. Its case for this point is very 
strong. 
Response C Electoral law is spread across many locations and is very out of date. There are often 
inconsistencies (as the point above about different requirements in relation to donations 
for different kinds of elections illustrates). As many others have pointed out, 
rationalization and updating are badly needed. The digital space is developing very 
rapidly, and so processes for ongoing review are also essential. 
Response D First, archives of online political advertising should be regulated. Given that this 
remains a rapidly evolving space, it may be best to do this, at least initially, via 
voluntary agreement between government and tech companies. But ultimately the goal 
should be that the principles underpinning these archives are set by parliament or by a 
body accountable to parliament. In particular, greater information is needed on 
targeting than is currently offered. Assurances are also needed that advertising that 
does not comply with election law is not accepted. 
Second, consideration should be given to how to deal with the fact that campaign 
organizations can now produce many thousands of versions of their advertisements: 
53 
even if all the information is available, such volumes hinder genuine transparency. 
Limits on the number of different advertisements that any one campaign organization 
can issue might be appropriate. 
Third, the extension of imprint requirements to digital campaign materials is clearly 
needed. This was already done for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, and 
lessons can be learnt from that. There are undoubtedly difficulties in deciding exactly to 
what the requirements should apply and what form imprints should take, but the 
Electoral Commission and Cabinet Office have done much thinking on the matter, and 
it is possible to devise a solution that is much better than the status quo. 
Fourth, spending returns should be required more quickly – no more than three months 
after any election or referendum – and the Electoral Commission should be empowered 
to establish detailed requirements as to their content. 
Fifth, donation return periods should be standardized, or any variations between 
different kinds of elections clearly justified. Specifically, if weekly reporting is possible in 
general elections, justification for any deviations from that are needed. 
Sixth, alongside measures designed to increase transparency, greater resources 
should be focused on enhancing voters’ digital literacy skills, so that voters are aware 
of the ways in which they might be targeted, how to find out more, and how to report 
anything they find suspicious. Tech companies might be placed under obligations to 
provide greater guidance for voters, and a digital levy might be used to fund campaign 
work by the Electoral Commission or independent bodies sponsored by the 
Commission. 
Response E The measures above to enhance transparency would help the Electoral Commission in 
conducting timely investigations. The limit on the fines that the Electoral Commission 
can impose should be raised. 
Response F Much work has already been done to identify problems and propose solutions: the 
difficulty is not primarily that awareness of these matters is low, but rather than 
government has failed as yet to act. It is to be hoped that this will change once the 
basic Brexit question has been resolved. There are already some processes for 
ongoing review, notably through the Electoral Commission’s excellent reports on 
elections and referendums. It is likely that fora for ongoing discussion among regulators 
of the digital space and between regulators and tech companies are needed. It is 
important that these should operate transparently: back channels are not sufficient to 
provide confidence among voters, candidates, and campaigners that emerging issues 
are being identified and tackled. There may be a case for increasing the resources 
available to the Electoral Commission for conducting research. 
Response G Changes in these directions would be highly desirable. Whether fines should be 
unlimited or subject to a much higher limit than at present would require consideration. 
Response H These changes would be highly desirable. Reporting of campaign spending should 
cover all forms of relevant spending, including online spending. It should be broken 
down in ways that are relevant to voters and regulators, and that includes detailed 
breakdowns of what has been spent online on what campaign activities targeted at 
whom at what time. 
Response I The important point is that any such transfer should count as spending by the 
designated lead campaigner. 
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Response J These are all vital points. In addition, as noted above, targeting information needs to be 
detailed. In elections, for example, it must be clear if material has been targeted at 
people in particular constituencies. The criteria for targeting should in all cases be 
provided. 
Response K  
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42. Mr Roger Boaden, ECREU Expat Citizens Rights in the EU & British in Europe 
 
Response A  
Response B  
Response C  
Response D The Electoral Commission 
The Electoral Commission (EC) needs a root and branch reform. Thereby ensuring 
there are more opportunities to recruit some key ‘legal’ figures who have the 
qualifications to ensure that any legal actions taken by the EC will stand up to the most 
detailed scrutiny in any Court in the land. It is also clear that the EC does need a boost 
in staffing numbers. I see the need for the EC to have a division which equates to, and 
which possesses, some of the powers of the CPS. 
In existing cases which have been referred to the Metropolitan Police there has been 
criticism of the failure of the EC to provide all the required documentation. If this is the 
case it highlights the weaknesses which exist in the existing structure of the EC. The 
arrival of the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’), which regulates the 
processing by an individual, a company or an organisation of personal data relating to 
individuals in the EU, must be made as the cornerstone of the EC, despite the fact that 
the UK will soon be outside the jurisdiction of EU Law. The GDPR will allow the EC to 
establish some more detailed sanctions and penalties, particularly for large global 
corporations. The individual must be fully protected from any action undertaken by, or 
on behalf of, any large corporation, and the penalties must be of a size which will act as 
a real deterrent to those huge corporations. 
Big Data 
‘Big Data’ is here now, which is why some wealthy individuals and corporations have 
invested substantial sums to own, control, and manipulate data. 
If future elections/referendums continue to be regulated by Central Government, in that 
spending limits are set, there must also be the power to regulate any budgetary 
proposals from the campaign organisations, which can maintain a close monitoring of 
expenditure as it progresses. 
We cannot ignore what has happened in the past, such as during the Referendum 
Campaign, with the manipulation of a number of databases by Leave.EU and Vote 
Leave. Why? Because it is clearly continuing today, and we must examine in detail the 
number of differing organisations who have been using social media to post digital ads 
of rumour, disinformation and fake news onto the accounts of those who reply so 
heavily on social media. Many £millions have been spent since 2016 and continue to 
be spent. 
That expenditure must also be controlled! Why? Simply because the work being done 
right now is providing ideal conditions for developing, testing and proving software and 
systems, thus helping those undertaking that work into a position whereby they can use 
their Big Data in any future General Election or Referendum. There is then the question 
of the sources of the money which fuels that expenditure, and inevitably, we are forced 
to look across the Atlantic, and where so many right-wing think tanks, in particular, are 
suspected to find their funding. 
I would site two examples which cause me considerable concerns. First, is the daily 
publication of digital ads under the banner of Leave.EU, which continues to operate 
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under the control of Arron Banks from his Bristol HQ. He has quite openly been 
pursuing entryism into Conservative Associations, and an oft-stated desire to undertake 
the de-selection of a range of Conservative MPs. 
During the Referendum Leave.EU developed a database, using the systems, 
operations, and staff of Eldon Insurance, and it is now clear that customers of 
GoSkippy Insurance, were used to provide elements of the build for that database. A 
separate company owned by Arron Banks is Big Data Dolphins, with Liz Bilney as the 
CEO, operating from the same building as GoSkippy. Liz Bilney was the CEO of 
Leave.EU and is clearly a long-time confidante of Banks. 
Arron Banks was very open about ‘using’ the submission made to Leave.EU by 
Cambridge Analytica, to develop his own ‘database of truth’, with Eldon Insurance 
actuarial experts undertaking the systems’ development work for him. He did that in 
close a relationship with Gerry Gunster of the US company Goddard Gunster, who has 
clearly maintained that close working relationship, since Andy Wigmore, Banks’s ever 
present partner in crime, is in regular contact with Gunster, meeting him in the past few 
weeks in London. 
The Electoral Commission should have the power to investigate all the work currently 
being done by Leave.EU and Arron Banks from his Bristol HQ. 
Second, I think the Electoral Commission must investigate The Brexit Party. The 
sudden ‘launch’ and rapid growth of financial ‘supporters’ is, in itself, highly suspicious. 
There is no way such large audiences could have been brought together at such short 
notice without there having been a substantial campaign of digital ads, and emails to 
the database which Nigel Farage clearly possesses. When one examines indisputable 
facts you find that the ‘new’ Brexit Party has been 3 years in the making, when Nigel 
Farage walked away from UKIP declaring he would be back. Then the six possible 
domain names for The Brexit Party were first registered in August 2016. And, The 
Brexit Party Ltd was registered with Companies House on 23 November 2018. 
So, this idea, perpetrated by Nigel Farage that his ‘new’ Party was a bit like a ‘pop up 
shop’, is frankly far from the truth! Therefore, when one examines these simple facts, it 
is possible to appreciate that much work went into the creation of the ‘new’ Party, which 
given the razzmatazz associated with the launch and with subsequent Rallies, involved 
a great deal of financial support. 
That in turn raises important questions about the source of that finance. It clearly did 
not come from the 100,000 supporters Nigel Farage claimed having launched, since 
there had been a lot of preparation beforehand. Even if you are a one-man band with 
no controlling committees, which is what both Arron Banks and Nigel Farage have 
called for, it is simply not possible to mount the level of marketing and publicity that this 
supposed ‘new’ Party was able to do so quickly. Take for example, the appearance of a 
logo and all the supporting materials which have been produced. 
So where did the finance come from? Was it all from Arron Banks and Richard Tice, 
using their £millions up front for Nigel? Or were there other sources? It is critical to 
know this now, before this ‘new’ Party gets into a General Election Campaign. It is 
important because the establishment of The Brexit Party probably comes from a large 
scale use of data. The most obvious would be the use of the database which we know 
Arron Banks created in Bristol from Eldon Insurance and GoSkippy Insurance, plus the 
fact that both of them would have retained a copy of the UKIP database. 
This, however, highlights how Big Data is created. The Banks’s company Big Data 
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Dolphins, will by now have added so many data points to, for example, both the UKIP 
membership, and any electoral registers they have purchased, that the database now 
will be of their own creation. That enables them to store the re-worked database and 
scrap the original databases from which they have constructed the new database. 
GoSkippy has about 1.75 million customers, and it is rumoured that they were all 
invited originally to support Brexit. 
We must not forget that political ads in non-broadcast media whose principal function is 
to influence voters in local, regional, national or international elections or referendums 
are exempt from the Advertising Code. It is essential therefore for there to be work 
done to establish a code for political ads in non-broadcast media, given the levels of 
rumour, misinformation and fake news which have been used. 
The Electoral Commission has stated: 
‘Campaigners can use digital and social media tools to direct their messages to the 
people they most want to reach. Campaigners use the personal data they and social 
media platforms have to target voters. They target voters based on demographic 
factors like age and gender, on their interests and on their physical location. This is 
often called ‘micro-targeting’ because campaigners are able to send messages tailored 
to specific groups of voters based on this information. They can also adjust the 
messages they send very rapidly, to take account of what seems to work best with 
particular groups or individuals. 
‘Only the voter, the campaigner and the platform know who has been targeted with 
which messages. Only the company and campaigner know why a voter was targeted 
and how much was spent on a particular campaign. This is why the term ‘dark ads’ has 
been used to describe micro-targeting, although it is perfectly legal.’ 
For me, this sums up the problem for which we need an urgent solution. 
Response E Spending Online 
The revelations by the DCMS Select Committee have shown in stark reality the degree 
to which ‘dark money’ has become synonymous with ‘darks ads’. Micro-targeting - that 
is micro-targeting via the social media - imported by a British company from the US, 
backed by substantial sums of US money, has been shown as the single most 
influencer of the Referendum Campaign. In the 80s and the 90s I had worked with 
Experian to develop micro-targeting, but what I learnt then does not begin to compare 
with what the advent of social media enables any company or organisation to do now. 
Dominic Cummings, who was the Campaign Director for Vote Leave, backed up by 
Thomas Borwick the Vote Leave Chief Technology Officer, has provided evidence that 
they posted 3 Billion digital ads onto the social media accounts of 8 Million British 
electors. They started on day one of the ‘official’ campaign, but half of the ads went out 
in the final 3 days. Leaving aside any of the fines and reports for criminal investigations, 
that is an almighty number of digital ads used to persuade, what Cummings had called 
‘The Persuadables’ to vote Leave. 
When you link those figures to what the Electoral Commission said: Only the voter, the 
campaigner and the platform know who has been targeted with which messages. Only 
the company and campaigner know why a voter was targeted and how much was 
spent on a particular campaign, we have to recognise the urgent need to find 
mechanisms which will regulate, and if necessary control the content of what is posted 
hour by hour. 
The unsuspecting ‘targets’ must be protected from rumour, disinformation and fake 
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news. Full details to be found on this site: 
https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/report/?source=archive-landing-page&country=G
B 
For example, three organisations, which are not political parties, spent £1.325 million 
on digital ads with Facebook in the ten months to 23 July 2019. 
Two of the organisations could broadly be described as anti-Brexit, People’s Vote 
(£472,842) and Best for Britain (£428,401) and both have a detailed background which 
can be verified. The third, is a shady organisation which is very pro-Brexit, and appears 
to be controlled by one individual, called Tim Dawson. This is Britain’s Future 
(£423,835). 
By contrast the three main Parties spent £639,000 in the same ten month period. 
Conservatives (£188,239); Labour (£170,256); and LibDems (£280,338). Clearly some 
of Party expenditure was spent on achieving contacts for the 23 May European 
Parliament Election, and presumably that expenditure will appear in the accounts the 
Parties will submit to the Electoral Commission. It is important to note that at the 
beginning of this year The Guardian carried an article about Britain’s Future, and this is 
what appeared in that article. ‘Dawson did not respond to multiple requests for 
comment on whether he is subsidising its activities himself, whether he is relying on 
public donations, or whether there is another financial backer. He is the only public 
individual associated with the group.’ 
The Guardian article went on: ‘Many of the adverts placed by Britain’s Future use 
localised targeting to a greater degree than Vote Leave did in the 2016 EU referendum 
campaign and are designed to encourage members of the public to send messages to 
politicians who are making up their mind on which side to back in Tuesday’s crunch 
Brexit vote in the House of Commons. 
‘Facebook introduced new rules on political advertising transparency at the end of last 
year after a series of scandals associated with the 2016 US presidential election and 
the EU referendum. They require all political advertising to be labelled, to be placed in 
a public archive for seven years, and for those placing the adverts to verify they are 
living at a UK postal address. 
‘However, the new rules do not force an advertiser to declare the ultimate source of the 
money for any political campaigns, meaning it is simple to place adverts with minimal 
transparency on who is ultimately picking up the tab.’ 
Britain’s Future does not appear in the FacebookAdLibrary Report for the past 90 days, 
which rather neatly has avoided the need to register with the Electoral Commission. So, 
someone decided it was appropriate to spend getting on for half a million pounds to get 
across pro-Brexit messages - no reporting, no presenting of accounts, no evidence of 
funding. Britain’s Future has to be properly regulated in future! 
The rules which apply to political parties should also apply to any organisation which 
enters the political arena with online digital advertisements which go into the social 
media. They should be registered and should be accountable for the sources of their 
finance, and for the expenditure which they undertake. 
Response F Strengthening digital campaigning laws. 
Digital campaigning laws must be strengthened. We need a root and branch reform of 
the laws which exist. However, I believe this needs to be carried out alongside a major 
reform for all electoral law. It is now clear that digital advertising has become the major 
tool being used by some political Parties as the primary tool for their campaign plans. 
59 
This has lead to the entry into the campaigning environment of a number of 
organisations which are not directly related to registered Parties. 
I can do no better than to direct you to a number of key paragraphs from the final report 
of the DCMS Select Committee - Paragraphs 211 to 217 inclusive. 
Response G I agree 
Response H I agree 
Response I I believe there needs to be some very strict rules concerning all expenditure. 
Response J The FacebookAdLibrary already provides us with spending on Facebook digital ads. 
We need there to be a National repository. 
Response K The comments I have included here are my own. They, in part represent issues 
discussed within both ECREU and BiE, but they do not represent a view, or policy 
decisions of either organisation. I am a founder member of ECREU, and a member of 
the Steering Team of BiE. 
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43. Privacy International 
 
Response A Privacy International believes that transparency of digital advertising and online political 
campaigning is fundamental to ensure free and fair elections in the modern age. 
Political campaigns around the world have turned into sophisticated data operations. 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal, while not unique, raised awareness about the 
potential impact of the combination of profiling, micro-targeting and powerful machine 
learning on electoral processes. 
Privacy International has documented how online targeted advertising is facilitated by a 
complex and opaque ecosystem that includes AdTech companies, data brokers, and 
other third-party companies that track people on websites and apps and combine this 
data with offline information. Profiling and data-driven targeting techniques used by the 
broader digital advertising industry are increasingly deployed in the political 
campaigning context, with various companies offering specific services tailored to the 
election context. In the UK, the Information Commissioner's report Democracy 
Disrupted 
(https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259369/democracy-disrupted-110718.pdf) 
and updates to the DCMS Committee in July 
(https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2259371/investigation-into-data-analytics-fo
r-political-purposes-update.pdf) and November 
(https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-use-of-data-
analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf) 2018 reference a number of such 
companies. 
Companies and political parties are subject to the principle of transparency under 
Article 5 of GDPR and under a duty to provide information to those whose data they 
process (Article 13 and 14 of GDPR) as well as information as how it has been 
processed and to provide access to it (Article 15 of GDPR). To date, there is a long 
way to go in terms of their compliance with these provisions (as PI highlighted in 
submissions ( 
https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/2426/our-complaints-against-acxiom-criteo-eq
uifax-experian-oracle-quantcast-tapad ) to the ICO and other data protection authorities 
about a number of companies in the data broker and ad tech sector). GDPR is only just 
over a year old and still in the early phases of enforcement. More needs to be done to 
ensure that all actors pro-actively implement and respect these obligations. 
Transparency at every level must be proactive and up to date. Adequate information 
should be provided to voters explaining why they are receiving a particular message, 
who is responsible for it, and how they can exercise their rights to protect their data and 
prevent being targeted. Such transparency should not be limited to advertising, but also 
include the delivery of other content, such as the methods of curation, filtering, pushing, 
and recommendation of content. Transparency to individuals about why they are 
seeing a particular message must be accompanied by transparency by political parties 
and campaigns of the tools and services they are using, as well as their messaging. 
This includes providing much more information on the sources of data, what is being 
done with that data, who is being targeted with what messages and what companies 
are being contracted and for what services, such as a campaign software, consultancy 
services etc. 
Political parties and other political actors should, as a minimum: 
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• ensure that the public can easily recognise political messages and 
communications as well as the party, foundation or organisation behind them. They 
should make available on their websites and as part of the communication, information 
on any targeting criteria used in the dissemination of such communications. 
• be transparent as to the third parties they contract with as part of their 
campaigns both to obtain data and to further process data, including profiling and 
targeting, such as data brokers and political advertising companies together with those 
that provide consultancy services and software. 
Companies that are hosting or distributing political advertising must, at a minimum, 
disclose information as to: 
• how political advertising and social 'issue-based' advertising is defined; 
• number of impressions that an ad received within specific geographic and 
demographic criteria (e.g. within a political district, in a certain age range), broken down 
by paid vs. organic reach; 
• targeting criteria used by advertisers to design their ad campaign, as well as 
information about the audience that the ad actually reached; 
• information about ad spend per political actor; 
• information about microtargeting, including whether the ad was a/b tested and 
the different versions of the ad; if the ad used a lookalike audience; the features (race/ 
ethnicity, gender, geography, etc.) used to create that audience; if the ad was directed 
at platform-defined user segments or interests, and the segments or interests used; or 
if the ad was targeted based on a user list the advertiser already possessed. 
Recently, a variety of transparency tools have been developed, including extensions 
which users can add, such as WhoTargetsMe or recently in Argentina Publi Electoral 
(https://publielectoral.adc.org.ar/) , and ad archives by major platforms. These 
responses are important in terms of the information that is provided to individuals and 
also the information that can be gathered for the purposes of research and scrutiny. 
The ad archives are a work in progress and there remains much to be done. It is still 
unclear how they apply across the world and researchers have faced difficulties 
(https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/04/29/facebooks-ad-archive-api-is-inadequate/) 
despite setting out some steps that could be taken to make the ad archives more 
effective 
(https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/03/27/facebook-and-google-this-is-what-an-effective-
ad-archive-api-looks-like/). Furthermore, despite political parties and campaigns being 
required to provide certain information as noted above, privacy policies where at least 
some level of transparency could be provided without reliance on third parties, also to 
do not provide enough details. For example, see our analysis of the Conservative party 
leadership campaign 
(https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3019/how-uk-conservative-leadership-race-la
test-example-political-data-exploitation). Further transparency was also a key part of 
the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation 
(https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2824/european-parliament-elections-prot
ecting-our-data-protect-us-against). 
Privacy International recommends that the APPG map out such tools and efforts, in 
consultation with those regulators already considering this issue, including the UK ICO 
and the Electoral Commission as well as civil society and researchers. 
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Response B The GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 ("DPA") already provide the UK with tools 
to begin to tackle some of the issues of concern to the APPG. Privacy International 
encourages measures to support the enforcement of this regulatory regime. In theory, 
data protection law in the UK strengthens the rights of individuals with regard to the 
protection of their data, imposes more stringent obligations on those processing 
personal data, and provides for stronger regulatory enforcement powers. In practice, 
just over one year on, a lot more still needs to be done and changes are only starting to 
take place. 
Privacy International has identified three main shortcomings related to the 
deterrence/enforcement legal framework in the UK. 
First, the DPA contains exemptions for political parties that threaten to undermine 
protections. Paragraph 22 of Schedule 1 of the DPA 2018 permits political parties to 
process personal data “revealing political opinions” without the need for consent. 
Privacy International and other organisations expressed serious concerns about this 
loophole during the drafting the DPA 2018, and we called (so far to no avail) on all main 
UK political parties to publicly commit not using the exemption provided in the law to 
target voters - both online and offline - in all local and national forthcoming elections or 
by-elections ( 
https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/2032/privacy-international-asks-major-uk-
political-parties-commit-not-using-legal ). A similar provision in the Spanish data 
protection law has since been declared unconstitutional 
(https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/NotasDePrensaDocumentos/NP_2019_076/Pres
s%20Release%20No.%2076.2019.pdf) and another in Romania is the subject of a 
complaint to the European Commission 
(https://privacyinternational.org/news/2735/romanian-ngo-files-complaint-european-co
mmission-national-implementation-gdpr ). 
PI recommends that the APPG investigate how and for what purposes political parties 
in the UK are relying on this provision. Second, there is a need for collective redress 
mechanisms that empower civil society, which are currently not envisioned in the law. 
Regulatory regimes are stronger and more effective if the ability of individuals to make 
complaints is supplemented by the ability of civil society acting in the public interest to 
bring complaints. This is particularly important if complaints are to address and prompt 
scrutiny of systemic issues, including those that might impact on more than one 
individual, particular groups, or society as a whole. This is recognised to an extent, for 
example, in the introduction of Police Super-complaints 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/police-super-complaints ).This mechanism 
has been used by Liberty and Southhall Black Sisters to challenge Police data sharing 
for immigration purposes 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-data-sharing-for-immigration-purpo
ses-a-super-complaint) . 
Such mechanisms are particularly important from a privacy perspective, as privacy 
invasions are often invisible, harms frequently only happen in the future, and they 
always affect some people more than others. The need for a form of collective redress 
and to empower civil society to take action is recognised in Article 80(2) of GDPR. 
Article 80(2) provides for the ability of "not-for-profit body, organisation or association, 
which has been properly constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has 
statutory objectives which are in the public interest, and is active in the field of the 
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protection of data subjects' rights and freedoms with regard to the protection of their 
personal data" to make complaints and seek an effective remedy under GDPR 
independently of a data subject's mandate. The benefits of such a provision have been 
explained by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/blog/civil-society-organisations-
natural-allies-data-protection_en) and by Privacy International 
(https://privacyinternational.org/blog/1050/why-we-need-collective-redress-data-protecti
on). In spite of this, Article 80(2) of GDPR was not implemented in the DPA. Instead, it 
will be the subject of a review 30 months from the DPA having come into force (section 
189(2)(c) of the DPA). PI encourages the APPG to consider mechanisms for the 
introduction of a super complaints or other forms of collective redress (such as in 
Article 80(2) of GDPR) to enable civil society to tackle systemic issues undermining 
protections for individuals and society. Any such measure should supplement and 
bolster, not replace, the ability of individuals to complain and/or to be represented by 
civil society in complaints. At a minimum, the APPG should engage with the promised 
review of Article 80(2). Third, there is a need for joint cooperation and enforcement 
between regulators. Threats to the election come from different actors and require both 
the engagement of multiple regulators as well as coordination among them. This need 
for coordination in enforcement (and monitoring) was highlighted in measures adopted 
by the EU in the run up to the 2019 European Parliament elections. The EU demanded 
measures from European member states, particularly focussing on cooperation 
between national authorities with competences in electoral matters and authorities in 
connected fields (such as data protection authorities, media regulators, cyber security 
authorities etc). 
Given the role of personal data, it was considered of particular importance that the data 
protection authorities collaborate with relevant election authorities both at national and 
European levels, including in sanctioning infringement of data protection rules where 
such infringement is linked to political activities by a political party 
(https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2824/european-parliament-elections-prot
ecting-our-data-protect-us-against) . As noted by the European Commission, “it should 
be possible to impose sanctions on political parties or political foundations that take 
advantage of infringements of data protection rules with a view to deliberately 
influencing the outcome of elections to the European Parliament.” 
For that purpose, a procedure at the European level has been introduced to ensure the 
sanctioning of actions that not only breach people’s privacy but that “could also 
potentially influence the outcome of elections to the European Parliament”. The 
proposal allows for the sanctions to be imposed by the Authority for European Political 
Parties and European Political Foundations. They could amount to 5% of the annual 
budget of the European party or foundation concerned. In addition, the European party 
or foundation subject to a sanction would not be able to receive funding from the EU 
budget the following year. PI recommends the APPG consider mechanisms to ensure 
stronger cooperation among regulatory authorities in this field as well as engagement 
with other regulators and legislatures looking at similar issues around the world. 
Response C We have combined with response in relation to Transparency (above). 
Response D Our proposals are incorporated into our previous answer addressing the top issues. 
Response E Our proposals are incorporated into our previous answer addressing the top issues. 
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Response F Our proposals are incorporated into our previous answer addressing the top issues. 
Response G If we look at this issue form a data protection perspective, we can see that a lack of or 
weak enforcement also creates a culture of non-compliance. The previous maximum 
fine of £500,000 under the Data Protection Act 1998 did not appear to act as a 
significant deterrent, as many of the practices which we see today would have fallen 
short of the DPA 1998's requirements. For this reason, Data Protection Authorities 
were further empowered under GDPR to fine up to, the greater of €20millon or 4% of 
global annual turnover. The Electoral Commission could no doubt benefit from being 
similarly empowered. However, monetary penalties should not be the only sanction and 
consideration should be given of what type of behaviour can be prohibited as part of a 
sanction. 
Response H Privacy International supports the proposal to include additional requirements related to 
expenditures for online campaigning. Political parties and other actors are increasingly 
using social media platforms and other digital communications means both for targeting 
potential individual donors (particularly for small donations) and for spending on 
political advertising. 
Campaign financing is notoriously difficult to monitor. Even more, recent and ongoing 
investigations have shown how the traditional rules of campaign financing fail to 
regulate and shed a light on these new forms of online fundraising and expenditures. In 
its 2018 report on online manipulation and personal data, the European Data Protection 
Supervisor noted that “the reported spending on campaign materials may not provide 
sufficient details about spending on digital advertising and associated services, e.g. 
targeted ads on social media, analytics services, creation of voter databases, 
engagement with data brokers.” 
(https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-19_online_manipulation_en.pd
f ) In this regard we note that the Electoral Commission has also called for changes in 
the laws to increase transparency for voters in digital campaigning, including on spend 
(https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/244594/Digital-ca
mpaigning-improving-transparency-for-voters.pdf ). 
Privacy International recommends that campaign finance law require timely online 
reporting on spending on online campaigning and on the funding obtained online. The 
information should be sufficiently granular and detailed to promote transparency and 
accountability. This should include provisions to require political parties and other 
political actors to make publicly available (e.g.as a minimum, prominently on their 
websites) information on their expenditure for online activities, including paid online 
political advertisements and communications. This should include information regarding 
which third parties, if any, have assisted the political actors with their online activities, 
including the amount spent on each third parties’ services. 
To ensure effective monitoring the disclosure of campaign expenditure should be 
broken down into meaningful categories such as amount spent on types of content on 
each social media platform, information about the campaign’s intended target audience 
on platforms, as well as actual reached audience. Additionally, the law should require 
the disclosure of information on groups that support political campaigns, yet are not 
officially associated with the campaign, and disclosure of campaign expenditure for 
online activities, including paid online political advertisements and communications. 
Response I  
65 
Response J One of the current key campaigning safeguards is to ensure that political parties and 
other contestants have equal and fair access to traditional media and that reporting by 
publicly owned media is fair and not partisan. The rationale for these obligations (of 
impartiality, fairness, balance, and equality during elections) is the ‘scarcity 
assumption’, i.e. the fact that opportunities to access traditional media are limited. This 
‘scarcity’, it is assumed, would not apply to online media, given the facility and variety 
of sources of opinions and access to them. However, this assumption does not take 
into consideration the market concentration in the digital communications field and the 
way information is distributed and shared by digital platforms (notably search engines 
and social media platforms, including messaging apps). 
A few giant tech companies act as gatekeepers of the digital content which most 
individuals access online. As noted by the European Data Protection Supervisor, “data 
analytics could help individuals navigate through the increasingly noisy information 
environment” but “in effect, the forum for public discourse and the available space for 




In particular, search engines and social media platforms filter the news and opinions 
users access based on profiling. This goes beyond paid-for targeted advertisements 
and promotion of content to the way all content is displayed and recommended (for 
example, the personalisation of Google search results 
(https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/ ); Facebook’s newsfeed ( 
https://www.facebook.com/help/1155510281178725 ) or YouTube’s recommendations ( 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html ). 
These data targeting techniques expose individuals only to selected political messages 
and political information, directly challenging the assumption that a wide spectrum of 
opinions and content in the online media is easily available to anyone. Effects like filter 
bubbles, etc. are direct consequences of such targeting and have significant effects on 
the formation of political opinions and ultimately on elections. 
Privacy International acknowledges that regulating the online space is complex and 
fraught with risks (including of unduly limiting freedom of expression and of access to 
information) For these reasons, Privacy International advocates for caution. However, 
there are some measures, based on existing obligations under data protection law, that 
require urgent enforcement and would provide some protection. At the very minimum, 
internet and social media platforms must be transparent about their profiling activities, 
including for the personalisation of what people see. The use of personal data for 
profiling must also comply with data protection standards. 
Additionally, Privacy International supports the adoption of measures aimed at 
enhancing transparency in this field (as noted in the previous answer.) Given the 
difficulties in defining what constitutes political advertising and the many actors 
involved, effective ads transparency must go beyond just political ads or scrutiny limited 
to one particular platform. Solutions must enable meaningful transparency for users as 
well as enable effective scrutiny by researchers and civil society. The APPG should 
consider how these challenges might be surmounted, for example with an online 
repository of all digital ads. 
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Response K Privacy International has recently published a few briefings related to data and 
elections which may be of interest to the APPG, including: 
• Data Exploitation and Democratic Societies: 
https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/2850/data-exploitation-and-democratic-societi
es • Technology, data and elections: A ‘checklist’ on the election cycle, June 2019: 
https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/3093/technology-data-and-elections-checklist-
election-cycle 




• Privacy International’s Response to the Open Consultation on the Online 
Harms White Paper: 
https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/Online%20Harms%20Respon
se%20-%20Privacy%20International_0.pdf 
• When your data becomes political, video: 
https://privacyinternational.org/video/2937/video-your-vote-sale-political-advertisers-thin
k-so • Privacy International's Response to the ICO's Call for Views on a Code of 





44. Mr Neil Maybin, Individual 
 
Response A Currently, targeted campaigning and advertising is opaque, subverting debate before 
the vote by depriving candidates the right of reply. 
Currently, voters do not find out about the funding of campaigns until after the vote. 
This information should be an important factor for voters when they make their choice. 
Response B Current levels of deterrence, where the very worst penalty is a six figure fine, are 
woefully insufficient to deter electoral malpractice. Indeed they could reasonably be 
regarded as simply the cost of doing business. 
Response C Current monitoring focusses on publishing information about finances after the vote, 
when it is too late to be used in establishing the credibility of candidates. 
Current monitoring of the sources of financial donations is insufficiently robust to 
ensure fair elections. 
Response D Ensure that all election advertising is published for all to see as it is published: so for 
example targeted advertising must be publicly disclosed together with the basis on 
which it is targeted. To be effective these disclosures must be at the time the 
advertising is presented, because they must be part of the public debate informing the 
vote. 
Alternatively, ban all targeted advertising as it opens up scope for dishonestly and 
making different incompatible promises to different voters. 
The original source of all donations over a certain amount (for example, £10,000) must 
be disclosed at the time they are made, otherwise they must be deemed inadmissible 
and unlawful. There is no point leaving this until after the vote. These donations should 
be part of the public debate informing the vote. 
Response E There must be custodial sentences for serious electoral crimes. Anything less can be 
regarded as being merely the cost of doing business. The £300,000 or so of fines 
imposed on the Leave campaigns in the 2016 referendum illustrate the ineffectiveness 
of even substantial financial penalties. 
Another way of looking at this is to think about the impact of electoral crime. If a gang 
stole £30 million or a white collar worker stole £300 million they would be (rightly) given 
long prison sentences. Yet if a group intentionally subverted our democracy costing us, 
for example, £300 billion, the worst they could currently expect is a six figure fine. This 
has to change. 
Response F Monitoring should be focussed on sourcing of funding and on advertising. I've covered 
these under Transparency and Deterrence above. I would re-emphasise here that to be 
effective, disclosures of both funding and on advertising must be made at the time of 
the campaign and not after the vote. 
Response G Electoral Commission should have far more resources including specialised police 
officers. Introducing unlimited fines would be welcome but still a long way from what is 
needed. Only custodial sentences, determined by the tariff for all other forms of fraud at 
this scale, can deter large scale intentional electoral fraud. 
Response H I support this, but it should go further in that all candidates should be required to report 
any spending as it is incurred, and in any case within 24 hours. This information is 
essential to enable people to decide which way to vote. 
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Response I In an ideal world this would not be necessary, but given the difficulty of enforcing this I 
agree that it would be better for these financial transfers to end. 
Response J I support this, but it should go further in that all candidates should be required to report 
any advertising as it is published, and in any case within 24 hours. This information is 
essential to enable people to decide which way to vote. 
Response K I think your work is absolutely essential. The UK's democratic structures are showing 
their age, and in the last three years they have in some respects failed. Ensuring that 
our elections are fair and transparent is one of several important ways in which we can 
rebuild our country and its reputation. 
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45. MS ANNA THEW, FLUX/Exile FIlms 
 
Response A There should be regulation to enable disclosure FOI to take down fraudulent 
misrepresentation 
Response B Revision of the Fraud Act 2006 and Misrepresentation Act 1967 to cover electoral law 
so there is no dividing line between criminal fraud to gain or cause a loss, and electoral 
fraud. The limitation periods for electoral offences must be scrapped. 
Response C Education is necessary to enable monitoring - I go into this in the attached paper 
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Response D 
REPRESENTATION – FAIR VOTE 
Background 
 
I am a linguist and performer, turned artist and film-maker. I live in London and work 
free-lance. As I distribute in France and Germany and trade in Europe I am directly 
affected by the drop in value of sterling since 2016. I and my family are also deeply 
affected emotionally and psychologically. My daughter lives and works in Barcelona. 
One niece is married to a French man and works in France. Another niece is married to 
a chef from Alsace whose parents also live in the UK. Over 50% of my closest friends 
and colleagues resident and paying taxes in the UK from 10 to 40 years are from 
outside the UK, EU and otherwise. 
We live in circumstances of fear and insecurity for the future. We see imported food 
particularly fresh fruit and vegetables rising in price. As my husband is a long term 
sufferer from lymphoma and has a compromised immune system we are all too aware 
of the longer waiting lists, the terrible understaffing in the hospitals and A&E 
understaffed and in panic. 
People are undoubtedly dying as a result of the terrifying losses of staff since the 
referendum. 
Therefore three things concerned me about the way in which the referendum was 
fought unscrupulously by Vote Leave and other Leave groups and prominent public 
figures such as Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, MPs and Nigel Farage MEP. Firstly, the 
blatant lies that were perpetrated on the bus and otherwise fraudulently promising that 
we would be better off by £350 million a week and that we should rather save our NHS. 
I was not fooled by this deceit. However I am from the North East, born in Sheffield and 
teens in a small farming village near Doncaster and the farmers opposite who are like 
extended family, were mislead, if not brainwashed by the press and politicians that 
there was an immigration problem. Irrational fear and insecurity was instilled in them to 
an extent that was difficult to believe. Only that I saw a terrible film on the television 
about NHS waiting lists because of the influx of immigrants and found it even more 
difficult to believe how such fraudulently staged campaign advertising could be allowed. 
So firstly, there ARE laws that are designed to prevent fraudulent promises in 
advertising on television. How is it that campaign advertising is not covered by the 
same law. If it is not, the law on trading standards MUST be extended to CAMPAIGN 
advertising. It is called Electoral Campaign MARKETING. They are SELLING Boris 
Johnson. They are SELLING Donald Trump. They are SELLING Erdogan and Salvini 
and LePen and Orban. They are selling the lies for GAIN of position and control over 
the state PURSE, therefore the same regulations MUST apply. If a statement in a 
newspaper, on a billboard, a bus, a tv programme or a campaign pamphlet, there must 
be a government body such as trading standards, campaign marketing standards that 
is empowered to take the advertising down. 
And there need to be stringent measures to prevent what is more than white lies; for 
what is DECEIT, that is criminal fraud and corruption. It should not have to be for a 
wealthy individual, or a crowd funded individual with no means, to PAY to seek justice 
in the civil, or magistrates courts. It was known that the bus message was utterly false. 
Then how could it just be allowed to continue and the person held to account only the 
nominal UK regisitered director of the limited company, the FIRM, responsible and not 
the individual, who spread the deception. 
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Secondly incitement to ANY form of hatred, or hostility, against individual, state or 
creed, however clever and subtly achieved, should be banned, whether against Turks, 
Muslims, Jews, Christians, Anna Soubry, Jeremy Corbyn, or Germans. There is a law 
to ban this. Why is this not being applied to the Daily Mail, the Sun, Sky News. the BBC 
and whichever channel for instance, transmitted the threat to the UKIP/EU Leave 
instigated NHS fiction film? Then we come to finance. And it is very very obvious to an 
artist and film-maker that Vote Leave and EU Leave were ploughing phenomenal sums 
into expert campaign advertising techniques. You know this from the graphics, the size 
and design of the font. The Conservatives did not employ Saatchi and Saatchi for 
nothing. They are better at it than the local campaign group who mix up the colours and 
the messages and make a mess. 
Stronger for Europe design is a case in point. So I know that the side with the eye 
catching colours is slicker and is spending on the most clued strategists. 
I am a film-maker and have for the last 5 years been fighting a legal battle to have my 
analogue, celluloid film negative and master materials digitally restored to an archival 
standard to be able to return to superior cinema projection prints. 
In or around 2011-2013 over 10 years; over 10 hours of my master materials were 
destroyed in the digital take over of London’s last laboratory, Soho Images, by Deluxe 
142 Ltd, UK registered subsidiary of US global media giant Deluxe inc., owned by Mr 
Pearlman, one of the 15 richest men in the States. 
So I have learned a thing or two about the brutal methods of take over by US digital 
giants, which is GLOBAL, and of which I and my invaluable assets are a minuscule 
part, which is beyond all understanding and reason and escapes justice. 
The strategy is to destroy the very tools, the very means with which film are made for 
theatrical release and potential global communications and effectively eliminate it, 
carve it up, eliminate the competition - even though technically and audio-visually 
analogue is better. 
If you can control media, entertainment and communications; if you can control 
marketing and advertising (publicity is the nice word) you control what people hear, 
what people see, what people learn. You control everything. You can therefore market 
anything however inferior in quality, bad, ugly, or evil. And the algorithms that you can 
buy: the mathematical minds and scientific and creative brains to devise the algorithms, 
are in your control, as you have the investment and he money to devise, conceive of 
and CONCEAL your methodology. 
And the algorithms, a kind of sci-fi Orwellian, Big Brother, have no morals, no ethics 
and no humanity. There is no possibility of a saviour, a St Francis of Assisi, or a 
Buddha realising that being wealthy and powerful when others have nothing, can be 
morally wrong and who’s humanity side overcomes the satanic side and of his own 
volition gives away all his earthly possession and lives in harmony with nature. 
So with data – you are dealing with the intangible, the invisible. 
To produce data from analogue - film- or the written word, scientific information, or 
creative image information is time consuming and costly. The machines, satellites, 
computers, technology, software and cables under the ocean necessary are expensive 
and the software is upgraded every 2 to 3 years, for domestic and general business 
dependency and control, if not every month at the high financial market end. And all of 
us are held to ransom by this technology and inbuilt obsolescence, or upgrading 
phenomena, where the synapses of the collective of the finest human brains (but not 
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necessarily the most caring and sensitive) can be replicated and made dispensable. If 
you replicate and control this, like the mythical destructive fireball in the Mahabaratha, 
you can control the world. To control it you must have the power to destroy it. This male 
psycho-sexual power phenomenon of being first, being bigger and stronger, and more 
fearful than the rest. 
What are actually pyschoses – arms, armies, men behaving badly en masse. 
So how do you obtain justice and parity? When your very means of communication and 
as a communicator, which an artist and film-maker or writer is, your means of 
existence, your very function and role in society, are taken over, disrupted, destroyed? 
The first thing you learn is the cost of replacing assets and that it is all and only to do 
with marketing and making money and keeping the money – keeping your opponent, 
the consumer, destroyed. Your principle tool is DECEIT and CONCEALMENT. 
So you lie about the technology and you lie about the cost and you do this in the 
contract that you set up to purportedly resolve the issue “equitably” before the courts, to 
avoid the courts. 
And you rely upon having more knowledge and information aout the way in which 
digital media and communications, data, works. You rely on the LACK of understanding 
and education/learning of your opponent. 
This point is made in Dovshenko’s film ARSENAL, the literate elite control the illiterate 
masses and gun fodder. 
So point (1) is to know the cost of producing the data, the goods and the services to 
produce the data, the time and advanced technology and computer scientists to 
produce a digital copy. 
The invisible data costs in the region of £80,000 for 10 hours of files, that is £8,000 per 
hour, this is to commercially replicate every image, some 4,000 files every 3 minutes. 
Point (2) is to know how very little, if nothing it costs to transfer the very expensive 
terabytes and terabytes of data from one computer to the next, by Soho Hub Net i.e. or 
Mega NZ, nothing for 50 gigs, to invite chains or recipients, once the data is complete 
for delivery. 
Therein lies your probelem of competing with the giant and of obtaining justice, 
fairness, parity, 
As your recipients are your “clients” (as students in receipt of education are now 
considered). even if they did not directly commissio the services on paper, or by email 
with a data accessible trail of accounting – the recipient/clients/ beneficiaries’ 
anonymity is protected. 
So you cannot know WHO ordered, or commissioned AIQ, or CA Election Campaign 
Marketing Services, internally, by word of mouth, on the telephone and you cannot 
know how many recipient destinations were ordered by the chief commissioner to be 
delivered of the goods; the invaluable data. 
So Steve Bannon or Robert Mercer could be the commissioners and commanders 
internal to Cambridge Analytica, as Boris Johnson and Michael Gove well have been 
operative executors within Vote Leave, as they are now in Government. They might 
have struck the deal in a bar or on the telephone, or in an email, subsequently deleted, 
say like Trump, or how many strings of commissioners and purchasers lie in the chain. 
So CA say they have deleted their harvested data (and their campaign strategy 
advice/invaluable information/data) and this may well be true, but BEFORE they 
deleted the data, you can be assured that the TRANSFER to at least 10 key 
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client/beneficiaries/players; Bannon, Mercer, Trump, Banks, Farage, Cummings, 
Johnson, Grimes, AIQ, DUP, NI Vote Leave (letter of Steve Baker advocating that 
members of the LEAVE family share information – that is employ a unified strategy and 
attack). These players in turn transmit the invaluable data – now in a couple of PDF 
attachments – the information/advice; the results of the very very costly marketing 
research, purchased from Kogan and analysed by CA and fine tuned by AIQ; what text, 
what slogans, what colours, what signs, what images and the addresses and locations 
of those to be persuaded, or rather deceived and defrauded of their democratic voice, 
their democratic power, their equal voice, their people’s voices, their part in society. 
Note Bannon styles his voice and delivery on Orson Welles. 
The first thing to learn is that sounds and images have persuasive function and allure, 
like the snakes in Jungle Book “Go to sleep, close your eyes…” hypnosis, charm. This 
knowledge and skill is thousands and thousands of years old, millennia. So what are 
the means of deceit, the articles of Fraud and where are the loopholes in the laws in 
place to stop the crimes that are already defined as theft by deceit. 
(1) the cost of the services, the loophole for expenditure and declaration has to be 
changed. Expenditure/commissions ADVANCE PAYMENTS and RECEIPTS/INCOME 
like the Mayor of Birmingham, or Arron Banks £8 – 12 million – to buy power and 
services in preparation. 
(2) NO WIN NO FEE payments and receipts of CA, AIQ, POST the event. 
Leave EU and potentially, in reality almost definitely Vote Leave will have operated 
advance payments, investments in the Brexit project as CA openly advertised its 
operation of no win, no fee arrangements with African states, say like the setting up of 
the Brexit Party with Farage’s supposedly private personal assets, or no win, no fee 
transfers after the 1 year limitation mark for electoral fraud cases to be brought.\ 
Therefore it was safe for FB and Twitter to make disclosures in 2018 over 1 year 
AFTER the limitation period for electoral fraud. So the time limits for electoral fraud 
have to either be abolished in their entirety with the understanding that investment in 
winning, by paying for expensive media and communications marketing services in 
advance, or post can be regulated. (They’re not only marketing people’s personal data 
as the “persuadables”/the targets – but the age old methods/techniques of deceit, 
charm*) the techniques of persuasion, the trained mellifluous voice of the orator, the 
colour and identity of the uniform, etc. the hairdo, the music, the bribes, the 
temptations. 
*that is the valuable results of the psyops data marketing research servicesl; the 
purpose of the algorithms and all thos clever mathematicians + computer scientists and 
teams of creative artists employed at mega investment expense. 
So 1 you should not be able to form a limited company with the 2 nomanl UK registered 
directors for the purpose of charity commission registration to enable the operation + 
receipt of donations in money AND IN KIND. You only need to look at the variations in 
the Deluxe Inc., UK subsidiary limited company names since first set up in the 1970’s, 
after the fist vote to be in the EU, that mopped up every last film laboratory in the UK, 
or the alteration of Banks’ EU Leave or Leave/EU Ltd to EU Leave Group Ltd, Leave 
Means Leave etc., etc., and so on along with the re-naming of files and itemised 
income and expenditure, as deceit and malfeasance is in every possible money 
laundering loophole, effected by our SLACK SLACK limited company registration and 
re-registration regulations that hardly regulate anything. You can even declare yourself 
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bankrupt, change all the files and asset names and transfer them at the click of a 
button to your new firm. 
So that you cannot possibly know how much one party, or commercial company, or the 
private individual that is the director, or on the executive of that firm is spending and 
who is the master commissioner, if not master commissioners/government corruption, 
money and motive laundering. 
So ANY payment in advance, or post (no win no fee) has to be regulated and 
prevented. 
There can be no buying of, or investment in the acquisition of power in government, or 
in government influencing charities and organisations, such as the IEA, or the ERG, 
and the DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN ELECTORAL FRAUD AND CORRUPTION OF 
GOVERNMENT BY INFILTRATION AND PURCHASE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE 
had to be eradicated. 
There needs to be a revision of the Fraud Act 2006 and the Misrepresentation Act 1967 
to cover precisely what is at stake here and that is the infiltration, corruption of 
government and the disruptio of parliamentary democracy, as the disruption of 
democracy, is the disruption of a functioning fabric of society and the public good - 
social – society – socialism – democracy. Democracy cannot by its very nature and 
foundation be anything but a form of socialism, a form of the collective responsibility, as 
opposed to the feudalism of hierarchy. 
Democratic society, the operation of common, collective principles – justice and the 
public good, where all people are equal before the law and all wealth is shared and we 
are one happy extended family. So those motivated to overturn the principles of 
socialism and the collective, the public good are motivated to overturn and subvert 
democracy. 
So we can no longer have the 1 year limitation and the 6 weeks in advance limitation, 
or the the dividing line between electoral fraud limitation periods and straight criminal 
and corruption fraud periods, which runs from the point of discovery. So it should have 
been possible to hold Vote Leave, the DUP and BeLeave to account for the covert 
online ads, upon the point of FB disclosure in July 2018, interestingly just after the 
Electoral Commission announcement of criminal levels of intent to overspend. 
The limitation period has to go. Electoral fraud and corruption of government have to be 
linked to criminal fraud for pecuniary gain and/or to cause others (the people, the state) 
a loss, which is in effect what we have here, yet the police are doing nothing. 
The chain of limited companies and the ease of registration on line, has to be stopped 
and better regulated as it is easy for foreign investors in a ploy, such as Brexit to find 
the min 2 UK resident registered directors, see Cuadrilla and Deluxe 142, 2 UK 
registered directors, CEO and other directors registered in the US and/or Australia. 
Possibly an election campaign has to have more than commercial market regulation, in 
order that self bankruptcy and just CA Alexander Nix setting up elsewhere has to be 
regulated and prevented. 
The RENAMING of companies and the RENAMING of files containing the data or data 
very minimally altered, so that the contents are actually the same, but configured 
differently prior to transfer, re-naming as – no idea HOW this can be regulated, perhaps 
by metadata within the original file creation???? 
CONTENT 
We have laws to restrict content and we are not using them. Firstly the electoral 
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commission should have powers to regulate and prevent fraudulent misrepresentation, 
misrepresentation which has the potential not only to make gains for Mr Farage and Mr 
Mercer and Mr Murdoch and Vote Leave, the Brexit ploy financiers and hedge funders, 
but HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AND HAS CAUSED OTHERS A FINANCIAL 
LOSS, OR A LOSS OF LIBERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, as has happened in this 
instance to literally millions of people across the UK and the EU, of whatever nationality 
HATE publications have to be stopped, newspapers vilifying and rabble raising against 
MPs and Judges, or individuals like Gina Miller, surely has to be stopped. 
It is against the law to instil, or whip up hatred of ANYONE or any group, Anna Soubry, 
Jeremy Corbyn, Muslims, Jews, Christians, or Germans 
The ad with the swastikas and brown coloured Europe and the Turks/Muslim implied 
invasion should be able to be taken down, like any hate inciting ad or slogan by the 
British League. IMAGES and SIGNS need to be subjected to scrutiny and analysis of 
meaning. Pier Paolo Pasolini advocated that with film, a medium that was barely 60 
years old at the time of his writing the essays and articles in Heretical Empiricism, there 
needed to be a dictionary of image signs that convey meaning equally to 
communication in language. 
As with false advertising and promotion that a product, goods or services have 
properties that they do not have, the ad on the red bus, for example, should have been 
able to be taken down. It is a criminal offence to deceive either for pecuniary gain, 
power of position, or to intentionally cause another or others (people), your opponents 
(EU citizens), in this instance, a loss. 
Boris Johnson’s advertising campaign for PM should have been able to be regulated as 
so many of the claims are so extreme as to be criminal in intent, to steal power and 
position and control. 
So primarily we also need to EDUCATE the public, lawyers, politicians/the law makers 
about 1 how to stop the legal loopholes on expenditure and transfer of DATA 
DONATIONS IN KIND and DATA PROLIFERATION – on how to identify what is an 
Article of Fraud, a false misrepresentation made wilfully – and that those 
misrepresentations and connivances of persuasion and deceit are not only the word, 
but the sign and the image, the signifiers/the false allure – the hypnosis – the charm – 
the tools of brain washing – DECEPTION. 
Stealing and abusing people’s data on facebook is in my view, as a creative artist, 
film-maker and technician, only the half of it. We need to be educated to read and 
understand the power of image communication down to the colour of the background 
and the size of the font. 
Stephen Fry has put out an interesting analysis of the Vote Leave, BeLeave, DUP AIQ 
devised and generated ads on Facebook. This image/sign literacy has to be increased 
in the same way that facebook are a step ahead in trying to analyse body language and 
gesture in sinister film content posted on line. 
Anna Thew 
Response E As above 
Response F As above 
Response G If overspend is found, there should be an automatic reduction by the same percentage 
in the votes gained. If a regulation were passed this would act as an effective deterrent. 
However the Electoral Commission should be independent, there are grave issues with 
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the involvement for instance of some appointees who were also implicated in the 
Conservative Party Campaign fraud in 2015, so there should be member of other EU 
member states perhaps, to ensure that our elections are free and fair. Also there 
should be greater capacity to scrutinise DECEIT and FALSE MISREPRESENTATION 
by EXECUTIVE MEMBERS of campaigns. 
Response H  
Response I THIS IS CLEARLY RIDICULOUS IN THE EU REFERENDUM THERE WERE ONLY 2 
PARTIES, THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION SHOULD HAVE CLEARER GUIDELINES 
AND KNOW THAT THERE WERE ONLY TWO SIDES, TWO PARTS and therefore 
total expenditure by individuals and differently named groups. As the individual 
donation by PAYPAL and as proven in the US, was encouraged or organised 
systematically by Cambridge Analytica, It is DUMB seeing that this is an electoral 
money laundering loophole not to close it. 
Response J WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO KNOW OF ALL ADS TO SCRUTINISE AND TAKE DOWN 
OFFENSIVE COMMENT - I.E. THE SWASKTIKA ADS put up and only disclosed by FB 
in JULY 2018!!!! Targetting of deprived elderly people with weak intelligence poor areas 
should be actually FORBIDDEN. 
Response K  
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46. Prof Vian Bakir, Network for Media & Persuasive Communication, Bangor University 
 
Response A On what sort of digital campaign was run. Who was targeted, and was the campaign 
both civil and informative? 
Response B Make each campaign group publicly reflect on the above in each election or 
referendum (a self-evaluation) 
Response C Make independent experts, stakeholders and citizens reflect on the above in each 
election or referendum. Ensure there is a repository for each campaign group's 
self-evaluation, plus media coverage of this. Ensure that there is a kite-mark system to 
brand the veracity and civility of the campaigning. Through these measures, we can 
work towards culture change both among campaigners, and among citizens' 
expectations of campaigners. 
Response D Campaigners should be legally required to complete a publicly archived self-evaluation 
shortly after each campaign. This should: Summarise which audiences were targeted, 
and with what success; Reflect upon which aspects of the campaign most succeeded 
in mobilising voters (e.g. specific adverts, messages, themes, memes); Reflect upon 
whether the campaign gave voters enough information with which to make an informed 
choice on which to base their electoral decision (i.e. was information true, complete, 
undistorted and relevant?); Reflect upon to what extent the campaign was civil. 
Response E We further recommend that this self-reporting be incentivised via: An independent 
panel (of diverse stakeholders, including fact-checkers, academics, and campaigners 
from opposing sides) to verify, and critically comment upon, the self-evaluations; A 
kite-mark system to brand the veracity and civility of the campaigning; Ensuring that 
this is covered by the media, post-election, and that the analysis is available online in a 
public archive. 
Response F This would occur for every election and referendum. The public archive would be 
maintained going forward, forming a growing educational resource for all citizens. 
Media coverage of the self-evaluations, and the independent panel's response would 
ensure wider dissemination. 
Response G Agree, based on evidence from various UK Inquiries 
Response H Yes. Very important. 
Response I Good idea, given that groups do secretly coordinate their work. 
Response J Good idea. The repository should also include self-evaluations as we outline in our 
submission. 
Response K We have written a brief report on this matter (titled CULTURE CHANGE: 
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1.1  The Problem 
Research from academia, investigative journalism and regulatory and political inquiries finds: 
- Extensive use of deception and emotion in campaigning for the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum.  
- Techniques for targeting citizens with emotive and deceptive information have intensified in terms 
of granularity of targeting; and remain hidden from the view of the wider community or nation.   
- False messages prompt reactions of fear, disgust and surprise, and have a propensity towards 
recirculation online. 
 
1.2  Solutions 
Various Inquiries in the UK post-Brexit agree that people need to be aware of attempts to manipulate them. 
Solutions put forward to safeguard elections (and that the UK government agreed to take forward in May 
2019) centre on ensuring that online election material, via imprints, clearly shows who has produced it – 
thus helping the electorate evaluate and to come to their own conclusions about the online messages that 
they may receive; new laws to bar people from running for office if found guilty of intimidating or abusive 
behaviour; and launching a consultation on electoral integrity in order to protect UK politics from foreign 
influence. Other steps announced include improving citizens’ digital literacy in the area of disinformation. 
While these are important steps, what is just as important, but largely unaddressed, is a culture change 
amongst political campaigners towards running civil and informative election campaigns, and a 
reinforcement of citizens’ expectations that civil and informative election campaigns are what they will be 
exposed to. To that end, we make the following Recommendations. 
 
1.3 Recommendations 
1.3.1 That there be incentives for digital political campaigners to act ethically, and for their behaviour to 
be critically and regularly reflected upon by society. 
1.3.2 Specifically, we recommend the institution of publicly available self-evaluations by all political 
campaign groups post-elections to: Summarise which audiences were targeted, and with what 
success; Reflect upon which aspects of the campaign most succeeded in mobilising voters (e.g. 
specific adverts, messages, themes, memes); Reflect upon whether the campaign gave voters 
enough information with which to make an informed choice on which to base their electoral 
decision (i.e. was information true, complete, undistorted and relevant?); Reflect upon to what 
extent the campaign was civil.  
1.3.3 We further recommend that this self-reporting be incentivised via: An independent panel (of diverse 
stakeholders, including fact-checkers, academics, and campaigners from opposing sides) to verify, 
and critically comment upon, the self-evaluations; A kite-mark system to brand the veracity and 
civility of the campaigning; Ensuring that this is covered by the media, post-election, and that the 
analysis is available online in a public archive. 
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2. The Problem, Unpacked 
 
2.1  Extensive use of deception and emotion in campaigning for 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum 
 
Emotive, deceptive, targeted communications have long existed. On emotive communication, as far back as 
the era of classical Greek Democracy (5th century BC), Aristotle recognised the importance of affect in 
persuasive communications. Writing in the 21st century, influential psychologist Westen argues that issues 
that arouse emotions have the biggest impact on voting and voter mobilisation: such issues tend to be 
contentious issues.1 On deception, multiple studies document the rise of deception in campaigns, thereby 
depriving people of the information that they need to make an informed decision.2 On targeting of 
audiences, since the mid-1990s digital marketing techniques have been used in political campaigning to 
supplement the traditional focus on demographic market segmentation, by combining public voter files with 
commercial information from data brokers, in order to analyse, profile and target voters according to their 
characteristics and online preferences.3 This includes exploiting and targeting powerful appeals to emotional, 
base or gut instincts among the electorate.4 
Such use of emotive, deceptive information was evident in the Brexit referendum. This submission focuses 
on the Leave campaigns, because they have attracted the most regulatory scrutiny. ‘Vote Leave’ was the 
official campaign to leave the EU, led by then Conservative Members of Parliament (MPs), Boris Johnson and 
Michael Gove. Also of note are unofficial campaigns (including the Leave.EU group founded by Arron Banks 
and Richard Tice; and youth-oriented campaign group BeLeave fronted by Darren Grimes).  
On his blog, Vote Leave’s campaign strategist, Dominic Cummings, proclaimed the potency of Leave’s 
message on: ‘350m / NHS / Turkey’.5  Respectively,  these messages were that: the UK was spending £350 
million a week on the EU, which it could spend on the National Health Service (NHS) if it left the EU; and that 
Turkey, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania were about to join the EU, and that immigration could 
not be reduced unless the UK left the EU. These were the messages in Facebook adverts seen by the most 
people.  
For instance, three identical Facebook adverts which were seen by between two and five million people 
urged voters to ‘spend our money on our priorities like the NHS’, citing the £350m figure. The text read: ‘The 
UK sends over £350 million to the EU each week - that's enough to build a fully-staffed, brand new hospital 
every 7 days! Shouldn't we spend it on OUR PRIORITIES and NOT THEIRS? Take action and vote to leave the 
European Union on 23 June. Let's spend our money on our priorities. Act Now & Vote Leave! Vote Leave’.6  
 
1 Westen, D. (2008) The political brain: The role of emotion in deciding the fate of the nation. New York: 
PublicAffairs, p.173. 
2 Perloff, R.M. (2018). The dynamics of political communication: media and politics in a digital age. New York an 
London: Routledge, pp. 410-413. Bakir, V., Herring, E., Miller, D. and Robinson, P. (2018). Lying and Deception in 
Politics. In. J. Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford handbook of politics and lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
3 Chester, J. & Montgomery, K. (2017) The role of digital marketing in political campaigns. Internet Policy Review, 
6(4). DOI: 10.14763/2017.4.773 https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/role-digital-marketing-political-campaigns 
4 Jamieson, K. H. (1996) Packaging the presidency: A history and criticism of presidential campaign advertising. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
5 Cummings, D. (2017) On the referendum #22: Some basic numbers for the Vote Leave campaign. 
https://dominiccummings.wordpress.com/2016/10/29/on-the-referendum-20-the-campaign-physics-and-data-science-
vote-leaves-voter-intention-collection-system-vics-now-available-for-all/ p.12. 




Another five of the nine Vote Leave adverts which were viewed millions of times focused on immigration. 7  
Of those, two identical adverts stressed plans for Turkey to join the EU with an image showing a large red 
arrow sweeping across Europe from Turkey to the UK. The accompanying text reads: ‘The EU is expanding 
and plans on granting Turkey visa-free travel. This will put enormous pressure on the NHS, our border 
security and economy. Have we lost control? We already send £350 million to the EU every single week. 
Shouldn't we spend our money on our priorities instead? Vote Leave Day - Thursday 23 June. Is This Good 
News? Click No! Vote Leave’. Another ad presents a large red arrow sweeping across Europe from Turkey to 
the UK, accompanied by the text: ‘TURKEY HAS A POPULATION OF 76 MILLION. TURKEY IS JOINING THE EU. 
GOOD IDEA??? Yes/No’ Beneath this is a red ‘yes’ button and a blue ‘no’ button. More than 30 other Vote 
Leave adverts, some viewed by between 500,000 and a million people, mentioned Turkey in the context of 
its border with Syria and Iraq. Again, the images showed red arrows and figures pointing towards the UK. 
‘The EU is expanding and plans on granting Turkey visa-free travel making our new border Syria and Iraq!’ 
read the accompanying text. 8  Other ads raised the spectre of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia 
(as well as Turkey) joining the EU.9 
Such messages are clearly highly emotive, invoking fear of hordes of immigrants swamping much-cherished, 
but strained national resources such as the National Health Service. Certainly, immigration was a key issue 
for Brexit voters. Pre-referendum research into the psychology of the EU membership referendum vote 
amongst the British public found that: the most important argument of the Brexit camp is largely perceived 
to be the fight against immigration.10 The study also found that in most cases, supporters of a Remain and 
Leave vote alike were actually in favour of existing ties with Europe, especially with old  EU Member States 
and, to a lesser extent, Greece and Poland.  The difference between Remain and Leave camps solely seemed 
to pertain to a few current and possible future candidates such as Romania and Ukraine (in both cases, a 
majority were against membership of the same Union). This finding explains the Leave campaigns’ focus on 
fears of immigration from Turkey, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia.  
Furthermore, Vote Leave’s director, Cummings made a show during the campaign of refusing to work with 
Arron Banks (of the Leave.EU group – one of the unofficial Leave campaigns) while admitting his campaign 
relied on their harsh anti-immigration messages.11 In providing oral evidence to the UK’s Fake News and 
Disinformation Inquiry, Banks highlights the methods with which he campaigned during the Referendum: 
 
‘How does social media get traction? That is what you have to consider. You are saying, “How did 
the message get out to all these people?” It must have been data. My experience of social media is it 
is a firestorm that, just like a brush fire, it blows over the thing. Our skill was creating bush fires and 
then putting a big fan on and making the fan blow.’12 
 
7 Griffin, A. (2018) Brexit Adverts used by Leave Campaign Revealed by Facebook. The Independent, 26 July. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/brexit-facebook-ads-leave-campaign-nhs-immigration-
boris-johnson-a8465516.html  
8 Griffin, A. (2018) Brexit Adverts used by Leave Campaign Revealed by Facebook. The Independent, 26 July. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/brexit-facebook-ads-leave-campaign-nhs-immigration-
boris-johnson-a8465516.html  
9 BBC news (2018) Vote Leave's targeted Brexit ads released by Facebook. BBC News, 26 July. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44966969 . Lomas, N. (2018) Facebook finally hands over leave campaign 
Brexit ads. Techcrunch, July 26. https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/26/facebook-finally-hands-over-leave-campaign-
brexit-ad  
10 LSE, Opinium and Lansons (2016) ‘The Impact of Brexit on Consumer behaviour’, 8 June. 
https://www.opinium.co.uk/?s=the_impact_of_brexit_on_consumer_behaviour  
11 Merrick, R. (2019) Dominic Cummings: Vote Leave chief found in contempt of parliament over refusal to give 
evidence to 'fake news' inquiry. The Independent, 27 March. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/dominic-
cummings-vote-leave-contempt-parliament-brexit-inquiry-fake-news-a8841731.html  




Banks described the issue of immigration as one that set ‘the wild fires burning’.13 As reported in The New 
Yorker: ‘A typical Leave.EU post on Facebook warned voters that “immigration without assimilation equals 
invasion”’.14  Furthermore, an investigation by Channel 4 News revealed in 2019 that Leave.EU was behind a 
fake video that went viral, garnering hundreds of thousands of views on Facebook. The video, published by 
Leave.EU as an ‘undercover investigation’ on Facebook, purported to show how easy it is to smuggle 
migrants into the UK from across the Channel. Debunking this video several years later, satellite data, seen 
by Channel 4 News shows the footage was filmed in reverse, and that the so-called shots of ‘migrants’ 
entering the UK were actually filmed before the boat had even left British waters.15  
These messages are not only emotive but are also deceptive messages, as seen by post-referendum fact-
checks of Leave’s message on: ‘£350 million’ and ‘Turkey’. On £350 million: The Telegraph and fact-checker 
Full Fact pronounced Vote Leave’s claim as wrong. They explained: 
The UK pays more into the EU budget than it gets back. But it's not £350 million a week. The 
UK’s discount, or rebate, reduces what we would otherwise be liable to pay. In 2015, we paid 
the EU an estimated £13 billion, or £250 million a week. Some of that money came back in EU 
payments funnelled through the government, so the government’s ‘net contribution’ was 
around £8.5 billion, or £160 million a week. The EU also spends money directly – in grants to 
British researchers, for instance.16 
The Independent also calls this claim out as a misuse of official statistics, not least because: 
the effect on the UK’s public finances from depressed economic growth caused by leaving the single 
market is expected to dwarf any saving made from ending the UK’s subscription to the EU budget. 
The Office for Budget Responsibility says that even a 0.1 per cent fall in growth over the next 50 
years would see tax receipts £36bn lower. Thus, the impression that leaving the EU would somehow 
save money or lessen austerity is likely to be a false one.17 
The message on Turkey was also highly deceptive. At the time, negotiations for Turkey to join the EU had 
completed one of 35 ‘chapters’ of legislation and as a member the UK would be able to veto any plans. Jean-
Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, and Emmanuel Macron, president of France, have 
since strongly ruled out the possibility of Turkey joining the EU.18 Furthermore, there are no imminent plans 
for Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia or Albania to join the EU. 
Interestingly, that Leave’s messages on immigration were deceptive is unlikely to have damaged their 
persuasiveness amongst their target audience. Pre-referendum research into the psychology of the EU 
membership referendum vote amongst the British public found that: whilst the sample was virtually equally 
split between supporters of the Remain and Leave camps, ‘on the whole, the pro-remain arguments are 
 
13 DCMS (2019) Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report. 14 February. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, House of Commons 1791. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf  p.43. 
14 Caesar, E. (2019) Banks, the “Bad Boy of Brexit”, The New Yorker, 18 March. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/25/the-chaotic-triumph-of-arron-banks-the-bad-boy-of-brexit   
15 Channel 4 News (2019) Revealed: How Leave.EU faked migrant footage, 16 April. 
https://www.channel4.com/news/revealed-how-leave-eu-faked-migrant-footage   
16 Kirk, A. (2017). EU referendum: The claims that won it for Brexit, fact checked. The Telegraph, 13 March. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/eu-referendum-claims-won-brexit-fact-checked/  
17 Stone, J. (2017) Brexit lies: The demonstrably false claims of the EU referendum campaign, The Independent, 17 
December. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/infact/brexit-second-referendum-false-claims-eu-referendum-
campaign-lies-fake-news-a8113381.html  




perceived as much more genuine than the pro-leave ones’.19 The authors interpret this as down to a large 
proportion of Leave voters actually expressing a visceral and emotional rejection of the EU in full belief that 
leaving may well come at some very direct cost. In other words, many do not necessarily believe the claims 
of the Brexit camp - that we will be no worse off after Brexit, or better able to control immigration – but they 
want to leave the EU anyway.  
One might argue that citizens are used to deceptive, emotive political campaigns, and that campaigns such 
as those conducted by Leave during the Brexit referendum should therefore not precipitate social or political 
concern. However, we argue that what is problematic, is that techniques for targeting citizens with emotive 
and deceptive information have rapidly intensified in terms of granularity of targeting; and remain hidden 
from the view of the wider community or nation.  Furthermore, deceptive and emotive messages have a 
propensity towards recirculation online. These are discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
2.2 Techniques for targeting citizens with emotive and deceptive information have intensified in terms of 
granularity of targeting20 
In 2017, Cummings claims that Vote Leave had innovated, ‘the first web-based canvassing software that 
actually works properly in the UK and its integration into world-leading data science modelling to target 
digital advertising and ground campaigning’. 21 Across the following few years, the mechanics of this 
campaign were gradually revealed through a series of inquiries and investigations in the UK, as well as from 
revelations from insiders and whistleblowers. 
In July 2018, the UK parliament (DCMS) published thousands of ‘dark ads’ that Facebook had used to target 
British citizens with pro-Leave messages during the Brexit campaign.22 These ads were run by AggregateIQ (a 
Canadian data firm that has been linked to British firm Cambridge Analytica/SCL)  on behalf of Vote Leave 
(the official campaign to leave the EU) and ‘50 Million’, BrexitCentral/BeLeave (the youth-oriented 
campaigners) and DUP Vote to Leave campaigns.23   
 
In November 2018, Howard presented written evidence to the UK’s High Court to the effect that the impact 
of unlawful overspending on digital advertising by Vote Leave and BeLeave campaigns in the 2016 EU 
Referendum was likely enough to have swung the election results towards Leave.24  In making his case, 
Howard’s analysis reconstructs Vote Leave’s digital campaign. Its core features are as follows.  
- Identification of target audiences, including the ‘persuadables’. AggregateIQ built a ‘core 
audience’ for Vote Leave’s adverts, by first identifying the social media profiles of those who had 
already ‘liked’ Eurosceptic pages on Facebook. Vote Leave advertised to this core audience to try 
 
19 LSE, Opinium and Lansons (2016) ‘The Impact of Brexit on Consumer behaviour’, 8 June. 
https://www.opinium.co.uk/?s=the_impact_of_brexit_on_consumer_behaviour  
20 For more on this, as well as the ethical implications, see Emotional AI: https://emotionalai.org  
21 Cummings, D. (2017) On the referendum #22: Some basic numbers for the Vote Leave campaign. 
https://dominiccummings.wordpress.com/2016/10/29/on-the-referendum-20-the-campaign-physics-and-data-science-
vote-leaves-voter-intention-collection-system-vics-now-available-for-all/ p.2. 
22 Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2018) Ads supplied by Facebook to the DCMS Committee. Available 
at:  https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-sport/Fake_news_evidence/Ads-
supplied-by-Facebook-to-the-DCMS-Committee.pdf  
23 The Electoral Commission found, in its report (July 2018), that Vote Leave and BeLeave acted under a common plan, 
for which they both relied on the services of AggregateIQ. See: The Electoral Commission (2018) Digital campaigning: 
increasing transparency for voters, June. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf_file/Digital-
campaigning-improving-transparency-for-voters.pdf  
24 Howard, P.N. (2018) Claim No: CO/3214/2018. THE QUEEN on the application of SUSAN WILSON & OTHERS -
and-THE PRIME MINISTER, REPORT OF DR PHILIP N. HOWARD PROFESSOR, OXFORD UNIVERSITY TO 




and bring them onto its website where they would be invited to add their details to its database. 
AggregateIQ also used an advertising tool within Facebook called ‘Lookalike Audience Builder’, 
which applied the demographic features identified by Facebook in the ‘core audience’ group to 
the UK population at large. This second group (‘the ‘persuadables’) consisted of about 9 million 
people on Facebook whom Facebook identified as having the same demographic features as the 
core audience, but had not previously expressed interest in Eurosceptic content on Facebook by 
‘liking’ Eurosceptic pages.  
- Competition to attract the disinterested and build the database. Early on in the campaign, Vote 
Leave launched a competition (on 27 May 2016) to attract the attention of people not normally 
interested in politics and to gather voters for its database. The competition promised a £50 
million prize to anyone who could correctly predict the winner of all 51 games at football 
tournament, Euro 2016, and recruited former England cricketer, Sir Ian Botham, to promote the 
contest.25 As Cummings describes, ‘This provided very useful data including from people who 
usually ignore politics, helping us refine various models, and it also provided us with mobile 
numbers for GOTV [Get Out The Vote].’ 26 Over 120,000 entered the competition, all of whom 
were sent a reminder on 23 June 2016 to vote in the 2016 Referendum.27   
- Iterative testing of adverts to identify the most persuasive. Via targeted digital advertising, Vote 
Leave then turned sympathisers into committed supporters of, donors to, and volunteers for the 
campaign. Sympathisers were invited to click on an online advert that took them to Vote Leave’s 
website, where they would be invited to provide their personal details (populating Vote Leave’s 
database), and to make a donation, share Vote Leave’s messaging (thereby generating organic 
growth of the message), or volunteer their time towards the campaign. At each step in this 
process, the advertisements and messages were tested on an iterative basis, so that adverts or 
messages which failed to convince enough readers to move to the next step were re-worked or 
changed entirely until a success threshold was reached.  For instance, in the Leave campaign, 
while funding the NHS from the money saved by leaving the EU was identified as a core message 
to be promoted, other ads were trialled suggesting that we spend the money saved on other 
things such storm defences in flooded York and education.28 As such, the ads vary greatly in how 
many people saw them. According to Facebook’s data (released with the ads), some are listed as 
only garnering between 0-999 impressions apiece. Commonly listed ranges include 50,000-
99,999 and 100,000 -199,999. Higher ranges like 2M-4.9M and 5M-9.9M are also listed.29 Nine 
adverts were viewed between two and five million times out of hundreds paid for by Vote 
Leave.30   
- Profiling messages to different audiences online. Vote Leave developed different advertisements 
for the ‘core’ and ‘persuadable’ audiences. 31 Also, ads that were run by youth-oriented 
 
25 BBC news (2018) Vote Leave's targeted Brexit ads released by Facebook. BBC News, 26 July. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44966969  
26 Cummings, D. (2017) On the referendum #22: Some basic numbers for the Vote Leave campaign. 
https://dominiccummings.wordpress.com/2016/10/29/on-the-referendum-20-the-campaign-physics-and-data-science-
vote-leaves-voter-intention-collection-system-vics-now-available-for-all/ p.2. 
27 Howard, P.N. (2018) Claim No: CO/3214/2018. THE QUEEN on the application of  SUSAN WILSON & OTHERS 
-and-THE PRIME MINISTER,  REPORT OF DR PHILIP N. HOWARD PROFESSOR, OXFORD UNIVERSITY TO 
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, DATED 30 
NOVEMBER 2018. https://www.ukineuchallenge.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/257136-Expert-report-of-Prof-
Howard-FINAL-Signed.pdf  
28 BBC news (2018) Vote Leave's targeted Brexit ads released by Facebook. BBC News, 26 July. 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-44966969 
29 Lomas, N. (2018) Facebook finally hands over leave campaign Brexit ads. Techcrunch, July 26. 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/26/facebook-finally-hands-over-leave-campaign-brexit-ad   
30 Griffin, A. (2018) Brexit Adverts used by Leave Campaign Revealed by Facebook. The Independent, 26 July. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/brexit-facebook-ads-leave-campaign-nhs-immigration-
boris-johnson-a8465516.html  
31 Howard, P.N. (2018) Claim No: CO/3214/2018. THE QUEEN on the application of  SUSAN WILSON & OTHERS 
-and-THE PRIME MINISTER,  REPORT OF DR PHILIP N. HOWARD PROFESSOR, OXFORD UNIVERSITY TO 
THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, DATED 30 
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campaigners, Brexit Central/BeLeave, eschewed stoking fears against Turkish immigration, but 
instead urged target recipients to back a ‘fair immigration system’ or an ‘Australian-style points 
based system’. This campaigner also created ads that invoked consumer technology as a reason 
to back Brexit: one appealed to users of ride-hailing apps and another to users of video 
streaming services to reject the EU by suggesting its regulations might interfere with access to 
these services.32  
- Identification of swing voter mentality and behaviour. Having identified from focus groups that 
crucial swing voters were very confused, and liable to change their decision on which way to 
vote based on whether they had last seen a message from either side of the referendum 
campaign, Vote Leave decided to implement a ‘Waterloo Strategy’, to ensure that a Vote Leave 
advertisement was delivered to swing voters as late as possible in the campaign. This involved, 
testing, over months, 450 different types of Facebook ad to see which were most effective, then 
spending a large amount of money (£1.5 million) in the last week on Facebook ads, digital ads 
and videos.33 
In November 2018, the British data protection regulator, The Information Commissioners Office (ICO) 
released the findings of its investigation into the use of data analytics for political purposes, revealing the 
unlawful use of data by various groups during the Brexit referendum. In particular, Cambridge Analytica 
harvested some 87 million Facebook profiles to create personality profiles that could be used to target leave 
voters during the referendum. Cambridge Analytica whistleblower, Christopher Wylie, said: ‘We exploited 
Facebook to harvest millions of people’s profiles. And built models to exploit what we knew about them and 
target their inner demons. That was the basis the entire company was built on.’34 The ICO noted that the 
breaches by Cambridge Analytica were so serious (e.g. breaches of principle one of the DPA1998 for unfairly 
processing people’s personal data for political purposes, including purposes connected with the 2016 US 
Presidential campaigns) that it would have issued a ‘substantial fine’ had the company not already gone into 
administration (Information Commissioners Office 2018: 35); and it is pursuing criminal prosecution over the 
Cambridge Analytica’s Brexit data misuse. 35 The ICO also issued the maximum penalty of £500,000 to 







32 Lomas, N. (2018) Facebook finally hands over leave campaign Brexit ads. Techcrunch, July 26. 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/26/facebook-finally-hands-over-leave-campaign-brexit-ad 
33 Cummings, D. (2017) On the referendum #22: Some basic numbers for the Vote Leave campaign. 
https://dominiccummings.wordpress.com/2016/10/29/on-the-referendum-20-the-campaign-physics-and-data-science-
vote-leaves-voter-intention-collection-system-vics-now-available-for-all/ . Howard, P.N. (2018) Claim No: 
CO/3214/2018. THE QUEEN on the application of  SUSAN WILSON & OTHERS -and-THE PRIME MINISTER,  
REPORT OF DR PHILIP N. HOWARD PROFESSOR, OXFORD UNIVERSITY TO THE HIGH COURT OF 
JUSTICE, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, DATED 30 NOVEMBER 2018. 
https://www.ukineuchallenge.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/257136-Expert-report-of-Prof-Howard-FINAL-
Signed.pdf 
34 Cadwalladr, C. (2018) Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major data 
breach. Guardian, 17 March. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-
influence-us-election  
35 Information Commissioners Office (2018) Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns:  A 
report to Parliament, 6 November 2018. https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-
use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf  
36 Facebook was fined under the older Data Protection Act 1998, which meant the social media avoided a potential 
GDPR fine stretching to $1.6bn. 
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2.3 Techniques for targeting citizens with emotive and deceptive information remain hidden from view of the 
wider community or nation 
Cummings explains that in the referendum, the Vote Leave campaign ‘excluded London and Scotland from 
most of our digital marketing’. 37  He elaborates: ‘We ran very few digital ads in London (you can 
positively/negatively target audiences geographically) which contributed to people in London not seeing 
what we did.’38  Furthermore, during the Brexit referendum, Facebook did not have any disclosure rules for 
political ads. As such, there was no way for anyone other than each target recipient to know a particular ad 
existed or who it was targeted at.39  
In October 2018, Facebook announced new requirements for organisations and individuals placing an advert 
that features political figures and parties, elections, legislation before Parliament or past referendums. These 
requirements introduced a verification process, whereby people placing political adverts must prove their 
identity (by a passport, driving licence, or residence permit), which will be checked by a third-party 
organisation. Political adverts suspected of promoting misinformation or disinformation can be reported 
and, if the advert contains ‘falsehoods’, it can be taken down.40  
 
However, in August 2019, the Guardian reported that coordinated disinformation campaigns can still get 
around Facebook’s transparency requirements for political advertising. The Guardian describes how lobbying 
firm CTF Partners (run by Sir Lynton Crosby) has secretly built a network of unbranded ‘news’ pages on 
Facebook for dozens of clients ranging from the Saudi government to major polluters. This is an example of 
‘astroturfing’, where political campaigners attempt to create the perception of an upswell of grassroots 
support for a cause: 
 
The supposed news sources, which were liked by millions of users and reached tens of millions 
through the use of paid Facebook adverts, were grown using the social network’s promotional tools, 
with assistance from Facebook sales teams who encouraged the purchase of more promotions. 
Once CTF employees found a tactic that provoked a strong reaction, they would double down, 
according to one of the ex-employees: “If you’re after the Maga [make America great again] crowd 
you just target people like this. Then once you’ve got an audience you just target people like that.”41 
 
Facebook said the network of pages pretending to be news sources on behalf of corporate and state clients 
did not break their rules on ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’ (a term used to shut down disinformation 
networks overseen by foreign governments) because Crosby’s employees used their real names on internal 
Facebook administration tools (information that is not available to the general public).  
 
That dark ads and dark posts continue to abound, despite Facebook’s efforts to prevent this, leads to silo-ed, 
non-scrutinised, un-fact checked conversations about what campaigners stand for and are promising 
(notwithstanding efforts by whistleblowers and investigative journalists). 
 
37 Cummings, D. (2017) On the referendum #22: Some basic numbers for the Vote Leave campaign. 
https://dominiccummings.wordpress.com/2016/10/29/on-the-referendum-20-the-campaign-physics-and-data-science-
vote-leaves-voter-intention-collection-system-vics-now-available-for-all/ p.5. 
38 Cummings, D. (2017) On the referendum #22: Some basic numbers for the Vote Leave campaign. 
https://dominiccummings.wordpress.com/2016/10/29/on-the-referendum-20-the-campaign-physics-and-data-science-
vote-leaves-voter-intention-collection-system-vics-now-available-for-all/ p.11. 
39 Lomas, N. (2018) Facebook finally hands over leave campaign Brexit ads. Techcrunch, July 26. 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/26/facebook-finally-hands-over-leave-campaign-brexit-ad 
40 DCMS (2019) Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report. 14 February. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, House of Commons 1791. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf  p.62.  




This non-transparent state of affairs is particularly problematic in national elections and referenda for the 
following reasons. 
- Informed choices. As the UK’s ICO notes: ‘Citizens can only make truly informed choices about 
who to vote for if they are sure that those decisions have not been unduly influenced.’42 They 
further observe: ‘If voters are unaware of how their data is being used to target them with 
political messages, then they won’t be empowered to exercise their legal rights in relation to 
that data and the techniques being deployed, or to challenge the messages they are receiving.’43 
- Shared national conversations better enable us to hold power to account. The importance of, and 
threat to, shared national conversations must be recognised. If deceptive micro-targeting takes 
place, and if this is not scrutinised by central authorities and media (or if citizens are no longer 
paying attention to central authorities and mainstream media) then there is little chance of 
those elected on such platforms being held to public account. 
- Polarisation potential. If disinformation circulates, uncorrected, in closed communities, and if 
that disinformation is deliberately inflammatory, we generate a polarised, emotive society. 
Selective exposure, where people prefer and tune into, information that supports their existing 
beliefs is an old finding in communication research.44 However, when selective exposure is 
combined with false information that is fed into self-reinforcing algorithmic and cognitive 
systems, or digital ‘echo chambers’, there is little chance of citizens correcting the false 
information. Empirically demonstrated consequences of algorithmically created filter bubbles 
and human confirmation bias are limited exposure to, and lack of engagement with, different 
ideas and other people’s viewpoints.45 
- Undue influence. It is impossible to know for sure which aspects of a campaign were decisive to 
winning the votes.46  While it is impossible to disentangle which aspects of the campaign proved 
decisive, Ben Page, who runs polling company Ipsos Mori, told the New Yorker: ‘when something 
is very close, as this was, anything can make a difference. … By having an official and unofficial 
Leave campaign, there was the ability to offer a respectable (sovereignty) and less respectable 
(migrant scum) argument simultaneously.’ Arron Banks told the New Yorker that the social-
media postings of Leave.EU reached working-class voters, particularly in the North of England, 
who would not otherwise have voted.47 Claims from insiders on the centrality of targeting users 
to winning elections are also made for the Trump 2016 presidential campaign. According to the 
Final Report from the UK’s Inquiry into Disinformation and ‘Fake News’, Theresa Hong, a 
member of Trump’s 2016 digital presidential election campaign described ‘Project Alamo’. This 
involved staff working for presidential candidate Trump, Cambridge Analytica staff and Facebook 
staff, ‘all working together with the Cambridge Analytica data sets, targeting specific states and 
 
42 Information Commissioners Office (2018) Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A 
report to Parliament, 6 November 2018. https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-
use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf  p.4. 
43 Information Commissioners Office (2018) Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns:  A 
report to Parliament, 6 November 2018. https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-
use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf p.18. 
44 Lazarsfeld, P.F., Berelson, B. and Gaudet, H. (1944) The People’s Choice: How a Voter Makes up his Mind in a 
Presidential Campaign. New York: Columbia University Press. 
45 Bessi A., Zollo F., Del Vicario M., Puliga M., Scala A., Caldarelli G. Uzzi, B. & Quattrociocchi, W. (2016) Users 
Polarization on Facebook and Youtube. PLoS ONE 11(8): e0159641. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159641;   del Vicario, 
M., Bessi, A., Zollo, F., Petroni, F., Scala, A., Caldarellia, G., Stanley, H. E. and Quattrociocchi, W. (2016). The 
spreading of misinformation online. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113(3): 554-559. 
http://www.pnas.org/content/113/3/554.full.pdf  
46 Some have tried e.g. Howard, P.N. (2018) Claim No: CO/3214/2018. THE QUEEN on the application of SUSAN 
WILSON & OTHERS -and-THE PRIME MINISTER,  REPORT OF DR PHILIP N. HOWARD PROFESSOR, 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY TO THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION, 
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT, DATED 30 NOVEMBER 2018. https://www.ukineuchallenge.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/257136-Expert-report-of-Prof-Howard-FINAL-Signed.pdf  
47 Caesar, E. (2019) Banks, the “Bad Boy of Brexit”, The New Yorker, 18 March. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/25/the-chaotic-triumph-of-arron-banks-the-bad-boy-of-brexit   
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specific voters. The project spent $85 million on Facebook adverts and Ms Hong said that 
“without Facebook we wouldn’t have won”’.48 We should not depict this state of affairs as a 
democratic collapse, not least because advertising technologies are unlikely to be as effective as 
their sales teams tout. However, the prominence of analytics companies is cause for concern, 
especially regarding transparency of their activities to the Electoral Commission (in the UK) and 
citizens. As the UK’s ICO points out: ‘Without a high level of transparency and trust amongst 
citizens that their data is being used appropriately, we are at risk of developing a system of voter 
surveillance by default.’ 49 
- Distrust in electoral system. If winning campaigns are based on disinformation, the winners’ false 
claims are likely to generate social discontent with the democratic outcome and process.  
 
2.4 False messages prompt reactions of fear, disgust and surprise, and have a propensity towards recirculation 
online 
 
Vosoughi et al.’s big data study of Twitter finds that false information spreads faster than truth on Twitter.50 
They investigated the differential diffusion of all of verified true and false news stories distributed on Twitter 
from 2006 – 2017 (comprising ~126,000 stories tweeted by ~3 million people more than 4.5 million times).51 
They found that falsehood diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in 
all categories of information: the effects were more pronounced for false political news than for false news 
about terrorism, natural disasters, science, urban legends, or financial information. They found that false 
stories inspired fear, disgust, and surprise in replies, whereas true stories inspired anticipation, sadness, joy, 
and trust. They also found that robots accelerated the spread of true and false news at the same rate: this 
implies that false news spreads more than the truth because humans, not robots, are more likely to spread 
it. 
A previous section has already established that the core messaging on the Vote Leave campaign was 
deceptive. Also of note is that part of Vote Leave’s strategy to turn sympathisers into committed supporters 
of the campaign was to invite the user to share Vote Leave’s messaging on the individual’s own social media 
accounts, thereby generating organic growth of the message without cost to Vote Leave. This dual prompt of 
false messaging plus an incitement to a sympathetic user to share the message would lead to recirculation of 
the message online. Indeed, according to Cumming’s blog, Vote Leave's Facebook Advertising reach was 





48 DCMS (2019) Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report. 14 February. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, House of Commons 1791. Available at: 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf  p.62. 
49 Information Commissioners Office (2018) Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A 
report to Parliament, 6 November 2018. https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-
use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf p.19. 
50 Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., Aral, S. (2018) The spread of true and false news online. Science. VOL 359 ISSUE 6380. 
51 They classified news as true or false using information from 6 fact-checking organisations that exhibited 95 to 98% 
agreement on the classifications. 






3.1  Solutions generated by Inquiries and Government 
 
Various post-Brexit Inquiries in the UK agree that people need to be aware of attempts to manipulate them. 
Solutions put forward to safeguard elections (and that the UK government agreed, in May 2019, to take 
forward) centre on ensuring that online election material, via imprints, clearly shows who has produced it – 
thus helping the electorate evaluate and to come to their own conclusions about the online messages that 
they receive; new laws to bar people from running for office if found guilty of intimidating or abusive 
behaviour; and launching a consultation on electoral integrity in order to protect UK politics from foreign 
influence.53 
 
Other steps announced include improving citizens’ digital literacy in the area of disinformation. For instance, 
in 2019, the Government launched a pilot behaviour change campaign aiming to increase audience 
resilience to disinformation, by educating and empowering those who see, inadvertently share and are 
affected by, false and misleading information. The campaign aims to increase the audience’s ability to spot 
disinformation by providing them with straightforward advice to help them check whether content is likely 
to be false or intentionally misleading.54 
 
3.2  Unaddressed solutions: towards culture change 
 
While these are all important steps (albeit with difficulties and limitations), also important, but largely 
unaddressed, are the following: 
 
a) Culture change amongst political campaigners towards running civil and informative election 
campaigns,  
b) Reinforcement of citizens’ expectations that civil and informative election campaigns are what they 
will be exposed to.  
On the need for a culture change amongst political campaigners towards running civil and informative 
election campaigns, the above analysis of the Brexit referendum campaign clearly shows that standards need 
to be raised among many of the campaigners themselves. The ability to micro-analyse, profile and target 
audiences with messages that maximise engagement of the targeted audience (with deceptive and emotive 
messages likely to be the most successful), to the exclusion of any other criteria, is likely to increase.55 
Indeed, the ICO’s report, Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns, while largely 
reporting on the Leave campaign, points to the problems identified being more widespread.56 The ICO was 
particularly concerned by:  
• the purchasing of marketing lists and lifestyle information from data brokers without sufficient due 
diligence around those brokers and the degree to which the data has been properly gathered and 
consented to;  
• a lack of fair processing information;  
• use of third-party data analytics companies with insufficient checks that those companies have 
obtained correct consents for use of data for that purpose;  
 
53 Cabinet Office and Kevin Foster MP (2019) Press release: Government safeguards UK elections, 5 May. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-safeguards-uk-elections  
54 Don’t feed the Beast. https://sharechecklist.gov.uk  
55 Bartlett, J., Smith, J. & Acton, R. (2018) The Future of Political Campaigning. Demos. July. 
https://ico.org.uk/media/2259365/the-future-of-political-campaigning.pdf  
56 Information Commissioners Office (2018) Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns:  A 
report to Parliament, 6 November 2018. https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-
use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf  
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• assuming ethnicity and/or age and combining this with electoral data sets they hold, raising 
concerns about data accuracy;  
• provision of contact lists of members to social media companies without appropriate fair processing 
information and collation of social media with membership lists without adequate privacy 
assessments. 57 
As the ICO explains, formal warnings were issued to 11 political parties (Conservatives, Labour, Lib Dems, 
Greens, SNP, Plaid Cymru, DUP, Ulster Unionists, Social Democrat, Sinn Féin and UKIP) detailing the outcome 
of their investigation and the steps that needed to be taken.58  
If parties are going to continue to target voters with messages iteratively tested and tailored to maximise 
engagement, then a code of ethical conduct should be developed (and adhered to) for the messages to be 
both civil and informative. Citizens should be able to expect such ethical conduct from the campaigns of their 
would-be-leaders.  
 
Rather than merely delegating this task of policing ethics to social media companies, regulators,59 or to 
heavy handed censorship laws (as in Singapore),60 it is in the long-term interests of society that we start to 
reinforce citizens’ expectations that civil and informative election campaigns are what they will be exposed 
to. This should be a process of long-term, continuing, education of all citizens, conducted and contextualised 
by each election or referendum (rather than short-term behaviour change campaigns). This will help voters 
recognise emotive and deceptive online messages (research indicates that people are poor judges in these 
areas).61 In turn, the development of such cultural norms - of civility and informativeness - should help 
constrain campaigners who are hungry to win at all costs. 
    





57 Information Commissioners Office (2018). Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns:  A 
report to Parliament, 6 November 2018. https://ico.org.uk/media/action-weve-taken/2260271/investigation-into-the-
use-of-data-analytics-in-political-campaigns-final-20181105.pdf p.23. 
58 The formal warnings included a demand for each party to provide Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) for 
all projects involving the use of personal data. Under the GDPR, data controllers are required to complete a DPIA 
wherever their intended processing is ‘likely to result in high risk’ to the rights and freedoms of data subjects. Because 
parties are using special category data (relating political opinions and ethnicity), as well as automated decision making 
and profiling, they would therefore be required undertake a DPIA under the GDPR. A DPIA gives a systematic and 
objective description of the intended processing and considers the risk to people’s personal data – not only the 
compliance risk of the organisation involved. 
59 In April 2019, the UK government announced in its Online Harms White Paper that a new independent regulator will 
be introduced to ensure that social media companies and tech firms are legally required to protect their users from a 
range of online harms, including disinformation, and face tough penalties if they do not comply. See Gov.UK (2019) 
Press release: UK to introduce world first online safety laws, 8 April. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-
introduce-world-first-online-safety-laws   
60 Russell, J. (2019) Singapore passes controversial ‘fake news’ law which critics fear will stifle free speech. 
Techcrunch. https://techcrunch.com/2019/05/09/singapore-fake-news-law/ 
61 Wardle, C. and Derakshan, H. (2017) Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and 





4.1   That there be incentives for digital political campaigners to act ethically, and for their behaviour to be 
critically and regularly reflected upon by society. 
 
4.2 Specifically, we recommend the institution of publicly available self-evaluations by all political 
campaign groups post elections to: 
- Summarise which audiences were targeted, and with what success. 
- Reflect upon which aspects of the campaign most succeeded in mobilising voters (e.g. specific 
adverts, messages, themes, memes). 
- Reflect upon whether the campaign gave voters enough information to make an informed 
choice on which to base their electoral decision: i.e. was the information true, complete, 
undistorted, and relevant?62 
- Reflect upon to what extent the campaign was civil.  
 
4.3   We further recommend that this self-reporting be incentivised via: 
- An independent panel (of diverse stakeholders, including fact-checkers, academics, and 
campaigners from opposing sides) to verify, and critically comment upon, the self-evaluations. 
- A kite-mark system to brand the veracity and civility of the campaigning. 
- Ensuring that this is covered by the media, post-election, and that the analysis is available online 




62 This list is derived from research that theorises and distinguishes consensual persuasion from manipulative 
persuasion. See Bakir, V., Herring, E., Miller, D. and Robinson, P. (2018) Organized Persuasive Communication: A 
















Response to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 




By Dr John Ault and Harry Busz 





Democracy Volunteers welcomes the formation of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Electoral Campaigning Transparency and the research that you are undertaking to try to 
improve the conduct and oversight of elections in the UK. There are many areas which will 
receive comment from other organisations and, whilst we might have interest in some of 
these, we feel it is most appropriate to deal with those specific to election observation and 
how it is conducted in the UK. 
In general, we have a few areas on which to comment but overall we would identify topics 
which have not been included in the area for review as ones which are equally important, and 
arguably more common place, than some of the challenges that have been identified. We 
wish to highlight: 
x The narrow focus of the review, which misses out critical issues related to electoral 
fraud and the Electoral Commission’s interaction with these such as family voting, 
postal voting and misconduct in polling stations. 
x That dealing with some of these ‘analogue’ challenges would allow authorities to 
deal with the failings identified by the review in the new digital age. 
x That third parties can find traditional ways to influence elections such as pressuring 
voters with the aid of technology, for instance the challenge of digital photography, 
in polling booths. 
Transparency 
How elections are run, how campaigns are conducted and how the process is accessible to 
the public as well as for observation are fundamental to a transparent democratic system. 
We support some of the suggested aims of the APPG in creating an environment where it 
becomes both the norm, and the legal framework, for election expenses to be produced 
online for a wider audience and for parties to be required to use their imprints on online 
election material, in the same way that they do for printed materials. 
However, we believe that these changes should be in the context of a broader review of the 
UK’s electoral law, and whilst we concede these might be simple successes we also feel that 
there is a requirement to assess electoral law on a wider basis in the context of modern 
political campaigning, whilst still conducting elections essentially in the same manner they 
have been conducted for the past century. 
We believe an important aspect of improving transparency is to have a greater awareness of 
election observation as a fundamental part of the UK’s political landscape. Often election 
administrators are unaware that election observation is even a possibility but, used properly, 
it can be an added level of deterrence against election malpractice and work as an effective 
bulwark against inefficient election administration. It can make elections more transparent as 
members of the public can observe polling operations and compare them to the standards 
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that are expected. We would argue that the identification of unsealed ballot boxes, something 
that would be considered extremely concerning in less developed democracies, goes almost 
unmentioned in the UK on the occasions we have observed it. Allowing (and even 
encouraging) observation more widely would allow for greater public trust in elections, as 
well as for greater trust among parties and candidates due to the independent oversight 
which occurs during polling operations when under observation. 
Whilst we concede that much of modern campaigning is done online, we also believe that 
some aspects of campaigning have not changed over recent years, such as election literature 
being given to voters. This literature can often appear in polling stations, indeed in a recent 
election observation in Northern Ireland, Democracy Volunteers observed election literature 
being left in polling booths in 19% of polling stations. Whilst this may not be seen as being as 
immediately as challenging to the democratic process as newer forms of campaigning, there 
can be little doubt it had an impact on these polling stations.1 
Deterrence  
With respect to deterrence, Democracy Volunteers welcomes the expansion and clarification 
of the jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission. Interference, foul play and a poor 
understanding of electoral laws are witnessed at many of the polling stations our organisation 
observes. 
 
Many of the issues which we commonly encounter, such as family voting, improper 
campaigning on the ground and, more recently, the use of technology in order to record one’s 
supposedly secret ballot, pose a serious threat to the integrity and validity of elections in the 
UK. As such we believe, as the Electoral Commission aims to support well run elections, that 
these areas must be focussed on in addition to campaign finance as elections move into the 
digital age.  
 
Codes of practice for campaigners 
Operations concerning the ground activities of elections and referenda are overseen by the 
Electoral Commission through their publication, Code of Conduct for Campaigners, which 
covers electoral registration, postal voting, proxy voting and polling station malpractice. From 
our perspective, the advice given in this publication are of crucial importance to securing free 
and fair elections, and the circulation of this to political parties and candidates contesting 
elections is welcomed.  
 
However, with regards to these issues the Electoral Commission has a relatively weak level of 
enforcement, with the document acting as a guide rather than carrying any significant legal 
backing through the Commission’s PPERA (2000) duties. Complaints are made to local 




authorities as a first port of call with the Electoral Commission acting as an advice giver. After 
this, criminal proceedings will be brought if the offence is deemed to be worthy of such 
intervention. We believe these actions are concerning as it shifts responsibility away from a 
central governing body leading to variance in its application and removes the expertise the 




The dangers to the democratic process of modern technology are not simply limited to the 
impact of modern online campaigning techniques. The use of modern technology can allow 
for greater control over voter behaviour from outside actors. 
In the recent Peterborough parliamentary by-election our observer team identified a growing 
practice of voters photographing their ballot papers. Whilst some have suggested this is to 
show their contempt for the electoral process and arguably those standing for election, this 
appeared to be on a more organised level than merely using social media to express 
discontent. 
Mobile phones allow voters to not only photograph their ballots but also to disseminate that 
information. At present it is not illegal to take a photograph of one’s own ballot paper, but it 
is a potential breach of the secret ballot if someone else disseminates the image. The Electoral 
Commission discourages the practice but is unable to legislate to limit the use of photography 
in polling stations. The innovation of such availability of this phone function and the ready 
means to communicate that to others is clearly a potential weakness of the present legislation 
concerning the secret ballot. 
We would recommend that this is outlawed as it could be possible to check how voters have 
voted if some unscrupulous individual wished to do so. We believe there was evidence in the 
Peterborough by-election to suggest that photography was undermining some individuals’ 
rights to have a secret ballot as this information appeared to be for dissemination rather than 
personal use.2 
Public Engagement in Preventing Electoral Fraud 
 
The UK’s electoral framework is Victorian in origin and the details of electoral misconduct are 
unclear to many voters. In some cases, election malpractice is not, in reality, an intended 
action of the voters than conduct them. The most obvious case is that of so-called ‘family 
voting’. This occurs when two or more voters enter a polling booth together and collaborate 
on how to vote. We see this a great deal in the United Kingdom. In the recent local elections 
in Northern Ireland, where we attended 23% of all the polling stations, we observed this in 
almost half of the polling stations we attended – affecting 9% of those voters we observed. 




The fact that almost 1 in 10 voters either had oversight of another’s vote or could not vote in 
secret is clearly a challenge to our democratic process.3  
 
What is interesting is that when we observe other European countries, this behaviour is much 
less common than in the UK. We believe in the cases of both The Netherlands and Finland 
that this is because they have public information programmes concerning this kind of 
unacceptable practice and signage in polling stations to discourage it. 
 
In Finland, these forms of public engagement and electoral education are actually an aspect 
of secondary and adult education programmes where the public is given ‘fake news’ 
awareness so that they are more aware of the various campaign methods that are being used 
to affect their vote, whether legitimately or otherwise. 
 
We believe that one of the fundamental failings of the UK’s own regulatory system is that 
there is a presumption that the Electoral Commission is even able to conduct oversight of the 
electoral process when, in reality, they are only responsible for giving advice to those who 
actually conduct elections4 – the returning officers based in local councils.  
 
The public should be a key part of the prevention of electoral fraud which is one of the reasons 
for the creation of the citizen observer group, Democracy Volunteers. By having greater 
numbers of independent observers overseeing elections there would be greater confidence 
in the process for voters and those conducting elections themselves. 
 
Placing observation as a cornerstone of making elections more transparent  
Election observation is an internationally accepted aspect of elections. As part of the OSCE 
the UK is a signatory to the Copenhagen Agreement which requires member states to issue 
invitations to observe elections to the OSCE/ODIHR and any other interested and qualified 
organisations. 
The UK’s Electoral Commission is responsible for administering and accrediting those who 
seek to be observers. The process is open to anyone who has not been subject to a conviction 
for an electoral offence in the past 5 years, is over the age of 16 and can produce appropriate 
identification. Observers must also commit not to be engaged in political activity and have to 
sign a declaration similar to that required of party activists attending counts and polling 
stations during an election. 
Observation, though something which has been available to interested parties for some years 
now, continues to be at the periphery of electoral management. Fewer than 500 people are 
accredited observers in the UK, of which many are civil servants, but the potential role of 
                                                          
3 https://democracyvolunteers.org/2019/07/02/final-report-northern-ireland-local-elections-02-05-19/ 
4 Except in the case of referenda. 
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observers to function as part of the deterrence process, and to aid the transparency of 
elections, should not be underestimated. However much the powers of the Electoral 
Commission are extended, or increased, their capacity to assess every polling station during 
an election is implausible. 
Whilst we appreciate that the nature of this review by the APPG is primarily aimed at newer 
issues which concern elections, such as the use of online campaigning and online reporting, 
we do feel that this is to ignore other aspects of elections which are equally under threat from 
interference and where transparency can be enhanced.  
As things stand, election observers are afforded reasonable access to the election process in 
polling stations and at counting venues to check that the electoral process is being conducted 
properly. As has recently been discussed, especially around the Peterborough By-election, 
postal voting is an area which is open to some question as it can be manipulated by those that 
seek to affect the voting behaviour of others. We feel this constitutes a significant challenge 
to the electoral process and should be open to greater oversight by independent observers. 
At the moment voters are simply required to sign a form to state they are conducting their 
vote in secret, but it is impossible to check if this is the case. 
Greater checks should be in place to limit the capacity for this process to be manipulated 
which can be independently verified by observers. Perhaps the UK should move to a position 
where advance voting is a possibility in the UK, reducing the necessity for postal voting. 
Conclusion 
We would like to thank the APPG for this opportunity to comment on this review. We would 
welcome the opportunity to comment further as some of our suggestions do not easily fit 
within some of the aspects of the review. We do feel, however, that some of the infractions 
we see on a regular basis are significant challenges to the democratic process and ones which 
should be given consideration alongside those being considered for the advent of more 
technologically advanced aspects of campaigning. 
APPG on Electoral Campaigning Transparency – Facebook response 
Facebook is committed to improving transparency in digital campaigning and we believe that 
updating election regulation to include clear regulatory guidance on requirements in this space 
would ensure a level playing field and enable voters to understand who is running campaigns and 
who is seeing those campaigns.  
 
We have taken an industry-leading position on political ad transparency in the UK, introducing new 
tools that go beyond what is currently required of us by law and further than anywhere else that 
allows political advertising. We are unique in offering this level of transparency around political 
advertising in the UK. 
 
Political advertising laws primarily focus on candidates and elections, rather than divisive political 
issues where we’ve seen more attempted interference. Some laws only apply during elections, 
although information campaigns are nonstop. And there are also important questions about how 
political campaigns use data and targeting. We believe legislation should be updated to reflect the 
reality of the threats and set standards for the whole industry. 
What we have done so far:  
Advertising 
• Digital advertising is typically more affordable than TV or print ads, giving less well-funded 
candidates a relatively economical way to reach their future constituents. 
• Facebook has already made significant changes around political ads: Advertisers in many 
countries including the UK must verify their identities and confirm that they are based in 
that country, before purchasing political ads. We have built a searchable library that shows 
who pays for ads, what other ads they ran and what audiences saw the ads. However, 
deciding whether an ad is political isn’t always straightforward. Our systems would be more 
effective if regulation created common standards for verifying political actors. 
• Different countries maintain their own standards and laws to ensure that people know who 
pays for the political advertising they see. People rightly expect that these standards will be 
reflected online, and we’ve been testing a range of ways of not only meeting those 
requirements in online political advertising, but going one step further by telling you who 
paid for an advert and housing all these ads for up to seven years in the Ad Library. 
• All election ads on Facebook and Instagram must be clearly labeled, including a “Paid For 
By” disclosure from the advertiser at the top of the ad. When people see that label, it 
means the person writing the ad went through the authorisation process and verified his 
or her identity and location. We believe this new level of transparency is good for people 
and will allow journalists, researchers, NGOs and others to hold campaigns, candidates and 
organisations accountable for the ads they create. 
• We’re up against smart and well-funded adversaries who change their tactics as we spot 
abuse. But we believe that this higher level of transparency is good for democracy and is 




In October 2018 in the UK we launched new tools aimed at bringing increased transparency to ads 
related to politics:  
• A “Paid for by” disclaimer that requires a political advertiser to verify their ID and location 
and accurately represent the Page that is running each ad. 
• Our Ad Library that archives political ads for seven years - which ensures a campaign can't 
just pop-up and disappear, as ads remain visible even after they stop running. 
• We also publish a Library Report detailing ads run and top spenders across our platforms. 
o You can search by the last day, seven days, 30 days, 90 days or all dates. 
o This Report gives everyone the ability to easily find out about the Pages running 
political ads, where they can search for further information about the advertiser 
and direct questions to them. 
• In addition to that, you can now see all ads every Page is currently running globally, simply 
by clicking ‘Page Transparency’ on any Facebook Page.  
Security and misinformation  
• The term “fake news” is used to describe a lot of different types of activity that we would 
like to prevent. When we study these issues, we have to first define what is actually “fake.” 
The most common issues are: 
o Fake identities– an instance where an actor conceals their identity or takes on the 
identity of another group or individual; 
o Fake audiences– this is using tricks to artificially expand the audience or the 
perception of support for a particular message; 
o False facts – the assertion of false information; and 
o False narratives– which are intentionally divisive headlines and language that exploit 
disagreements and sow conflict. This is the most difficult area for us, as different 
news outlets and consumers can have completely different opinions on what an 
appropriate narrative is even if they agree on the facts. 
• To tackle these issues, we engage in pragmatic planning by studying each upcoming 
election and working with external experts to understand the actors involved and the 
specific risks in each country.  
• We block millions of fake accounts each day at the point of creation before they can do 
any harm. This has been possible thanks to advances in machine learning, which have 
allowed us to find suspicious behaviours — without assessing the content itself. 
• Our efforts to fight false news rely on increased investments in both technology and 
people, with the goal of reducing opportunities for manipulation, while still allowing for 
open discussions. Our effort follows a three-pronged approach which we call remove, 
reduce, and inform. This involves removing content that violates our policies, reducing the 
spread of problematic content that does not violate our policies and informing people with 
additional information so they can choose what to click, read or share.  
• Fighting misinformation is an ever-evolving problem and we can’t do it alone. In 2016, 
Facebook started its third-party fact-checking program, working with IFCN-certified fact-
checkers around the world to rate and review the accuracy of content on our platform. In 
the UK we have worked with Full Fact since the start of 2019.  
Voter Suppression 
• We already prohibit offers to buy or sell votes as well as misrepresentations about the 
dates, locations, times and qualifications for casting a ballot. We have been removing this 
type of content since 2016. 
• We extended this policy further and are expressly banning misrepresentations about how 
to vote, such as claims that you can vote using an online app, and statements about 
whether a vote will be counted (e.g. “If you voted in the primary, your vote in the general 
election won’t count.”).  
• We recognise that some posts that are reported to us may require additional review. For 
example, we’re unable to verify every claim about the conditions of polling places around 
the world (e.g. “Primary School Flooded, Polling Location Closed”). In these cases, we will 
send content to our third-party fact-checkers for review. Content that is rated false will be 
ranked lower in News Feed, and accompanied by additional information written by our 
fact-checkers - ‘Related Articles’ - on the same subject. 
• We are constantly looking for ways to stay one step ahead of bad actors. For example, 
Facebook’s technology detected a false post claiming that Brazil’s Election Day had been 
moved from October 7 to October 8 due to national protests. While untrue, that message 
began to go viral. We quickly detected the problem, determined that the post violated our 
policies, and removed it in under an hour. And within two hours, we’d removed other 
versions of the same fake news post. 
EU Elections 
• Our preparations for these elections represented one of the most sophisticated 
operations Facebook has ever deployed to fight against misinformation, combat hate 
speech and prevent foreign interference - there are now nearly 40 different teams working 
on elections across the company. 
• We launched our political ads transparency tool in 27 countries simultaneously ahead of 
the election. We have built our system around the legal responsibility which is conferred 
upon national election authorities. 
Proposals for updated regulation in this space: 
We believe that electoral regulation needs to be updated to take account of how campaigns are 
increasingly using online advertising. An update to existing regulation is necessary to ensure that 
the requirements on campaigners are clear and that they comply with these requirements. 
 
Below we have outlined some initial thoughts about the updates that might work in this area, but 
this is not a definitive position and we would welcome the opportunity to engage in further 
discussion in this area with the APPG.  
 
How could regulation be updated to include digital advertising? 
• We believe that regulation in this area should require the Electoral Commission or the 
Government to define: 
o 1) which entities are eligible to engage in political advertising,  
o 2) what steps such entities must take when purchasing online political advertising; 
and  
o 3) what constitutes a political advertisement 
• Regulation should set forth how disclosures will reveal the identity of the person or entity 
behind an ad, creating common criteria for how to verify an entity that purchases online 
advertisements. 
• Regulation should specify how political campaigns are and are not permitted to use data to 
target voters.  
• The Regulator should specify clearly what an eligible entity who wants to engage in political 
advertising must do in order to do so legally. Options might include requiring eligible 
entities to register with the Electoral Commission as a political advertiser, requiring them 
to report all political advertising activity, and requiring them to adhere to specific 
guidelines on use of data. 
• It is important to consider carefully how responsibilities should be allocated in any updated 
regulatory framework. The primary responsibility for the legality of political campaigns 
should always lie with those who run those campaigns while other entities may need to 
accept some specific requirements if they choose to offer their services to political 
campaigns. These requirements need to be reasonable if the intent is for service providers 
to feel able to continue supporting political campaigns. 
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APPG on Electoral Campaigning Transparency 
 








This paper is in response to the call for evidence by the APPG on Electoral 
Campaigning Transparency. It features a series of recommendations informed by 
extensive academic research on campaigns and political finance. While there are 
some concrete steps that can be taken, it is, however, important to remember that a 
balance must be struck between effective regulation and ensuring that legitimate 
political activity is not unduly hindered through over-regulation of political life. 
Furthermore, it is essential to note that regulations alone may do little to improve 
public confidence. 
 
Recommendation 1. Increase the frequency of donation reporting between 
elections and during the short campaign, introducing ‘real time’ declaration of 
donations at national level 
Recommendation 2. Review the level of fines available to the Electoral Commission 
and establish a principle of the size of fines relative to party income. 
Recommendation 3. Consider the establishment of a permanent unit within an 
existing department to keep electoral law under regular review. 
Recommendation 4: The spending limits for registered participants in referendums 
should be reduced significantly to ensure that the designated campaigns are 
paramount in any referendum contest.  
Recommendation 5: The deadline for registration as a permitted participant in a 
referendum should take place much earlier, perhaps in advance of the controlled 
period. 
  




1.1 At the outset, it is important to recognise that transparency in respect of 
campaign spending and activity is relatively new, only being introduced by the 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 – hereafter PPERA. 
Prior to that, levels of transparency were minimal. 
1.2 PPERA represented a very significant change in respect of electoral law and 
has been broadly successful in delivering transparency and oversight in 
elections, though less so in terms of referendums.1 
1.3 Importantly, PPERA was delivered with broad cross-party consensus, in part 
because most of the provisions were proposed by the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life.2  
1.4 PPERA provides a sound basis for regulations on transparency and oversight 
and so for all its possible shortcomings, many criticisms of the legislation are 
exaggerated in respect of elections and party finance (though not 
referendums). 
1.5 Inevitably, some aspects of PPERA have not kept pace with technological 
change. Thus, digital advertising did not feature when the legislation was 
drafted. As digital campaigns grow in importance, it is essential that the 
imprint found on printed materials is also applied to digital ones.  
1.6 However, it is also worth noting three key things in respect of digital 
campaigning: 
16.1 First, the targeting associated with digital is not new – it represents an 
evolution of existing practice.  
16.2 Second, despite the coverage of digital campaigning, printed materials still 
represent a more significant form of election campaigning, though that will 
probably change over time.3 
16.3 Third, there are some aspects of digital campaigning which cannot be 
legislated upon and which may lead to a reduction in transparency. The global 
reach of the internet means that communications are by no means solely 
domestic. As a consequence, digital imprints may not capture all materials 
advocating one party/candidate or another if a digital campaign falls outside of 
domestic legislative control.4 
1.7 Transparency plays two important roles in respect of campaign finance and 
political finance more generally. First, it incentivises self-restraint through the 
risk of detection – if inappropriate behaviour is discovered, citizens will think 
                                                          
1  Fisher, J. (2015) ‘Britain’s Stop-Go Approach to Party Finance Reform’ in Boatright (ed), The 
Deregulatory Moment?  A Comparative Perspective on Changing Campaign Finance Laws. 
Michigan: University of Michigan Press. pp. 152-74. 
2   Committee on Standards in Public Life (1998) Fifth Report: The Funding of Political Parties in the 
United Kingdom. London: HMSO Cm 4057; Fisher, J. (2009) ‘Hayden Phillips and Jack Straw: 
The Continuation of British Exceptionalism in Party Finance?’, Parliamentary Affairs. 62 (2): 298-
317; Fisher, J. (2015) ‘Britain’s Stop-Go Approach to Party Finance Reform’ in Boatright (ed), The 
Deregulatory Moment?  A Comparative Perspective on Changing Campaign Finance Laws. 
Michigan: University of Michigan Press. pp. 152-74. 
3  Fisher, J. (2015) ‘Party Finance: The Death of the National Campaign?’ Parliamentary Affairs, 68 
(Suppl 1): 133-153; Fisher, J.  (2018) ‘Party Finance’ Parliamentary Affairs: Britain Votes 2017, 
71, (Issue suppl_1): 171–188. 
4  Fisher, J.  (2015) ‘Conclusions: Deregulating Party Finance: Is the US an Outlier or a Pioneer?’ in 
Boatright (ed), The Deregulatory Moment?  A Comparative Perspective on Changing Campaign 
Finance Laws. Michigan: University of Michigan Press. pp. 220-5. 
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less highly of a party and may punish them at the ballot box.  Second, if 
operationalised effectively, it informs voters at the political ‘moment’ – when 
interest is high or during a campaign. Transparency that is operationalised too 
long after a political ‘moment’ between elections risks voters not noticing the 
new information, whilst transparency that is operationalised after an election 
will not have the potential to change voter behaviour – either by rewarding or 
punishing parties. The check on behaviour would, therefore, be effectively lost 
until a subsequent election (if voters’ memories were that long). 
1.8 With these principles in mind, transparency in respect of election campaigns 
and wider political finance could be enhanced further. Since the introduction 
of PPERA in 2001, declarations in respect of donations have been made at 
quarterly intervals, and at weekly ones during the short campaign (post-
dissolution). Historically, this presented some challenges in respect of 
transparency as the donations that impacted most upon the success of a 
campaign were not made in the final weeks before an election, but in the final 
twelve to nine months before a campaign due to the lead time associated with 
various campaign techniques. The growth of digital campaigns, which have a 
shorter lead time, has meant that there is more relevance to ‘late money’ – 
donations made in the few weeks before a campaign.5 This being so, for the 
public to be better informed about the funds that are supporting parties’ 
election campaigns, there is a case for more regular reporting between 
elections and ‘real time’ reporting during the short campaign to ensure voters 
are informed about funding – particularly in the last week of the campaign, 
which is not currently reported upon until after polling day. The same is true 
for donations made in the final quarter before polling day, where this occurs 
prior to dissolution. 
1.9 These enhancements would be easily achievable at national level. At 
constituency level, however, significant care would need to be taken to ensure 
that an unreasonable and unsustainable burden was not placed on 
candidates’ agents – the vast majority of whom are volunteers.6 
 
Recommendation 1. Increase the frequency of donation reporting between 
elections and during the short campaign, introducing ‘real time’ declaration of 




2.1 Deterrence is essential with any regulation. Indeed, the best measure of the 
success of a regulation may not be how many cases have resulted in 
punishment, but how few times there is any investigation. 
                                                          
5  Fisher, J. (2015) ‘Party Finance: The Death of the National Campaign?’ Parliamentary Affairs, 68 
(Suppl 1): 133-153; Fisher, J.  (2018) ‘Party Finance’ Parliamentary Affairs: Britain Votes 2017, 
71, (Issue suppl_1): 171–188.  
6   In the 2015 and 2017 elections, around 90% of election agents of the principal five parties in 
Great Britain (Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and Scottish National 
Party) were volunteers – Fisher, J., Cutts, D. and Fieldhouse, E. Surveys of Election Agents at the 
2015 and 2017 General Elections 
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2.2 Since the Political Parties and Elections Act 2009, there have been two routes 
in terms of sanction – an Electoral Commission fine or referral to the Crown 
Prosecution Service.7 
2.3 It is important that the levels of fines available to the Electoral Commission 
are reviewed regularly, both to ensure that their true value is not eroded by 
inflation, and that their level cannot be considered as being ‘a cost of 
business’ by the larger parties.  
2.4 However, it is also important to recognise that there are legitimate limits that 
should be set on the value of fines. First, they should not be so large that they 
effectively prevent a party from operating. This has occurred overseas where 
the levels of fines have become disproportionate.8 Second, it’s important to 
recognise that the impact of Electoral Commission fines may be electoral (as 
a result of a reputational damage) as well as financial, and that electoral 
penalties may be far more serious to a party. 
2.5 That said, the electorate do not always behave in ways that one may expect 
in the light of such information. For example, shortly before the 2017 general 
election, the Crown Prosecution Service concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to authorise charges against the Conservative candidate in Thanet 
South (as well as two other individuals) in respect of alleged breaches related 
to election expenditure in the 2015 election.9 At the 2017 election, however, 
the candidate was re-elected with a 12.6 percentage point increase in his vote 
share (and over 6,000 additional votes), achieving more than 50% of the 
vote.10  The candidate and his agent were later acquitted.  
 
Recommendation 2. Review the level of fines available to the Electoral 





3.1 There is no question that campaign laws should be subject to regular review 
(just as with other laws) 
3.2 However, immediate reform as suggested in the call for evidence, is a wholly 
unrealistic (and probably undesirable) aspiration. Electoral law must not be 
subject to the kinds of sudden reforms that could suggest partisan advantage. 
Part of the reason that PPERA was introduced so successfully was because 
of cross-part consensus. 
3.3 The Electoral Commission keeps campaign laws under review, but requires 
Parliament to act if any change is to be brought about. As a consequence, 
                                                          
7  Fisher, J. (2010) ‘Political Parties and Elections Act 2009 c12’ Current Law Statutes Annotated, 
Thompson Reuters. pp. 12-1 – 12-88 
8  Fisher, J. & Klein, L. (2013) Party Finance in Georgia. Recommendations for Reform – Final 
Report. Report Produced for the Council of Europe. 
9  The nature of the case reflected a long-standing issue over the relationship between party and 
candidate electoral expenditure. See Fisher, J. (2018) ‘Party Election Expenditure Election 
Effects: National vs. District Level and the Regulatory Challenges’ in J. Mendilow & E. Phelippeau 
(eds) Handbook of Political Party Funding. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. pp. 55-77 
10  Fisher, J.  (2018) ‘Party Finance’ Parliamentary Affairs: Britain Votes 2017, 71, (Issue suppl_1): 
171–188.  
Page | 5  
 
some proposed changes can be delayed or lost due to a lack of parliamentary 
time or political will. 
3.4 One possible solution would be to create an election law review unit within an 
existing department – probably the Ministry of Justice. The unit would need to 
be permanent and work closely with the Electoral Commission. 
3.5 The upside of such a proposal is that its proposals would be arguably be less 
prone to being a victim of parliamentary time or political will – especially if it 
worked closely with a Select Committee. Such a move would also focus work 
in this area on a particular Select Committee. 
3.6 The downside is that it may duplicate the work of the Electoral Commission or 
threaten its independence. Any threat to the independence of the Electoral 
Commission would be wholly unacceptable. 
 
Recommendation 3. Consider the establishment of a permanent unit within an 
existing department to keep electoral law under regular review. 
 
4. Issues Specific to Referendums 
 
4.1 The 2016 referendum exposed significant flaws in the legislation on 
referendums contained within PPERA. 
4.2 I conducted a study of permitted participants at the 2016 referendum for the 
Electoral Commission.11 As a result of the study, I would make the following 
points as they relate to this enquiry. 
4.3 The spending limits for participants in the referendum were as follows: 
Designated Lead Campaigns £7,000,000 
Permitted Participants  £700,000 
Non-registered campaigns  £10,000 
 
4.4 In addition, political parties could register as referendum campaigners, with 
their spending limit being a function of their share of the UK vote at the 2015 
General Election. Thus: 
Greater than 30% share of the vote  £7,000,000 
Between 20-30% share of the vote £5,500,000 
Between 10-20% share of the vote  £4,000,000 
Between 5-10% share of the vote  £3,000,000 
Less than 5% share of the vote  £700,000 
 
4.5 In the 2016 referendum, there were 123 registered campaigners, compared 
with 12 in the AV Referendum of 2011 and 42 in the Scottish Independence 
Referendum of 2014. Of these, fifteen registered participants spent in excess 
of £250,000, totalling £9,385,315 (Remain) and £4,744,534 (Leave), in 
addition to the expenditure of the two designated lead campaigners.   In total, 
                                                          
11  Fisher, J. and Rottweiler, B. (2016) Research among permitted participants at the EU referendum. 
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non-designated participants spent £12,542,044 on the Remain side and 
£6,590,103 on the Leave side.  There was, additionally, no limit or effective 
deadline on the registration of campaigns. Thus, registered campaigns 
(including the designated lead) could have spent up to £31,000,000 on the 
Remain side and £21,500,000 on the Leave side. 
4.6 This raises potentially serious issues. The permissibility of registered 
participants reflects the reasonable position that campaigners on one side or 
another may not share similar views. Thus, on the Leave side, there was a 
particularly wide range of registered campaigners ranging from the political 
right to the political left.  
4.7 However, in a referendum with a binary choice, all campaigners on one side 
desire the same outcome – Yes or No, Remain or Leave etc. With the 
spending limits for registered participants being so high (at £700,000) it is 
clear that the spending limits for the designated campaign (at £7 million) are 
rendered effectively meaningless.  
4.8 In the case of the EU Referendum, the Remain side was able to spend a 
further £12.5 million in addition to designated campaign, while non-designated 
Leave campaigns effectively matched the spending of the designated Remain 
campaign in addition to the spend of the designated Leave campaign.  
4.9 Moreover, the lack of an upper limit on the number of registered participants 
means that in effect there could be a significantly uneven contest between the 
two sides. Had all registered and designated campaigns spent up to their limit, 
the Remain side would have been able to spend some £9,500,000 more than 
the Leave side.  
4.10 In addition, there are no restrictions on donations to multiple different 
campaigns on the same side, leading in effect to the potential for donor 
coordination.  
4.11 In some ways, the spending limits for non-designated campaigns are 
analogous to restrictions on third-party campaigns in elections, where in 2017 
registered third parties were permitted to spend up to £465,300 in the United 
Kingdom.  This represented 2.4% of the maximum spend of a party contesting 
all 650 seats. At present, the limit for a non-designated registered campaigner 
in a referendum is 10% of that of the designated campaign. Consideration 
should therefore be given to significantly reducing the expenditure limits of 
both registered and non-registered participants.  
4.12 One possibility would be to apply the same principle in respect of registered 
third party campaigns to registered referendum participants. However, 2.4% 
(£168,000) of the designated campaign spending limit would arguably still be 
too high, since unlike third-parties in elections, non-designated campaigners 
in referendums may explicitly and positively advocate the cause (Yes or No, 
Remain or Leave etc.). That being so, a much more significant reduction 
would arguably be more appropriate. 
4.13 Relatedly, the deadline for registering as a participant should be brought 
forward to much earlier in the controlled period, to prevent to unnecessary 
proliferation of registered groups. The current permissive approach permits 
campaigners on each side to register very late and thus affects both the 
spending capacity on each side and contributes to concerns about the 
possibilities of donor coordination. This becomes particularly pertinent as 
electronic campaigning becomes increasing prevalent, since this requires a 
far shorter lead time than more traditional campaign methods. 
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4.14 A further concern is that the large number of registered participants leads to 
significant problems with the ‘Working Together’ rules. Participants in the 
2016 referendum reported significant problems in understanding and 
implementing these rules.12  
4.15 In sum, the rules on spending limits for referendums are not currently fit for 
purpose, and create the potential for significant inequality in referendum 
campaigns. 
 
Recommendation 4: The spending limits for registered participants in 
referendums should be reduced significantly to ensure that the designated 
campaigns are paramount in any referendum contest.  
 
Recommendation 5: The deadline for registration as a permitted participant in 
a referendum should take place much earlier, perhaps in advance of the 
controlled period. 
                                                          
12  Fisher, J. and Rottweiler, B. (2016) Research among permitted participants at the EU referendum. 
Report produced for the Electoral Commission. August 2016 pp.14-21. 
Open Rights Group APPG on Electoral Campaigning Transparency 
Briefing 
 
This document outlines Open Rights Group’s (ORGs) response to the APPG on 
Election Campaigning Transparency. It addresses the three themes of transparency, 




There has been a move by platforms to self regulate, in order to set the terms of 
regulation.  
 
Facebook in particular has launched Ad Library, a publicly accessible database of 
targeted political and issue ads. This is particularly significant as whilst many 
platforms serve targeted political adverts, Facebook is often described as a ‘one stop 
shop’ for political ads. It is ground zero for the issues at hand.  
 
Whilst it is early days for transparency in political advertising we do not currently 




Ad Library offers a ‘disclaimer’ on ads. This is supposed to provide information about 
who has paid for the ad, even if the ad is presented by an innocuous campaign 
group. It is supposed to operate as a sort of note of the beneficial ownership of an ad 
(Appendix Ai).  
 
However, this hasn’t worked in practice. Rather than identifiable information, you can 
simply provide the name of the group that serve the ad. Whilst you can provide a 
name, email, or physical address, it does not appear to be mandatory. If it is, then 
Facebook are failing to enforce it.  
 
 
Transparency of Data  
 
Facebook now offer information about how you have been targeted. However, it 
contains little meaningful detail. Facebook provides data on age range (in clusters of 
4-11 years), region (England/ Scotland/ Wales/ Northern Ireland), gender, 
impressions and spend ​(Appendix Aii). 
 
However, we know that those who buy Facebook ads have access to a much more 
granular range of characteristics. In addition, ad buyers can mix their own data sets 
with Facebook’s (‘custom audiences’) for even more detailed targeting. Open Rights 
Group has sent Subject Access Requests (SARs) to UK political parties, and is in the 







The Electoral Commission should not play a part in deciding what is/is not a political 
ad, but the process by which platforms currently do so should be opened up to public 
scrutiny. 
 
Any political or issue ad on must be registered with the Electoral Commission. They 
should have a record of the contact details for the sponsor of the ad. This should be 
a process like registering with Companies House, except cheaper and faster.  
 
Watermarks (‘disclaimers’) should include elements of this information and an easily 
identifiable click-through to the Electoral Commission database. Elements of this 
could be augmented /rescinded in the case of political dissidents.  
 
The Electoral Commission database must be user friendly: clear, easy to use and 
widely available.  
 
Any Ad Library must be regularly reviewed by the Electoral Commission and relevant 
platform in order to ensure compliance with current and future regulation. 
 
 
Data transparency  
 
There should be information parity between advertiser and user for political 
purposes. Users should be able to see exactly what advertisers see in terms of their 





Each political actor (including all 3rd parties) registered with the Electoral 
Commission should have a designated webpage/page on each social media platform 
that they operate on. This must be clearly labeled.  
 
Each campaign should list its campaigning partners on the page and on its 
communications. For example, in the case of non party campaigners, you should list 
lead/minor campaigners somewhere clearly on the page.  
 







We believe there are three main reasons why current electoral regulation is not as 
effective as it might be with regard to digital campaigning.  
 
1. Regulated period 
 
There is no shelf life on social media posts. Political content can be generated long 
before the regulated period and linger online. Content created before an election can 
have a second life during an election (unless they are taken down for breaching 
community guidelines or similar). In a networked communication environment, it is 
incredibly difficult to determine if ‘shares’ are organic or not. The online environment 
empowers people to participate in this activity and there are very low barriers to 
entry. A lot of conceptual effort goes into gaming this, encouraging organic sharing, 
or artificially amplifying support through systems such as botnets. What is good for 
individual freedom of expression is bad for the concept of a regulated period.  
 
In addition, third party campaign groups and parties can appear and disappear 
outside the confines of regulated periods. 
 
      ​2.   Candidate Spending vs Party spending 
 
Given that social media platforms can target precisely and widely, the line between 
various candidate/party/local/ national spending limits. has been blurred to the point 
where they are essentially cosmetic.  
 
Both of these points feed into our central observation: that ​the real benefit of digital 








3. Data and Digital is all about making spending more efficient  
 
1) The recommendations of the 5th report of the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life  come from an era when mass media advertising was the 1
dominant model. It was assumed that the amount spent on such advertising 
had a strong proportional relationship to the number of people that saw it. The 
report gives some ballpark figures for 1997. 
 
- “The (undiscounted) cost of a page in one of the leading national newspapers 
is anything from £20,000 to £50,000 for each insert. ”  2
-  “A two week nation-wide poster campaign can easily cost £1 million. ” 3
- Whilst political parties were not even then allowed to purchase TV ad space, 
they were allowed expenditure on the production etc. 
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It is impossible to know or measure how effective political advertising is. But this 
scattergun, mass media approach aimed to make sure that a party’s message 
reached as many voters as possible, in the hope that by doing so they would reach 
as many persuadable voters as possible. It also prices in that you pay the people 





1 The Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/336
870/5thInquiry_FullReport.pdf​. 
2 Ibid, page 173.  
3Ibid, page 173.  
4 Ibid, page 181.  
 
 
Digital has made this business model effectively redundant. This is for three reasons.  
 
a) The use of personal data and associated services allows you to 
eliminate those you consider unlikely to vote for you and thus reduce 
your costs.  
 
b) Factors such as “shareability” and “virality” of content on social media 
reduces the marginal cost of distribution to zero ​. ​(Appendix Bi). ​This is 
particularly relevant for the rules on coordination between third party 
campaigns, as it may allow such groups to run coordinated campaigns 
together without breaching spending limits ​(Appendix Bii). 
 
Although there are well defined rules on what constitutes coordinated 
campaigns, they tend to relate to costs that run into the tens of thousands of 
pounds. It is now easy to run a wide ranging campaign for far less than this.  
 
c) Technological innovation driving down production costs: automated content 
generation, A/B testing, and botnets​ all have the potential to drive down 
labour costs for campaigning.  
 
 
What seems clear is that ​the location of value for a political campaign has 
shifted.​ It has moved from value = money spent on lengthy appearances in a variety 
of non broadcast media, to value= data used to create highly personalised digital 
communications .  
 
This impacts the effectiveness of regulation. For example, data and associated 
methodologies can be used to drive down spending in many of the categories 
currently listed by the Electoral Commission, without the cost of the data being 
declared.  
 
An additional observation is that the unregulated market for political data 
could usher in a return to the ‘arms race’ seen before the establishment of the 
Electoral Commission. ​Currently it seems that some political parties may have an 
unfair advantage online. In an era when our national politics is ever more 
heterogeneous in terms of political parties, this feels like a step backwards 





Deterrence Recommendations:  
 
 
Data audits:  
 
Data audits are a proposed collaboration between the ICO and the Electoral 
Commission. Inter agency cooperation should encourage both bodies to more fully 
carry out their statutory duties without having to resort to regulating speech or the 
creation of additional statute/ agencies. The ICO are already carrying out audits of 
political parties so this would be a way to involve the Electoral Commission.  
 
Before the commencement of the regulated period, political actors already covered 
under the regulation should submit themselves for a ‘data audit’. This audit would 
utilise the expert knowledge of the ICO and Electoral Commission. Audited material 
includes data assets that have been purchased outside of the regulatory period, but 
will be used inside the regulated period. This is necessary in part because the 
process of pricing, acquiring and purchasing data is very murky and unclear, even in 
a standard commercial environment. In addition, it is likely that some of the most 
useful granular data may not be purchased  but obtained by other means.  5
 
The audit will have three elements:  
 
a) Assessing the commercial value of data sets bought and sold before an 
election, and incorporating that into their spending limits.  
 
b)  ​ A legal and ethical audit of data. ​ Much of the most valuable granular data 
for targeting purposes ( such as that scraped from social media)  is obtained 
at least unethically and potentially unlawful re consent. In addition, apart from 
labour costs, such data is often essentially ‘free’. So there needs to be a way 
of capturing this.  
 
c) The ICO/ Electoral Commission will reserve the right to conduct a ‘drug 
test’ audit during the election to see if political actors are doing anything 
unlawful/unethical/breaching spending limits, providing reasonable 
suspicion is present​. The ICO must develop a methodology of doing this 
5 Some fairly complex and recent rules around ‘notional spending’ do exist. However they rely on the 
campaigner(s) to navigate them. In addition, some forms of personal data may not have a well 
established commercial value. Some data intensive targeting methodologies may be developed in 
house. The use value of data, in terms of money saved/efficiency gained, may be far greater than its 
commercial or exchange value. It would be more equitable and transparent for regulators to carry out 
this function. Currently it seems to be a question of capacity, application and enforcement. The 
Electoral Commission have themselves said that they require assistance on this.  
that is efficient, ethical and accountable (likely by comparing against the pre 
election audit). The public could be consulted on this. Both the ICO and the 




The need to give an opportunity to reform laws immediately and when needed is 
more problematic. If a new and effective method of campaigning was detected 
during an electoral cycle, what should happen? 
 
Parliament would be in recess and campaigning would be underway. We must ask: 
is it appropriate for a reform of the law to be undertaken at that time? Could you 
even lay a Statutory Instrument or proposed reform without requiring Parliament to 
be sitting in some form? 
 
If so, who would make that decision? The Minister with the election portfolio? This 
could allow the Government to make unilateral changes to the rules of campaigning 





The Electoral Commission should establish a digital campaigning / electoral 
innovations group made up of EC representatives but also external stakeholders and 
experts. 
 
This group’s mandate would be to perform horizon scanning work on emerging 
campaigning practices and discuss them in the context of existing digital 
campaigning laws, making recommendations to Parliament if reform is required. 
 
 
Data protection  
 
Political advertising can be regulated through data protection as well as through 
transparency and rules about placement. 
 
Data protection gives us the expectation that we agree to the way that our personal 
data is used (“consent”) and that it is used fairly (“fair processing”).  It is expected 
that we give explicit and separate consent for information about political or religious 
beliefs to be used (“special category data”). 
 
It is not obvious that these conditions are met in the current world of online 
advertising. In particular: 
 
1. While a social media user would agree that their personal data is used to 
allow that platform to let them be a member, it is not necessary for that 
personal data to be used for advertising purposes. Normally, a separate 
purpose requires a separate consent. Whether advertising profiling requires a 
separate consent is the subject of a legal challenge by NOYB. 
 
2. Online platforms like Facebook allow adverts based on special category data, 
or by inferring special category data such as religion or political opinion. This 
ought to require the separate consent of the user; it is unclear why these 
practices are currently allowed by platforms. 
 
3. In any case, making broad inferences of belief, mood or attempting to 
manipulate these based on data inferences may cross the line of what 
constitutes “fair processing”.  
 
While Recital 56 of the General Data Protection Regulation sets out that gathering 
personal data by political parties in the course of electoral activities for the operation 
of the democratic system could be permitted on the basis of public interest, the 
recital also emphasises safeguards.  
 
ORG believes that personal data in this recital should be construed narrowly to only 
include data held on the electoral register. We question whether the use of 
commercial data, such as Experian profiles, would fall into the scope of this recital.  
 
Moreover, the recital requires that appropriate safeguards should be established. If 
the definition of personal data were to be construed widely and include commercial 
data, then those safeguards need to include the objection to the processing of 
personal data for political campaigning purposes, allowing individuals to revoke the 
opportunity for their data to be used in political campaigns.  
 
Unfortunately, many abuses are hard for individuals to detect or complain about. For 
this reason, we were disappointed that Article 80(2) of GDPR was not activated in 
UK law. This provision would allow non-profit privacy organisations to make 
complaints when data protection law appears to be violated without seeking to 









Article 80(2) to be transposed into UK law.  
ICO Advice to clarify whether and when special category data can be used or 
inferred 
Guidance on fair processing. Multiple stakeholders ( EDPSB, academia, lawmakers 




































Appendix A:  
 
i) Financial Transparency Examples: 
 
Brexit Defence Force 
 
‘Brexit Defence Force’ are the declared sponsor of adverts on the “Brexit Votes 
Matter” community page on Facebook. They have been a subject of controversy 
since January when the ‘Brexit Defence Force’ page was taken down by Facebook 
for breaching its community guidelines. They have since resurfaced however as 
sponsors of ads on a new page ‘Brexit Votes Matter’. Neither Brexit Defence Force 
nor Brexit Votes Matter are listed on companies house.  
 
Not only is the ultimate identity of the Brexit Defence Force unknown (which 
renders the Ad Library disclaimer impotent), but a banned group has 













EU Flag Mafia 
 
EU Flag Mafia are both a community page and the given identity of those who pay 
for EU Flag Mafia ads. Their presence was relatively limited, mainly encouraging the 
attendance of an event for which you had to buy tickets.  
 
The EU Flag Mafia website is a commercial website that seems to be capitalising on 
the ‘Remainer’ market to sell a variety of products, including the “Brexit Vegetable 
Growing Survival Kit” for £24.99.  
 
EU Flag Mafia is not listed on Companies House. The name listed under the 
























ii) Options available to ad buyer , 3 examples: 
 




2. Target based on connections, not just on demographics 
 
 








i) Change UK vs Brexit Party on Facebook 
 
 
89 UP’s report on the 2019 European Parliament elections’ digital campaigns  6
focuses on the fact that the Brexit Party far more successful FB campaign that 
Change UK, despite only spending ⅕ of the same budget. Why?  
 
- The Brexit party understood their audience better- possibly through 
better data analysis and expertise​. It was easier for them to hone their 
messaging. Presumably their was work done outside of the regulated period. 
Change UK wouldn’t have had that kind of data infrastructure to model the 
electorate.  
 
- The Brexit party were far more active -more posts and more shares​. Over 
the period 5th April - 23rd May 2019 Brexit Party made 212 posts, Change UK 
made 62. The Brexit Party received 325,900 shares compared to Change 
UK’s 7,200. Over this period on Facebook, the Brexit Party gained 30,200 











ii)  Leadership mailing list proxy for Boris Johnson 
 
This would have cost nothing to send to thousands. 
Previously this exposure would have necessitated expensive ad buys in national 
newspapers. 
 
This sets a worrying precedent for future political activity in the UK. Do 3rd party 











iii) Open Rights Group has submitted Subject Access Requests to Political 
Parties, parties have a month to reply or face complaint. Here’s what we have 
received so far:  
 
Labour Party: Generic explanation as to why they would not not respond in time  
Brexit Party: did not respond so complaint submitted to the ICO  
Scottish National Party: No data held on me but they said that was only because I 
am not on the electoral register in Scotland - presumably they do hold data on 
people that are.  
Change UK: No data held  
Green Party: No data held 
Conservatives: Did hold Experian Data which had been purchased.  
Experian assign a group, type and segment to the population. Groups range from A 
to O; Types from 1 to 66; Segments from _ ​1 to ​_238. 
 
This is created from a large number of sources. Most is from Experian's 
ConsumerView Database. They (Experian) also use the 2011 census. We were 
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About Privacy International 
 
Privacy International (PI) is a leading charity advocating for strong national, regional, and 
international laws that protect the right to privacy around the world. Founded in 1990 and 
based in London, PI challenges overreaching state and corporate surveillance so that people 
everywhere can have greater security and freedom through greater personal privacy. 
 
Within its range of activities, PI investigates how peoples’ personal data is generated and 
exploited, and how it can be protected through legal and technological frameworks.  
 
PI employs technologists, investigators, policy experts, and lawyers, who work together to 
understand the technical underpinnings of emerging technology and to consider how existing 
legal definitions and frameworks map onto such technology. 
 
PI is frequently called upon to give expert evidence to Parliamentary and Governmental 
committees around the world on privacy issues and has advised, and reported to, among 
others, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, 









From your/your organisation’s perspective, WHAT are the top issues we 
should be aware of with regard to each of the below:  Transparency; 
deterrence; monitoring 
 
Transparency and monitoring 
 
Privacy International believes that transparency of digital advertising and online political 
campaigning is fundamental to ensure free and fair elections in the modern age. Political 
campaigns around the world have turned into sophisticated data operations. The Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, while not unique, raised awareness about the potential impact of the 
combination of profiling, micro-targeting and powerful machine learning on electoral 
processes. 
 
Privacy International has documented how online targeted advertising is facilitated by a 
complex and opaque ecosystem that includes AdTech companies, data brokers, and other 
third-party companies that track people on websites and apps and combine this data with 
offline information. Profiling and data-driven targeting techniques used by the broader 
digital advertising industry are increasingly deployed in the political campaigning context, 
with various companies offering specific services tailored to the election context. In the UK, the 
Information Commissioner's report Democracy Disrupted1 and updates to the DCMS Committee 
in July2 and November3 2018 reference a number of such companies. 
 
Companies and political parties are subject to the principle of transparency under Article 5 of 
GDPR and under a duty to provide information to those whose data they process (Article 13 
and 14 of GDPR) as well as information as how it has been processed and to provide access 
to it (Article 15 of GDPR). To date, there is a long way to go in terms of their compliance with 
these provisions (as Privacy International highlighted in submissions4 to the ICO and other data 
protection authorities about a number of companies in the data broker and ad tech sector). 
GDPR is only just over a year old and still in the early phases of enforcement. More needs to 
be done to ensure that all actors pro-actively implement and respect these obligations. 
 
Transparency at every level must be proactive and up to date. Adequate information should 
be provided to voters explaining why they are receiving a particular message, who is 
responsible for it, and how they can exercise their rights to protect their data and prevent 
being targeted. Such transparency should not be limited to advertising, but also include the 
delivery of other content, such as the methods of curation, filtering, pushing, and 
recommendation of content.  
 
Transparency to individuals about why they are seeing a particular message must be 
accompanied by transparency by political parties and campaigns of the tools and services 
they are using, as well as their messaging. This includes providing much more information on 
the sources of data, what is being done with that data, who is being targeted with what 
messages and what companies are being contracted and for what services, such as a 
campaign software, consultancy services etc. 










Political parties and other political actors should, as a minimum: 
 
• ensure that the public can easily recognise political messages and communications as 
well as the party, foundation or organisation behind them. They should make available 
on their websites and as part of the communication, information on any targeting 
criteria used in the dissemination of such communications. 
• be transparent as to the third parties they contract with as part of their campaigns 
both to obtain data and to further process data, including profiling and targeting, such 
as data brokers and political advertising companies together with those that provide 
consultancy services and software. 
 
Companies that are hosting or distributing political advertising must, at a minimum, disclose 
information as to: 
 
• how political advertising and social 'issue-based' advertising is defined; 
• number of impressions that an ad received within specific geographic and 
demographic criteria (e.g. within a political district, in a certain age range), broken 
down by paid vs. organic reach; 
• targeting criteria used by advertisers to design their ad campaign, as well as 
information about the audience that the ad actually reached; 
• information about ad spend per political actor; 
• information about microtargeting, including whether the ad was a/b tested and the 
different versions of the ad; if the ad used a lookalike audience; the features (race/ 
ethnicity, gender, geography, etc.) used to create that audience; if the ad was 
directed at platform-defined user segments or interests, and the segments or interests 
used; or if the ad was targeted based on a user list the advertiser already possessed. 
 
Recently, a variety of transparency tools have been developed, including extensions which 
users can add, such as WhoTargetsMe5 or recently in Argentina Publi Electoral6 , and ad 
archives by major platforms. These responses are important in terms of the information that is 
provided to individuals and also the information that can be gathered for the purposes of 
research and scrutiny.  The ad archives are a work in progress and there remains much to be 
done. It is still unclear how they apply across the world and researchers have faced 
difficulties7 despite setting out some steps that could be taken to make the ad archives more 
effective.8  
 
Furthermore, despite political parties and campaigns being required to provide certain 
information as noted above, privacy policies where at least some level of transparency could 
be provided without reliance on third parties, also to do not provide enough details. For 
example, see our analysis of the Conservative party leadership campaign.9  Further 
transparency was also a key part of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation.10  
 
                                                      
5 https://whotargets.me/en/  
6 https://publielectoral.adc.org.ar/ 








Privacy International recommends that the APPG map out such tools and efforts, in consultation 
with those regulators already considering this issue, including the UK ICO and the Electoral 




The GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 ("DPA") already provide the UK with tools to 
begin to tackle some of the issues of concern to the APPG. Privacy International encourages 
measures to support the enforcement of this regulatory regime. In theory, data protection law 
in the UK strengthens the rights of individuals with regard to the protection of their data, 
imposes more stringent obligations on those processing personal data, and provides for 
stronger regulatory enforcement powers. In practice, just over one year on, a lot more still 
needs to be done and changes are only starting to take place. 
 
Privacy International has identified three main shortcomings related to the 
deterrence/enforcement legal framework in the UK. 
 
First, the DPA contains exemptions for political parties that threaten to undermine protections. 
Paragraph 22 of Schedule 1 of the DPA 2018 permits political parties to process personal 
data “revealing political opinions” without the need for consent.  
 
Privacy International and other organisations expressed serious concerns about this loophole 
during the drafting the DPA 2018, and we called (so far to no avail) on all main UK political 
parties to publicly commit not using the exemption provided in the law to target voters - both 
online and offline - in all local and national forthcoming elections or by-elections.11 A similar 
provision in the Spanish data protection law has since been declared unconstitutional12 and 
another in Romania is the subject of a complaint to the European Commission.13 
 
PI recommends that the APPG investigate how and for what purposes political parties in the 
UK are relying on this provision.  
 
Second, there is a need for collective redress mechanisms that empower civil society, which are 
currently not envisioned in the law. 
 
Regulatory regimes are stronger and more effective if the ability of individuals to make 
complaints is supplemented by the ability of civil society acting in the public interest to bring 
complaints. This is particularly important if complaints are to address and prompt scrutiny of 
systemic issues, including those that might impact on more than one individual, particular 
groups, or society as a whole. This is recognised to an extent, for example, in the introduction 
of Police Super-complaints.14  This mechanism has been used by Liberty and Southhall Black 
Sisters to challenge Police data sharing for immigration purposes.15  
Such mechanisms are particularly important from a privacy perspective, as privacy invasions 
are often invisible, harms frequently only happen in the future, and they always affect some 











people more than others. The need for a form of collective redress and to empower civil 
society to take action is recognised in Article 80(2) of GDPR. Article 80(2) provides for the 
ability of "not-for-profit body, organisation or association, which has been properly 
constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State, has statutory objectives which are 
in the public interest, and is active in the field of the protection of data subjects' rights and 
freedoms with regard to the protection of their personal data" to make complaints and seek 
an effective remedy under GDPR independently of a data subject's mandate. The benefits of 
such a provision have been explained by the European Data Protection Supervisor16 and by 
Privacy International.17 In spite of this, Article 80(2) of GDPR was not implemented in the DPA. 
Instead, it will be the subject of a review 30 months from the DPA having come into force 
(section 189(2)(c) of the DPA).  
 
PI encourages the APPG to consider mechanisms for the introduction of a super complaints or 
other forms of collective redress (such as in Article 80(2) of GDPR) to enable civil society to 
tackle systemic issues undermining protections for individuals and society. Any such measure 
should supplement and bolster, not replace, the ability of individuals to complain and/or to be 
represented by civil society in complaints. At a minimum, the APPG should engage with the 
promised review of Article 80(2).  
 
Third, there is a need for joint cooperation and enforcement between regulators.  
 
Threats to the election come from different actors and require both the engagement of 
multiple regulators as well as coordination among them. This need for coordination in 
enforcement (and monitoring) was highlighted in measures adopted by the EU in the run up to 
the 2019 European Parliament elections. The EU demanded measures from European member 
states, particularly focussing on cooperation between national authorities with competences in 
electoral matters and authorities in connected fields (such as data protection authorities, media 
regulators, cyber security authorities etc). 
 
Given the role of personal data, it was considered of particular importance that the data 
protection authorities collaborate with relevant election authorities both at national and 
European levels, including in sanctioning infringement of data protection rules where such 
infringement is linked to political activities by a political party18 As noted by the European 
Commission, “it should be possible to impose sanctions on political parties or political 
foundations that take advantage of infringements of data protection rules with a view to 
deliberately influencing the outcome of elections to the European Parliament.” 
 
For that purpose, a procedure at the European level has been introduced to ensure the 
sanctioning of actions that not only breach people’s privacy but that “could also potentially 
influence the outcome of elections to the European Parliament”. The proposal allows for the 
sanctions to be imposed by the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political 
Foundations. They could amount to 5% of the annual budget of the European party or 
foundation concerned. In addition, the European party or foundation subject to a sanction 
would not be able to receive funding from the EU budget the following year.  
 
                                                      
16 https://edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/blog/civil-society-organisations-natural-
allies-data-protection_en 




PI recommends the APPG consider mechanisms to ensure stronger cooperation among 
regulatory authorities in this field as well as engagement with other regulators and 
legislatures looking at similar issues around the world. 
 
From your/your organisation’s perspective, HOW would you propose dealing 
with the top issues you raised in each area? Laws, regulations and specific 
recommendations are appreciated:  Transparency; deterrence; monitoring 
 
Our proposals are incorporated into our previous answer addressing the top issues. 
 
If not previously addressed, do you have specific thoughts on the below four proposals? 
 
(1) Provide the Electoral Commission with the resources they need to promptly investigate 
and prosecute those who break electoral law with specialised electoral offence officers. 
Fines for electoral offences should be unlimited rather than a maximum of £20,000, 
which is an insufficient deterrent. 
 
If we look at this issue form a data protection perspective, we can see that a lack of or weak 
enforcement also creates a culture of non-compliance. The previous maximum fine of 
£500,000 under the Data Protection Act 1998 did not appear to act as a significant 
deterrent, as many of the practices which we see today would have fallen short of the DPA 
1998's requirements. For this reason, Data Protection Authorities were further empowered 
under GDPR to fine up to, the greater of €20millon or 4% of global annual turnover. The 
Electoral Commission could no doubt benefit from being similarly empowered. However, 
monetary penalties should not be the only sanction and consideration should be given of what 
type of behaviour can be prohibited as part of a sanction.  
 
(2) Report campaign spending online. Even candidate campaigns should be required to 
declare their expenditures online. This includes creating a national database for election 
spending. 
 
Privacy International supports the proposal to include additional requirements related to 
expenditures for online campaigning. Political parties and other actors are increasingly using 
social media platforms and other digital communications means both for targeting potential 
individual donors (particularly for small donations) and for spending on political advertising. 
 
Campaign financing is notoriously difficult to monitor. Even more, recent and ongoing 
investigations have shown how the traditional rules of campaign financing fail to regulate and 
shed a light on these new forms of online fundraising and expenditures. In its 2018 report on 
online manipulation and personal data, the European Data Protection Supervisor noted that 
“the reported spending on campaign materials may not provide sufficient details about 
spending on digital advertising and associated services, e.g. targeted ads on social media, 
analytics services, creation of voter databases, engagement with data brokers.”.19 In this 
regard we note that the Electoral Commission has also called for changes in the laws to 
increase transparency for voters in digital campaigning, including on spend.20 
 
                                                      




Privacy International recommends that campaign finance law require timely online reporting 
on spending on online campaigning and on the funding obtained online. The information 
should be sufficiently granular and detailed to promote transparency and accountability. This 
should include provisions to require political parties and other political actors to make publicly 
available (e.g.as a minimum, prominently on their websites) information on their expenditure 
for online activities, including paid online political advertisements and communications. This 
should include information regarding which third parties, if any, have assisted the political 
actors with their online activities, including the amount spent on each third parties’ services. 
 
To ensure effective monitoring the disclosure of campaign expenditure should be broken down 
into meaningful categories such as amount spent on types of content on each social media 
platform, information about the campaign’s intended target audience on platforms, as well as 
actual reached audience. Additionally, the law should require the disclosure of information on 
groups that support political campaigns, yet are not officially associated with the campaign, 
and disclosure of campaign expenditure for online activities, including paid online political 
advertisements and communications. 
 
(4) Ensure parity between political offline and digital advertising in the election period. 
This includes creating an online repository of all digital ads, enforcing imprints on digital 
ads and making targeting and financing details less than two clicks away. 
 
One of the current key campaigning safeguards is to ensure that political parties and other 
contestants have equal and fair access to traditional media and that reporting by publicly 
owned media is fair and not partisan. The rationale for these obligations (of impartiality, 
fairness, balance, and equality during elections) is the ‘scarcity assumption’, i.e. the fact that 
opportunities to access traditional media are limited. This ‘scarcity’, it is assumed, would not 
apply to online media, given the facility and variety of sources of opinions and access to them. 
However, this assumption does not take into consideration the market concentration in the 
digital communications field and the way information is distributed and shared by digital 
platforms (notably search engines and social media platforms, including messaging apps). 
 
A few giant tech companies act as gatekeepers of the digital content which most individuals 
access online. As noted by the European Data Protection Supervisor, “data analytics could 
help individuals navigate through the increasingly noisy information environment” but “in 
effect, the forum for public discourse and the available space for freedom of speech is now 
bounded by the profit motives of powerful private companies.21 
 
In particular, search engines and social media platforms filter the news and opinions users 
access based on profiling. This goes beyond paid-for targeted advertisements and promotion 
of content to the way all content is displayed and recommended (for example, the 
personalisation of Google search results22; Facebook’s newsfeed23; or YouTube’s 
recommendations.24 These data targeting techniques expose individuals only to selected 
political messages and political information, directly challenging the assumption that a wide 
spectrum of opinions and content in the online media is easily available to anyone. Effects like 
filter bubbles, etc. are direct consequences of such targeting and have significant effects on 
the formation of political opinions and ultimately on elections. 
 
                                                      
21 https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-19_online_manipulation_en.pdf  
22 https://www.google.com/search/howsearchworks/algorithms/  
23 https://www.facebook.com/help/1155510281178725  
24 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html  
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Privacy International acknowledges that regulating the online space is complex and fraught 
with risks (including of unduly limiting freedom of expression and of access to information) For 
these reasons, Privacy International advocates for caution. However, there are some measures, 
based on existing obligations under data protection law, that require urgent enforcement and 
would provide some protection. At the very minimum, internet and social media platforms must 
be transparent about their profiling activities, including for the personalisation of what people 
see. The use of personal data for profiling must also comply with data protection standards. 
 
Additionally, Privacy International supports the adoption of measures aimed at enhancing 
transparency in this field (as noted in the previous answer.)  Given the difficulties in defining 
what constitutes political advertising and the many actors involved, effective ads transparency 
must go beyond just political ads or scrutiny limited to one particular platform. Solutions must 
enable meaningful transparency for users as well as enable effective scrutiny by researchers 
and civil society.   
 
The APPG should consider how these challenges might be surmounted, for example with an 
online repository of all digital ads. 
  
 10 
Is there anything else you would like to share with the APPG? 
 
Privacy International has recently published a few briefings related to data and elections 
which may be of interest to the APPG, including: 
     
• Data Exploitation and Democratic Societies: https://privacyinternational.org/long-
read/2850/data-exploitation-and-democratic-societies  
• Technology, data and elections: A ‘checklist’ on the election cycle, June 2019: 
https://privacyinternational.org/advocacy/3093/technology-data-and-elections-
checklist-election-cycle 
• European Parliament elections – protecting our data to protect us against manipulation 
(https://privacyinternational.org/news-analysis/2824/european-parliament-elections-
protecting-our-data-protect-us-against) 
• Privacy International’s Response to the Open Consultation on the Online Harms White 
Paper: https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2019-
07/Online%20Harms%20Response%20-%20Privacy%20International_0.pdf 
• When your data becomes political, video: 
https://privacyinternational.org/video/2937/video-your-vote-sale-political-
advertisers-think-so  
• Privacy International's Response to the ICO's Call for Views on a Code of Practice for 
the use of personal information in political campaigns : 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/advocacy/2838/pi-response-ico-call-views-
code-practice-use-personal-information-political-campaigns 
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1. There are a number of proposals that have been put forward by various organisations, 
which will make a good start in updating the legal framework for election campaigns. Such 
measures include: 
- Extending the imprint requirements ​. Updating the imprint requirements is an 
obvious move, which has been advocated for a number of years and on which the 
Government has been consulting.  The challenges for such a measure are practical: 2
such as how to include the details where the communication has limited space; 
determining (with clarity) which publications are subject to the requirements; and 
how to monitor compliance. 
- A database of political advertisements ​. While the technology firms are 
implementing publicly accessible libraries of paid advertisements, there is a strong 
case for regulatory oversight to ensure that the database is mandatory, easily 
accessible and includes all the relevant information (such as the content of message, 
the true identity of the person behind the message and the amounts spent).  
- Including more detail in election spending returns ​, so that people can see the how 
the money was spent by parties and other campaigners on digital communications.  
- Updating certain electoral offences ​ (particularly those that were formulated to 
address problems in Victorian era campaigns).   3
 
2. Given that such proposals have been widely discussed elsewhere, I do not go into further 
detail here. Below I outline some further issues to consider. While it may be hoped that there 
are some quick fixes, it is important not to look at a specific rule in isolation and keep in 
mind the broader framework regulating political finance.  Moreover, while the current 
concerns about campaigns tend to focus on transparency and targeted advertising, there are 
some old problems in political finance that remain, and some newer issues that may become 
more pressing in the future.  
 
3. Before looking at a few specific issues, it worth noting that while transparency is an 
important part of the framework for election law and often a first step in diagnosing a 
problem, it does not generate public confidence by itself. By releasing more information, 
there is a risk that people will simply speculate about the motives of the person financing a 
campaign. That has been the experience resulting from the disclosure of political donations, 
which has often fuelled controversy. To some degree, this is unavoidable, but it is important 
to be realistic about what transparency can achieve.  
 
 
Political advertisements  
4. Rules regulating political advertising are a central component in the legal framework for 
elections. Much of the current attention is focused on direct paid advertising on the digital 
1*​ Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Oxford, and Fellow, University College, Oxford. The 
evidence provided reflects the views of the author.  
2 Cabinet Office, ​Protecting the Debate​ (May 2019).  
3 See the Law Commission, ​Electoral Law: An Interim Report​ (2016).  
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media (as with the database of adverts and the imprint requirements discussed above). That 
is, of course, just one type of communication that could be subject to regulation. A more 
challenging issue is where a person is paid to post content on the digital media. In such a 
case, the message may not be labelled as a sponsored post and would appear to be an 
individual speaking on his or her own behalf. In the commercial sphere, there are provisions 
regulating such types of sponsored message (see the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008).  
 
5. The Electoral Commission has suggested that such communications could be covered 
through an extension of the imprint requirements.  However, it is not clear to me whether 4
such an extension would cover social media posts by individuals (and therefore whether it 
would cover ​paid ​ social media posts). A separate option may be to impose a more general 
requirement for people to reveal when a political message is sponsored (going beyond 
election messages). There would be challenges in monitoring compliance with such a rule 
(though that is true with commercial communications), but such a measure could at least 




6. Some of the old problems relating to political finance have not gone away. Very large 
donations are still being made to political parties. Large donations have been the cause of 
many scandals, and there is every reason to expect the controversy to return in the future. 
Any major review of political finance will have to revisit this issue. 
 
7. At the other end of the scale, contributions below £500 are disregarded for the purposes of 
the law regulating political donations  and therefore do not have to be from a permissible 5
donor (as defined under PPERA). There are concerns that the £500 threshold allows political 
parties to receive foreign donations (which is particularly easy through online appeals for 
funds). Further research is required to see if this is a significant problem. There are two 
potential issues. The first is whether there are sufficient safeguards to prevent larger foreign 
donations being made through an aggregation of multiple contributions of less than £500 (for 
example by small donations being spread through proxy donors outside of the jurisdiction). 
The current anti-evasion rules could restrict such a pattern of small donations  and the 6
political party is expected to have some systems in place to minimise the risk of receiving an 
impermissible donation. However, there could be challenges for either a party or regulator to 
detect such aggregate payments. The second issue is that even if there is no such aggregation, 
there can still be concerns if lots of donations of less than £500 are being sought from foreign 
donors, such that a UK political party could become responsive to overseas interests.  
 
8. The role of company donations is another longstanding issue in relation to political finance 
and raise the following problems:   7
4 Electoral Commission, ​Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters ​(2018) p.8.  
5 PPERA 2000, s.52. 
6 The Electoral Commission asks to be notified where there is an attempt to evade the rules, see Electoral 
Commission, ​Managing Donations to Political Parties ​, p.6. 
7 See discussion in the Electoral Commission, ​A regulatory review of the UK’s party and election finance laws 
(2013) and Electoral Commission, ​Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters ​(2018), p.18-19.  
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- Lack of transparency. While it is possible to find out information about the donating 
company, how the company acquired its funds (and from what source) may not be 
known.   8
- The company trading in the UK may be owned by a foreign national or company, but 
will still be a permissible donor. Companies can therefore provide a way for foreign 
money to finance political parties (which would not be permissible as a direct 
donation by the individual). 
- The threshold to establish that a company is trading in the UK is not high and can lead 
to a suspicion where the donation exceeds the company’s UK profits. 
- Using company funds to make a donation may be more tax efficient for the owner 
than drawing the money out of the company as income to make a donation as an 
individual.  The owner of a company thereby has a tax advantage which is not 9




9. Third party electoral activity is covered by the current regulations on campaign spending 
and donation disclosure. One of the main challenges in this area lies in defining the scope of 
regulated third party activity. If drawn too narrowly, then independent organisations will 
provide a route for political money to avoid election laws. However, extending the reach of 
third party controls can also generate controversy about the excessive burdening of 
independent political activity and restricting freedom of expression (reflected in debates 
surrounding the enactment of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and 
Trade Union Administration Act 2014). There is a delicate balance to be struck between the 
competing rights and interests. 
 
10. Third party digital campaigning poses some further challenges for a regulator. In 
particular, a regulator will face difficulties in monitoring all the websites or organisations 
potentially spending money on election campaigns online. In many cases, the sums spent may 
be well below the threshold for registration, but it will be difficult to know exactly how much 
is being spent on electoral activities (particularly where the organisation/publisher uses the 
same resources on non-electoral communications). Moreover, it may not be clear when a 
publication engaging in electoral advocacy online should be benefit from the media 
exemption from third party controls.  
 
11. More specifically, there have been some recent concerns about third party political 
activity outside the context of an election. For example, an organisation may target people on 
social media urging them to contact an MP about a particular issue. There may be relatively 
little information about who is behind that campaign. While such activity can be considered 
as a form of lobbying, it would not be covered under the current rules for the Register of 
Consultant Lobbyists (which is limited to the direct lobbying of Ministers and Permanent 
Secretaries).  The register does not cover lobbying activities that attempt to mobilise 10
members of the public to contact an office holder. One measure worth further consideration is 
8 However, there are provisions that aim to prevent a person or organisation being used as front for donations 
from others, see PPERA 2000, s. 54(6), s.54A and s.61. For provisions requiring a level of transparency from 
unincorporated associations, see PPERA, Schedule 19A.  
9 See R. Williams, ‘Regulating Political Donations by Companies: Challenges and Misconceptions’ (2012) 75 
Modern Law Review​ 951.  
10 Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014, s.2(3).  
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whether paid attempts to mobilise the public to write to/apply pressure on an office holder 
should be disclosed by certain types of organisation. The Canadian Lobbying Act, for 
example, contains a requirement for the professional lobbyist to disclose details of 
‘grass-roots communications’.  Such a measure would be a substantial expansion of 11
lobbying regulation in the UK and would need to be carefully considered. I offer this as a 




12. The regulation of the media has shaped the way elections are conducted in the UK. The 
ban on political advertising on television and radio has been a key feature that has helped to 
keep the cost of campaigns down. The regulation of the broadcast media has prevented 
broadcast licence holders using channels for political advocacy and has aimed to ensure that 
viewers receive a range of different political viewpoints (although I put to one side the debate 
about the success of such measures). That framework remains an important part of the system 
of election communications, which shapes how audience assess and interpret messages 
received on the digital media.   12
 
13. The developments in the digital media are likely to put some aspects of media regulation 
under strain (and may already be doing so). For example, the UK has long expected the 
audio-visual media to conform to standards of impartiality. While there is much audio-visual 
content on the digital media, the closest competitors to traditional television are TV 
on-demand services. At present the leading on-demand services do not provide news or 
election coverage, but if they were to provide such content (which could easily be done, 
especially where the on-demand service has a link with or owns a newspaper) it would have a 
very wide reach and operate outside of the current impartiality rules. That could change the 
experience of citizens watching news on television and have a broader effect on the coverage 
and communication of election messages. There is an important debate about how media 
regulation should adapt to the online services. I do not advocate a particular extension of the 
law here, but raise the point to show how changes to the system of election coverage should 




14. A final point is whether the technology companies that host user content and enable 
people to locate content should be subject to specialist regulation in elections. Such 
regulation is already anticipated in the government’s White Paper.  In addition to the matters 13
discussed above (such as the database of political adverts), there are further options for 
regulation.  
- Certain technology platforms could be required to offer free advertising during an 
election campaign (to replicate the free mailshot or the access to television), which 
could go out to a general audience (rather than narrowly targeted to sections of the 
electorate).  
11 Canadian Lobbying Act, s.5(2)(j) and see also the guidance from the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying 
of Canada, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/00874.html >. 
12 For discussion in the relation to the USA, see Benkler, Farris and Roberts, ​Network Propaganda​ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018). 
13 Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and Home Department, ​Online Harms White Paper ​. 
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- Companies could be under a duty to ensure that leading political parties or candidates 
gain similar prominence in the material promoted under its services (via the relevant 
algorithms). A search engine could provide links to the leading parties or candidates 
in response to certain queries during an election campaign (with results clearly 
identified as ‘public service results’ and separate from ordinary search results). Again, 
this is not to fix a concrete proposal, but to show that regulation could enhance 
electoral debate and secure exposure to diverse content.  
- The technology companies could be required to provide candidates and parties with 
access to paid advertising on equal terms and conditions.  
- If there are concerns about the ethics of targeted advertising more generally (and I 
leave this question open), for example in so far as it facilitates duplicity, then 
regulations could be imposed to restrict the sale of certain types of targeted political 




Written evidence to the APPG on Electoral Campaigning Transparency 
Bethany Shiner, Middlesex University, London 
This written submission follows on from my oral evidence given 2 July 2019 and includes                             
extracts from my article in ​Public Law ‘Big Data, Small Law: How Gaps in Regulation are                               
Affecting Political Campaigning Methods and the Need for Fundamental Reform’, April                     
2019. 
Central recommendation 
Democracy demands plenty of space for political debate, information sharing, deliberation                     
and opinion forming. Reforms that in any way reduce that space, which is protected by                             
international human rights law, must be avoided. Therefore, reforms should focus not on the                           
content of online political communication but on the method for example by targeting                         
processes like automation on a large scale and or material when the source is unclear or                               
foreign. Regulation must be overseen by a reformed Electoral Commission in close                       
co-operation with the Information Commissioners Office (ICO). To ensure that activist                     
groups that are not associated with registered parties/campaigns and other forms of                       
political communication are not disadvantaged restrictions on methods of political                   
communication must sufficiently clear, accessible and predictable, and proportionate to its                     
aims. There must also be an accessible, independent and affordable process of complaints                         
and appeals.  
Overview 
Before turning to the ‘quick win’ reforms proposed by the APPG, I would like to take a step                                   
back to contextualise the recent explosion of digital political campaigning methods and the                         
growth of disinformation. This is of serious concern but these methods sit within a political                             
system that has long shown measurable signs of increasing electorate disenfranchisement,                     
1
dissatisfaction and distrust. We have to trust the electoral process as well as have faith in the                                 
electoral outcomes, but also feel that it is worth participating in.  
Participants in the Electoral Commission’s research on public perceptions of political finance                       
regulations and digital campaigning were worried about foreign interference but also                     
recognised that our own political parties and political candidates use the exact same                         
techniques as foreign states including dark advertisements, dark money, data exploitation                     
for micro-targeting, disinformation, false promises, misleading statements, citing false                 
statistics as well as breaching spending rules. From this has spawned a huge online                           
2
influence industry with the space that has opened up between the electorate and its                           
representatives being exploited by companies for profit; by foreign states to destabilise; and,                         
by some of our own political candidates for power. 
As such, all reforms must seek to build in basic values to improve the integrity of election                                 
campaigns and political communications. These recent methods of political communication                   
1 See   
https://theconversation.com/why-british-people-dont-trust-the-government-any-more-and-what-can-be-done-a




2 GfK and The Electoral Commission, ‘Political finance regulation and digital campaigning: a public perspective:                             
UK report for qualitative research findings’ April 24, 2018 
are deceitful and in response we need to structurally introduce the principles of                         
accountability and transparency in a way that conforms with international human rights                       
law. This takes us away from needing to prove whether or not these techniques actually                             
3
work - which is incredibly difficult to empirically measure.  
Taking a principle-based approach to establish more trust in the democratic system better                         
helps us future-proof against the effects of emerging technologies that have the capacity to                           
be even more harmful. Already, our concerns around Facebook risk ignoring the emerging                         
global use of WhatsApp which raises of host of different issues because it is a closed and                                 
encrypted network so messages shared on WhatsApp cannot be submitted into a publicly                         
accessible and searchable database of political adverts for scrutiny as easily as Facebook                         
advertisements. Deep fakes have entered the political realm, blurring what is real and what                           
4
is doctored causing confusion or belief in something untrue amongst the electorate and it is                             
5
not clear how proposed reforms will address these.  
There are suggestions that digital strategy firms are deploying tests to detect emotional                         
attachments and values to produce political messages engineered to maximise emotional                     
and psychological impact. As emotion artificial intelligence is developed this is possible and                         
raises more concerns about how the law can preserve political agency. On the horizon lie                             
6
technologies that can detect individuals’ emotional states through data surveillance and                     
promote large-scale behaviour change interventions through smart-phone prompts and can                   
7
read and respond to thoughts. ​Experts warn that it will be increasingly possible to stage                            
8
‘attacks’ based on the data analysis of human behaviours, emotions, and beliefs.   
9
We need to prevent the electorate from becoming more disenfranchised through the                       
cementing of cynicism because the content or method of political communication is too often                           
deceptive, inscrutable and manipulative. This could result in an overwhelmed electorate that                       
finds it increasingly difficult to exercise judgement due to the volume of material and the                             
3 E.g. Article 10 ECHR protects freedom of expression and the International Covenant on Civil and Political                                 
Rights protects everyone’s right to maintain an opinion without interference and to seek, receive and impart                               
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers and through any media. 
4 WhatsApp messages have end-to-end encryption and WhatsApp says even it cannot access messages. Note,                             
however, that research has revealed some weaknesses in the system. See A. Griffin “WhatsApp messages can be                                 
intercepted by Government or Hackers – But there’s an easy way to fix it” ( ​independent.co.uk, January 13, 2017​)                                   
www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/whatsapp-update-security-bug-problem-backdoor-
guardian-issue-how-to-safe-a7525506.html [Accessed 3 July 2019]; and, G. Zanon “No, end-to-end encryption                     
does not prevent Facebook from accessing WhatsApp chats’ ( ​medium.com, April 12, 2018​)                       
https://medium.com/@gzanon/no-end-to-end-encryption-does-not-prevent-facebook-from-accessing-whatsap
p-chats-d7c6508731b2 ​ [Accessed 3 July 2019] 
5 Deep fakes are very easy to make, for example via deepfakesapp.online. See the recent example of the deepfake                                     
of Nancy Pelosi: ‘Doctored Nancy Pelosi video highlights threat of “deepfake” tech’ ( ​cbsnews.com, May 25, 2019)                               
www.cbsnews.com/news/doctored-nancy-pelosi-video-highlights-threat-of-deepfake-tech-2019-05-25/ 
[Accessed 3 July 2019] 
6 L. Goasduff, “Emotion AI Will Personalize Interactions” (Smarter With Gartner, 22 January 2018),                           
www.gartner.com/smarterwithgartner/emotion-ai-will-personalize-interactions/ ​ [Accessed 24 January 2019]. 
7 N. Lathia et al, “Smartphones for Large-scale Behavior Change interventions” (2013) 12(3) IEEE Pervasive                             
Computing 66 
8 An MIT headset can read and transcribe thoughts (the internal voice) by measuring subtle neuromuscular                               
signals that are triggered when a person verbalises internally. When someone says words inside his or her head,                                   
the device matches particular signals to particular words, feeding them into a computer with 92% translation                               
success rate. 
9 Future of Humanity Institute, “The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and                           
Mitigation” (arxiv.org, February 2018), ​https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1802/1802.07228.pdf [Accessed 24             
January 2019]. 
inability to differentiate between reliable and unreliable sources. The greatest antidote to this                         
is ​increased deliberation and participation​ which need to be built into our political system. 
Instead of constructing very specific reforms that address the specific harms witnessed                       
during the UK-EU referendum campaign, we should future-proof by thinking up broader,                       
value-based and adaptable changes to the system that are standard-setting and embody                       
basic principles like reasonableness, fairness and predictability.  
The law must not be restrictive or have the effect of curtailing democratic debate but it must                                 
create protect the conditions in which democratic debate can flourish. In regards to the                           
spread of disinformation using bots, trolls and amplification we must ​regulate the method of                           
digital political communication rather than the content of it, ​as far as it is possible. For                               
example, this could involve requiring bots to be clearly marked as bots and subscribing to                             
the same data protection requirements of consent and purpose minimisation or banning                       
10
the use of dark advertisements during election campaign periods.  
Addressing the specific proposals raised in the APPG briefing 
 
1. Provide the Electoral Commission with the resources they need to promptly investigate and                         
prosecute those who break electoral law with specialised electoral offence officers. Fines for                         
electoral offences should be unlimited rather than a maximum of £20,000, which is an                           
insufficient deterrent.  
The Electoral Commission itself needs to be completely reformed e.g. that it employs                         
ex-politicians, not lawyers, does not have a specialist technical team and has insufficient                         
resources. The relationship between the Electoral Commission and the ICO should be                       
formalised as many of these issues cross over into the jurisdiction of both regulators; ​the                            
complex legal framework applicable to micro-targeting, for example, is overlapping                   
provisions in data protection law, direct marketing and electoral law. The Electoral                       
Commission needs the expertise and resources to monitor and investigate contemporary                     
electoral campaign practices. The ICO has benefited from the GDPR and the Data Protection                           
Act 2018 by being given powers that will enable it to respond quickly and effectively to                               
allegations and begin collecting evidence promptly. We need to ensure the Electoral                       
Commission has similar powers and resources and that the law can tackle contemporary                         
electoral practices whilst being flexible enough to anticipate future campaign methods. 
 
As the DCMS has recommended, the Electoral Commission should be able to petition                         
against an election due to illegal actions, which currently can only be brought by an                             
individual. A petition to an election court can lead to an election result being overturned                             
11
on the basis of dishonesty by candidates (as long as that relates to another candidate). But,                               
this does not apply to referendum results even when illegal practices are shown. The                           
proposal to ​remove the cap on fines to make it unlimited is sensible but I suggest there must                                   
be formal guidance on how the Electoral Commission will calculate the fines based on the                             
size of the party or campaign group, the amount spent when electoral law was broken, and                               
other factors such as amount of people affected by the breach. 
2. Report campaign spending online. Even candidate campaigns should be required to declare                       
their expenditures online. This includes creating a national database for election spending. 
Do not see any issues with this beyond ensuring it is not overly burdensome so that smaller                                 
political parties are not overwhelmed by this task. It should aim to make it easier for                               
10 N. Marechal ‘When Bots Tweet: Toward a Normative Framework for Bots on Social Networking Sites’ (2016)                                 
International Journal of Communication ​ 10  
11 Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, ‘Disinformation and ‘fake news’: Final Report’, Eighth Report of 
Session 2017–19, HC 1791, Para 214 
political parties to track, calculate and declare their spending. There is a need to toughen up                               
the regulation on the different caps in spending in local and national elections to avoid the                               
funnelling of money into swing seats which should fall under local spending but might be                             
paid for out of the national budget.   
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3. End financial transfers from the designated campaign. The Electoral Commission’s current                     
rules in a referendum allow the designated campaign to give up to £700,000 to groups as long                                 
as they don’t coordinate their work. 
This seems sensible. 
4. Ensure parity between political offline and digital advertising in the election period. This                         
includes creating an online repository of all digital ads, enforcing imprints on digital ads and                             
making targeting and financing details less than two clicks away.  
Regarding an ​online repository of all digital ads ​, in theory this should ​promote accountability                           
but it must be clarified which types of material will be caught by this requirement. This will                                 
be easier to enforce if it only applies to paid ads because there are thousands of non-paid for                                   
content shared online everyday like memes and videos some of which is ‘organic’ content or                             
seemingly so. Even with paid-for ads, will this apply to content funded by registered                           
political parties, candidates and groups only? How will this requirement be monitored and                         
will there be applicable sanctions if the rules are consistently not complied with? There must                             
be mechanisms to ensure that grassroots campaigns and other groups are not disadvantaged                         
by this requirement. The Electoral Commission has endorsed a social media online                       
13
database of paid-for political ads, which social media companies already said they would                         
implement, instead of endorsing a more robust idea of creating a central public register of                             
14
online political ads that would not be left to social media companies. Also, need to be                               
15
mindful that there could be thousands of ads associated with any one campaign.  
 
The enforcement of imprints on digital ads raises similar complexity in the volume of political                             
content online not all of which is linked to official campaign groups or political parties. Main                               
question is ​how will it be regulated and enforced​. Facebook will not readily accept this                             
burden which may require expensive human moderators to make subjective and contextual                       
judgements calls – or, algorithms which raises issues of wrongly identifying lawful or                         
16
exempted content as being in breach and therefore breaching the freedom of expression and                           
suppressing authentic voices. As such, ​the Electoral Commission should enforce this                     
17
requirement to avoid placing yet more control in the hands of platforms.  
 
12 Tambini et al, “The new political campaigning” (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2017), LSE                                 
Media Policy Project Series, Media Policy Brief 19, p.12, ​http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/71945/ [Accessed 24 January                         
2019] 
13 Difficulties arise because genuine grassroots groups are undermined by ‘astroturfing’ which is fake grassroots                             
activity on social media. 
14 Facebook’s new view ads mechanism will enable users to view all of the advertiser’s material. 
15 Electoral Commission, Digital campaigning: Increasing transparency for voters and Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee, Disinformation and “fake news”: Interim Report 
16 It is possible Facebook would employ human moderators as it does in Germany in response to the Network                                     
Enforcement Act which privatises law enforcement by requiring platforms to decide whether content is illegal                             
and therefore subject to removal. However, the use of algorithms and automation to monitor online activity                               
(referred to as ‘automation or algorithmic filtering’) is being increasingly used and not without great risk, see the                                   
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, David Kaye, ‘Content Regulation in the Digital Age’,  
https://freedex.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/2015/files/2017/09/Concept-Note-Social-Media-Search-and-FOE.pd
f ​ [Accesses 4 July 2019] 
17 US-based academic, Daphne Keller, has written extensively on this point. In response to the EU Commission’s                                 
Communication on illegal content online, which recommends using filtering technology to moderate online                         
content see D. Keller ‘Problems with filters in the European Commission’s platforms proposal’ (October, 5 2017)                               
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/10/problems-filters-european-commissions-platforms-proposal 
[Accessed 9 July 2019] 
Further questions to consider in regards to this reform include: will material that does not                             
comply be removed? If so, how will such decisions be appealed or reviewed? Note, that                             
Facebook has proposed an independent oversight board which will deliberate decisions on                       
content removal by its moderators which raises several problems in itself despite seeming to                           
be a commendable attempt at building it independent review. How will material that does                           
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not include an imprint be removed considering that it is not possible to delete all traces of a                                   
post especially if it gets shared a lot? There are ways around the imprint requirement such as                                 
paying people to post messages as ordinary users or by relying on the organic spread of                               
material on social media without paying for it. Also, ​it must be clear who this requirement                               
applies to so not to disadvantage or chill the work of activists, grassroots movements, small                             
parties and campaign groups. The imprint should include information about the source of                         
funding for the material and who is responsible for the content (so the party as well as any                                   
consultancy agency). Also need to ​be very clear about ​the material this would apply to –                               
only material published in the regulated period before an election or referendum, or all year                             
round? What about material on specific issues published by activist groups not associated                         
with a party?​   
19
 
Targeting and financing details should be accessible and easily digestible to online users and there                             
needs to be ​a process of ensuring that the information is correct ​. Facebook has introduced                             
new transparency rules which require that people who manage Pages with large numbers of                           
followers need to be verified to prevent outside people or groups shaping debate on                           
domestic issues. The UK-applicable authorisation process only enables Page administrators                   
to post ads about social issues, elections or politics and their identify must be verified                             
through a two-factor authentication process to demonstrate that the administrator is                     
UK-based by showing UK ID and UK-based residential postal address. Location can also be                           
confirmed by Facebook monitoring the location settings and general Facebook activity.                     
20
This requirement can be circumvented by employing a UK-based individual to act as                         
administrator even if the content is being produced or funded by a third country or group                               
based in another country. In terms of the origin of the adverts, it is very easy to change the                                     
location of a Facebook account holder if it is an individual account, IP address or set the                                 




The DCMS recommended “that the Government launches an independent investigation into                     
past elections—including the UK election of 2017, the UK Referendum of 2016, and the                           
Scottish Referendum of 2014—to explore what actually happened with regard to foreign                       
influence, disinformation, funding, voter manipulation, and the sharing of data, so that                       
appropriate changes to the law can be made and lessons can be learnt for future elections                               
and referenda.” This should be supported by the APPG who should also push for an                             
21
independent investigation into past elections​. It is inconceivable that the DCMS’s work has                         
unearthed evidence of interference in the UK’s domestic deliberations about something of                       




om%20%251%24s​ [Accessed 9 July 2019] 
19 Some suggestions made by respondents in response to Q27 of the Cabinet Office’s ‘Protecting the Debate:                                 
Intimidation, Influence and Information’ Government Response, May 2019               
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/799873
/Protecting-the-Debate-Government-Response-2019.05.01.pdf ​ [Accessed 4 July 2019] 
20 ​www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051  
21 Ibid, footnote 11, Para 273 
such constitutional, social, economic and global significance but the Government has refused                       
to further inquire in the absence of proof of that interference having any effect on the                               
outcome even though there is evidence of interference having happened. Whilst                     
understanding the desire to establish stability and not stir further unrest around the Brexit                           
outcome and negotiations, this is an untenable position for the Government to adopt and                           
needs to be challenged.  
 
Close the loophole in the spending limits between local and national election campaigns so                           
that it is not possible for money beyond the stated limits to be poured into marginal seats.                                 
This is an unfortunate symptom of the UK’s First Past the Post System and until and if it is                                     
reformed, can be addressed by better monitoring spending for online campaign material and                         
reporting of spending online which should specify the intended location of campaign                       
material when it is sent by way of custom audience tools or other targeted tools. 
 
The Privacy and Electronic ​Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 prohibit direct                    
marketing through automated telephone calls, fax, email, text messages and post, unless the                         
receiver has given consent. No provision explicitly applies to social media direct marketing.                         
The law should extend the prohibition to automated direct marketing online unless consent                         
has been given​. This will be done if the UK enacts the ePrivacy Regulation concerning the                               
respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications                         
following its departure from the EU because the Regulation will apply to all electronic                           
communications that amount to direct marketing, including targeted advertisements. Also,                   
the right to object to direct marketing applies but individuals should be made aware of this                               
right and how to exercise it at the time consent is sought.  
 
Although the use of big data and profiling is not unlawful, several requirements must be                             
met for the use of data to be lawful, and these requirements become even stricter when the                                 
data reveals political opinions because that is sensitive personal data. The ICO’s ​statutory                         
code of conduct on the use of data in politics must make it clear exactly how data can be                                     
lawfully used by political parties, campaigns and candidates particularly when information                     
about individuals is inferred based on an analysis of non-sensitive data points. In future, it                             
should be abundantly clear that, for example, the use of smartphone apps to hoover up data                             
from the smartphone owner as well as their contact details is unlawful unless consent is                               
22
gained from each person whose data is accessed and that data protection impact                         
assessments must be provided, that the data is obtained only for one or more specified and                               
lawful purposes and be processed compatibly with those purposes only.   
 
Monitoring 
Representatives of online platforms, leading social networks, advertisers and advertising                   
industry have agreed on a self-regulatory Code of Practice to address the spread of online                             
disinformation and fake news across the EU. Further, the ICO, the Electoral Commission                         
23
and the DCMS agree that social media companies should be urged to introduce                         
transparency features. But, if intermediaries are expected to monitor political content online                       
(to determine what is harmful or illegal, and whether any restrictions are complied with),                           
22 As seen during the UK-EU referendum campaign: Information Commissioner’s Office, Investigation into the                           
use of data analytics in political campaigns: Investigation update; T. Peters, “Brexit? There was an app for that”                                   
(Medium.com, 24 June 2016)       
https://medium.com/@uCampaignCEO/brexit-there-was-an-app-for-that-57d1d658b4f [Accessed 24 January       
2019]. 
23 Code of Practice against Disinformation, 29 January 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/code-practice-against-diinformation-2019-jan-29_en ​ [Accessed 9 July 
2019] 
very careful thought must be given to how this can be done while preserving freedom of                               
speech and not enforcing rules unfairly or in a discriminatory way. It must also be                             
deliberated whether such power should be delegated to technology companies.  
 
The same digital interventions that can be heralded as promoting democratic engagement,                       
such as Facebook’s ‘Get out the vote’ campaigns, can also be used to suppress democratic                             
engagement or shape democratic discourse opaquely. If platforms are expected to                     
self-regulate it could make it more likely they will disrupt political campaigns – as Facebook                             
did during the Irish referendum on the Eighth Amendment when, after public pressure, it                           
blocked ads that originated from outside of Ireland. Although this was a legitimate concern,                           
such an intervention is in the gift of intermediaries that make judgement calls as moderators                             
and are not subject to review in the way an administrative decision would be. Facebook’s                             
action in the Irish referendum came late in the campaign cycle and was an unforeseen                             
intervention disadvantaging some campaign groups by disrupting campaign strategies.                 
Interventions like this should be predictable, consistent and transparent. I​n the absence of a                           
solution which removes these risks dialogue between regulators and intermediaries                   
(politicians/campaigns and social media platforms) on monitoring and regulating online                   
political material must be for the purpose of consultation only. We cannot afford to dilute or                               
compromise electoral integrity according to the desires of private interests and corporate                       
profit.  
 
Social media exposes the rules on political advertising to be inconsistent and inadequate in                           
meeting the stated aim of controlling political advertising. An individual can complain                       
about misleading claims on consumer and Government ads, but political ads complained of                         
being misleading, harmful or offensive cannot be investigated. The ​content of ads should not                           
be regulated even when containing clearly erroneous information and misleading                   
information on the basis of the necessarily high protection afforded to free speech political                           
speech - although it such content should be monitored by organisations like the Office for                             
National Statistics. 
 
The idea of a code of conduct to establish minimum standards online has recently                           
re-emerged in the Committee on Standards in Public Life review of intimidation in public                           
life; the Constitution Society report on data and democracy; and, the ICO’s report on the                             
24 25
use of data in politics. It is unclear whether the code would be statutory or not which has                                   
26
implications on what the code should set out. For example, ​a statutory code on political                             
communication could address the method of communication, so as an example a ban on                           
dark ads and/or micro-targeting during regulated election periods. If there was a ban on                           
certain forms of political communication, thought needs to be given as to how the ban is                               
monitored and enforced, as well as processes of appeal and complaint. I would urge against                             
bans being enforced by platforms such as Facebook as this places more power and control in                               
its hands, not less. If there was to be a non-statutory code of conduct, then it could set out                                     
pledges on standards of political communication that address things like misleading content.                       
But, what effect will a non-statutory code have in setting the much higher standards we                             
need to see in political communications? Who will monitor whether the code is followed and                             
24 Committee on Standards in Public Life, Intimidation in Public Life: A Review by the Committee on Standards 
in Public Life (TSO, 2017) Cm.9543. 
25 J.K. Morrison, R. Naik and S. Hankey, Data and Democracy in the Digital Age (London: The Constitution 
Society, 2018), 
https://consoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Stephanie-Hankey-Julianne-Kerr-Morrison-Ravi-Naik-Da
ta-and-Democracy-in-the-Digital-Age.pdf ​ [Accessed 24 January 2019] 
26 Information Commissioner’s Office, Democracy disrupted? Personal information and political influence, p.44. 
enforce it, and what will the sanctions be? The obvious choice is the Electoral Commission,                             
as long as it is subject to the necessary reforms discussed already. 
 
Deterrence 
Being clear on what the values are that we want to imbue within the broader system might                                 
help direct our mind when it comes to deciding how to deter. Preventative strategies are                             
best along with effective means of investigating and enforcing sanctions. This means                       
deciding how we monitor and ensuring regulators have enough resources as well as                         
statutory power.  
 
The GDPR introduces more data rights and restrictions on the use of personal data as well as                                 
proactive principles and requirements. To enforce standards of data use in political                       
communication we need methods of informing individuals of their rights and how to                         
exercise them. An information campaign could be hosted on social media platforms which                         
clearly informs individuals of their right to consent and explicit consent, right to object and                             
withdraw consent, the requirement for data privacy notices, and how to complain. In this                           
vein Article 80(2) GDPR is currently excluded from the Data Protection Act 2018 even                           
though it provides any body, organisation or association the right to lodge a complaint with                             
the supervisory authority, independent of a data subject’s mandate, if data rights may have                           
been infringed as a result of processing. ​Article 80 GDPR should be incorporated into the                             
Data Protection Act 2018 after the statutory review period (or sooner). This would provide a                             
much more effective mechanism for holding controllers to account, through lodging                     
complaints and seeking judicial remedies and compensation, where individual data subjects                     
may not be able to or may not even know there are grounds to do so. 
- Lack of transparency. While it is possible to find out information about the donating 
company, how the company acquired its funds (and from what source) may not be 
known.   8
- The company trading in the UK may be owned by a foreign national or company, but 
will still be a permissible donor. Companies can therefore provide a way for foreign 
money to finance political parties (which would not be permissible as a direct 
donation by the individual). 
- The threshold to establish that a company is trading in the UK is not high and can lead 
to a suspicion where the donation exceeds the company’s UK profits. 
- Using company funds to make a donation may be more tax efficient for the owner 
than drawing the money out of the company as income to make a donation as an 
individual.  The owner of a company thereby has a tax advantage which is not 9




9. Third party electoral activity is covered by the current regulations on campaign spending 
and donation disclosure. One of the main challenges in this area lies in defining the scope of 
regulated third party activity. If drawn too narrowly, then independent organisations will 
provide a route for political money to avoid election laws. However, extending the reach of 
third party controls can also generate controversy about the excessive burdening of 
independent political activity and restricting freedom of expression (reflected in debates 
surrounding the enactment of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and 
Trade Union Administration Act 2014). There is a delicate balance to be struck between the 
competing rights and interests. 
 
10. Third party digital campaigning poses some further challenges for a regulator. In 
particular, a regulator will face difficulties in monitoring all the websites or organisations 
potentially spending money on election campaigns online. In many cases, the sums spent may 
be well below the threshold for registration, but it will be difficult to know exactly how much 
is being spent on electoral activities (particularly where the organisation/publisher uses the 
same resources on non-electoral communications). Moreover, it may not be clear when a 
publication engaging in electoral advocacy online should be benefit from the media 
exemption from third party controls.  
 
11. More specifically, there have been some recent concerns about third party political 
activity outside the context of an election. For example, an organisation may target people on 
social media urging them to contact an MP about a particular issue. There may be relatively 
little information about who is behind that campaign. While such activity can be considered 
as a form of lobbying, it would not be covered under the current rules for the Register of 
Consultant Lobbyists (which is limited to the direct lobbying of Ministers and Permanent 
Secretaries).  The register does not cover lobbying activities that attempt to mobilise 10
members of the public to contact an office holder. One measure worth further consideration is 
8 However, there are provisions that aim to prevent a person or organisation being used as front for donations 
from others, see PPERA 2000, s. 54(6), s.54A and s.61. For provisions requiring a level of transparency from 
unincorporated associations, see PPERA, Schedule 19A.  
9 See R. Williams, ‘Regulating Political Donations by Companies: Challenges and Misconceptions’ (2012) 75 
Modern Law Review​ 951.  
10 Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014, s.2(3).  
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whether paid attempts to mobilise the public to write to/apply pressure on an office holder 
should be disclosed by certain types of organisation. The Canadian Lobbying Act, for 
example, contains a requirement for the professional lobbyist to disclose details of 
‘grass-roots communications’.  Such a measure would be a substantial expansion of 11
lobbying regulation in the UK and would need to be carefully considered. I offer this as a 




12. The regulation of the media has shaped the way elections are conducted in the UK. The 
ban on political advertising on television and radio has been a key feature that has helped to 
keep the cost of campaigns down. The regulation of the broadcast media has prevented 
broadcast licence holders using channels for political advocacy and has aimed to ensure that 
viewers receive a range of different political viewpoints (although I put to one side the debate 
about the success of such measures). That framework remains an important part of the system 
of election communications, which shapes how audience assess and interpret messages 
received on the digital media.   12
 
13. The developments in the digital media are likely to put some aspects of media regulation 
under strain (and may already be doing so). For example, the UK has long expected the 
audio-visual media to conform to standards of impartiality. While there is much audio-visual 
content on the digital media, the closest competitors to traditional television are TV 
on-demand services. At present the leading on-demand services do not provide news or 
election coverage, but if they were to provide such content (which could easily be done, 
especially where the on-demand service has a link with or owns a newspaper) it would have a 
very wide reach and operate outside of the current impartiality rules. That could change the 
experience of citizens watching news on television and have a broader effect on the coverage 
and communication of election messages. There is an important debate about how media 
regulation should adapt to the online services. I do not advocate a particular extension of the 
law here, but raise the point to show how changes to the system of election coverage should 




14. A final point is whether the technology companies that host user content and enable 
people to locate content should be subject to specialist regulation in elections. Such 
regulation is already anticipated in the government’s White Paper.  In addition to the matters 13
discussed above (such as the database of political adverts), there are further options for 
regulation.  
- Certain technology platforms could be required to offer free advertising during an 
election campaign (to replicate the free mailshot or the access to television), which 
could go out to a general audience (rather than narrowly targeted to sections of the 
electorate).  
11 Canadian Lobbying Act, s.5(2)(j) and see also the guidance from the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying 
of Canada, <https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/eic/site/012.nsf/eng/00874.html >. 
12 For discussion in the relation to the USA, see Benkler, Farris and Roberts, ​Network Propaganda​ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2018). 
13 Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and Home Department, ​Online Harms White Paper ​. 
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- Companies could be under a duty to ensure that leading political parties or candidates 
gain similar prominence in the material promoted under its services (via the relevant 
algorithms). A search engine could provide links to the leading parties or candidates 
in response to certain queries during an election campaign (with results clearly 
identified as ‘public service results’ and separate from ordinary search results). Again, 
this is not to fix a concrete proposal, but to show that regulation could enhance 
electoral debate and secure exposure to diverse content.  
- The technology companies could be required to provide candidates and parties with 
access to paid advertising on equal terms and conditions.  
- If there are concerns about the ethics of targeted advertising more generally (and I 
leave this question open), for example in so far as it facilitates duplicity, then 
regulations could be imposed to restrict the sale of certain types of targeted political 






About Who Targets Me 
Who Targets Me is a citizen-led research and activism project studying political advertising             
on social media. We were founded during the 2017 General Election campaign to monitor              
the use of online political ads in real time and discuss their meaning, both political and, more                 
broadly, for British democracy. As part of or work, we have built tools to try and exemplify the                  
levels of transparency that platforms should provide and voters deserve. 
 
In our submission we provide a blueprint for a system of transparency for political advertising               
online, which would create a trustworthy political environment for the average voter. To this              
end we set out firstly, how to set a clear, public standard for transparency, secondly, how to                 
monitor adherence to this standard and thirdly measures to deter violations of this standard.              
Central to our blueprint is a well resourced regulator operating with a mindset which takes               
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● Political online advertising can be a positive part of the political process by helping              
users connect with parties that speak to their political views and encourage them to              
participate in the democratic process. Currently however it is damaging to           
democracy, because it threatens to split political debate and polarise politics further.  
● We need a ​transparency standard​, that is developed as a set of public,             
democratically created rules and enforced by an independent regulator, not by           
private companies. 
● We propose making the effect a given use of ads has on the ​overall functioning of                
democracy ​, measured by how it affects the level of information and confidence            
voters have in that process. 
● To ensure that advertising contributes positively to the democractic process,          
transparency needs to become a feature of the entire ecosystem, from the the             
messages ​, the ​messengers behind them, their ​funding and what ​targeting they           
use. 
● To make ads more transparent, they should be ​clearly marked as political​, paid             
advertising when shows to users and combined with easy access to further            
information. Ads should furthermore be collected in a ​central, publicly run           
repository which provides a comprehensive overview over all ads run within a            
campaign. 
● Regulating political advertising online involves clarifying the role of different          
stakeholders.  
○ Political parties ​: Regulation should enable parties to use the possibilities of           
targeting to convince voters of their policies and candidates, instead of           
competing on technical skill of targeting tiny subsets of the electorate. 
○ Tech platforms ​: The responsibility of the corporations behind online         
platforms need to be redefined taking account of their power to shape public             
opinion. They should be more open about how advertising on their platform            
works and work with regulators to report likely violations. 
○ The regulator ​: An independent, public regulator needs to build the capacity           
to understand political advertising and spot violations, be able to intervene in            
running campaigns and punish offending campaigners severely in order to          
deter manipulation of the electoral process. 
○ The public ​: Citizens are not just passive recipients of electoral transparency,           
they should be at the heart of setting the norms and rules for campaigns. 
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1. Introduction & Rationale  
 
Political advertising on the internet, and particularly on the big social media platforms, is              
rapidly growing in scale and sophistication. What was a novelty a decade ago is now a                
primary campaign technique, with the largest parties spending millions of pounds to buy             
hundreds of millions of impressions of ads in the final weeks of each election campaign.               
Furthermore, these techniques are available to anyone, from a local candidate running for a              
council seat, to a global power working to sow discord. 
 
A regulatory solution must therefore work to ensure that voters and regulators, along with              
journalists and researchers - all of whom contribute to a vibrant democracy - can              
straightforwardly distinguish between a genuine campaign behaving legally and one that is            
concealing its origin and evading scrutiny. We believe the founding principles of this             
distinction are that online political ads must be trustworthy and transparent. 
 
Our guiding ideal is that voters should be able to trust political advertisements they              
see online and spot problematic ones, without acquiring special knowledge or making            
unreasonable effort. Our approach is to introduce radical transparency to online           
political advertising. 
 
1.1. Rationale for introducing radical transparency: 
 
We argue that the public perception of harm to democracy is a harm in itself. A democracy                 
that is seen to be damaged is one that is less trusted, is weaker, and therefore serves                 
citizens worse. One important way political advertisement online harms democracy is the            
fracturing of public debate. Targeted ads allow parties to aim specific messages at narrow              
audiences to attract their votes, without the risk of other groups who reject that message               
being dissuaded from supporting those parties.  
 
Increasing political campaign transparency is an urgent task. The lack of a general standard              
allows certain actors to campaign outside of what most citizens would accept as reasonable              
democratic practice and makes it harder to stop or even fully gauge such behaviour. One               
example are ads explicitly targeted at attacking political opponents’ record or past            
statements, often in well produced videos. Such specific, direct attack ads are relatively new              
the UK political landscape and they can be used much more effectively in combination with               
precise targeting. 
This challenge becomes more urgent as more resources are dedicated to new, data-driven             
methods of campaigning and as technology progresses, adding, for example, advanced           
tracking of citizens and their political views, better analytics and tools to influence public              
opinion to the existing possibilities.  
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Establishing robust standards could instead allow us to reap the benefits of targeted             
advertising for democracy. The technology can help inform voters about key issues they             
care about and relevant policy proposals for tackling them. Done well, it could even be more                
transparent than traditional campaigning, making it easier to scrutinise the messages           
campaigners and parties use with different audiences.  
 
Furthermore, an early, successful UK standard could set an example for other democracies             
which upholds important democractic standards of free and open debate, stopping abuse            
without curtailing legitimate political speech. It could either inspire similar steps in other             
jurisdictions, or be directly linked up with international efforts to enhance transparency. 
 
2. Radical Transparency Standard: Our proposal 
 
We believe a public standard for transparent political advertising is needed, because without             
it the rules for online advertising will be set by the corporations running internet platforms.               
Corporate self-regulation has not been successful, as scandals involving the misuse of data             
and spread of disinformation on major social media platforms, most notably surrounding            
Facebook with regard to Cambridge Analytica, show.  
 
Beyond that we believe that structural reasons make corporate standards less effective at             
protecting democracy: 
 
1. Internet platforms are profit-oriented, which will incline and sometimes compel them           
to maximise profit for owners, even when this is detrimental to democracy. These             
incentives can overlap, for example when firms suffer reputational damage which           
endangers their business model. However, they do not necessarily align and will be             
weaker than those of an independent regulator.  
2. Even with the best intentions, private actors might miss crucial risks, due to the              
limited perspective and viewpoints of those steering corporate policy. For example,           
consider Mark Zuckerberg dismissing the idea of Facebook influencing the elections           
as “pretty crazy” or the highly homogenous makeup of the tech firms workforce: Both              1
suggest that companies like Facebook might fail to anticipate larger structural           
problems or issues that affect those underrepresented in their own workforce           
disproportionately. 
3. Lastly, even a ​good corporate policy is less reliable when it comes to reporting and               
enforcement than binding, democratically legitimised rules. Firstly, company policies         
can be changed quickly and without public involvement. Indeed, companies might           
face strong pressure to, for example, drop costly transparency measures if they need             
to cut costs. Secondly, even while rules are in place, violations or failings will not               
always become public: they might be downplayed or hidden to avoid reputational            
damage. In contrast, such obfuscation would be much harder if a powerful regulator             
was enforcing a binding set of standards. 
1 Zuckerberg: the idea that fake news on Facebook influenced the election is ‘crazy’. (2016). The 
Verge. https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/10/13594558/mark-zuckerberg-election-fake-news-trump 
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Consider for example the reluctance of Facebook to agree to share any data on its platforms                
and the allegations by projects similar to Who Targets Me that the platform had intentionally               
altered its code to make it harder to scrape data on ads from the platform . Furthermore the                 2
Facebook Ad Library is a step in the right direction, but still provides limited data for money                 
spent on specific ads and by specific advertisers and often provides patchy or unclear              
information.  
 
2.1. Democratically beneficial political advertising 
 
We believe that online political advertising on the internet can be beneficial to the              
democractic process and should not face an outright ban. Political advertising can add an              
important information source for citizens and online ads can even encourage voters to seek              
out further information on the campaign . Rather there should be a democractic judgement             3
about what citizens are willing to accept and what they are not. We therefore propose the                
following the following test: 
 
Test: Does a proposed advertising practice improve the political process for voters? 
 
I. Does it improve how informed voters are about their political choices? 
II. Can voters be confident that they understand: 
A. The message of any given ad? 
B. Who is behind it? 
C. Who paid for it? 
D. Why they are seeing it? 
III. Can voters trust that violations of electoral and data protection law will be detected              
and punished? 
 
This test should be developed further, especially with regard to what acceptable levels of              
understanding are and how to reach them, by involving the public (see section 4.4.). The               
final version should be understood as a living document, which is periodically reviewed and              
updated to react to technical, social and political developments.  
 
2.2. Systemic Transparency  
 
In order to be effective, radical transparency needs to become a feature of the political               
system, rather than something that is selectively applied to individual platforms or            
stakeholders. To see why, recall our guiding ideal: voters should be able to understand and               
trust the electoral process and the ads they see, without having to go to extraordinary               
2 Ad Tool Facebook Built to Fight Disinformation Doesn’t Work as Advertised. (2019). Nytimes.com. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/technology/facebook-ad-library.html 
3 Housholder et al. (2018) Does Political Advertising Lead to Online Information Seeking? A 
Real-World Test Using Google Search Data, Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 62:2, 
337-353, DOI: 10.1080/08838151.2018.1451854 
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lengths in deciphering subtle details of advertising design, targeting and financing. It is             
important that voters seek out information and acquire media literacy, but neither will be              
sufficient unless the political system is overall trustworthy. This is especially important, as it              
is not realistic to expect that all or even most citizens will have the time or ability to critically                   
scrutinise every ad and political communication they receive – especially given that there is             
currently very little to stop political campaigners from crafting messages and content likely to              
lead recipients into a particular direction. 
 
Ultimately, how much burden can be placed on individuals should be evaluated by involving              
citizens in discussions and finding out both where they consider acceptable levels of             
transparency to lie and how they ‘read’ political ads online: Systemic transparency involves             
understanding the ​message ​, the ​messenger behind it, their ​funding and what ​targeting            
they use. 
 
2.3 Trade-offs  
 
Before proposing specific measures to monitor and track political advertising, we want to             
highlight some important tradeoffs which need to be resolved. 
 
Cost​: Any regulation that requires campaigners and platforms to share additional information            
or adhere to restrictions is likely to impose costs on them. This could both suppress the                
ability of less well resourced interest groups to share their views and campaign as well as                
distort the market for advertising towards larger platforms, who will find it easier to comply.               
To counter such effects, we support a proportional approach to transparency requirements,            
which allows very small advertisers and campaigners exemptions and then rises           
proportionately with their reach/user base, resources and real-world impact. Additionally, as           
suggested by the Home Office/DCMS White Paper on Online Harms , smaller players could             4
receive support in the form of technical solutions and advice making it easier for them to                
comply with regulations.  
 
Legitimate anonymity​: While transparency is a systemic good and necessary for the political             
system to work and detect abuses, we recognise that some individuals and groups will be               
deterred from campaigning on or voicing support for sensitive issues, including sexual            
orientation or matters of belief. We consider it desirable to enable such parties to stay               
anonymous, but would want to see enough friction in getting such status to deter misuse of                
this category. One such solution could be an application process to a public regulator or               
advisory body, which would grant exemptions by weighing the benefit of a given applicant              
being able to take part in the political debate with the cost of reducing transparency. Again,                
better resourced campaigns should face a proportionally higher bar for being allowed to             
remain anonymous. 
 




Free expression: There is justified uneasiness about regulating speech online, which arise in             
the context of tackling problems like disinformation. However, in the case of the electoral              
system, campaign law and advertising rules, speech is already heavily regulated and            
circumscribed. Political advertisement is regulated by strict rules in both content and form:             
certain media, like TV, are entirely off-limits and there are conditions for running political ads.               
Furthermore, we focus on making advertising transparent and advocate few restrictions on            
the ads themselves, which are content-agnostic and focus instead of the form and intended              
effect of ads, such as those that attempt overtly or implicitly to discourage people from voting                
(see part 3).  
 
3. Monitoring: Creating practical transparency 
 
Ads which target specific groups with appealing messages but are not visible to the rest of                
the electorate damage the political process by undermining a common basis for political             
debate and choice. To create systematic transparency, we propose i) making ads more             
easily readable and ii) creating a public register of ads. These tools would provide more               
information, but beyond these practical measures, we want to encourage a democratic            




As discussed above, anybody seeing a political ad should be able to figure out why they are                 
seeing it and have easy access to information about those behind it.  
With regards to the messages themselves, every ad should visually stand out as a political               
ad, both from other content on the platform and commercial advertising. 
Furthermore it should be very easy to gain further information about who the message is               
from, how it was paid for and why the recipient is being targeted. Currently especially the last                 
aspect is inadequate and varies greatly between platforms. While some platforms do display             
information about the party running an ad, it usually does not explain well why it is being                 
shown to some people but not others and others make no such information available.  
 
Ad library/registry: Clearly marking individual ads and providing information is important for            
providing information to citizens, but is not enough to create systematic transparency. The             
same information about messages, messengers, funding and targeting should be available           
to regulators, journalists, researchers and concerned citizens. They need to be able to gain              
an understanding of all ads running during a specific period of time or election, locally and                
nationally, across different platforms, as well as aggregating this information by advertiser,            
funder or cause. Currently data on advertising is provided by two types of sources:              
organisations such as Who Targets Me who collect ad data from volunteers and make it               
available for research and some of the platforms themselves, most notably Facebook, who             
provide some information in their Facebook Ad Library  and Facebook Ad Library Report .  5 6
 
5 Facebook Ad Library https://www.facebook.com/ads/library 
6 Facebook Ad Library Report https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/report 
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This public repository or database should contain the following metrics, displayed in or close              
to real-time and available freely: 
 
● Message ​: Full text of ads, links to them which make it easier to investigate, for               
example reactions to it and social shares 
○ Times an ad was displayed, how many individuals saw it, engagement with            
the ad/clickthrough  
● Messenger ​: Identity of advertisers, with name UK individuals as well as all the ads              
they ran. 
● Funding/Spending​: Amounts spend on pages and by certain funders and the source            
of that money 
● Targeting​: What features (demographics, personal characteristics, locations etc.) are         
and were used to target ads, as well as custom or lookalike audiences? 
 
In recognition of the cost involved with ensuring this transparency, it would be possible to               
introduce different tiers of transparency, mandating higher levels of disclosure for political            
parties and campaigns directly pushing for the election of specific candidates and less             
stringent requirements for general campaigners on political issues. 
 
This platform should not be run or designed by the platforms. As we explained in section 1.,                 
private companies face very different incentive structures and can not be relied on to              
maintain transparency enhancing methods or publish comprehensive data in the most useful            
format. Therefore access to live data and archived information should be independent of             
private companies policies’ or their fortunes. Furthermore, a public database should           
aggregate data from different platforms, allowing scrutiny of an entire campaign or all ads              
bought around an issue, rather than just those running on particular platforms. This             
aggregation of different sources of data presents technical challenges, but has the additional             
benefit of preparing society for future online advertising methods.  
 
Ideally such a platform would exist across countries as well as across platforms. This could               
make patterns of influence visible, both with respect to learnings from one country being              
applied to others, but also suspicious patterns such as external donors supporting political             
movements in different European countries. 
 
4. Deterrence: Compliance standards for different stakeholders 
 
The transparency standard we described above sets out an ideal for the type of information               
citizens need to have for democracy to continue functioning and what role we want online               
advertising to play in our politics. In section 2 we set out how these requirements for                
transparency can be translated into practical measures to make clear who is behind ads and               
make the entire system more trustworthy. Lastly we want to outline how regulations can              
enforce this transparency by i) defining the position of stakeholders in the online advertising              
ecosystem and ii) ensuring these stakeholders follow the rules.  
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Because the technology is relatively new and its widespread use in politics even newer,              
there are no explicit rules for political advertising on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or               
Google Ads. To be effective, regulation needs to clearly define the obligations for different              
stakeholders, most notable advertisers (that is, political parties and campaigners), platforms           
and the regulators overseeing this space.  
 
4.1. Political campaigners 
 
Political campaigners, whether they are parties or groups supporting them or political            
policies should aim to win over voters by winning the political argument and convincing them               
of their plans and candidates. Targeted advertising can be a part of the effort to make                
citizens aware of, say, their campaign’s promises or the merits of a candidate. They should               
not compete on who can most finely slice the electorate into sub-groups and present the               
most flattering image of their party to them or most successfully acquire data to target               
potential voters.  
What counts as acceptable practice in political advertising should be itself the result of              
democratic decisions taken by elected officials based on the test proposed above. For             
example, party A targeting supporters of party B with ads highlighting the discrepancy             
between previous promises and actual voting record of its MP can be useful information for               
such voters, but could also be seen as purely negative voter suppression.  
Regulation could not only limit uses of such tools citizens consider unacceptable, but also              
promote a more positive, constructive political sphere directly: Targeted ads allow parties to             
present extreme or populist messages to voters who like them, without suffering            
consequences from other groups. This is likely to make politics more extreme, as parties not               
so much compete but instead split the population in totally different audiences. Over time              
these could grow smaller and smaller, until theoretically parties could target neighbourhoods            
or streets with custom messages. Such fragmentation undercuts the idea of a community or              
demos which forms the basis of a working democracy and healthy public debate.  
 
Beyond that campaigners should have to register at lower spending limits than is currently              
the case: The Electoral Commission requires individuals to register if they plan to spend over               
£20.000, which can buy a significant volume of ads on a platform such as Facebook without                
much accountability.  
4.2. Technology platforms 
 
The technology platforms running social networking websites have become essential fora for            
political debate and campaigning, but are in many ways neither designed not equipped to              
host it. They have taken great care to defend their status as neutral platforms which do not                 
create their own content and do not take substantive positions on political issues, instead              
relying on community standards as a basis for content moderation. These efforts have been              
stepped up recently, partly as a response to growing dissatisfaction with the prevalence of              
disinformation on social media platforms. In an effort to curb harmful and offensive content,              
firms have taken more decisions about what speech they will allow. While an active stance               
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towards clearly unacceptable content is welcome, many worry about private companies           
wielding the power to effectively decide what speech is allowed to be part of the               
conversation. Some companies have responded to these concerns by appointing          
independent bodies to oversee their policies called for greater regulation or started formally             7 8
cooperating with regulators and governments.  
 
Such steps towards more accountability are welcome, but the quality and integrity of the              
political system should not rely on tech firms making the right decisions. On practical terms,               
platforms running political ads should disclose them publicly as explained in section 3., as              
well as flagging them clearly when showing them to users. Tech platforms should also be               
more open about their work with political campaigns. This is practice is prevalent in the USA,                
where campaigns spend large sums of money and it makes business sense for platforms to               
dedicate staff to helping their clients use their advertising potential effectively. As online             
advertising attracts more and more resources, this model could spread and it should do so               
transparently. Legislation could regulate such cooperation, for example by classifying any           
advice as campaign donations, subject to disclosure rules and spending limits. It could also              
enforce alternative models, for example by banning all cooperation during the campaign,            
limiting any help to an open Q&A session, which all registered campaigners could attend and               
use to ask any question they want. In such a format all questions and answers would be                 
available to all campaigners, reducing undue advantage. They could also be made public. 
 
When tech firms become aware of wrongdoing or violations of (electoral) laws, they should              
notify the authorities and their users who were shown the material in question. This would               
not only support public trust that breaches when they happen will be brought to light, but also                 
provide a powerful incentive for social media firms to avoid becoming a conduit for              
questionable electoral tactics.  
 
Beyond that there should be a broader debate about the status these platforms have and the                
responsibilities they should take on, which goes beyond electoral transparency, touching on            
the immense power of these companies to dominate their corners of the internet and impose               





Online political advertising requires dedicated attention from an existing or new regulator.            
This agency needs the power to enforce the standards laid out above and adapt them as                
circumstances change. To that end, it needs to be independent, both of industry and of               








government, as both advertising platforms and political parties have vested interests in being             
able to sell, buy and run advertising. It would have three main areas of responsibility:  
 
1. Build capacity and understanding of the advertising landscape. This is a condition for             
successfully intervening in this space. We highlight it here, because this space is             
constantly evolving at a rapid pace. Both technical capabilities for data collection,            
analysis and targeting citizens and the political machinery making use of them are             
developing rapidly. This means that the regulator needs to be able to produce             
recommendations to update the regulations covering political ads. However it also           
needs to accept that change will happen faster than such adjustment can be made. 
 
Therefore the regulator needs to take steps anticipating that the rules will be bent as               
well as broken, as campaigners try to find ways to keep within the letter of the law                 
without limiting their impact. We therefore suggest that any regulator tasked with            
overseeing the online political ad space adopt an adversarial mindset, starting from            
the assumption that its rules will be tested.  
 
To this end it needs to stay keenly aware of i) techniques used in political systems all                 
over the world, especially in places known for political innovation, such as the USA              
and ii) techniques used in commercial advertising, such as advanced targeting or            
data collection. Furthermore we suggest using (cyber)security methods such as          
red-teaming, in which and independent group within the regulatory agency is tasked            
with devising ways of circumventing its restrictions. Much like such exercises in            
military, intelligence or cybersecurity context, this could reveal weaknesses in the           
regulators' ability to detect and deter breaches threatening democracy. 
 
2. Detecting violations​: Based on its knowledge of the space, the regulators most            
important task is to detect violations of transparency standards and wider electoral            
law connected to online ads. The guiding ideal here remains a situation in which              
citizens can broadly trust the ads they see and turn to an independent party when               
they are suspicious that rules are being broken.  
 
This includes detecting ways to bypass restrictions such as spending limits by            
coordinating ad-buying or sharing data and other assets. One route to doing this             
would be to analyse ads on a given topic, searching for patterns in messaging or in                
the demographics targeted. 
 
The regulator should aim to track campaigns as they happen, using both the             
real-time information provided by platforms and its capabilities for looking for           
irregularities in those data, but also the investigative ability described above. The            
regulator should furthermore give citizens the ability to report ads that they are             
suspicious of directly. We recognise that this will likely create a high workload, but it               
could be invaluable both to detecting ads which contravene regulations. When this            
happens, the regulator should have the power to take ads offline quickly, publicise             
any misdoing, suspend the offending parties from running further ads during the            
campaign or issue fines as appropriate. This would immediately stop any distortions            
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detected and furthermore provide deter campaigners and platforms from running the           
ads in the first place. 
 
3. Deterring ​: The regulator should apply its powers to stop and punish violations as set              
out above and thereby deter parties from running illicit ads in the first place. The               
exact level of punishments above suspending offending ads should be determined in            
line with what is considered acceptable and the likely harm to the democractic             
process. The could include: 
a. Substantial fines. These need to be proportional both to the damage caused            
and to the resources available to campaigns and should be set at a level that               
is genuinely painful for even well resourced, major parties.  
It should furthermore be determined in what situation fines should be levied at             
the platforms carrying political ads as well as those parties running them. We             
are not advocating giving tech firms a role to decide what is politically             
acceptable speech, but would require them to reject blatantly fraudulent          
campaigns or breaches of law, as well as closing technical loopholes           
wherever possible.  
b. Mandatory licensing: A campaigner who has violated rules regarding political          
advertising could be placed under additional scrutiny and made to clear their            
ads with the regulator before they are shown to members of the public.  
c. Bans from campaigning: A more extreme solution would be to ban certain            
groups or individuals from engaging in campaigning activitiy for a period of            
time. This could apply to political consultants found to systematically facilitate           
circumvention of electoral laws and would present a very strong incentive to            
run clean campaigns.  
 
These measures should make campaigners carefully consider the use of new tools            
and, where in doubt see further advice from the regulator. Many of these present              
suggestions, which should be carefully weighed by policy- and lawmakers. Ideally,           
this process should allow for a high amount of input from the public, as we lay out in                  
the next section. 
  
4.4. Citizens  
 
We have so far mainly referred to citizens as beneficiaries of transparency in political              
advertising online. We furthermore believe that they should be involved as much as possible              
in responding to questions which go right to the heart of the democractic process. Ultimately               
it is citizens who should decide what they consider to be acceptable conduct in an electoral                
contest, even though in practice the government will have to act to limit malicious behaviour.  
 
We have proposed limited certain kinds of political advertising, because we believe they are              
not in the interest of voters making democratic decisions. When asked, people do not agree               
with the amount of data that is collected about them and the targeting that is used for. They                  
do not believe social media companies do enough to prevent unethical behaviour on their              
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platforms . 61% of Britons believe that the government should do more to separate what is               9
false and true online . 10
 
Beyond a general sense that something ought to be done however, it would be helpful to ask                 
members of the public where they would draw the line, for example when it comes to ads                 
being targeted with the aim of showing the failings of one's political opponents or whether               
political ads should be shareable on social media platforms, giving them additional reach.             
Especially in these febrie political times, public support would strengthen the legitimacy of             
any steps limiting political speech. This could be gathered through surveys and focus groups              
but also through more in-depth involvement of the public in this process, through workshops              
or citizens assemblies. Involving the public requires careful understanding of the issues, so             
that they can be presented with viable options and models for, say, assigning responsibility              
for ads that run on social networks maintained by large, international tech firms. It would               
however be very helpful to designing an adequate response now and setting rules for the               








9 Edelmann Trust Barometer, 2018, UK Results 
https://www.edelman.co.uk/research/edelman-trust-barometer-2018-uk-findings 
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The way in which we read has changed 
dramatically with the dawn of the digital 
age. Information is available with the 
touch of a button, or a tap of the finger. As 
the transition has been made from paper 
to screen, our understanding of what this 
means for both our personal reading 
behaviour and wider society is not entirely 
understood, and often misunderstood. 
The effects, especially of social media , 
on wellbeing have come under particular 
scrutiny. 
This report begins by exploring how 
we explore content in this new reading 
environment, and whether this has 
had any effect on key areas such as 
concentration, memory, and mental health. 
We then look at what we are consuming, 
and how economic and social models 
underpinning the production of content 
for online markets are radically different 
from the models which preceded them in 
the offline world.
Providing a clear analysis of the differing 
effect of reading, for example, an eBook on 
a Kindle and Twitter on a smartphone, can 
be challenging. However, we can say that 
depending on the activity, concentration, 
attention and memory can all be affected 
to varying degrees, at least in the very 
short term. Our own original analysis of 
the Millennium Cohort Study found that 
children who spend more time on social 
media, for example, are less likely to report 
being happy with their life. However, this 
is a complex area which is hotly disputed.
The available evidence suggests that 
screens themselves appear, in moderation, 
not to have any significant impact on 
health and wellbeing. Besides which, 
reverting to a world where the only written 
words are physically printed not only 
seems wildly impractical and potentially 
regressive but also avoids the crucial issue 
of what, not how, we are consuming. 
Many of the new problems we have 
identified in the report can be associated 
with the way in which new content is 
consumed, but we cannot escape the 
fact that much of the harm is caused by 
substance rather than the style of content 
now available. We therefore propose a 
range of new measures for both the 
government and the industry to create a 
truly enlightened society of readers and 
writers for the new digital age.
Recommendations
A Rebalanced Attention Economy
Recommendation 1: The Government and 
universities should commission further 
research on the design and behavioural 
factors that lead to healthier, more 
community-spirited online spaces. 
Recommendation 2: The Government 
should work with and fund the publishing 
industry to develop a ‘Citizen Editors’ 
voluntary training scheme. 
Recommendation 3: As part of the Digital 
Charter initiative, the Government should 
look to develop a public service publishing 
ethos, which should apply to all publishers, 
including technology platforms. The long-
term priority should be to ensure that the 
public service publishing considerations 
materially alter search engine optimisation 
and content-promoting algorithms, so that 




Recommendation 4: The Government 
should work with tech companies to 
develop new product standards that can 
allow users to control their settings more 
easily or that have default settings that 
promote a better reading environment. 
For example, a ‘reading mode’ could 
immediately switch online browsing on 
smartphones to optimal settings for 
reading (e.g. blocking distracting pop-ups/
adverts). 
Recommendation 5: The Government 
needs to reinvigorate the character and 
resilience education agenda in all schools, 
colleges and adult education settings. This 
should be incorporated into Ofsted’s new 
inspection framework. 
Support for quality content creators
Recommendation 6: The Government 
should zero-rate VAT on ebooks, 
audiobooks, digital newspapers, journals 
and other online publications. 
Recommendation 7: The Government 
should make sure that both it and The 
Charity Commission deliver on recent 
promises to enable the philanthropic 
funding of public interest journalism, as 
recommended by the Cairncross review. 
Recommendation 8: Arts Council England 
should spend more on literature and the 
Government should encourage it to do so. 
It should also ensure that the UK retains 
its membership of Creative Europe, with 
funding access, after Brexit. 
Recommendation 9: The Government 
should consult with the publishing 
industry on a potential publishers’ waiver 
on Article 11 of the Digital Single Market 
Directive. The objective should be to put 
publishers themselves in control of their 
own rights, so that they can pass on their 
licence to publish if they choose, but be 
compensated by tech companies, as 
Article 11 recommends, if they prefer. 
Reading and Writing in Society
Recommendation 10: The Government 
should invest in school and college 
libraries with the ambition that all schools 
can provide access to safe reading spaces 
that protect children from the attention 
economy whilst they read online.
Recommendation 11: The Government 
should work with reading charities to 
ensure that all disadvantaged children 
enjoy an entitlement to a universal summer 
reading and creative writing programme 
over the summer holiday as part of a 
broader cultural enrichment strategy. 
Recommendation 12: 
The Government should develop a national 
lifetime book gifting scheme, enshrining 
book ownership and reading as a key 
citizen entitlement. It should also work 
with publishers to explore the possibility 
of public book banks, run by Reading 
Ambassadors. 
8
Introduction: A new world of words
Fewer things seem more important, more central to the human condition, than 
reading. The beauty and utility it provides our lives is so vital it can almost seem 
banal. As Scout says, in To Kill a Mockingbird, when Miss Caroline threatens to restrict 
her reading privileges: 
“Until I feared I would lose it, I never loved to read. One does not love breathing”.
It appears that many of us in Britain feel a little like Scout does about reading. Around 200 
million books are sold each year, amounting to hundreds of millions of hours of reading.1 
And that is before we even factor in the magazines, periodicals, journals, research papers, 
pamphlets, webzines, blogs and all the other countless conduits for the written word we 
voraciously consume. The contents of which – with friends, family, colleagues and even 
complete strangers – mediate our conversations and ultimately our lives. 
Demos believes passionately in the power and pleasure of reading. In our recent report, 
A Society of Readers, we highlighted how reading even has the potential to alleviate some 
of the great social problems of our time, from social mobility to loneliness, mental and 
physical health challenges. Allowing ourselves to dream a little, we called for: 
“A society that saturates itself with books for everyone at every point of life. A state 
that marks significant life events with the gift of reading – especially to its children. 
A school system where children, by and large, arrive with a love of reading that was 
handed down to them by their parents who were supported at various points in 
their life to turn to books themselves…
…a society where workplaces may even carve out the time to allow their employees 
time to attend further reading classes and reading groups. And a society that does not 
forget that its ill and ill-informed not only have cognitive needs but imaginations that 
can still light a fire too – and where we encourage them to share these imaginations 
by bonding with their contemporaries over the written word.”2
We still hold fast to that vision of a society of readers. However, the written – or spoken 
– words we so cherish do not leap fully-formed onto our pages or screens of their own 
accord. Sadly, for writers, there is no magic way of moving directly from thought to 
expression. Rather, those words are discovered, curated, cultivated, edited, proofed, fact-
checked, nurtured and ultimately published by one of the most strategically important 
industries, both culturally and economically, in Britain. Last year alone, the publishing 
industry created £3.2bn worth of direct gross value added to the UK economy, supported 
70,000 jobs and generated immeasurable soft power capital. 
However, the purpose of this report is not merely to recant the prior importance of 
publishing to delivering a genuine society of readers. Rather, it is to understand how that 
industry might help us tackle some urgent social challenges that, in this case, may lie a 
little closer to home. Because one thing that you can say about reading and publishing in 
the 21st century which requires very little research is just how profoundly the way we do 
both has changed. For one, vast swathes of the published written word are now viewed 
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on screens that have come to dominate, if not our lives, then certainly the way we access 
information about the wider world. Fully two-thirds of adults (64%) say the internet is an 
essential part of their life, a statistic that would have been unthinkable even ten years 
ago, when smartphones were only just beginning to take hold of the communications 
market.3 That today this figure seems unsurprising only shows how far we have come 
in so short a space in time. Both the reading environment and the publishing industry 
have been totally transformed. We live in a new world of words. 
It is, though, a new world that people are beginning to worry about. To read the Government’s 
recent Online Harms White Paper,4 for example, is to enter a dark world of cyberbullying, 
radicalisation, fake news and poor mental health outcomes – especially for young “digital 
natives” (those who grew up in the digital age and have never known a world without 
the internet). Some of these issues have been associated by some commentators with 
the shift in our reading environment, the over-exposure to screen time, in and of itself. 
However, by far the larger concern and bigger public policy debate, concerns content. 
Yes, as Bill Gates remarked presciently and more optimistically over 20 years ago – 
“content is king”.5 But sadly not always in a good way – the content we, and young people 
especially, read online could be harmful. Worse still, an entire economic edifice – what 
some commentators have called the “attention economy” – could be quite deliberately 
keeping us hooked on inaccurate, harmful or emotionally exploitative content. 
This was not quite how Gates saw it going. Yet if we want better content in our lives 
then surely it pays to examine the lessons we could learn from an industry that has been 
informing and entertaining us through its judicious moderation of words for centuries? 
We believe it does and that, more importantly, it may be the only way towards healthier 
online spaces and a true society of readers. 
The report is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter 1 assesses the evidence base for a range of social problems that have been 
linked to this shift in the digital reading and content environment; 
Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive picture of the societal attitudes and lived experience 
of British citizens in the modern attention economy; 
Chapter 3 explores the social role of publishing in Britain and what lessons we can learn 
that might meet some of our harmful content challenges; 
Chapter 4 suggests a reform agenda with which policymakers might boost publishing’s 
social role, tackle the damaging incentives of the attention economy, create safer online 
spaces and help nurture a society of readers. 
As well as desk-based research, this report is underpinned by a mixed-method 
approach that draws upon two discussion groups with members of the public (both 
in London); a nationally representative polling survey; secondary quantitative analysis 
of the Millennium Cohort Study, a comprehensive literature review and a short semi-
structured qualitative interview series with experts and policymakers operating with 
the publishing industry. Further details about our methodological approach – and 
the Millennium Cohort Study analysis in particular – can be found in Appendix One. 
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01.
Reading and wellbeing in the 
digital era
It is important, at the outset, to 
have a firm grasp on all aspects of, 
and social challenges that might 
arise from, the profound shift in our 
reading culture.
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The digital age has brought with it huge changes in the way we produce and receive 
published content, with the vast bulk of the information we consume now read on 
screens, produced by an ever-proliferating array of content producers. The effects of 
this dramatic shift to the reading and content environment are well researched but 
hotly disputed. Social media content in particular has been held responsible for a 
wide variety of online harms – from shaking faith in democracy through the passive 
promotion of disinformation, right the way through to altering the way our brains 
store and process information. This chapter assesses the evidence base for a range 
of social problems that have been linked, rightly or wrongly, to this shift in the digital 
reading environment: 
• Screen usage (and associated negative impacts); 
• Worse concentration; 
• Poor mental health and wellbeing; 
• Effects on neuroplasticity and memory;
• Misinformation.
If this list seems broad, then that is deliberately so. For though this report is ultimately 
about how publishing can improve the digital content ecosystem, it is important at 
the outset to have a firm grasp on all aspects of, and social challenges that might 
arise from,  the profound shift in our reading culture. That said, it is also important 
to appreciate the challenges and limitations associated with researching this area. 
Firstly, the literature studying the effects that flow from this profound change is 
clearly in its infancy. But also concepts such as “screen time” are usually defined 
differently across different studies, often covering multiple facets of digital use that 
make little analysis of the content consumed. The concept of “screen time” itself 
has been called “statistically noisy nonsense”.6 Therefore, providing a clear analysis 
of the differing effect of reading, for example, an eBook on a Kindle and Twitter on a 
smartphone, can be challenging. 
Screen usage and the reading environment
One area of research that has received significant scrutiny is the impact that the shift 
towards more reading on screens has had upon our reading habits in and of themselves 
(as distinct from their potential link to social harms such as mental health challenges). 
For example, there is a well-advanced argument that the shift from printed word to 
digital screen has significantly changed the way we interact with our media, making 
us less likely to read a document linearly and instead encouraging habits such as the 
rapid scanning of text for key information. A 2005 study by Liu supports this hypothesis, 
suggesting that screen-based reading is characterised by more time spent browsing, 
scanning, keyword spotting, engaging in non-linear reading (reading out of order) and 
reading more selectively. Conversely, screen reading meant less time spent on in-depth 
and concentrated reading, and being more prone to distraction.7 Similarly, Myberg found 
that common activities typically performed when reading certain types of information 
on paper – such as highlighting and annotating – have not yet fully migrated onto the 
digital screen.8 For example, while scanning and skimming are ubiquitous in all forms of 
reading, it is easier on digital technology with the use of keyword searching and scrolling.9 
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There are also concerns that the move away from physical books and the corresponding 
loss of a tactile element to reading means that something essential is lost from the 
experience. Labelling this feeling “haptic dissonance”, Gerlach and Buxman argue that 
in failing to recreate this tactile experience, screens and e-readers may prevent people 
from navigating long texts in an intuitive and satisfying way.10 There is at least some 
market evidence to back this up too – print books are still the most popular form of 
books purchased in the UK, with 62 percent of 16-24 year olds – i.e. so-called digital 
“natives” – also preferring physical books over their digital equivalents.11 Furthermore, a 
2009 study by Sanchez and Wiley suggested that reading text on a screen and scrolling 
through that information could decrease comprehension and reduce the understanding 
of complex topics. 12
Aside from the impact screen reading has on reading habits, there are also a number of 
widespread worries that too much screen time can be harmful.  For example, prolonged 
periods of looking at a screen have been found to put strain on the eyes leading to 
“computer vision syndrome”, or “digital eye strain”, with symptoms including eye strain, 
headaches, blurred vision, dry eyes, and neck or back pain. Medical guidance has adapted 
to this with the so-called 20:20:20 rule, which recommends looking away from the screen 
every twenty minutes, for twenty seconds, at something that is twenty feet away.13
More recently, concerns have grown about the blue light emitted from devices such 
as smartphones and the potential impact on sleep quality and duration. For example, 
Harvard University researchers found that the blue light emitted by the most popular 
handheld devices can suppress the sleep hormone melatonin for about twice as long, 
when compared with a control green light, as well as also shifting our natural circadian 
rhythms by twice as much (3 hours vs. 1.5 hours).14 This research backed up a 2015 
study that such devices “often generate substantial short-wavelength (blue-enriched) 
light emissions that can adversely affect sleep.”15 However, the study did not examine 
whether using these devices before sleep had a significant effect on sleep quality 
and duration directly. Moreover, whilst an analysis of the 2016 US National Survey of 
Children’s Health found that “Each hour devoted to digital screens was associated with 
3-8 fewer minutes of nightly sleep and significantly lower levels of sleep consistency”, 
the research concluded that screen use “has little practical effect on pediatric [sic] sleep”, 
and that “contextual factors surrounding screen time exert a more pronounced influence 
on pediatric sleep compared to screen time itself”.16 Ultimately, a lack of sufficient trial 
evidence makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the causality of any links 
between screen use and poor sleep at this stage. It is possible, for example, that an 
“effect-cause” relationship could explain the link as people with pre-existing insomnia 
may increase phone use while they are struggling to sleep. The guidance from the Royal 
College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) currently recommends that screens 
should be avoided one hour before bed, so as to reduce stimulation from the light or 
the content of the screens.17
Concentration
There is also a wide body of literature that suggests the presence of a wide range of 
digital devices on our person is having a profound effect on our concentration, and 
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consequently our productivity. A 2015 examination of the impact of new technology upon 
multitasking patterns in everyday settings found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that activities 
like studying, doing homework, learning during lectures and learning from other sources 
are all negatively affected by concurrent multitasking with technology. Young people who 
multitask frequently may be poorer at ignoring irrelevant environmental information and 
focusing on the task at hand.18 
Similarly, a 2005 study on “infomania” (the negative effects of “always-on” technology) 
found that distraction diminishes IQ test performance, with the impact greater for males 
than females.19 Noisy conditions – including receiving text messages, phone calls, and 
emails – also precipitated a striking increase in self-reported stress; on a 0-10 scale of 
“stress experienced during the test”, women reported an increase of 4.75 - 6.75. For men, 
this increased from 2.75 to 5.5.
So why do we multitask so widely when it appears to have such a detrimental effect on 
our productivity? Research has found that while it may not fulfil our cognitive needs, 
it is effective at meeting emotional needs, like being entertained or feeling productive, 
without actually meeting the cognitive needs of studying effectively or getting work 
done.20 Moreover, the positive feelings associated with multitasking create a feedback 
loop that makes people more likely to multitask in the future. 
Research by Marci found that “digital natives” – those who were born in and never 
remember anything other than the internet era – switch their attention between media 
platforms 27 times per hour – about every other minute, and 35% more than “digital 
immigrants” (i.e. those who migrated to the digital world, with some experience of the pre-
internet era).21 “Digital natives” also spend significantly more time using multiple platforms, 
which leads to a “more constrained pattern of emotional engagement with content”. They 
are more likely to use media to regulate their mood, with the study suggesting that as 
digital natives grow tired or bored, they turn their attention to something new.22
Of course, this is not entirely a new challenge of the smartphone era. Numerous studies 
also suggest that mobile phones may distract our attention in different settings. 
Interruptions by mobile or conventional phones, whether it be through notifications or 
phone calls, can easily derail our train of thought.23 However, there appears to be a great 
deal of evidence to suggest “engagement with smart devices can have an acute impact 
on ongoing cognitive tasks” in the very short-term.24 
Mental health and wellbeing 
Clearly, there has also been a lot of concern around the impact increased digital 
activity has on mental health. This has been especially prominent following the death 
of Molly Russell, whose parents held Instagram, and the dissemination of graphic 
content on the platform, partly responsible.25 
For such policy reasons – as well as data ones, with young people easily comprising 
the biggest usage group26 – most research has focused on younger age groups and 
tends to focus specifically on the impact of social media, rather than on other types 
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of short-form or low-quality media content. However, in truth it is incredibly difficult to 
assess the impact a person’s digital activity or social media usage specifically has on 
their general mental health. Not only is the available data highly open to interpretation, 
even when there are stark relationships it is often extremely difficult to attribute causality. 
As such, journalistic articles that emphasise the supposedly negative effects of social 
media upon mental health sometimes fail to distinguish between different types of social 
media platforms, or different classifications of frequency of use, or different definitions 
of wellbeing, and so on.27 
The existing academic literature is equally mixed. Some studies have found that Facebook 
use, for example, can improve self-esteem28 by “satisfying users’ need for self-worth and 
self - integrity. 29 However another study, based on surveys sent to participants after every 
time they used Facebook, have found that increased use of that particular platform can 
decrease overall wellbeing.30 Meanwhile, the recently published King’s Trust Youth Index 
found that nearly half of 16-25 year olds surveyed (46 per cent) think that comparing 
their lives to others on social media makes them feel “inadequate” – a finding partially 
reflected in our focus groups and polling analysis (see Chapter Two). 
Overall, the impact of Facebook on wellbeing can vary greatly depending upon how the 
user interacts with it. Research by Burke and Kraut, for example, found that receiving 
direct communication from trusted friends is more likely to increase wellbeing than 
scrolling through their photos.31 Equally, one theory – dubbed the “Goldilocks Hypothesis” 
– posits that moderate use of social media can have a net positive effect, allowing the 
exercise of social skills and increasing connection to peers. 32 There is, according to the 
same  study conducted by Przybylski and Weinstein (academics from the University of 
Oxford and Cardiff University respectively) a level of digital activities that is “just right”. 
Too little, and the user would forego the benefits that digital activities bring; too much 
and other potentially rewarding activities, such as real-life social interaction, might be 
foregone. On the other hand, when Demos conducted a thorough quantitative analysis 
of the latest wave of Millennium Cohort data, we found that the participants – now aged 
fourteen – who spent more time on social media seemed to suffer a range of worse 
wellbeing outcomes (see next page).33
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Demos’ original quantitative analysis of the Millennium Cohort Study35
Demos analysed Wave Six of the Millennium Cohort Study which includes a range of 
questions about social media use and other digital habits. The fieldwork for this Wave was 
carried out in 2015, when the participants in the sample (just under 12,000) longitudinal 
series were 14 years old. 
In our analysis, we defined a low social media use group as those who use social media 
up to one hour per day (34.6 % of total sample). Medium social media use is defined as 
one or two hours per day (32.3 %) while high use is defined as three or more hours per 
day (33.1 %). 
Our top line findings are as follows: 
Reading
• Reading for joy correlates with happiness at school. 62.5% of children who read 
for joy are happy with their school work whereas only 49.6% of non-readers say 
the same. 
Consumerism
• Social media use seems to reinforce consumerism. 14 year olds who spend three 
or more hours per day on social media are over 20 % more likely to care about 
popular labels, compared to those who spend up to an hour per day (at 82.6 % 
compared to 61.9). 
• Frequent readers, on the other hand, seem to care less about popular labels than 
their peers, at 63.5 % compared to 79.3 %. 
Happiness
• Children who spend more time on social media are less likely to report being happy 
with their life. Among children who use social media no more than one hour per 
day, seven in ten (69.9 %) report feeling happy. Among high social media users, 
only half say the same (52.5 %). 
• Girls especially tend to be unhappy when they spend a lot of time on social media. 
Only 46.5 % of the high use group report being happy with their life, compared to 
64.4 % for boys in the same group. Girls are also more likely to be heavy social 
media users (43.6 % for girls versus 22.5 for boys). 
• Children who spent three or more hours per day on social media were also more 
likely to report concentration problems. The figure was 60.5 for the high use group 
compared to 49.2 % for the middle use group and 45.2 % for the low use group. 
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Body image and mental health
• Children who spend more time on social media are less likely to be happy with the 
way they look (29.7 % for the high use group, compared to 47.5 % for the low use 
group). This difference is driven especially by girls who spend a lot of time on social 
media. They have the worst body image of any group, with only 21.6 % saying they 
are happy with their body. 
• Among girls who spend three or more hours per day on social media, six in ten are 
hoping to lose weight (60.0 %). For girls who spend little time on social media, it is 
closer to four in ten (43.2 %). For boys, we see similar patterns but much less stark. 
• Self-harm is more common among high social media users. 14 year olds who 
spend three or more hours per day on social media are twice as likely to self-harm 
as their peers who spend more time offline, at 23.3 % compared to 9.1 and 11.4 % 
for the low and middle use groups respectively. 
• Again, this is more pronounced for girls. Of girls who spend more than two hours per 
day on social media, almost three in ten (29.3) have self-harmed over the last year. 
• The high-use group was also more likely to experience feelings of self-hatred, at 
35.7 %, compared to 17.1 % for the low social media group.
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However, in fairness, many studies into social media and its effects (including Demos’s 
original analysis of Millennium Cohort Study data) are based upon secondary quantitative 
analysis of large, often self-reported datasets. However, when the Oxford Internet 
Institute performed a specification curve analysis it found that though there is clear 
empirical evidence linking high levels of digital technology use to negative impacts upon 
psychological wellbeing, the association is actually “too small to warrant policy change”.36
In short, there needs to be more research into digital use and wellbeing, with clearer 
data and more thorough analysis. We are confident this will emerge soon – the evidence 
base on this topic is growing all the time. However, for now firm conclusions are perhaps 
inadvisable. 
Effects on neuroplasticity and memory
Neuroplasticity can be defined as the “ability of the nervous system to respond to intrinsic 
or extrinsic stimuli by reorganizing its structure, function and connections.”37 In other 
words, the brain can rewire itself to adapt to new environments. The degree to which our 
brains are plastic changes across our lifespan, but this depends on a number of genetic 
and environmental factors, and how they interlink.38
There is a large body of evidence that neuroplasticity can be observed with meditation 
and treatment of brain injury. However, the idea that the brain might be “re-written” 
through repeated overuse of digital media – which has been a regular focus of media 
articles39 – is extremely contentious. Indeed, more broadly there is a mixed and varied 
literature on whether a causal link between use of digital technology and changes in 
the brain can be established. 
Perhaps the most notable proponent of the idea is Baroness Greenfield, who has written 
extensively on the supposedly harmful effects of short-form media content, particularly 
on younger people and children. Comparing the effects of technology, she is quoted 
saying “I want parents to be so aware of the risks of the technology that they intervene 
to stop their children doing it, like with smoking.”40
Greenfield argues that technology – incessant exposure to social media, search engines 
and videogames – is capable of rewiring our brains and questions whether the minds 
of “digital natives”- those who grew up with the technology – are different to “digital 
immigrants” (those for whom social media is relatively new). Her book, Mind Change, 
draws an analogy between this issue and climate change in terms of the scale of the 
social challenge we may soon face.41 This compliments the long body of material that 
purports to find a link between changes in the brain and use of digital media – for example, 
by Carr42 and Small.43 However, Greenfield’s research has been subject to much criticism 
from some scientists and clinicians. Writing in the British Medical Journal (BMJ), Bell 
(et al.) expressed a concern that “Greenfield’s claims are not based on a fair scientific 
appraisal of the evidence, often confuse correlation for causation, give undue weight to 
anecdote and poor-quality studies, and are misleading to parents and the public at large.”44
 
Putting the neuroplasticity debate to one side, the widespread prevalence of internet 
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enabled devices does seem to have significantly changed the way we obtain information. 
Now, with the power of search engines like Google, we can instantly find volumes of 
knowledge greater than the multi-volume encyclopedias of yesteryear. Alongside this 
rise in knowledge, off-shore and at our fingertips, have come worries that the availability 
of information has had a detrimental effect on our memory. In 2011, a study by Betsy 
Sparrow et al. looked at how we memorise information when we expect it to be stored 
by a computer for later use.45 It concluded that instant access to information through 
search engines may have an impact on our ability to memorise information in the long 
term. By relying on our devices to produce information, we would be more likely to discard 
information, knowing that it would be instantly available. This research coined the term 
“digital amnesia” to describe this effect.46 Similarly, a study in 2015 found that those who 
think more intuitively and less analytically when given reasoning problems were more 
likely to rely on their smartphones. 47 The available evidence therefore suggests that 
when we turn to devices such as search engines, we generally learn and remember less 
from our experiences. However, it should perhaps be pointed out that such concerns 
regularly emerge when new technologies create better ways to store information. For 
example, similar studies found the same phenomenon occurs with more traditional ways 
of storing knowledge, such as the “Rolodex”.48
Addiction
While the evidence of a clinical addiction to technology has not yet been scientifically 
established, there have been increasing concerns in recent years. Excessive online 
gaming has been classified as a disorder by the World Health Organisationm, which says 
that “when gaming takes precedence over other activities in a person’s life” it becomes 
a medical disorder.49 Meanwhile, in the UK, the NHS has started offering treatment for 
“gaming disorder”.50 
The Government has recently published the Online Harms White Paper which raises 
“designed addiction” as an emerging concern.51 It claims that some online products 
use “seemingly small but influential features” such as ‘likes’ in order to retain attention, 
encouraging use for a longer period of time. These features could “exacerbate” existing 
addictive traits in an individual. It could also enable existing addictive tendencies such 
as gambling. 
The key question as far as this report is concerned is whether such “designed addiction” 
techniques are utilised to ensure that the reading environment online is not conducive to 
the production of high-quality content. Like many of the topics discussed in this chapter, 
conclusive evidence remains to be found. However, this issue is considered further in 
Chapter 4.
Misinformation 
The digital age has brought with it the ability to disseminate information almost 
instantaneously, largely bypassing the editorial mechanisms of the past. This has had great 
advantages. Previous Demos research, namely our project, Plugged In,52 demonstrated 
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the utility of social media as a vehicle for meaningful social change and activism. We are 
now able to access and share content at a previously unthinkable pace, and the creation 
of content has been democratised to a considerable extent.
However, these changes have brought new and complex problems. The ability to broadcast 
information with little to no editorial control lends itself to the spread of “misinformation” 
– the accidental proliferation of information that is not true, and “disinformation” – the 
deliberate proliferation of falsehoods. This has implications for “the fabric of democracy 
itself” according to the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee.53 
It is vital that people have trust in the information that they consume, in order to make 
informed decisions. Currently that does not appear to be the case. According to the 
2018 Reuters Institute Digital News Report54, 44% of people have trust in general media, 
falling to only 23% on social media. Moreover, the recently published Cairncross review 
found that “Half of UK adults worry about ‘fake news’ or disinformation”. A quarter do 
not know how to verify sources of information they find online.55 Of course, misleading 
information is far from a recent phenomenon, but the technological environment allows 
the spread of such content on a much wider scale and at a much greater speed.
From our own polling, trust in all forms of media to deliver impartial accurate information 
is low across the population. Only 30% of UK adults trust academic papers or reports 
to deliver this, while only 25% trust newspapers. Social media and magazines were only 
trusted by one in ten (11% and 10% respectively).
The next chapter elaborates on this, and asks what the general public thinks more 
broadly about these issues.
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Britain inside the attention 
economy
To obtain a deeper understanding 
of some of these emerging social 
problems, we brought in the voices 
of the public.
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In the previous chapter, we surveyed the literature and evidence that documents the 
impact of the new digital reading environment. To recap on some of the main findings:
• There is some evidence that screen-based reading differs significantly from physical 
reading – with less time spent on in-depth and concentrated reading. 
• There is some evidence of a relationship between digital consumption and 
concentration in certain situations. 
• Social media has mixed associations with wellbeing, but there is some evidence 
that excessive use tends to be detrimental on a range of outcomes. 
To obtain a deeper understanding of some of these emerging social problems, we 
undertook two focus groups with members of the public, granting us a deeper insight 
into people’s lived experience of the transformation in the media and content landscape. 
We also undertook an original, nationally representative survey of 2000 adults in the UK, 
to assess attitudes to these challenges at a societal level. 
This chapter presents the findings of this phase, presenting a comprehensive picture of 
Britain in the attention economy. Some of our top line findings include:  
• Two in five (42%) 18-34 year olds self-identify as addicted to social media. However, 
only 26% of 18-34 year olds think the amount of time they spend online is unhealthy. 
• Nearly half (46%) of the public find reading books enjoyable, compared to 19% 
saying this about social media.
• Three in five (59%) think social media content should be edited.
• Disinformation or “fake news” ranks highest (54%), followed by mental health 
conditions (46%) and self-harm or suicide (45%) from a list of social challenges 
caused or made worse by social media. 
22
Polling
Social media addiction and satisfaction
Social media is the most widely consumed form of media. Over half (54%) of UK 
adults read social media every day.
While younger people (18-34) use social media the most often – 65% use it at least 
once per day, as opposed to 43% of those aged 55+ – they tend to have more negative 
perceptions about how addicted they are, how enjoyable they find it, and how relaxed 
it makes them feel. A quarter (25%) of UK adults say they are addicted to social media, 
with a clear age correlation. Two in five (42%) 18-34 year olds are addicted, compared to 
11% of those aged 55+. This aligns with the trend we observed in the first chapter of the 
rising worry of younger people not feeling able to control their usage of digital media – a 
theme further explored in the focus groups below. 
Curiously, this does not translate to a direct perception that time spent on social media 
is inherently unhealthy. 17% of all UK adults think the amount of time they spend online 
is unhealthy, while 37% consider it to be healthy. However, those who are 18-34 are twice 
as likely to say the amount of time they spend online is unhealthy compared to those 
aged 55+ (26% vs 12% respectively). While young people are the most prolific users of 
social media, they are the group that is most likely to have negative opinions surrounding 
their usage of it. 
When thinking about the range of social issues we identified in the previous chapters 
that could be caused or made worse by social media, disinformation or “fake news” ranks 
highest (54%), followed by mental health conditions (46%) and self-harm or suicide (45%). 
Relaxation and Utility
Our findings suggest that the predominant usage of social media and digital technology 
more widely is based less around enjoyment, and more focused on the utility it can bring. 
When it comes to relaxation, almost half (46%) of UK adults find it relaxing to read a 
book, while only 10% find it relaxing to read social media. Similarly, 46% of the public find 
reading books enjoyable, compared to 19% saying this about social media. One in five 
find that reading books helps them to learn a lot, and helps them to sleep (both 20%), 
and that it makes them feel intellectually stimulated (19%).
On the topic of utility, one in five (22%) find they can access information quickly when 
reading social media, compared to 10% saying this about books. 
Reading social media content also makes people feel more connected to the world than 
reading books; 19% say they feel engaged with the world when reading social media, 
compared to 8% saying this when reading a book. This gives an indication that books 
are used more for escapism and relaxation, while social media is used more for its utility.
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Type of reading
Generally, each type of media reader prefers reading their media offline, with the exception 
of academic papers or reports; of those who have read an academic paper or report, 40% 
say they prefer to read them online, compared to 27% preferring to read them offline. Of 
the different media types presented in a graph below, two in five (40%) said they did not 
trust any of them to deliver impartial accurate information. Trust levels were lower the 
older you were; 45% of those aged 55+ said they did not trust any of the media types 
listed to deliver impartial accurate information, compared to 31% of 18-34 year olds.
 
Similarly, when thinking about media trust in delivering high-quality, thought-provoking 
content, trust levels were also fairly low. Academic papers or reports (35%) were most 
trusted to deliver this, followed by newspapers (34%). 
Fig 1: Thinking about reading a book or reading material via social media, which of 
the following apply to you? Please select all that apply.
Fig 2: Which of the following types of media do you prefer to read online (e.g. on a 
computer, smartphone, tablet or e-reader), or offline (i.e. possess a physical copy)




I can access 
information 
quickly
I find it 
boring
I find it 
challenges 
me
I find it 
easy to 
concentrate
I find it 
enjoyable
I find it 
relaxing
It helps me 
learn a lot

















Public trust is low in all forms of media, especially social media. Trust levels in media 
delivering impartial accurate information is fairly low across the population, and even 
lower on social media.
Academic papers were the most trusted, with 30%, while only 25% trust newspapers. 
Social media was among the least trusted and magazines were only trusted by one in 
ten (11% and 10% respectively).
Fig 4: To what extent do you trust the following types of media to deliver high 
quality, thought provoking content?


























Interestingly, people are overwhelmingly supportive of the idea of a social media moderator. 
Three in five (59%) think social media content should be edited by moderators, while a 
quarter (24%) do not think it should be edited. This sentiment the moderators should 
edit content is highest among the older population; 71% of those aged 55+ think social 
media content should be edited by moderators, compared to under half (45%) of 18-34 
year olds.
If social media was edited by moderators, the public think this would most help 
combat disinformation or “fake news” (48%), followed by self-harm or suicide (41%) and 
terrorism (35%). A third (33%) also think it could help combat mental health conditions. 
Focus Groups
In order to further explore these findings, Demos gathered two focus groups with similar 
demographics, including both high and low users of social media and of mixed reading 
ability. 
Both groups were given a short survey on their wellbeing upon arrival. The first group 
proceeded to read traditional printed books for fifteen minutes while the second browsed 
their phones for the same period of time. They were then asked questions about their 
reading habits, opinions on the change in the reading landscape, as well as the impact 
this had on them personally and on wider society. While we certainly cannot claim the 
following discussion to be representative of the population as a whole (or for our pre-
survey reading selections to be a particularly scientific process!) the attitudes expressed 
do provide a useful qualitative exploration of the themes uncovered in our literature 
review. Both focus groups took place in the Demos offices in London. 
Fig 5: If social media content were edited by moderators what social issues do you 













































































































Each focus group commenced by asking the participants how they felt after their 
respective time reading. Broadly speaking, the group that read the printed books reported 
feeling more relaxed than the group that spent time on their phones. 
Both groups had extremely mixed views on the benefits and drawbacks of digital 
technology. Most participants saw technology as a tool to assist in the daily practicalities 
of life such as mapping and news, but mainly exclusively used printed books to read for 
pleasure. This is especially true of the older participants who tended to use the “basic” 
features of their devices such as making phone calls and sending SMS messages. 
There was a general perception among some participants that their usage was “too 
much” and spoke of trying to reduce usage, frequently mentioning “phone addiction”. 
Both groups mentioned the ‘Screen Time’ feature recently introduced on iPhones. 
The groups were negative overall about the perceived impact social media has on society 
in general, citing mental health concerns: fear of missing out, comparison to others, and 
distraction from other, “more worthwhile” social activities.
Personal reading habits
When reading for pleasure, participants in both groups were almost unanimous in their 
preference for long-form books (and usually, though not always, for non-screen reading). 
When they did read shorter-form content, it was usually on their mobile devices and for 
very practical purposes.
Amongst the reasons given for the preference, the feel of the book and the paper was 
frequently cited:
“I still read books, physical books for my pleasure but news, and apps and everything, 
I do everything like that on my phone, but never real books because real books are 
different, they’re what I want to savour and I love them and I love the feel of them 
and everything about them. Everything else like the news and stuff I scroll through 
on my phone. It’s different.”
Female Participant, Group 1
There was also a fairly regular implication that books were special and ‘more noble’ 
than digital content which was described as almost being disposable:
“I like reading my news and like gossip articles or any sort of stuff like that online 
because you can just sort of discard it, and you can open it up in a tab and swipe 
it away afterwards.”
Female Participant, Group 1
Some participants mentioned that they read books on e-readers such as the Amazon 
Kindle: 
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“I used to read books but now I prefer the Amazon Kindle. So, I read on Kindle nearly 
every day. Because, I love novels and [ …] I like the internet. Cause I want to get in 
touch with my country, which is Mauritius. That’s keeping in touch with everything 
happening over there and all over the world actually.”
Female Participant, 50-65, Group 2
However, many preferred the physical feel of a book – seemingly supportive of the haptic 
dissonance hypothesis (see Chapter One): 
“I just think there’s something about a book, a physical book, turning the page, 
looking back at it. With a Kindle on the tube, I just wouldn’t do it, I tried it for a bit, 
but I really don’t like it.” 
Male Participant, 18-25, Group 1 
While there was recognition that advances in technology had made the lives of the 
participants easier in many ways, physical books still held a central role in their lives:
“It’s so convenient for a start, and it’s a lot easier to read The Guardian app on my 
phone than to have The Guardian on the train – especially with the trains these 
days, if you opened it you’d have no space. Emails and everything are so quick, 
you’re not wasting time waiting for post. You can look up any article and things 
like that. I use it for absolutely everything, but not to replace my treasured books.”
Female Participant, 40-50, Group 1
As we identified in Chapter One, there is evidence that new reading behaviour can be 
characterised by skimming and scrolling when interacting with content on screens.  This 
was reflected in our participants:
“I read just the first paragraph that’s say and that’s all you need. When I’m in Uni, 
I have to read big articles, I can skim through them so quickly, picking out bits of 
the information. When I need to read articles I can skim through that I don’t need 
to sit down and read them. My brain can process the words so fast you don’t need 
to sit down…”
Female Participant, 18-25, Group 2
Attention Span & New Reading Environment 
There was a recognition that the new reading environment wasn’t always conducive 
to productivity. Many got the impression that they were constantly overwhelmed with 
different distractions and tasks while reading on a screen:
“Reading from a screen you feel pressure to read as if you are working. When there 
is a lot of information there which you feel you have to get through. You tend to 
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rush through it.  Going to the next article, email whatever.  Sometimes you are not 
taking it off, absorbing it, not digesting it.”
Male Participant, 30-45, Group 2 
“Even if I’m looking for my emails, I know half of them are junk, I have to sit and 
delete them, they are worth deleting. It’s like a whole other checklist of things you 
have to do. When I got three WhatsApp notifications, two Snapchats and these are 
more things I have to keep doing… It is quite stressful sometimes.”
Female Participant, 20-30, Group 2
“You are not concentrating on one thing. Reading a book- you are concentrating 
in the book, you are in the moment, in a story. With a phone, If I was on BBC news, 
I’m doing my emails, doing work staff. Doing it all at the same time , you can go 
back to each one within a second. No real concentration effort going into what 
you are reading.” 
Male Participant, 30-40, Group 2
Tech Addiction
Despite the personal benefits the participants extolled, there was a broad consensus 
that digital technology has had a negative overall impact on society. Multiple participants 
amongst both groups were concerned that the quality of real-life social interaction had 
declined:
“I think people lose their ability to actually engage in a conversation or will base 
their conversations off something they’ve just seen on the news. There’s nothing 
natural, it’s very superficial these days”
Female Participant, 18-25, Group 1 
“Nobody speaks to anybody anymore. The conversation is lost. You can be at a 
bus stop with 20 people they are all around not talking.”
Male Participant, 30-45, Group 2
There was much discussion about the possible addictive effects digital media has on 
people in general. Many sought to limit their screen time with the implication that too 
much could be harmful:
“I think probably with a lot of screen time generally, mainly the laptop and the phone, 
I try not to over indulge in it. I give myself limits.”
Male Participant, 30-40, Group 1
Furthermore, many participants lamented the widespread use of phones in society, 
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especially amongst younger people:
“I think some people don’t know when to stop. I think it can be very addictive. I look 
around sometimes and I can see some people are affected because they’re losing 
their social skills, and manners, you go out to dinner, see a group of people, and 
half of them if not more are all on their phones instead of having a conversation 
and socialising, laughing and joking. They’re all glued to their phones.”
Female Participant, 18-25, Group 1
“It is a dumb society, kids are getting more stupid. It’s shocking.”
Male Participant, 40-50, Group 2
“I mean, I go to pub quite a lot. People in the pub are on the phone, they are not 
drinking, they are on the phone all the time.“
Male Participant, 30-40, Group 1
However, some found that phone use was not a problem for them. This tended to be 
the opinion of older participants:
“I’ve had a mobile since the mid 90s but I don’t feel addicted even now you’ve got 
smartphones and everything. If I left the house without it I wouldn’t go back, even 
if I was out the whole day.”
Male Participant, 40-50, Group 1
Some participants spoke of a simpler time where technology was not prevalent. 
Interestingly, these tended to be the younger participants:
“I think people coped back in the day. I wasn’t around then. I don’t know when the 
first mobile phone or whatever was first invented, but everyone grew up just fine 
just having books” 
Female Participant, 18-25, Group 1
Even among the older participants, there was a sense that with the instant availability of 
information had made society more concerned with instant gratification, less likely to read 
longer-form content when they could access short-form content almost immediately:
“I think people are less patient. You can get it all instantly. You expect everything 
quicker now.”
Female Participant, 40-50, Group 1
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There was also a worry that short-form, instantly available content has hampered critical 
thinking skills:
“They can get stuff, information but it’s all on the screen. There is no thinking outside 
of the box you can’t solve the problem without the phone”
Male Participant, 30-40, Group 2
However, that opinion was not unanimous, with wide recognition of the benefits 
instant access brings: 
“I think it’s brilliant. I know what you’re saying about people looking less patient 
but why would you want to spend ages looking up something if you can just find 
it instantly?”
Female Participant, 60-70, Group 1 
Mental Health
As discussed in the literature review, there is mixed evidence as to whether digital 
technology, and more specifically social media, has any effect on our mental health. 
Our focus groups were less circumspect, with people generally perceiving the impact 
of social media to be negative in this respect: 
“I think it affects people’s sleep, people’s mental health, people’s wellbeing. With 
social media, although it does some good, it also leads to a lot of harm.” 
Female Participant, 18-25, Group 1 
The ability to compare ourselves to many of our friends’ seemingly perfect lives was 
raised:
“It seems to be magnified. When I was at school there were 30 girls for me to 
compare myself to but now with the internet, they’ve got hundreds that people 
compare themselves to”
Female Participant, 40-50, Group 1
“I feel like people don’t have confidence anymore because people have quite low 
self-esteem. ‘Cause online, you can put the perfect parts of your life and that’s all 
everyone sees successful people want you to see that. People don’t tell you about 
bad things, … everyone thinks other’s lives are so perfect.”
Female Participant, 30-40, Group 2
There was, however, scepticism about the overall effect:
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“I mean I wouldn’t like to say anything because it would be based on supposition. 
How many mental health issues did people have before they were engaged in 
digital technology. A lot more research has to be done on that before we start 
thinking of ways of tackling it, but could be forcing those companies to become 
more responsible and not facilitate that kind of thing.”





The social role of publishing
It is important that the vast 
opportunities of online publishing 
do not come at the expense of the 
quality of content.
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It is important that the vast opportunities of online publishing do not come at the expense 
of the quality of content. The past chapters have revealed that most challenges for 
reading online revolve not around the medium or style of content, but the substance 
of the content. This chapter will look at how to improve the quality of content and the 
structural incentives that might be able to prevent low-quality, harmful content that can 
have deleterious effects upon wellbeing.
The economic and social models underpinning the production of content for online 
markets are radically different from the models which preceded them in the offline 
world. In many cases the economics that incentivise the creation of risky, exploitative, 
and damaging content would never have been commercially viable in the traditional 
publishing industry. 
Of course, democratisation of our content has offered a voice to those who have previously 
not been able to express themselves, enriching many areas of our cultural landscape. 
The detrimental impact on mental health, for example, is unlikely to be caused by the 
medium of delivery and more likely the content itself. Besides which, reverting to a world 
where the only written word is a physically printed one not only seems wildly impractical 
and potentially regressive but also avoids the crucial issue of how to build towards an 
economic model that incentivises quality and protects readers from harm.
This chapter therefore sets out the established social role of publishing across three 
key areas – the trust economy; encouraging reading and writing for pleasure; and peer 
review and research – before attempting to draw out some preliminary lessons about 
what publishing can offer the new content landscape in its desire to reduce harm and 
contribute towards a true society of readers. 
The Trust Economy
 
Clearly, the publishing industry has a significant impact upon the British economy in 
material terms. According to research by Frontier Economics, the industry could contribute 
up to £7.8bn gross value added (GVA), employing up to 70,000 people when freelancers 
and the supply chain are taken into consideration.56 Interestingly, this is equivalent to 
around £113k GVA per worker meaning that the UK’s publishing industry is extraordinarily 
productive. The industry also enjoys a high-export profile, with physical book exports 
alone contributing a £1.1bn surplus to the UK’s net trade position, a status which sees 
it as the largest physical book exporter in the world in real terms, not just per capita. 
When the UK faces a huge trade deficit and repeated Governments, of all stripes, have 
sought to boost the country’s export profile, that would tend to suggest that maintaining 
publishing’s competitiveness should be seen as a significant industrial policy goal (though 
it does also tend to suggest that the publishing industry, like all trade-sensitive industries, 
could be exposed to the impact of Brexit and future trade agreements). 
However, in terms of publishing’s social role, its role in shaping what might be called the 
“trust economy” is arguably more significant. As projects such as the Edelman Trust 
barometer demonstrate, British institutions are not in a strong position when it comes 
to trust.57 Yet it is difficult not to see that the transformation in the content landscape 
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has played a significant role in eroding faith in our institutions, indeed even in our own 
confidence to judge information sources accurately – a study by the American Press 
Institute found that only 27% of Americans are personally optimistic that they can 
identify factual reporting as distinct from commentary and opinion.58  Platforms have 
an impact here –  in research conducted for the British Council in 2017, Demos found 
that only 16% of young people in the UK trusted news seen on Facebook, as opposed 
to 45% who trust established online news sites. Furthermore, 35% felt that it was fairly 
to very difficult to tell the difference between truth and lies on social media.59
 
It is important to state that this profound erosion of the trust economy has not occurred 
overnight and nor clearly is it driven entirely by the changing nature of the content, 
media and information ecosystem. Nevertheless, the impact of social media – in news 
reporting and consumption in particular – is difficult to overstate. This is not only true 
when considering the content itself, but also the structural incentives of the attention 
economy social media has created: a paradigm shift in how news and information is 
sourced, funded, reported, received and communicated to the public has taken place. 
The basic point here is that the funding stream for the new digital ecosystem is 
predominantly based on advertising revenue from third parties as opposed to directly 
from the customer. As Tim Wu’s magisterial book The Attention Merchants highlights in 
depth, advertising as the primary funding source for information is nothing new and, in 
fairness, there are some upsides – it is frictionless, free and inclusive (i.e. disadvantaged 
people enjoy the same access point in price terms) and clearly maximises convenience.60 
Nevertheless, the move towards a content ecosystem dominated by and ultimately 
gatekept by Google, Facebook and the other tech giants has materially changed the 
balance within the trust economy. The problems are becoming increasingly apparent – 
not just in terms of the online harms already discussed, but in terms of the challenges 
it presents existing, established, high-quality content producers. Organisations that 
previously enjoyed a key role in mediating democracy itself have found their business 
models rendered inoperable, slavishly tied to the whims of the social media algorithms. 
Faced with falling revenues, this has meant the techniques that work in the new content 
landscape become more widespread across the whole content industry. And so we 
arrive in a world of “clickbait”, “churnalism”, “listicles”, relentless data capture (with strong 
financial incentives for bending the rules), micro-targeted adverts and a trust economy 
that favours advertising metrics over more normative and subjective considerations – 
the bottom line over trust, time, quality and even truth.  
The economic model of the publishing industry is clearly based upon a different approach. 
Whether purchasing a book or access to an academic journal, the end consumer is usually 
the one who funds the bulk of the publishing activity. This makes the economic self-
interest of the content producer clearer and more direct, with a much greater emphasis 
on building a trusting relationship with the consumer. The length of the content matters 
here. Long-form content requires that deeper relationship – the consumer’s attention 
must still be retained – but cheap sensationalism, of the sort that taps deep into our 
innate emotional responses, is not sufficient to engage the reader over time. This shifts 
the content-consumer relationship towards trust, because trust is necessary to establish 
that deep and sometimes magical bond between writer and reader. 
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But so much for expounding the obvious differences between high-quality published 
content and the ephemera of social media – what policy or societal lessons can we 
draw from this? Well, perhaps that, however impractical it may seem – not to mention 
the huge questions of liberty, free speech and concentrating elite power it raises – there 
may be, as our polling suggested, latent support for a more edited internet. 
How this is delivered is difficult to fathom at this stage (we will discuss this more in 
the following chapter), particularly when there is a societal expectation that content on 
the internet will be provided free of charge, and with minimal friction – digital denizens 
expect to be allowed to upload, read and share content without having to wait for 
moderation or fact-checking procedures . The public are certainly voting with their 
wallets in this respect, at least in the news industry – currently only 7% of UK adults pay 
a subscription for online news services, while only 1% have donated to an online news 
source.61 Nevertheless, the continued robust health of the wider publishing industry, not 
to mention the growing popularity of services such as Netflix and Patreon shows that 
an appetite exists for payment and subscription-based models of content production.
More important, is the question of who would ever be trusted to step into the breach as 
content curators to deliver healthier online spaces. And here, perhaps is a role for the 
skills and expertise of the publishing industry. Because though our polling found trust 
in short supply, edited content, particularly from academic or expert sources, seemed 
to have an edge. And there is clearly some latent support for the view that providing 
access to accurate, well-edited information is a key function of the publishing industry.
Writing and reading for pleasure
It may seem obvious, but the societal importance of encouraging people, especially 
children, to read high-quality long-form content for pleasure (of their own free will, 
and anticipating satisfaction) cannot be emphasised enough, not only for educational 
outcomes but also emotional wellbeing.
Evidence shows that those children who are the most engaged with literacy are three 
times more likely to have higher levels of mental wellbeing than children who are the 
least engaged (39.4% vs 11.8%).62 A landmark OECD study conducted in 2009 found 
that children who read for pleasure daily or nearly every day are a year ahead in reading 
performance versus those who never do63. From our analysis of the Millennium Cohort 
Study, we found that reading for joy correlates with happiness at school. 62.5% of children 
who read for joy are happy with their school work whereas only 49.6% of non-readers 
say the same. 
Demos’ recent report, A Society of Readers also found that reading has transformative 
potential as a policy intervention that could radically improve social outcomes on issues 
such as loneliness, social mobility and overall health & wellbeing.
Moreover, a major literature review by The Reading Agency found that among adults, 
the main outcomes reported were enjoyment, relaxation and escapism. This ties in with 
the sentiments expressed from our focus groups that reading for pleasure provides a 
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way to “recharge” from the stresses of everyday life. One participant who took an hour 
per day away from screens to read for pleasure said: 
“It relaxes me, it clears my mind. Work is a very stressful performance 
based  environment and having that hour away, just to sort of reset [...] I’m more 
proactive, and get better results.”
Female Participant, 18-25
This also aligns with our polling which found that almost half (46%) of UK adults find it 
relaxing to read a book, a key indicator of wellbeing. 
There is also a strong body of evidence that suggests writing long-form content has 
significant benefits for mental health, memory, and overall wellbeing. Writing therapy 
is a recognised way of reducing stress, and increasing mental resilience. Writing about 
traumatic, stressful or emotional events has been found to result in improvements in 
both physical and psychological health. In a 2005 study, participants were asked to write 
about such events for 15–20 minutes on 3–5 occasions. Those who did generally had 
significantly better physical and psychological outcomes compared with those who 
wrote about neutral topics.64
Improved memory is also associated with long-form writing. In 2001, a study looked at the 
effect of emotional disclosure through expressive writing on available working memory. 
Participants assigned to write about their thoughts and feelings about coming to college 
demonstrated larger working memory gains 7 weeks later compared with 36 writers 
assigned to a trivial topic, and the study found that expressive writing reduces intrusive 
and avoidant thinking about a stressful experience, thus freeing memory resources. 65
Conversely, writing about positive life experiences also produces positive outcomes. A 
2009 study tested the potential to elicit a broadened attentional focus through writing 
about a positive life experience and to derive health benefits from such writing. Participants 
wrote for 20 minutes each day for 3 consecutive days about either a positive life experience 
or a control topic. Writing about positive experiences led to improved physical health 
(measured 4–6 weeks after writing) compared to a control group.66
In terms of the publishing industry, the policy lessons we can draw from the overwhelming 
evidence in favour of encouraging reading and writing should be self-evident. That 
is, without a flourishing publishing industry, the conditions for a genuine society of 
readers – or writers – simply does not exist. Equally, without sufficient policy support 
for reading and writing – particularly in the education system – the conditions for a 
flourishing publishing industry are not precipitous either. Therefore, it stands that a 
strong publishing industry should want more policy support for reading and writing, and 
vice-versa, a desire for a society more inclined to reading and writing is contingent upon 
a strong publishing industry. 
Where the policy task becomes more difficult however, is ensuring, in the age of the 
attention economy, that we are creating a reading environment that allows people to 
concentrate long enough to enjoy long-form content without being distracted. This is 
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particularly important for those who might only be able to access their information and 
content online which, as the National Literacy Trust has shown, is more likely to be the 
case for disadvantaged young people (which is also one reason why calling for restrictions 
on screen time could have a counter-productive impact in terms of social justice).67
Peer review and research
 
In theory it could be argued that with the advent of digital media, there should be as 
few limitations on the publication of content as possible, and that it is ultimately the 
responsibility of the individual to discern fact from fiction. However, as we have outlined, 
this point of view is not without its problems. Our polling found that public trust in social 
media’s ability to deliver both impartial accurate information, and high-quality, thought-
provoking content is low (11% and 13% respectively). Conversely, academic sources 
were the most trusted (30% and 35% respectively). That should spark policy interest in 
peer review and its ability to generate trust, given that peer review remains the primary 
mechanism for maintaining quality within the academic world. A 2015 study of how 
trustworthiness is determined found that peer review remains “king” in the digital age, 
being “the most trustworthy characteristic of all.”68
Frequently used in academic journals, peer review is a process whereby an author’s work 
is scrutinised by “experts in the same field”69 – the advantages of which are obvious. The 
system of peer reviewing creates “a trusted form of scientific communication.” This is 
especially important in a field where “knowledge is cumulative and builds on itself”.70 It 
acts as a significant obstacle for low-quality research and content and provides credibility 
to research that can be substantiated.
 
It is also fundamentally conducive to trust in the reader. Research that has been peer 
reviewed, thoroughly checked and scrutinised creates a certain level of assurance. A 
reader can usually have the assurance that a peer reviewed piece of research is of a 
high-quality.
 
However, as with all editorial processes, it can be time consuming – taking several 
hours of time from academics who are usually not paid to undertake the reviewer role. 
It has also been claimed that the peer review mechanism acts to stifle “new and fresh 
knowledge and new developments [in] the scientific community”.71
38
04.
Reforming the reading 
environment
We set out a range of proposals for 
shifting the balance in the attention 
economy toward the production and 
curation of high-quality content.
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Change brings new challenges, as well as new opportunities. It is never possible to halt 
the tide of technological innovation, and nor should we. People now have access to more 
information at their fingertips than at any time in human history, and if well managed, 
the internet remains a source of extraordinary potential for human flourishing.
But as this report has shown, new ways of reading have been accompanied by new harms. 
The role of government and civil society, when confronted with innovation, is to identify 
those harms, and introduce new regulations, incentives or systems that minimise them.
This chapter looks at the policy and regulatory landscape in which content is being 
produced today, and recommends ways to minimise harm, without trampling on the 
creativity and diversity of the online environment. We set out a range of proposals for 
shifting the balance in the attention economy toward the production and curation of 
high-quality content. We put forward ideas to improve the economics of producing that 
high-quality content. And, recognising the vital importance of reading to a healthy society, 
we recommend changes that will give individuals and communities a better chance to 
experience the joy and connection that comes from a great book.
A Rebalanced Attention Economy
The first step to creating a less harmful and more enlightened content environment 
is to understand more about it. At the moment, our knowledge base on what makes 
a healthy, community-spirited online space is painfully limited, but it is quite clear that 
the design architecture of platforms and online communities makes a substantial 
difference to their ethos. Not all online spaces and communities end up like angry Twitter 
threads or the YouTube comments channel – some like Wikipedia (a crowdsourced 
online encyclopedia), Stack Overflow and GitHub (forums for software developers), and 
even football fan forums are tremendously successful examples of civic-spirited, self-
regulating, collaborative enterprises. Understanding more about the design, behavioural 
and psychological impulses that drive healthy online spaces such as these should be 
seen as one of the most important areas of public policy research. So whilst it can be 
something of a cliché to call for more research as a policy recommendation, this is one 
area where it is certainly justified: 
Recommendation 1: The Government and universities should commission further 
research on the design and behavioural factors that lead to healthier, more community-
spirited online spaces. 
However, what we have clearly identified throughout this project is latent support for 
our online spaces – and the trust economy in particular – to become more ‘edited’.  Our 
research seems to indicate that the public supports the idea of online spaces being 
edited to a much greater degree than simply excluding illegal content. They would in 
many cases prefer the owners of these platforms to perform a gatekeeping role: to make 
sensible, judicious, even-handed, impartial decisions about content in their online spaces. 
In short, they are asking for online content to be curated by publishers. 
This, in a roundabout way, is the principle also accepted by the Government’s Online 
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Harms White Paper. That some content is harmful and should never pollute our online 
spaces seems to command widespread support amongst the public and policymakers. 
The challenge of course is to turn that impulse into something more practical. 
This is difficult for a number of reasons. First, there are legitimate moral concerns that 
policing online expression raises about free speech, and the constantly litigated question 
of where to draw the boundaries between harmful and merely offensive content. Whilst 
policy making in this space must be closely informed by what the public thinks, when 
considering some of our most fundamental rights and liberties we must ensure that 
public opinion is not the only guiding consideration. 
What’s more, we live in a world with a content landscape, alongside entire online economies, 
geared towards frictionless, free media. And just because people are unhappy with social 
media companies and the trust economy as it stands, it should not be therefore assumed 
that they would support a move towards a different approach – paid subscriptions for 
example – to become the dominant model of disseminating content online. Research by 
internet theorist Erik Brynjolfsson has suggested it would take surprisingly large sums 
of money for people, as a cash incentive, to give up their access to this model of social 
media or online search.72 This calls for a careful balance to be struck and we make two 
recommendations: 
Recommendation 2: The Government should work with and fund the publishing industry 
to develop a ‘Citizen Editors’ voluntary training scheme. 
Recommendation 3: As part of the Digital Charter initiative, the Government should 
look to develop a public service publishing ethos, which should apply to all publishers, 
including technology platforms. The long-term priority should be to ensure that the 
public service publishing considerations materially alter search engine optimisation and 
content-promoting algorithms, so that harmful and poor-quality content is less valued.
The model we are striving for here remains a voluntarist one: self-regulation of our online 
spaces. The best online communities seem to be self-policed, with a strong shared ethos. 
However, it is quite clear that this is going to require adaptations – not least, over time, a 
move towards developing the ‘online content moderator’ into a key professional position 
in the future trust economy. When one considers how dark harmful content can be, and 
the negative experiences of many already working as moderators73, this is not a position 
that many will be happy to fulfil – and it will require significantly more technological and 
psychological training when it becomes further professionalised.
In the meantime, the Government should work with experts in the publishing industry to 
introduce a voluntary ‘Citizen Editors’ training scheme for those who mediate our online 
spaces – from Facebook groups, to football message boards and fandom communities 
– to become better at content moderation. This programme should be modelled on the 
successful Community Organisers Expansion Programme, which has trained people in 
the skills needed to mobilise local people toward shared action, recognising that these 
skills do not just come naturally, and can be nurtured.
The incentives that drive the attention economy will need to change too. From a normative 
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standpoint, emotionally exploitative or even inaccurate content should not be prioritised 
by search engine or social media optimisation algorithms just because it is more 
immediately clickable, or promotes more engagement. This suggests the need for a 
shift away from foregrounding material solely because it has proved to be popular, and 
towards an approach which takes the quality of that content into account. For many 
platforms, this would be a seismic, and potentially fatal, change to their approach to 
content recommendation.
In broadcasting, there are a range of platforms, each bound by a different level of public 
service obligation. The BBC is a public-service-only broadcaster, in the UK at least. Other 
broadcasters like ITV are commercial, but have public service obligations, such as the 
amount of advertising they are permitted to broadcast, and the provision of a news 
channel. Finally, satellite and digital channels are even less regulated.
This public service obligation model could be recreated for providers of online content. 
One interesting model, suggested by the economist Diane Coyle, would be to create 
a BBC equivalent: a public service rival to the major online platforms. This may seem 
fanciful and, for now, should not be the aim – but nor should it be ruled out entirely if 
our online spaces fail to adapt.
Whether a public-service-only model is pursued or not, a middle ground could be 
established to create the equivalent of the public service obligations placed on some 
commercial broadcasters. This would be a range of publishing standards that technology 
companies should voluntarily adhere to in order to be categorised as “public service 
publishers”. The goal would be to create a positive incentive for search and social media 
companies to take seriously the need for their algorithms to make judgements about 
quality when optimising their results. This will not be easy, but recent developments 
toward automated fact-checking, enabled by AI, suggest the technology is within reach.
One area that needs urgent attention, however, is to ensure that the reading environment is 
protected from the intrusions of notifications, targeted advertising, and other interruptions 
that can undermine the reader’s ability to absorb information or be transported by narrative. 
There have already been some encouraging steps taken in this area on a voluntary basis, 
with Apple adopting ‘Do Not Disturb’ and ‘Screen Time’ monitoring facilities on their 
devices. However, these features are far from the universal standards implemented, for 
example, to counter dangerous levels of sound from headphones. 
The bottom line is that it is absolutely vital that young people in particular should be able 
to read online in a more mindful manner, without being subject to the bombardments 
of the attention economy. Therefore we recommend that:
Recommendation 4: The Government should work with tech companies to develop 
new product standards that can allow users to control their settings more easily or that 
have default settings that promote a better reading environment. For example, a ‘reading 
mode’ could immediately switch online browsing on smartphones to optimal settings 
for reading (e.g. blocking distracting pop-ups/adverts). 
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Finally, there is the huge social challenge that is young people’s mental health outcomes. 
As we have seen from our Millennium Cohort Study analysis, the attention economy is 
perhaps not a benign influence in this worrying development. This is not the place for a 
lengthy array of policies that could help improve young people’s mental health outcomes. 
However, we do feel that the Government has lost sight of one of the most important 
systemic responses to this and the online world – the promotion and strengthening of 
good moral character, otherwise known as character education. There are many policies 
that flow from this – encouraging character education pedagogies in teacher training; 
encouraging Ofsted to make sub-judgements within inspection criteria; a greater focus 
on extra-curricular activities – but in truth effective character education requires a whole 
school or college approach.
Recommendation 5: The Government needs to reinvigorate the character and resilience 
education agenda in all schools, colleges and adult education settings. This should be 
incorporated into Ofsted’s new inspection framework. 
Support for quality content creators
The next step is to realise and support those we know who produce high-quality content. 
The publishing industry has acted as a font for a healthy supply of high-quality, long-form 
content. The UK Government has traditionally recognised this fact by keeping printed 
books VAT exempt, so as not to impose “a tax on knowledge”.74 The same cannot be said 
for eBooks, which remain subject to tax at the full 20%. This has created a digital double 
standard which has, in part, stifled the immense opportunities the digital platform brings.
We believe that levelling this VAT treatment would act as a spur for the production and 
consumption of high-quality content in the modern attention economy. Of course there 
will always be those who prefer printed books, but such a change could release a flood 
of good quality content which as of yet has remained untapped. It would encourage 
diversity and innovation among online content producers with a new incentive for 
consumption, and ensure a more healthy supply of high-quality information into the 
rebalanced attention economy. We therefore recommend that:
Recommendation 6: The Government should zero-rate VAT on eBooks, audiobooks, 
digital newspapers, journals and other online publications. 
As we have discussed in the previous chapter, the traditional guardians of the trust 
economy have had their business models rendered inoperable. Local news in particular 
has suffered – the number of full-time frontline journalists in the UK industry has dropped 
from an estimated 23,000 in 2007 to 17,000 in 2019, and the numbers are still swiftly 
declining.75 We desperately crave innovative methods for rejuvenating revenue streams 
in the wake of the substantial changes we have outlined. In the wake of the Cairncross 
Review into the future of sustainable journalism, the Culture Secretary, Jeremy Wright 
pledged to pursue a model of charitable funding for journalistic activity. We welcome 
this, as a hugely important source of content for democracy, and recommend that:
Recommendation 7: The Government should make sure both it and The Charity 
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Commission deliver on recent promises to enable the philanthropic funding of public 
interest journalism, as recommended by the Cairncross review. 
While commercial profitability of writing is extremely important for sustaining innovative 
writing, authors retain several other streams of revenue. The Society of Authors, the trade 
union for writers, illustrators and literary translators, estimates that in between 2015-
2018, Arts Council England expects to spend approximately £46m on literature from a 
total budget of over £1.3bn, which represents just 3.5%.76 Arts Council England could 
allocate more of its significant budget towards supporting grants that enable, among 
other things, training and mentoring to writing talent in the UK.
In the wake of Brexit, the industry risks losing a vital source of income, namely the funding 
from Creative Europe, which brings in an estimated £18.4 million per year to the UK.77 
It also serves as a primary conduit for British works to be translated to other European 
languages, strengthening Britain’s cultural capital. We therefore recommend that:
Recommendation 8: Arts Council England should spend more on literature and the 
Government should encourage it to do so. It should also ensure that the UK retains its 
membership of Creative Europe, with funding access, after Brexit. 
As the UK’s current copyright legislation is woefully out of date, there is a desperate 
need to modernise. However, the changes proposed by the recently passed EU Copyright 
Directive have the potential to completely change the way content is purveyed on the 
internet, which have in turn made it incredibly controversial, especially articles 11 and 13. 
Article 11 essentially allows journalists to charge social media companies for posting 
content on their sites, ostensibly reclaiming click revenue that has been lost as a result 
of just the headline being read, and not the full article.78 The intention behind this has 
been to protect the rights of journalists for their content. However, this has created the 
worry that small and medium sized publishers could lose out, due to platforms such as 
Google and Facebook pulling their content off the platform entirely. This also presents 
the need to strike a balance between free expression and fair compensation for the 
content produced. We propose that publishers be put in control of their right to claim 
their material, but not to the detriment of free expression.
Recommendation 9: The Government should consult with the publishing industry on a 
potential publishers’ waiver on the Article 11 of the Digital Single Market Directive. The 
objective should be to put publishers themselves in control of their own rights, so that 
they can pass on their licence to publish if they choose, but be compensated by tech 
companies, as Article 11 recommends, if they prefer. 
Reading and Writing in Society
The final step is to transform the UK into a society of readers and writers, by passing on 
a true love and passion. To do this, we must protect the physical spaces where those 
seeking refuge from the attention economy can go. 
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There is a mountain of evidence that libraries provide an overwhelming boost, not only 
to literacy and wellbeing, but also to economic prosperity.79 For children particularly, 
libraries provide a safe space to engage with high-quality, published content. Therefore 
we recommend:
Recommendation 10: The Government should invest in school and college libraries with 
the ambition that all schools can provide access to safe reading spaces that protect 
children from the attention economy whilst they read online.
In A Society of Readers, we advocated for two schemes: a summer entitlement to reading, 
and a national lifetime book gifting scheme. We would like to repeat our calls for these, 
while emphasizing the importance of both reading and writing.
A Society of Readers uncovered ample evidence of the scarring effect of the school 
summer holiday upon social mobility and disadvantaged educational attainment. This 
is an issue that a whole host of vested interests all too regularly duck – and Demos has 
long been open to a reform of the school calendar. However, even if the school holiday 
was reduced to 3 weeks that is, at best, a mitigation strategy. The basic problem is 
that outside of school, privilege will always flex its social capital muscles, with dire 
consequences for educational attainment, social mobility and loneliness too. Therefore, 
we believe it is time for the Government, working with reading charities, to develop a 
universal entitlement for disadvantaged children to enjoy sport, reading and cultural 
enrichment over the summer holidays. The evidence shows that reading programmes – 
such as the Summer Reading Challenge (see Chapter Three) – can prevent the ‘summer 
slide’ for disadvantaged kids, and many programmes do already exist. But they are not 
universal and many more disadvantaged pupils should take part in reading and cultural 
enrichment programmes over the summer. 
Recommendation 11: The Government should work with reading charities to ensure 
that all disadvantaged children enjoy an entitlement to a universal summer reading 
and creative writing programme over the summer holiday as part of a broader cultural 
enrichment strategy. 
We believe a crucial part of this encouraging reading will be encouraging a state-sponsored 
book gifting scheme. There are a number of civil society-led book gifting schemes that 
already give books to people at different stages of their life – for example, the Book 
Trust’s ‘Bookstart’ scheme that gifts books to children in their early years. Evaluators find 
it “is undoubtedly an important element in supporting parents to develop book sharing 
practices.80 The Government should certainly not aim to assimilate these schemes 
into a state-backed one and should work with charities to draw upon their expertise. 
Nevertheless, we believe that it would say something subtle but profound about who we 
are as a nation – and the centrality of reading within that – if the state were to enshrine 
book gifting as an entitlement at key stages of a citizen’s life, such as: starting school, 
leaving school, entering the labour market, leaving prison, reaching state pension age.
Recommendation 12: The Government should develop a national lifetime book gifting 
scheme, enshrining book ownership and reading as a key citizen entitlement. It should 
also work with publishers to explore the possibility of public book banks, run by Reading 
Ambassadors. 
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Conclusion: Towards a digital 
social charter
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The digital era is radically transforming the way we read and publish information, and 
with this transformation there will be challenges and opportunities. 
This report has focused on how the changing world of publishing and consumption of 
content is affecting individuals and communities, offering policy solutions to ensure 
these impacts are well-managed. In a time when information is instant, the report has 
found the most pressing of challenges to be that of quality and substance of content. 
The focus for policymakers, therefore, must be striking a balance between the benefits 
of open, online publishing world with the quality and substance of its content. We believe 
the best way to achieve this is by working with individuals, technology companies, the 
publishing industry, and governments to ensure everyone plays a role in regulating this 
online world. We think of this as a digital social charter: a common effort to secure 
common rewards.
The evidence around the direct impacts on physical and, to a lesser extent, mental 
wellbeing of individuals consuming content online remains inconclusive. We therefore 
believe more research should be done to help governments and tech-companies design 
healthier online spaces. 
To ensure quality, we should be considering what can be done by governments, individuals 
and tech companies to create better online spaces. The Government and technology 
platforms in particular should be looking at how to make online platforms provide the 
best environment for reading online, from creating algorithms, to ensuring the highest 
quality content reaches readers, to developing standards for online products that enable 
readers to tailor their own settings. And last, but not least, individuals can also do more; 
publicly trained voluntary ‘Citizen Editors’ could become stewards for our online content, 
safeguarding users from online harms. 
There is also more we can be doing to ensure what is posted online is of high-quality. 
The current business model in the ‘attention economy’ can sometimes incentivise low-
quality content, or misinformation. To compensate this government can do more to 
support good quality. A zero-rate VAT could help online publications continue to provide 
content of high-quality, free at the point of access. In addition, the government can guide 
our public institutions, such as The Charity Commission and Art Council England, to do 
more to support the online publishing industry. 
All the while, we should not forget the original reading community. As this report has 
highlighted, and the previous Demos report A Society of Readers has found, the benefits 
of reading are huge: from fighting loneliness to improving mental well-being. And just 
because we are increasingly reading content online, this should not come at the cost of 
offline content. We therefore believe more should be done to preserve and build on our 
‘society of readers’ today in the UK. This can come from investment in spaces and skills, 
as well as capitalising on social networks through schemes such a ‘national lifetime 
book gifting scheme’ to help everyone continue to read. 
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Appendix One: Methodology for Millennium Cohort Study 
Analysis
The Millennium Cohort Study (MCS) is a national longitudinal birth cohort study following 
the lives of around 19,500 children born in the UK between January 2015 and April 2016. 
The MCS is one of the most comprehensive longitudinal studies providing information 
on the cohort’s demographics, behavioural development and life experiences. 
Our analysis is based on the MCS Wave 6 which is the most recent dataset collected 
from January 2015 to March 2016. The Wave 6 dataset was collected from 11,872 cohort 
members when cohort members were 14 years old.
Our study explores how three variables – time spent on social media, the internet and 
reading for joy – impact life happiness, wellbeing and health and body image of the 
cohort which took part in MCS Wave 6. 
We defined three groups to analyse the impact of time spent on social media. A low social 
media use group is defined as those who use social media up to one hour per day (35 
percent), medium social media use is defined as one or two hours per day (32 percent) 
while high social media use is defined as three or more hours per day (33 per cent). 
A low internet use group is defined as those who spend less than one hour on the internet 
(11 percent), a medium internet use is defined as more than one hour or less than 5 
hours (55 percent) and high internet use is defined as more than 5 hours and less than 
7 hours on the internet (34 percent).   
A frequent reader group involved people who read most days, at least once a week and 
at least once a month (34 percent) whereas  a not frequent reader group is defined as 
people who read several times a year, once a year or less and never or almost never (61 
percent). 
We inquired into the questions on life happiness in general, happiness at school, social 
relationships, consumerism, body image, wellbeing and mental health and moral attitudes. 
We explored the gendered differences. 
We ran a regression analysis to assess the strength and significance of the association.
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Executive Summary
Since starting work with Facebook on the Third Party Fact Checking 
programme in January, the first three months were Full Fact’s 
familiarisation period. The following three months were focused on 
trying to expand our coverage in specific areas that we identified as 
important, notably health information.
For this period our goal was to understand the nature of the challenges 
we would be facing from online misinformation on Facebook, to 
understand and discuss the kinds of editorial choices we need to make 
within the rules of the programme, and to develop operating guidelines 
to govern our future work on the Third Party Fact Checking programme.
This report sets out our experience so far and shares our draft 
operating guidelines. We welcome your feedback on them. We expect 
that future reports will be briefer.
Our overall view at this point is that –
• The Third Party Fact Checking programme is worthwhile, and 
it is likely that something similar may be needed on other 
internet platforms too.
• We have been encouraged by some signs that Facebook is 
continuing to develop the programme based on feedback, and we 
believe that further development is needed
• We believe that Facebook’s current rating system for the Third Party 
Fact Checking programme needs to change, and we have made 
other specific recommendations about how the programme can 
be strengthened.
• Fact checking depends on access to authoritative expert 
information, and in a world with more information than ever, 
where it’s hard to know what’s true and what’s not, we believe 
government should do more to ensure trustworthy sources are 
available, for example in areas like public health and the law. 
However, we raise two major concerns –
• Scale. Facebook’s focus seems to be increasing scale by 
extending the Third Party Fact Checking programme to more 
languages and countries (it is currently working with fact 
checkers across 42 languages worldwide). However, there is also 
a need to scale up the volume of content and speed of response. 
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This, again, is an industry-wide concern relevant to other 
internet companies too.
• Opacity. We want Facebook to share more data with fact 
checkers, so that we can better evaluate content we are 
checking and evaluate our impact.
Key recommendations
We make eleven recommendations based on our experience of the 
programme so far. Ten of these are recommendations for action 
Facebook should take; one is a longer term recommendation 
for government.
Recommendations for Facebook
• Recommendation 1: Continue developing tools that can better 
identify potentially harmful false content including repeated posts
• Recommendation 2: Provide more data on shares over time for 
flagged content
• Recommendation 3: Add a ‘Mixture’ rating which does not reduce 
the reach of content
• Recommendation 4: Add an ‘Unsubstantiated’ rating
• Recommendation 5: Add a ‘More context needed’ rating
• Recommendation 6: Add a rating for humorous posts other than 
satire or pranks
• Recommendation 7: Develop clearer guidance on how to 
differentiate between several claims within a single post
• Recommendation 8: Share more data with fact checkers about the 
reach of our fact checks
• Recommendation 9: The Third Party Fact Checking programme 
should expand to fully include Instagram content
• Recommendation 10: Be explicit about plans for machine learning 
Recommendations for government
• Recommendation 11: The government should review responsibilities 
for providing authoritative public information on topics where harm 
may result from inaccurate information and fill gaps
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The production of this report
This report was drafted by staff at Full Fact with input from everybody 
involved in our work under the Third Party Fact Checking programme. 
The contents are the responsibility of the Chief Executive. They may or 
may not reflect the views of members of Full Fact’s cross-party Board 
of Trustees and they are not the responsibility of Facebook or any other 
organisation named in the report.
This report has not been shared in advance with other fact checkers 
who are part of Facebook’s Third Party Fact Checking programme. 
However, we would be particularly grateful for feedback from other 
fact checkers. 
According to the approach we agreed before joining the Third Party 
Fact Checking programme, this report was provided in draft to 
Facebook on 5 July 2019, with an invitation for Facebook to provide 
feedback and to respond publicly. 
Facebook's response
Facebook have responded: “Our third-party fact-checking programme 
is an important part of our multi-pronged approach to fighting 
misinformation. We welcome feedback that draws on the experiences 
and first-hand knowledge of organisations like Full Fact, which has 
become a valued partner in the U.K.
We are encouraged that many of the recommendations in the report 
are being actively pursued by our teams as part of continued dialogue 
with our partners, and we know there’s always room to improve. This 
includes scaling the impact of fact-checks through identical content 
matching and similarity detection, continuing to evolve our rating scale 
to account for a growing spectrum of types of misinformation, piloting 
ways to utilise fact-checkers’ signals on Instagram and more. We also 
agree that there’s a need to explore additional tactics for fighting 
false news at scale !.
We look forward to continued collaboration with Full Fact and our more 
than 50 global fact-checking partners.”
Editorial independence
Facebook has not sought to influence Full Fact’s editorial choices. In 
particular, Facebook has never asked Full Fact to fact check or not to 
fact check any specific post, or to give or change any rating, or to treat 
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any publisher in one way or another. This notice will appear in all future 
quarterly reports unless there is any reason to modify it.
Facebook provides us with a queue of publicly-shared posts that 
Facebook has identified as potentially needing fact checking using 
its own systems. We do not know except in the broadest terms how 
these posts are chosen. What we have seen included in the queue so 
far strikes us as what you might reasonably expect such a system to 
include, although at this stage we have not formed a view on what it 
may be missing.
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A brief overview of how  
the Third Party Fact Checking 
programme works
The queue
Fact checkers working on the Third Party Fact Checking programme 
are provided by Facebook with a “queue” of content (such as text 
posts, images, videos and links) that it has identified as possibly 
false. Each fact checker’s queue is generated specifically for the 
territory they operate in; our queue is supposed to prioritise UK-
centric content.
We do not know exactly what metrics Facebook uses to determine 
what goes into the queue, but we do know that it is a combination of 
Facebook users flagging the content as suspicious, and Facebook’s 
algorithms proactively identifying other signals that might suggest 
it is false (such as, for example, comments underneath saying 
“this is fake”.)
The queue also includes information on the total number of shares 
each post has received, and the date it was first shared on. (Since 
the period this report covers, while it was being written, Facebook 
has also added information on the number of users who flagged the 
content, and the number of shares in the previous 24 hours.)
Fact checkers can bookmark items from the queue, to examine later 
and eventually attach any published fact checks to.
We are also able to proactively add posts to the queue which we 
have found through our own monitoring and fact checking, for 
example website links or Facebook posts. The posts we add must 
be rated either ‘false’ or ‘mixture’. So far we have added one post 
on health: a Facebook status with almost 60,000 shares claiming a 
tampon could be put in a stab wound. We added another on whether 
there was a legal ban on British media reporting on the Yellow Vest 
protests in France.
From our experience so far, the majority of items in the queue are 
not things that we either would or could fact check: they may be 
statements of opinion rather than factual claims, news articles about 
widely accepted events, or random links that are nothing to do with 
10 fullfact.org
Full Fact: Report on the Facebook Third Party Fact Checking programme | Jan–Jun 2019
factual claims at all (there was a period when there were a surprising 
number of Mr Bean videos.) This does not seem unusual to us; it is 
roughly what we would expect at this stage since launch, especially 
as user behaviour in terms of flagging, and the precision of Facebook’s 
algorithms in terms of identifying useful signals, may both need 
time to adjust.
“Attaching” a fact check
Once we have researched, written and published our fact check on 
our website, the Third Party Fact Checking programme enables Full 
Fact to “attach” the fact check article to the content on Facebook. 
This is through an interface on the queue in which we include: 
• the URL of our article
• one of nine possible ratings chosen from a drop-down 
menu (see below)
• and a brief headline with a rating statement at the front (e.g. 
“FALSE” – although this text is not restricted to the exact wording 
of the ratings in the drop down menu, and we have occasionally 
used other phrases such as “context needed”.) 
The same fact check can be attached to more than one piece of 
content (for example, if the same claims appear in multiple posts).
There is also an option to have Facebook apply the fact check 
automatically to “identical content”, which we understand to 
mean only genuinely identical content – the exact same image or 
exact same text. 
What happens next
Depending on the rating applied by us, Facebook may take additional 
action – for example, reducing the distribution of the post if it has 
been rated false.
Users who then want to share the post that we have fact checked will 
receive a notification about our “additional reporting” on the topic, 
which includes the short headline we added when attaching the fact 
check, and a link to the fact check on our website.
If they still want to share the post, they can click “continue” and will 
be able to share it. 
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Ratings
There are nine possible ratings fact checkers can apply to content 
under the programme: False, Mixture, False Headline, True, Not eligible, 
Satire, Opinion, Prank generator, and Not rated. 
Of these, only False, False Headline and Mixture are used by Facebook 
to reduce the distribution of content, and to notify users if they have 
shared something that has been fact checked.
The following is how Facebook describe each of these ratings:
False: The primary claim(s) of the content are factually inaccurate. 
This generally corresponds to “false” or “mostly false” ratings on fact-
checkers’ sites.
Mixture: The claim(s) of the content are a mix of accurate and inaccurate, 
or the primary claim is misleading or incomplete.
False Headline: The primary claim(s) of the article body content are true, 
but the primary claim within the headline is factually inaccurate.
True: The primary claim(s) of the content are factually accurate. This 
generally corresponds to “true” or “mostly true” ratings on fact-
checkers’ sites.
Not eligible: The content contains a claim that is not verifiable, was 
true at the time of writing, or from a website or Page with the primary 
purpose of expressing the opinion or agenda of a political figure.
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Satire: The content is posted by a Page or domain that is a known satire 
publication, or a reasonable person would understand the content 
to be irony or humor with a social message. It still may benefit from 
additional context.
Opinion: The content expresses a personal opinion, advocates a point 
of view (e.g., on a social or political issue), or is self-promotional. This 
includes, but is not limited to, content shared from a website or Page with 
the main purpose of expressing the opinions or agendas of public figures, 
think tanks, NGOs, and businesses.
Prank generator: Websites that allow users to create their own “prank” 
news stories to share on social media sites.
Not rated: This is the default state before fact-checkers have fact-checked 
content or if the URL is broken. Leaving it in this state (or returning to this 
rating from another rating) means that we should take no action based 
on your rating. 
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Overview of what Full Fact has done 
in Jan–Jun 2019
Fact checking 
In January we attached ten fact checks to 16 pieces of content on 
Facebook’s fact checking queue. In June, we attached 19 fact checks 
to 58 pieces of content.  All the content we’ve written as part of the 
Third Party Fact Checking programme can be viewed at fullfact.org/
online !.
Of the 96 fact checks we’ve published as part of the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme up to 1 July, 59 rated the claim(s) as ‘false’, 19 
were rated ‘mixture’, seven were rated ‘opinion’, six were rated ‘satire’ 
and five were rated true. None have been rated as ‘false headline’, ‘not 
rated’, ‘not eligible’ or ‘prank generator’ yet. 
Over the six months, one claim on the queue was deleted before we 
could attach our fact check to it !. That was a post on wind turbines 
not taking as much energy to build as they release.
There was no situation that we treated as a ‘Major Incident’ (a breaking 
news event such as a terrorist attack requiring urgent fact checking) 
in this period.
Developing operating guidelines
All of Full Fact’s editorial work is governed by editorial guidelines 
to ensure we meet our charitable standards. The Third Party Fact 
Checking programme needed specific operating guidelines
During this period, every post has been reviewed through our normal 
review process, which involves the claim being fact checked and then 
the fact check being reviewed, including sources, methods, and for 
example calculations, by one or more other fact checkers.
Additionally, in these six months each post has also been reviewed by 
our Editor before publication and during the period in which we were 
developing our operating guidelines they were also reviewed by our 
Chief Executive. We have held regular discussions among the whole 
editorial team, and with the Chief Executive, to consider hard cases and 
lessons learned.
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Although this has been time consuming, it has provided a solid basis for 
ensuring that we take a robust and consistent approach to the editorial 
challenges of the programme.
This work and experience has led us to develop robust operating 
guidelines that will allow us to work quickly while securing our 
charitable standards. The draft guidelines are included in this report 
and we welcome feedback.
We have also developed an initial Major Incident procedure, which is 
included in this report.
Liaising with Facebook and other fact checkers  
working on the programme
Full Fact takes part in calls with Facebook and other fact checkers 
working on the programme, organised by Facebook. Facebook also 
organises regional meetings for the same purpose. We attended a 
meeting with European fact checkers in April.
We regularly liaise with other fact checkers separately from Facebook 
to discuss our experiences and learn from one another as well.
Assessing and reporting on the Third Party Fact  
Checking programme
Full Fact committed to reporting regularly on the operation of the 
programme when we began work in January 2019. The first of 
these reports was unavoidably delayed due to staff absences, with 
the result that we took the decision to combine the reports on the 
first two quarters into one. We will be releasing reports quarterly 
from this point on.
We have devoted time to internal discussions of what we are learning 
and to producing this report, which we hope is of value to Facebook, 
to other internet companies, and to anyone seeking to scrutinise 
their or our work.
We anticipate that future reports will be shorter once Full Fact’s 
work on the programme is in more of a steady state. However, we 
hope and expect to see continuing improvements in the operation 
of the programme.
We are grateful to Facebook for agreeing to this condition of our 
participation. It is important and necessary for Full Fact as a charity 
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that exists for the public benefit to be transparent and accountable 
about our assessment of the public benefit of the work.
Building networks
Full Fact’s experience of fact checking is that our work is most 
effective when we work closely with people and organisations with 
deep subject expertise. This allows us to be faster, more rigorous, 
and more comprehensive. In other contexts we have worked closely 
with leading academic experts in different policy areas such as the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Oxford University’s Migration Observatory, 
and the UK in a Changing Europe project from the Economic and Social 
Research Council.
Fact checking online content, including but not limited to the content we 
see under the Third Party Fact Checking programme, has taken us into 
subject areas where we need to broaden our networks.
Fact checking issues of public health, of the kind that often arise on 
Facebook (rather than claims about health policy, the NHS and so 
forth) goes beyond Full Fact’s established in-house expertise. We have 
therefore begun setting up meetings with different expert organisations 
who might be able to help ensure our content is relevant, timely and that 
we’re targeting the biggest problem areas for health misinformation.
We would welcome contacts from any organisation that might be 
interested in working with us, particularly in the field of public health.
So far we have had conversations with among others Alzheimer’s 
Society, Anthony Nolan, and the Vaccine Confidence Project at the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. We’ve also reached out 
to dozens of other organisations and are working to identify more we 
can approach to help us in our work.
We had an exploratory meeting with representatives from the 
Association of Police Communicators (APCOMM) to discuss how we 
might establish lines of communication in the event of a major incident 
and in due course we may update our Major Incident procedure if we 
create any formal mechanism for doing so. This would be reported in our 
quarterly report.
We are concerned that we are finding areas where it is hard to find 
sources of impartial and authoritative expert advice, especially from 
organisations that are capable of responding in time to be relevant to 
modern online public debate. We address this in the recommendations.
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Funding
The total fees Full Fact has earned from Facebook for work on the Third 
Party Fact Checking programme during Jan–Jun 2019 is $171,800.
The amount of money that Full Fact is entitled to depends on the 
amount of fact checking done under the programme.
After completing our first three months of work on the programme, and 
having developed our editorial approach to the project, in April Full Fact 
hired one new fact checker to add to our existing team’s work.
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Observations from our work
Specific topics of interest 
Health
At least 18 pieces have come under the general banner of health as 
part of the Third Party Fact Checking programme: on subjects from 
side effects of the pill ! and whether chemicals in bath products 
can induce labour !, to emergency scenarios like whether cough 
CPR works !, and whether a tampon can help someone who’s 
been stabbed !.
We have often found it difficult to get answers on these health claims, 
and had a particular case where we were bounced between 13 
different press offices trying to get to the bottom of the Radox and 
labour claim !.
Vaccine-related claims have been the most numerous health-related 
claims in the queue. These often require specific expertise which goes 
beyond Full Fact’s in-house expertise, so in the first six months we 
focused on building up connections with experts in relevant area. This 
should improve the quality and speed with which we can fact check 
vaccine-related claims going forward.
Police
Several claims appearing multiple times on the queue (this 999 call 
image is misleading ! and two pieces on speed limits !) involved 
contacting the police to fact check claims circulating online with limited 
evidence. We suspect more of the Third Party Fact Checking work will 
involve research of a similar nature. 
Some case studies that have informed 
our recommendations
Satire
One common problem we had was around humorous posts, which 
many people may have misunderstood as being real. At the launch 
of our participation in the programme !, we had said in multiple 
blog posts that “We’ll only be checking images, videos or articles 
presented as fact-based reporting. Other content, like satire and 
opinion, will be exempt.” This was badly phrased: we should have said 
we’d be checking all these types of content, but satire and opinion are 
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exempt from having their distribution on news feeds impacted because 
of our ratings. 
We fact checked one post that claimed (as a joke) that the BBC 
was adding Arabic subtitles to EastEnders ! – many readers had 
seemingly interpreted it as a real news story. While in the end we 
were actually unable to attach our fact check to the content on the 
queue because there were some technical issues with the queue, 
we nonetheless received some push back from the original piece’s 
publisher ! who felt we should not have fact checked it at all. (There 
may be a need to communicate more clearly that the satire rating does 
not reduce a post’s distribution – indeed it is a signal to Facebook that 
they should not take action against the content.)
Most people wouldn’t call the video purporting to show a police officer 
taking drugs ! satire, but that is how we rated it. The video was filmed 
as a joke, so giving it a rating that would damage its distribution seems 
inappropriate. Some commenters and the person who’d posted it (who 
wasn’t the original creator) did seem to think it was legitimate, and it 
had been shared over 34,000 times. Satire seemed the best rating, as 
its distribution would be unaffected and it would acknowledge in some 
way that the content was created for humour rather than to mislead. 
Going forward, rating jokes (or more widely people messing around 
online to be funny) as satire, is not ideal. We discuss this further in 
our recommendations.
Opinion
We rated a claim comparing the population of Iceland and the 
number of homeless people in the UK ! as opinion. This was due to 
lack of a better rating, rather than us thinking the statement itself was 
what Facebook probably intended the “opinion” rating to be used for. 
The fact check itself addressed the claim that “there are now more UK 
citizens homeless than the entire population of Iceland”. 
Our conclusion, in short, was that the two numbers are likely in the 
same ballpark. (The best available estimate from Shelter on the number 
of homeless people puts homelessness in Great Britain at 320,000 
while the population of Iceland is around 360,000; the Shelter estimate 
is likely a low estimate due to the difficulty of collecting robust data 
on this issue). Therefore, it’s not possible to state definitively that the 
claim is true— but because it’s based on a likely underestimate, doesn’t 
include Northern Ireland, and the numbers are in the same territory, 
we felt it was a case where it was possible to have different reasonable 
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interpretations of the same evidence. As such, it would have been 
disingenuous to give it a false or mixture rating and see its distribution 
reduced as a result. 
So we went with opinion, which means the post doesn’t get reduced 
distribution and users trying to share don’t get prompted with our 
reporting. Our fact check would appear in ‘related articles’ below the post, 
with the message “CONTEXT: The number of homeless people in Britain is 
broadly comparable to the population of Iceland”. We discuss the need for 
a rating that reflects such situations more in the recommendations.
We used the opinion rating in another piece, which looked at whether 
the NHS is “free for all 500 million EU citizens” ! because, as we 
wrote, whether the claim is correct or not comes down to whether 
you interpret “free for all” as meaning in certain circumstances or in 
all circumstances.
We used opinion again for a piece where the rating came down to 
whether or not votes for Labour in the 2019 EU elections could be 
interpreted as votes to Leave the EU !.
The burden of proof being on the claimant
We fact checked an image claiming a woman in Sweden had been 
attacked by a Muslim migrant !, which we rated as false. While an 
attack did take place, we established – after speaking with journalists 
in Sweden – that the identity of the attacker remains unknown, and 
there was no evidence that he was a Muslim or a migrant.  
The Facebook guidelines suggest rating unproven claims as “mixture”, 
and we are naturally wary about describing a claim as “false” when we 
do not have positive evidence of its falsity. But in this case, especially 
given the harm that can result from this type of misinformation, we 
decided that the burden of proof should be on the claimant. In effect, 
in stating the identity of the attacker with certainty despite there being 
no evidence behind that part of the claim, the claim is falsely asserting 
knowledge where no such knowledge exists: in the end we decided on 
a “false” rating.
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Our view of the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme
This section represents Full Fact’s view of the Third Party Fact Checking 
programme. We do not speak for Facebook, who may take a different 
view, or for any other fact checker participating in the programme.
In brief –
• The Third Party Fact Checking programme includes some work of 
clear social value that can at its best help to save lives, if it can 
achieve the necessary scale.
• A lot of the work has at least clear value to Facebook in creating 
better environments for its users.
• The Third Party Fact Checking programme may play an important 
role in generating the data to make new technologies for 
reducing harms from inaccurate information possible, but at 
the moment we know too little about plans for using that data. 
We call below for Facebook to make more data available to fact 
checking partners.
Full Fact recognises that there are multiple different ways in which fact 
checking can be beneficial. It may be that it reduces the immediate 
spread of false information (as seems to be the primary goal of 
this programme). But it could also – for example – reduce people’s 
belief in false information that has already spread, it may improve 
broader understanding of issues, it may reduce the likelihood of 
similar misinformation circulating in the future, it can reduce long 
term incentives for actors to spread misinformation (the “they know 
we check” effect), and it should perform an educational role in giving 
people a toolkit to make assessments of information themselves. 
We feel that all these modes of action should be considered when 
assessing the possible impact of the programme.
Full Fact sees an important distinction between intervention on 
specific topics where there is clear harm associated with inaccurate 
information (such as elections, health, and during emergencies) and 
what could be described as a wider ‘spam filtering’ function covering 
inaccurate content more generally. Both of these are valuable but the 
task and benefits are different in each case.
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Tackling specific harms
We believe that the Third Party Fact Checking programme 
can be valuable in helping to tackle specific harms from 
inaccurate information.
We have already seen cases in the first six months of our work in the 
programme where we have helped to address posts circulating that 
represent potential risks to life, or to people’s health and wellbeing.
As we have said before, we also believe there is a clear, specific 
and valuable role for the programme in responding to emergency 
situations, and in tackling attempted election interference.
Some of the content most clearly addressing specific harms includes –
• A claim wrongly suggesting that, if you cannot speak on a 999 
call, pressing 55 will allow the police to track your location (a 
misunderstanding of the “silent solutions” scheme to help police 
distinguish genuine emergency calls from accidental dialling.)
• A claim promoting the idea of “Cough CPR” – that if you are 
suffering a heart attack, you should cough repeatedly in 
order to keep your heart beating (medical authorities do not 
recommend this).
• A claim saying that if you are stabbed, you should “whack” a 
tampon into the stab wound, as this will stop the bleeding (first aid 
experts we spoke to said that it likely would not be effective at this, 
and could lead to further problems).
• A claim saying that taking a pregnancy test could be used to “check 
for testicular cancer if you are unsure of lumps and bumps”. Cancer 
Research UK told us they definitely wouldn’t recommend relying on 
a pregnancy test to self-diagnose testicular cancer, as it wouldn’t 
come up positive in all cases of the disease.
• A claim saying that type 1 diabetes is listed as a side effect of 
the MMR vaccine. It’s listed as an adverse reaction of the vaccine 
used in the US (which isn’t the same as a side effect, it can refer to 
conditions developed by chance after someone was vaccinated but 
not caused by the vaccine).
• A comprehensive guide to some of the main claims made about the 
ingredients in vaccines, the countries they may or not be banned in, 
whether they are harmful and in what amounts.
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However, we have two important points for further work.
The first is an operational point, that we suspect that there must be 
more of this kind of content than we are currently seeing or able to 
fact check under the Third Party Fact Checking programme. We hope 
that we can work with Facebook to identify and prioritise more of 
this kind of valuable work under the programme. Recommendation 
1 reflects this.
The second is a longer-term strategic point, that we need to develop 
a plan for taking this kind of work to internet scale. We are keen to 
work with Facebook and others to achieve this while maintaining 
high standards of accuracy, balance, and accountability for the 
public benefit.
‘Spam filtering’
There is another category of content which we regularly see as part of 
the Third Party Fact Checking programme, which is content which may 
be inaccurate or misleading but where the stakes are not so high as to 
risk life. It may be a nuisance or simply content that reduces the quality 
of experience on Facebook. It may even be inaccurate content which is 
harmless, and obvious, and which people enjoy.
We would not prioritise fact checking this kind of content within Full 
Fact’s fact checking, but we recognise that it has value in creating 
better environments for internet users, particularly as Facebook and 
others seek machine learning approaches to tackling content quality 
questions at scale. Our operating guidelines discuss how we will 
approach these fact checks but in brief while of course we will publish 
them to be transparent we will not normally promote them through Full 
Fact’s own channels.
The role of technology
Full Fact has pioneered the use of technology and AI to make fact 
checking more effective. Our work on automated fact checking has 
been described as “seminal” and our tools have been used on three 
continents, and with our partners AfricaCheck, Chequeado, and the 
Open Data Institute, Full Fact won the Google AI Impact Challenge for 
our work in this area to use AI for social good.
We understand the need for Facebook (and other internet companies) 
to be able to make decisions about how all content is displayed within 
their products. One of the factors influencing these choices needs to 
be the likelihood of spreading inaccurate information, whether that 
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information is harmful or simply in this context a nuisance.
Understandably, internet companies are looking for technologies that 
can identify inaccurate information at internet scale. Facebook has 
publicly suggested that “we’re going to shift increasingly to a method 
where more of this content is flagged up front by A.I. tools that we 
develop”, as Mark Zuckerberg said before the US Congress. Other 
internet companies are certainly working in the same area.
These systems do not yet exist in any general sense. Creating these 
technologies involves solving some very hard problems, including 
ethical as well as technological problems. And attempts to do so need 
to be carefully scrutinised, which is one role Full Fact plays in this area.
The Third Party Fact Checking programme may play an important role 
in generating the data to make these new technologies possible, but at 
the moment we know too little about plans for using it.
We believe that AI can be useful in identifying content and patterns 
of inaccurate content that may lead to specific harms. The queue 
Facebook provides to fact checkers under the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme is an early example of this. Effective and ethical 
technology could in time help to make human efforts to tackle specific 
harmful inaccurate information more effective by identifying and 
classifying it at scale. 
However, machine learning depends on the data it learns from and we 
doubt that the existing ratings system is likely to produce a high quality 
outcome from machine learning. The categories are too broad for us to 
be confident that they have specific statistical qualities that distinguish 
them. Computers do not understand language or images and it is not 
obvious that what makes one post on a subject true and another on 
the same subject false is something a computer can pick up from the 
data the programme is generating.
It is possible that Facebook has information that we are not aware of 
that makes it confident that it can generate effective machine learning 
approaches without serious negative side effects. For example, they 
might be using data about the actors behind particular posts or groups 
of posts as well as data on the content of the post itself.
We would welcome a clearer statement from Facebook of the potential 
avenues they see for developing machine learning tools based on the 
Third Party Fact Checking data. We believe that our domain expertise 
could help make those efforts more effective and help to avoid 
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negative side effects or unintended consequences. We recognise that 
this discussion might have to be private because revealing details of 
plans to develop technology to prevent abuse can help people bypass 
those safeguards. However, at the moment no such discussion has 
taken place in public or in private.
Full Fact is glad to be part of a group of platforms, academics 
and practitioners organising a conference called Truth and 
Trust Online ! in October, working with all parties working on 
automated approaches to augment manual efforts on improving 
the truthfulness and trustworthiness of online communications. The 
organising committee includes representatives from Full Fact, Amazon, 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter, as well as from academia and 
elsewhere. The call for papers is now open.
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Recommendations for  
Facebook and others
Improving the information and tools available  
to fact checkers
In deciding which posts to fact check, we have access to Facebook’s 
“queue”. This provides a list of posts which have been flagged by users 
or Facebook’s algorithm as potentially inaccurate. It indicates when 
a post was first shared, when it was flagged to the queue, and how 
many shares it has received. All these factors feed in to what we decide 
to fact check. 
We have made recommendations for how the queue could develop 
to improve decision-making processes for fact checkers. In addition, 
we have one recommendation for how to increase the reach of fact 
checks we publish.
On a practical note, we have had some issues with posts we’ve 
‘bookmarked’ on the queue, then fact checked, later disappearing 
so we cannot attach our fact checks to them. This has happened 
in three cases.
Recommendation 1: Continue developing tools that can 
better identify potentially harmful false content including 
repeated posts
We suspect that there must be more potentially harmful false content 
than we are currently seeing or able to fact check under the Third Party 
Fact Checking programme. We hope that we can work with Facebook 
to identify and prioritise more particularly harmful content, such as 
that relating to public health, under the programme.
Once we submit a rating for a piece of content in the queue, there 
is an option to allow Facebook to automatically apply that rating to 
other, identical, posts (for example, identical images). This is valuable, 
but limited by the tendency of content to subtly change as it goes 
viral. The viral process often sees the same text or image shared in 
varying ways - where the language and layout of a post is similar to 
the original, but not identical. In its most literal sense, this includes 
people sharing different screenshots of a post on one social media site 
onto other sites.
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Take this post about the Lisbon Treaty !. We received an 
unprecedented number of reader requests to check this claim, which 
appeared all over Facebook (and other social media) but often with 
slight variations in wording or layout. We rated two posts ! (one of 
which has since been deleted) with around 2,000 shares between them, 
yet we know that there are many other versions on Facebook, some 
with far more shares !. But the process of identifying these manually 
is time consuming and imperfect.
This is a repeated pattern we see with online misinformation (we 
observed the same thing in posts about Shamima Begum !, 999 
calls ! and harmful dog treats !). 
Although there is no quick fix in identifying similar but not quite 
identical content, we suggest that Facebook continue to make 
developing the tools to do this a priority. We were pleased to see that 
in the second quarter of the year Facebook did introduce a feature that 
suggests possibly related content for posts that have already had fact 
checks applied to them. While its effectiveness is currently limited (we 
will assess it more fully in our next report) it is a positive step. 
We hope it will improve, and that Facebook will continue to develop 
more tools to enable fact checkers to search for and surface similar 
content. In addition to discovering content related to that which 
they have already fact checked, it would be valuable to have tools to 
better search for prior examples of identical or similar content during 
the research phase (knowing where and when a claim originated is 
often important context for fully understanding it, and may in fact 
change our conclusion – for example in the case of claims that are now 
outdated but may have been accurate when they first started). 
Without such tools, the Third Party Fact Checking programme risks only 
addressing the tip of the iceberg. The reach of our content could grow 
rapidly with effective tools in place for better identifying similar posts.
Recommendation 2: Provide more data on shares over  
time for flagged content
We recently checked a post claiming that a bath product was harmful 
for pregnant women. It had an exceptionally high number of shares 
(over 100,000) !, which was a primary reason for checking it. But it 
was also around a year old which means it may have no longer been 
getting very much reach online. Often things go viral in waves, or 
simply stop circulating after a while; so it would be highly valuable to 
have data on not just the number of shares, but when those shares 
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happened.  We were pleased that in the second quarter of the year, 
Facebook rolled out changes based on user feedback that do provide 
some more insight into this (showing how many shares the post has 
received in the past day, in addition to total shares), which is a very 
welcome and positive step. 
However, both for fully understanding the context of a post’s history 
and how rapidly it is currently spreading (and thus being able to 
prioritise what to check better), and for being able to assess the impact 
that our fact checks have on a post’s virality, we would need fuller data 
on how the post accrued shares over time, provided in a usable – and 
ideally downloadable – format.
Developing the Third Party Fact Checking  
programme ratings system
For a number of the posts we fact checked, we found the existing 
rating system to be ill-suited. Below are four ratings we recommend 
adding, with case studies to explain why they are necessary. Three of 
them are related to a central observation about the inadequacy of the 
‘Mixture’ rating; the fourth to the fact that the ‘Satire’ rating is the only 
way of labelling much humorous content.
The ‘Mixture’ rating is not fit for purpose  
(encompasses recommendations 3-5)
The ‘Mixture’ rating – which Facebook suggests should also be used to 
cover cases that could be described as ‘unproven’ – is insufficient for 
all the purposes it is being used for. As the only rating that currently 
sits between the poles of unambiguously ‘True’ or ‘False’, it could 
potentially be applied to a majority of the posts we check, but fails to 
accurately describe many of these situations. We also feel it can be 
over-punitive, as we understand that content rated as ‘Mixture’ will 
have its distribution significantly reduced. 
Recommendation 3: Add a ‘Mixture’ rating which does  
not reduce the reach of content
Facebook defines the “mixture” rating as “a mix of accurate and 
inaccurate, or the primary claim is misleading or incorrect”. In some 
cases the overall message of a post is broadly correct, but some of the 
finer details are not, to the extent that we would not feel comfortable 
as a fact checking organisation endorsing it as “true”. This means it 
should technically be categorised as mixture, but the reduction in 
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circulation of a post that comes with this rating seems excessive given 
that much in the post is correct. 
Given that there are certain circumstances in which “mixture” is the only 
reasonable rating to apply, but that it would not seem appropriate for 
the post to have its distribution reduced as a result, we recommend that 
Facebook introduce a rating akin to “mixture”, but which doesn’t reduce 
the reach of that content.
Case study: The post (since deleted) that said “There are more UK 
citizens homeless than the entire population of Iceland.” As noted before, 
we felt that because it’s not possible to state definitively that the claim 
is true we could not rate it as such !, but as we felt it was a case where 
it was possible to have different reasonable interpretations of the same 
evidence, and the best evidence suggested that the numbers were in the 
same ballpark, rating it as mixture or false also seemed wrong. 
Recommendation 4: Add an ‘Unsubstantiated’ rating
In some cases, we cannot definitively say something is false, but 
equally can find no evidence that it is correct. Facebook suggests that 
the “mixture” rating can be applied to “unproven” claims, but this is an 
insufficient response in cases where there is absolutely no substance 
to a claim (as opposed to cases where the evidence is genuinely mixed 
or unclear). A rating of “mixture” gives such baseless claims more 
credibility than they deserve by implying that there is some degree of 
truth in them. 
In such cases the burden of proof should rest with those making the 
claim. This is particularly the case in situations when evidence should be 
findable if the claim were true. In these situations, if there is no evidence 
for the claim, it should effectively be considered as being close to, or 
even equivalent to, false.  
To this end, the definition of “false” could possibly be expanded to 
include unevidenced assertions (even when they cannot be definitively 
disproved), although retroactively changing definitions may be a problem 
for consistency. But we believe a better option is to introduce a new 
“unsubstantiated” category, which Facebook can treat as a signal akin 
to a “false” rating. The additional merit of a separate “unsubstantiated” 
category is that it would allow users to better distinguish between 
content that has been debunked as false, and content for which there 
is simply no evidence. This rating seems particularly relevant in cases 
of terror attacks or other emergencies, where a lot of unsubstantiated 
rumours quickly start circulating online.
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Case study: The post claiming that a Swedish woman was attacked in 
a nightclub by a Muslim migrant. Despite the guidelines suggesting an 
unproven claim should be rated as “mixture”, we rated it is “false” due 
to the complete lack of evidence for the claim that he was a Muslim 
or a migrant !, and a consideration of the harm that can result from 
this type of misinformation. 
Recommendation 5: Add a ‘More context needed’ rating
In some cases we cannot definitively rate something as true, false, or 
even mixture, but we could still add more context to help a reader. This 
would make them more informed before they choose whether or not to 
share the piece. There is currently no category for this purpose. 
The highly specialist – as well as occasionally ambiguous or provisional 
– nature of much medical evidence is one reason why we are 
recommending to Facebook that a “context needed” rating might be 
necessary. For example, we often see posts that discuss the listed side 
effects of various medicines, in a way that implies they are inherently 
dangerous. These may be technically accurate, but potentially 
misleading without the context of relative risks and regulatory processes. 
Case study: This post lists potential side effects of one brand of 
contraceptive pill !. Most of them are accurate, in the sense that 
they are listed as potential side effects, but it could well be interpreted 
in ways that overstate the risk. We rated it as “true”, as we did not 
feel it was inaccurate enough to justify even a “mixture” rating; 
however, we believe that a “more context” rating would have been 
more appropriate.
Case study: This post claims to have calculated the total size of the 
People’s Vote March in London !. The assessment of the expert we 
spoke with ! was that the total number is likely to be higher than 
their estimate, but we cannot say this definitively. Due to the lack of 
appropriate rating, we did not rate it on Facebook, even though we 
could add valuable context for a reader.
Recommendation 6: Add a rating for humorous posts  
other than satire or pranks
Facebook’s definition of satire is “a page or domain that is a known 
satire publication, or a reasonable person would understand the 
content to be irony or humour with a social message”. But a lot of the 
time Facebook posts are quite simply jokes, or more generally just 
messing about, intending to be funny without any social message. 
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These can then get picked up by people who miss the point of the joke, 
or encounter it out of context, and share it believing it to be real. It 
would be helpful for Facebook users to be able to distinguish these kind 
of jokes—which don’t have a satirical message but get misconstrued 
online as real—from actual satire.
Facebook also has a rating of “prank generator” for websites that allow 
users to create their own humorous fake news stories, which likewise 
is a specific instance of the more general category of “jokes”. (We have 
not seen any examples of these in the queue to date.)
Given that satire is important in a democracy, we can see the value 
in having a specific rating for it – both to enable Facebook to better 
identify it and protect it from being treated as false news, and to 
give better information to Facebook users who may have taken it as 
real. But that means there should also be a rating for the broader 
category of non-serious, lighthearted or humorous posts that people 
might misunderstand. Like the “satire” rating, this should not reduce 
the reach of the post. It is not our job to judge the quality of people’s 
senses of humour.
Case study: this viral video of a man dressed up as a police officer 
and appearing to snort drugs !. The video was originally posted as a 
joke, but many people sharing it thought it was real !. We rated it as 
‘satire’, but that seems like quite a stretch. 
Resolving editorial questions around the programme
Recommendation 7: Develop clearer guidance on how to 
differentiate between several claims within a single post
The current ratings system offers little guidance on how to prioritise 
a single/the most important claim within a post. In some cases, there 
is a risk that a post which contains a complete falsehood—with the 
potential to cause harm—could end up being rated “mixture” on the 
grounds that it got some less important details correct. We strongly 
feel that it is advisable to focus on the most prominent/harmful claim 
in such cases, and clearer guidance on how to differentiate between 
several claims within a single post would be welcome.
Case study: This same post claiming to show a Swedish woman who 
was “savagely beaten by a Muslim migrant” after asking him to stop 
groping her. The post is correct in as much as it does show a Swedish 
woman who was beaten up in a nightclub after stopping a man from 
groping her ! - but we don’t know if he was a Muslim or a migrant. In 
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rating it false (for reasons outlined above), we decided to focus on the 
claim about the attacker being a Muslim migrant, as this was clearly 
the most notable claim and the main reason for its online circulation.  
However, we could have rated it “mixture” on the grounds that much of 
the information about the woman and the attack was correct. 
One possible approach in the future might be to enable fact checkers 
to apply multiple ratings to content, so that individual claims can be 
better separated out. Currently the rating can only be applied to the 
content as a whole (be it a link, a text post or an image).
Making it easier to evaluate our work on the 
programme
Recommendation 8: Share more data with fact checkers 
about the reach of our fact checks 
Currently, the only sense we have of how many people our fact checks 
are reaching comes from data on visits to our own website. But the 
Third Party Fact Checking programme brings with it a number of 
new ways in which people can read our content. In addition to the 
traditional ways we reach people—on our site, via our social media 
feeds, and via search engines—Facebook users may also see our fact 
checks if they engage with a post we have rated, and may for example 
get a notification linking to our fact check before they try and share 
something we have rated as misleading or false.
It would be helpful to understand how effective the additional ways 
that Third Party Fact Checking programme fact checks reach Facebook 
users are. Does the notification stop many people from sharing? What 
percentage of people who view a post we have rated click on our fact 
check beneath it? Are there cases in which our content gets many more 
interactions from Facebook users, and what does this tell us about how 
to effectively get the attention of Facebook users in future?
Other fact checkers, speaking to the BBC, have said they want more 
data about the reach of their work !, so they can assess its value.
Expanding and developing the programme
Recommendation 9: The Third Party Fact Checking 
programme should expand to Instagram
We believe the Third Party Fact Checking programme should be 
expanded to other platforms: most immediately, Instagram (which 
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is owned by Facebook). The potential to prevent harm is high here, 
particularly with the widespread existence of health misinformation 
on the platform. Facebook have already taken some steps towards 
using the results of the programme to influence content on Instagram, 
or Instagram images that are shared to Facebook. However, directly 
checking content on Instagram is not yet a part of the programme.
Recommendation 10: be explicit about plans for 
machine learning
We would welcome a clearer statement from Facebook of the potential 
avenues they see for developing machine learning tools based on the 
Third Party Fact Checking data. We believe that our domain expertise 
could help make those efforts more effective and help to avoid 
negative side effects or unintended consequences. We recognise that 
this discussion might have to be private because revealing details of 
plans to develop technology to prevent abuse can help people bypass 
those safeguards. However, at the moment no such discussion has 
taken place in public or in private.
Recommendations for government
Recommendation 11: The government should review 
responsibilities for providing authoritative public 
information on topics where harm may result from 
inaccurate information and fill gaps
As we argued in our paper “Tackling Misinformation in the 
Open Society !”, we believe that public bodies should be given 
a clear mandate to inform the public, in order to build resilience 
against misinformation.
In our work on the Third Party Fact Checking programme already, we 
have seen multiple examples of a related issue: major areas of public 
interest in which no body has primary responsibility for providing 
accurate and useful information. 
One obvious area is matters of public health. In one example, our 
attempts to fact check a claim about the safety of a bathroom 
product for pregnant women saw us bounced repeatedly between the 
press offices of 13 different public bodies, all of whom believed that 
providing such information was somebody else’s job. Similarly, we’ve 
had inquiries regarding the introduction of 5G technology in the UK, 
and there’s a distinct lack of official guidance properly addressing 
some public concerns. In a recent debate, an MP expressed dismay at 
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Public Health England’s “standard reply” to questions about 5G.
We have seen this in multiple cases relating to health issues.
Another area is law, in which there is no public body with a clear duty 
to provide information on the functioning of the legal system.
The lack of such authoritative sources has practical consequences: 
notably, it dramatically slows down the speed with which organisations 
such as ours can respond to misinformation (some of these fact checks 
can end up taking weeks). It also means that the final product may be 
less authoritative and useful to the reader.
Most importantly, the absence of reliable and trustworthy information 
can create a vacuum in which misinformation is better able to spread.
Establishing bodies with clear duties for providing impartial information 
in areas of public concern would have clear benefits. This kind of 
public service could potentially be provided by a wider range of public 
service institutions depending on the topic. It could be government 
itself (for example, when it comes to the law this could build on the 
work on public legal education ! already overseen and supported by 
the Solicitor General); trusted and independent public bodies such as 
the NHS (their Behind the Headlines ! service is a good example); or 
academic initiatives with a specific communications role and resources 
(where successful models include the Institute for Fiscal Studies !, 
the Migration Observatory ! at Oxford University, and the UK in a 
Changing Europe ! initiative).
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Future work for Full Fact
Our priorities are to increase our output under the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme and to further develop our links with relevant 
expert organisations to ensure that our work on the programme has 
the greatest possible public benefit.
As mentioned in ‘Our view of the Third Party Fact Checking programme’, 
we are keen to work with Facebook and others to find ways to help 
increase this work to internet scale.
One relevant question – as discussed briefly in the recommendations 
– is why any of Facebook’s programmes, including the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme, should be restricted to Facebook alone? It is 
clear to us that this work could have value on other platforms, including 
(but not limited to) other platforms owned by Facebook. 
Facebook have already said that they are testing using ratings 
applied to images ! under the Third Party Fact Checking programme 
to influence the discoverability of identical images on Instagram. In 
March, Facebook announced that content from other media sites (ie 
Twitter, YouTube) is now eligible to be checked as part of the Third 
Party Fact Checking programme. That means we can check tweets, 
Youtube videos, Instagram posts, etc, but our supporting articles 
will only appear (or impact a post’s distribution) if links to these are 
shared on Facebook.
However, as we’ve said, the ability to directly check content on 
Instagram directly is not yet a part of the programme.
Facebook have also recently said that vaccine misinformation will 
no longer appear on Instagram Explore or Hashtag pages. This may 
prevent users inadvertently coming across antivax content initially, but 
will do little to help those already in the community.
We do not see why the Third Party Fact Checking programme cannot 
be fully expanded to Instagram. The potential to prevent harm 
is high here, and there are known risks of health misinformation 
on the platform.
We have noted Facebook’s public discussion of increasing the role of 
crowdsourcing in understanding information quality on its platform. 
We will be studying their ideas carefully and engaging with Facebook in 
those discussions.
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Finally, we will continue to work on technology to tackle harmful 
inaccurate information for the public benefit, and to scrutinise 
work in this field.
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Appendix: Full Fact’s Operating 
Guidelines for the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme
These operating guidelines are an evolving document; we may change 
them over time as we learn more about how the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme works, and as we encounter difficult or edge 
cases that challenge our thinking. We will discuss these changes in 
future quarterly reports. 
In all cases, when we encounter a situation that the guidelines do not 
cover, staff should consult the Editor (or in the Editor’s absence, the 
Chief Executive). The Editor may consult the Chief Executive at any 
time, and the Chief Executive is ultimately responsible for upholding Full 
Fact’s standards.
Any changes to these guidelines will follow discussions between the 
Editor, the editorial team, and the Chief Executive. They must ultimately 
be agreed by the Editor and the Chief Executive.
Background: general operating guidelines
We have a set of standards for our pre-existing fact checking work, 
and most of these have translated across to our work as part of the 
Facebook Third Party Fact Checking programme. They underpin these 
operating guidelines, which should be read in that context.
As with all charities, Full Fact is legally required to work for the public 
benefit and to be politically non-partisan. Our legally-binding charitable 
objectives go a step further than this, requiring us to work “in an 
impartial, objective, balanced and independent manner observing 
strict political neutrality”. These principles apply equally to our work 
on the Third Party Fact Checking programme. We monitor our work to 
ensure that both our processes and our output meet these criteria; that 
includes our selection of which claims to fact check.
The Third Party Fact Checking programme is also governed by systems 
and guidance set down by Facebook, for example the choice of ratings 
that Facebook provides. We must operate within these and we will 
publish quarterly reports on our experience of the programme and how 
it might continue to develop.
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What we check, and why
In addition to our balance and impartiality requirements, when selecting 
claims to check normally we have a rule of thumb—that what we check 
should be some combination of important, influential and interesting. 
• “Important” here means that the issue has real-world impact — 
something that can affect people’s lives and choices. 
• “Influential” means that the claim is likely to reach and affect a large 
number of people, and potentially influence their beliefs (which could 
include, for example, if it was said by a public figure, if it appeared in 
the national media, or if it was widely shared online).
• “Interesting” means just that: that the question of whether the claim 
is accurate should be something that will engage an audience, or 
illuminate a broader issue. (For example, we generally avoid checking 
statements that are trivially true.) One possible guide for this is 
the volume of requests from our readers to fact check a particular 
claim, but we must take care to maintain our independence when 
considering any external requests.
Not everything we check will necessarily hit all three of these, but (in 
our work outside the Third Party Fact Checking programme) if a claim 
doesn’t register on any of them then we would not normally check it.
What Full Fact prioritises
These rules of thumb inform our prioritisation of work in the Third Party 
Fact Checking programme. Analogously with the “important” measure, 
we prioritise false or misleading claims that have the potential to cause 
harm if they are believed (such as health misinformation). 
The “influential” measure translates into the number of shares a post 
has received, and also factors such as whether influential pages have 
shared it, and whether there are multiple versions — we will prioritise 
claims that have spread widely.
The “interesting” measure has slightly less weight here as an 
independent factor, due to the fact that we also consider the number of 
shares a claim has as being reflective of the level of interest in the topic, 
and the presence of the claim in the dashboard queue suggests that 
some users may have flagged it as suspicious (which for these purposes 
we treat as equivalent to a reader request). In effect, the expectation 
that a claim be both interesting and influential are somewhat merged in 
the online context.
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However, there is another context in which the “interesting” 
measure may influence our prioritisation: we may choose to check 
some relatively trivial claims if we think that they have value as an 
engaging way to educate people on techniques for spotting false 
information online (for example, a claim about a horse that allowed 
us to point readers towards our guide on how to spot misleading 
images online !).
Fact checking other content from the queue
The existence of content in the queue is sufficient evidence that it 
is useful to Facebook to have that content fact checked, even if Full 
Fact might not have fact checked it outside the Third Party Fact 
Checking programme, and is sufficient to justify fact checking and 
rating that content.
All fact checks under the Third Party Fact Checking programme must 
be published on the dedicated page for these fact checks !. However, 
the extent to which fact checks of this kind are promoted elsewhere 
on Full Fact’s own channels should be determined by our own views of 
what is interesting and useful to our audiences.
Political actors
According to Facebook’s guidance, the Third Party Fact Checking 
programme is not intended to be applied to “a website or Page with 
the primary purpose of expressing the opinion or agenda of a political 
figure”. We do not include in the Third Party Fact Checking programme 
fact checks of claims made on Facebook by politicians, political parties, 
or non-party national political groups (we may, of course fact check 
these as part of our general fact checking work). Political opinions are 
also not subject to fact checking, as is the case with our general work.
Beyond these exclusions, however, there are a range of political 
actors on Facebook (such as activists, local party accounts or interest 
groupings) whose posts we should treat sensitively, with a mind to 
protecting freedom of speech. We do not believe that simply being 
involved in politics should make you exempt from fact checking or 
the Third Party Fact Checking programme, nor that simply appending 
a political opinion to a central factual claim should exclude it from 
consideration. If a claim originates from a political source but is 
primarily a factual claim that can be checked, we may do so. We 
should however be cautious when applying ratings that may reduce 
the distribution of a post in a situation where the factual claims are not 
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plainly false (see below for further discussion of how we apply ratings). 
If in doubt, this should be checked with the Editor before publication.
In addition, inaccurate claims originally made by politicians but that 
are being shared by third parties (for example, screenshots of a tweet 
from a politician) are eligible to be fact checked through Third Party 
Fact Checking. This reflects our principle that we check the claim 
not the person.
Humour
Much false information online originates from attempts at humour. 
We don’t believe it’s our job to judge how funny someone’s joke is. 
We should only prioritise humorous posts in a situation where there is 
compelling evidence (e.g. from comments or shares) that a significant 
number of people have mistakenly taken it seriously, and also when 
doing so would satisfy our other standards for selecting it to check 
(such as potential harm, or educational potential). Other fact checks of 
humorous posts for the Third Party Fact Checking programme should 
not normally be promoted through Full Fact’s own channels. 
How we check
We check claims, not people
The core of what we check is individual, identifiable factual claims; it 
is not the people who make them, or the broader positions or opinions 
they may be advocating. Our conclusions about claims should not 
normally comment on the motives, intent or character of the person or 
institution that made the claim. When analysing the spread of specific 
unsubstantiated claims it may sometimes be appropriate to comment 
on the actors involved, and it may be necessary to discuss the broader 
positions they advocate in order to properly contextualise how a claim 
is likely to have been understood by its audience. If in doubt this should 
always be checked by the Editor before publication.
We present evidence to allow our readers to reach their 
own conclusions
We present our own conclusions on the accuracy or otherwise of 
factual claims, but we always back this up by providing the evidence 
we have based our conclusions on to the reader (in the form of links to 
primary or secondary sources). We should always seek out the most 
authoritative source for any factual statement we make. We should 
provide sufficient evidence for Full Fact’s readers to make up their own 
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minds and reach their own conclusions from our work. Where there is 
insufficient quality evidence to reach a firm conclusion, we should tell 
the reader that.
If we must use evidence that is—for whatever reason—not publicly 
available, we should say so clearly and explain why; this should be 
checked with the Editor before publication. 
Our work means that we frequently have to make judgements about 
the reliability of sources in a manner that reflects our commitment 
to impartiality. In many cases it will be useful to explain those 
judgements clearly to the reader.
Standards of evidence will, by the nature of things, vary depending 
on the nature of the claim. For some types of claim (for example 
those of a statistical nature) there may be independently quality-
assessed sources such as national statistics; in other cases (such as 
claims about historical events) evidence may be harder to come by; 
particularly in matters around health claims, evidence may be partial 
or tentative. We should always be cautious, question our sources, 
and avoid over-interpreting evidence. However, we should not let 
over-fussy philosophical rigour deter us from reaching clear, useful 
conclusions: absence of evidence may not technically be evidence of 
absence, but in many cases it may be close enough for our purposes.
In all cases, we believe that it is the responsibility of the person or 
institution making the claim to provide the evidence to support it. If 
they cannot do so and we can find no evidence to support their claim 
then we should say so.
Health
Misleading health information has clear potential to cause severe 
harm. The nature of medical evidence is such that it is often 
impossible to state definitively that something is unambiguously 
true or untrue. Despite this, we should still aim to give clear advice to 
our readers and to present conclusions that reflect the best possible 
current knowledge. This includes assigning ratings such as “True” or 
“False” when the weight of evidence supports that interpretation. If 
multiple expert bodies with competency in a particular medical field 
tell us the same thing, then we should be comfortable passing that on 
to our readers. However, if there is more than one responsible body of 
professional opinion, our fact checks should reflect that in a balanced 
and proportionate way.
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How we assign ratings
In our general fact checking, Full Fact is relatively unusual among 
fact checking organisations in that we do not use any kind of rating 
system in our published fact checks, as we tend to believe that they 
can often obscure more than they illuminate, and can be hard to apply 
in a consistent manner. However for the Third Party Fact Checking 
programme we are required to apply one of the following ratings !; 
what follows is our current thinking on how these should be applied. In 
all cases, if there is a question about the rating being applied, it should 
be discussed with the Editor before publication.
True
We have only checked a small number of true claims, as our 
prioritisation of potentially misleading claims that could cause harm 
means that they are not our top priority. We would apply this in 
situations where we are confident the central claim or claims are 
unambiguously correct, or are close enough to being accurate that a 
reasonable person would not feel it necessary to correct them. (For 
example, minor imprecision on figures, or information that might be 
slightly out of date but is still substantially true.)
Mixture
This is a complex rating: it applies to posts that contain both true and 
false claims, and also claims that some fact checkers may rate as 
“unproven”. As a blend of truth, untruth and uncertainty, you could 
make a case that a large proportion of all human communication falls 
into this category; we try to use it more sparingly than that, although 
it still accounts for a substantial portion of our ratings. We will usually 
apply it if a post includes multiple claims of equal prominence, some of 
which are accurate and some of which are inaccurate; we may apply it 
if the claims have insufficient evidence to support them, or if they are 
presented in a significantly misleading way. If a post includes multiple 
claims of varying accuracy, but there is an identifiable central claim of 
greater prominence than the others, then we may choose not to apply 
the mixture rating.
False
We apply the false rating in situations where we are confident the 
central claim or claims are categorically false or highly misleading. 
We may apply it in situations where we are confident there is no 
evidence to support the claim; while on a strict interpretation it’s not 
possible definitively to say that such a claim is false, a false rating 
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may sometimes be justified if the claim is asserting knowledge where 
no such knowledge is possible or where there is no reasonable basis 
for the claim. 
This is particularly true in the case of claims that relate to, for example, 
specific events or historical information.
Satire
We have used this rating for both articles that are clearly intended to 
be satirical, but which have been misunderstood by readers, as well as 
more broadly for humorous content (see above for a discussion of why). 
Applying this rating does not affect the distribution of a post, which is 
why we use it in this broad manner — we don’t think the distribution of 
a post should be affected simply because some people missed the joke. 
We appreciate that “satire” is not a good descriptor of this 
broad a category of posts, and as such (see above) one of our 
recommendations to Facebook is that they introduce a new rating to 
cover humour more broadly. 
Opinion
This rating is obviously intended to encompass (for example) political 
opinion, such as newspaper columns. We have also used it in a 
different sense, as an alternative to the “Mixture” rating in cases where 
the truth of a claim is ambiguous or has insufficient evidence (such that 
we could not rate it “True”), but where we nonetheless feel that it was 
based on a defensible set of assumptions and thus should not have 
its distribution affected. In other words, we may use ‘Opinion’ where 
it is possible to have different reasonable interpretations of the same 
evidence and the claim we are fact checking is clearly one of those 
interpretations.
Ratings we have not yet used
False Headline, Not eligible, Prank generator, and Not rated. We will 
update these guidelines as and when we use them.
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Major Incident procedure
One of the areas where we believe the Third Party Fact Checking 
programme can play a useful role is in responding quickly to 
emergency situations where rumours and inaccurate information 
may be spreading online, for example after terrorist attacks or during 
natural disasters. In these situations the risk of harm from misleading 
information can be very high.
Major incident goal
To act quickly to reduce harm.
The focus on harm is critical: misunderstandings and inaccurate early 
reports are a constant feature of breaking news situations. We will 
not seek to resolve every misunderstanding or example of inaccurate 
information, but instead to prioritise what could be harmful.
Examples of potentially harmful content might include –
• Inaccurate health or safety advice
• False information about who has been affected
• False claims about what official sources have said
Triggering a major incident
Major incidents will often appear as breaking news and can be spotted 
by any member of staff (whether or not a fact checker) or flagged to us 
by Facebook or another outside source such as the emergency services. 
Major incidents may well occur outside working hours so a member 
of staff who believes they have spotted one should alert colleagues 
promptly through all internal channels.
Speed is essential and, if necessary, any member of the editorial 
team can declare a major incident. Usually to ensure coordination 
we would expect the decision to be made formally by the Editor, or 
the Chief Executive, or else the most senior member of the editorial 
team available.
When a major incident occurs we should –
• Tell all staff 
• Ensure enough editorial staff (a minimum of two) are online for us 
to publish in line with our processes
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• Tell Facebook through our main contact
• Consider notifying any relevant emergency service through their 
communication team
Active monitoring
During a major incident, Full Fact will not wait for potentially false or 
misleading information to appear in the Third Party Fact Checking 
programme queue.
We will actively monitor online sources and respond to what we 
believe is having an impact. The exact nature of monitoring will 
depend on the situation but is likely to include monitoring trending and 
fast-emerging posts.
Prioritising official sources of information
We recognise that during a major incident official bodies such as 
the emergency services will often be the most reliable sources 
of information. 
Usually it is Full Fact’s role to scrutinise, be sceptical of, and fact check 
the work of any public body.
During a major incident, we will use our judgement based on the 
context and nature of the incident, but will generally start with the 
presumption that official statements from the emergency services 
or other public bodies are the best source of reliable information 
that can minimise harm to the public. This approach would change if 
there was, for example, verifiable primary evidence that contradicted 
official claims.
Reviewing
In normal circumstances, Full Fact’s work always involves two or 
three fact checkers: one (the reviewer) independently checking the 
work done by the first, with a third often performing a final check 
before publication.
During a major incident, we will adopt a triage approach. Some 
fact checks may need extra care, while others (such as flagging 
demonstrably fake images) may need to be published rapidly in 
line with the major incident goal to act quickly to reduce harm. We 
currently do not envisage a situation in which a single fact checker 
would publish without any extra review, but we would likely drop the 
third review and speed up the second review.
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Action over explanation
During a major incident, it may not be possible to publish detailed fact 
checks at the speed necessary to reduce harm.
It is, however, important to maintain transparency. At minimum we will 
publish a single post with a list of actions taken and broad explanations 
such as ‘manipulated images’.
Liaising with others
Any actions taken by Full Fact must always be taken independently and 
within our charitable remit and operating guidelines.
During a major incident, Full Fact’s charitable goal of informed public 
discussion is shared by many other organisations, including the 
emergency services. We understand that situations can become 
operationally more difficult due to inaccurate information circulating.
We are therefore open to liaising with the emergency services or 
other relevant bodies to ensure that we can rapidly obtain reliable 
information from them, both about what is happening and about any 
specific concerns about harms from inaccurate information.
Actions taken by Full Fact based on this information will remain entirely 
Full Fact’s responsibility and independent decision. 
Full Fact 
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